Support Platoon Operations in the Field: Class 111

support Operatio Plato in Class 111 by Captain Juan J. Hernandez The success of a unit on the battlefield is reflected by the quality of logistical support that i t receives. The S4 is the primary logistical coordinator, but the support platoon carries out the logistical mission. This article will highlight problems and solutions for future and newly-appointed support platoon leaders in the area of Class 111 (POL) operations in the field. The key to success in the support platoon is to plan ahead, plan for contingencies, and allocate assets wisely. During an unrestricted, divisional maneuver in Europe in August 1984, the support platoon of an M1 Abrams battalion issued 10,ooO- 11,oMJ gallons of diesel fuel each day for one week. The support platoon, by TO&E, had a 22,000-gal-Ion capacity, but could only muster 15,000 gallons of fuel-carrying assets. This deficit was due to a lack of 64C truck drivers and 76W POL specialists within the platoon. The support platoon never operated at full strength and was often forced to leave trucks in the motor pool during FTXs and gunneries. The shortage of support platoon personnel is not uncommon. The support platoon leader must certify all of his personnel in the platoon as fuel handlers. A support platoon member should be cross-trained in both ammunition and POL operations to create redundancy within the platoon. One would imagine that a support platoon could easily support a 10,000-gallon-a-day fuel requirement. The older GOER/S-ton TPU platoon can carry 22,000 gallons, while a HEMTT platoon has a 30,000-gallon capacity. We must now take the following allocations into consideration. A 2,500-gallon HEMTT will always be assigned to the combat trains for emergency Class 111. Each company is allocated two HEMTI'S as part of the daily LOGPAC, one of which must also distribute assets to fuel the TOC, LOC, ALOC, UMCP, scouts, and mortars. Finally, the support platoon will have to consider dedicating a fuel vehicle, whcther it be a HEMTT or 5-ton TPU, to satisfy 1/4-ton, heater, and generator requirements for MOGAS. The platoon will be scattered across a wide area so the platoon leader will have very limited assets under his direct control. Combined with a lack of personnel, this situation could be chaotic if the support platoon leader does not anticipate it. He should know how many vehicles are in each supported unit and what kind of movement has been conducted. An M1 idling on a battle position for eight hours will devour a lot of fuel. As part of the planning process, the POL specialist in the platoon must coordinate with the forward support battalion for Class I11 as soon as possible. A support platoon without a rest plan could result in an accident involving fuel, ammunition, and needless injuries. This situation is made more dangerous in densely populated areas such as Europe. The platoon will find itself on the move 24 hours a day. A normal LOGPAC will depart the field trains enroute to the units around 1700-1800 hours daily. It may remain with the units until the early morning hours the next day. By the time the vehicles return, transfer of fuel from one HEMIT to another will have begun. The empty vehicles will depart for the forward support refuel point and return in the early afternoon. By the time the operators return and complete after-operations checks and services, the new LOGPAC will be formed. There are various ways to implement a sleep plan into this schedule. First, rotate drivers assigned to the combat trains. Those drivers remain stationary and are ~~ ARMOR - September-October 7988 45 well-rested. Second, when topping off at the forward support refuel point, send drivers who returned earliest that previous night. The support platoon is equipped with one ANflRC-46 in the support platoon leader's jeep and an AN/PRC-77. Radio comnunications in the platoon are severely limited. Support platoon personnel can only function on instructions provided to them before their departure on a mission. Brief your personnel in detail and ensure that they are proficient in map reading. The support platoon leader should take an active interest in how units conduct resupply operations. The company first sergeant is the primary logistics operator; there should be a good working relationship between him, the S4, and the support platoon leader. Units should avoid overexaggerat-ing fuel status. There have been many instances when a unit was allegedly "red" on fuel. The support platoon leader then redirected assets to that unit, only to have those assets returned to him three-quarters full. Tank commanders, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants should relay accurate infor-malion to the first sergeant. Rerout-ing unneeded assets from battalion control could be critical in combat. Units should be able to use the LRP system in resupply operations. The first sergeant and the supply sergeant make this work. The first sergeant should have units arrayed, or know exact positions, to expedite resupply operations and return the LOGPAC to the field trains. A HEMTT platoon can refuel an M1 company, service station method, in eight minutes. Inspect resupply operations whenever possible. Not only is the support platoon leader the resupply expert, but he is also responsible for 4U to 50 men. His presence is good for morale and enables him to observe the men at work. He will be able to see units abandon fuel vehicles in an assembly area, departing without leaving instructions to the driver; watch a tank platoon refueling on top of a battle position ~ during an ARTEP; or see a fuel vehicle driver attach himself to a tank platoon during a displacement. These situations happen, and it is the support platoon leader's job to correct them. Class 1 and V operations will follow similar patterns. The key to the support platoon leader's survival is planning and prioritization of assets. With an extremely high rate of fuel and ammunition consumption in the M1 and MlAl battalion, the support platoon will be the key to the unit's survival. Captain Juan J. Heman-dez graduated from USMA in 1982 and attended Airborne, Ranger and NBC schools and the German Airborne Course. He has served as platoon leader, battalion support platoon leader and company XO with 2-64 Armor in FRG. He is an AOAC graduate and is currently assigned to 2-37 Armor, 1st ID (forward) in

FRG.

An unusual book of "firsts" ... The following quotes are from 'Tank Facts and Feats." by Kenneth Macksey, a Guiness Superlatives book published by Sterling Publishing, New York, in 1981 : "The first employment of tanks by the Viet Cong did not take place until 3 March

1969. Until then tank defence had been by orthodox ambush based on hollow-charge weapons and mines. But at Ben Het in the Central Highlands, overlooking entrances to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the North Vietnamese committed a number of armored vehicles, including Russian-built PT-76s, to a night assault. A platoon of four U.S. M48s was part of the perimeter defence and had detected enemy engines. "Later yet track noises were heard. Then the Americans came under fire. Nothing could be seen through night-vision scopes until a PT-76 detonated some anti-person-ne1 mines, setting itself on fire. A shooting match began in which one M48 was struck in the glacis plate and some of its crew killed or wounded. 'The enemy withdrew, leaving three vehicles, including two PT- 76s destroyed. This was the first time in 16 years that U.S.- manned armour had engaged enemy tanks in battle ..." 46 ARMOR - Septernber-October 7988