Armor Takes Cologne

ArmorTakes Cologne WW// armored doctrine was to stay out of cities, but there were good reasons to send the 3d Armored Division on this difficult mission . by Major John M. House Introduction In late February 1945, as the U.S. First Army’s VI1 Corps approached Cologne, MG J. Lawton Collins, corps commander, had to decide which division or divisions should seize the city. His choice was the 3rd Armored Division (3AD) supported by the 104th Infantry Division (104ID). At first glance, this appears to be in opposition to doctrine. But the 3AD that attacked Cologne was not the armored division in the Army’s manuals. The factors affecting this decision, and the battle results, provide lessons learned that apply to future combat. Situation By late January 1945, the German Ardennes offensive was over. VI1 Corps rested out of contact in Belgium. On 5 February, VI1 Corps returned to Germany where it was positioned before the Ardennes battle near the Ruhr River.’ VI1 Corps faced the Ruhr with the Ninth Army north and I11 Corps south. The 8th and 104th Infantry Divisions (8ID, 1041D) were forward. 3AD, the 99th Infantry Division (WID), and the 4th Cavalry Group were in assembly areas.’ VI1 Corps’ next mission was to attack across the Ruhr and advance northeast, protecting Ninth Army’s southern flank as it attacked toward the Rhine. H-hour was 0330 on 23 February 1945.3 VI1 Corps attacked across the Ruhr with 104ID on the left (north) and 81D on the right (south)! By 27 February, VI1 Corps reached the Erft River? In photo above, M4s of the 3d Armored Division approach the outskirts of Cologne. The city’s spires and tall buildings are visible along the horizon at upper left. At the Erft, the German units opposing the corps were in poor condition. The corps estimated it faced remnants of five divisions totalling only 7,950 men and 40 tanks. The Germans were preparing positions west of Cologne and using villages as strongpoints! Cologne’s defenders were a combination of army units, police, firemen, old men, and Hitler Youth.’ A February thaw damaged roads and reduced cross-country mobility8 A 25-mile-long ridge called the Vorgebirge dominated 32 ARMOR - September-October 7988 the terrain west and southwest of Cologne. Surface mines dotted its slopes. Northwest of Cologne, the terrain was relatively flat with scat-tcred villages and towmy Collins now faced a decision. He had to protect the Ninth Army’s southern flank. Cologne lay ahead and was a major city with bridges over the Rhine. VI1 Corps had to defeat the Germans in the city to protect Ninth Army. Doctrine and experience would guide Collins’ decision. Armor Doctrine The Army’s 1941 FM 100-5, Operations, stated that the armored division’s primary role was offensive operations against hostilc rcar areas. The armored division was to avoid towns.” This doctrine remained unchanged in the 1944 version of FM 100-5. Infantry operated with armor 10 create gaps, secure ground, or act as a base of maneuver. Infantry made o por tunities for armor to exploit.” Ar: mored infantry was a component of the armored division. Mobile infantry followed the armored division to support it.’‘ If armor had to attack a town, doctrine called for infantry to assault the town, supported by artillery and tank Gre. Tanks would encircle the town to orevent reinforcement and escape.” Tanks could not knock down rows of sturdy houses, which canalized them into streets. If a tank smashed through a house, there was danger it would fall into a basement. I4 The tank‘s high mobility, protected firepower, and shock power made it an excellent weapon for surprise. If speed was important, doctrine called for using armored formations. 15 16 Two types of U.S. armored divisions fought in World War 11 - heavy and light. 3AD was heavy throughout the war.” The heavy armored division had two armored regiments (three battalions each), one armored inrantry regiment (three battalions), and three armored field artillery battalions.’* The light formation was in the 1944 FM 100-5. l9 Army doctrine emphasized using armor for exploitation. Howevcr, doctrine recognized that the situation might require armor to attack towns. Factors other than doctrine also influenced Collins’ decision to send 3AD against Cologne. Other Factors The attack on Cologne was not the first time armored forces fought in towns or other fortified areas. The standard technique was to follow the prescribed doctrine, using tanks to encircle, and infantry to enter the town.” 3AD had prior experience seizing urban and fortified areas. In August 1044, VI1 Corps seized Mons and cut off the German Seventh Army’s retreat. 3AD led the corps attack.?’ In September, 3AD successfully breached the Siegfried Line?‘ Another factor in 3AD’s favor was the division commander, MG Maurice Rose. Collins had great confidence in Rose, who had assumed command of 3AD on 7 August 1944.’3 Rose knew his business. 3AD needed more infantry to seize Cologne. Attaching infantry to armored divisions was a slandard practice.w Rose normally used an attached infantr regiment to form six task forces.’ Collins had three infantry divisions to provide rcin-force. February infantry casualties were higher in 81D and 1041D than 3AD, which meant 3AD was in good condition?‘ The terrain favored armor action in the northern part of the corps sector. Collins felt that the “checkerboard pattern of towns on the Cologne plain,” defended by the Germans as strongpoints, “suited perfectly the organization and tactics employed by General Rose.”” Through a series of carefully timed maneuvers and feints, 3AD surprised village strongpoints with massed armor and infantry.’8 VI1 Corps’ primary mission was to protect the Ninth Army’s southern flank. This argued for the corps main attack and slrcnglh to bc in the northern part of the corps sector. To move quickly to prevent a German counterattack into the Ninth Army was essential. To concentrate in the north also focused the corps against the weakest German forces in the sector.- 39 The Decision Collins placed his main effort in the north. He sent WID on the left (north) to advance to the Rhine and protect the Ninth Army. He had 3AD (reinforced with the 13th Infantry Regiment from 81D, the 395th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) from the 99ID, and the 4th Cavalry Group) attack on 99ID’s right. 3AD was to attack northeast, prevent enemy forces in Cologne from attacking Ninth Army, and be prepared to attack southeast.30 Collins ordered 104ID to attack southeast on order. 3AD’s and 1041D’s attacks southeast would send them into Cologne. Collins had 8ID attack eastward to protect the corps’ right (southern) flank?’ This plan sent 99ID and 3AD ] S G m b e r - O z b e r 1988 33 I through the better armor terrain. 81D and W I D attacked through the Vorgebirge mining area. Collins left the corps’ southern flank open;’ which allowed a concentration of effort in the north. These factors argued for sending a fast, strong unit northwest of Cologne. The reinforced 3AD fit the requirement. Initially, it was infantry heavy. By the time 3AD reached Cologne, Collins detached the 395th

RCT,

making Scouts of the 4th Cavalry Group, mounted on M24 Chaffees, consolidate at the newly-captured German village of Broich in early March 1945. 3AD a balanced infantry-armor force. A rapid advance provided the opportunity to seize Cologne before the Germans organized a strong defense. The danger was that a 3AD failure would mean VI1 Corps would lose a large amount of its combat power and its exploitation force. The corps field order makes no mention of a reserve. Therefore, Collins apparently gave up the doctrinal advantages of having a reserve to influence the course of attack.33 Collins was a strong believer in flexibility, as he showed during the attack by shifting units between 3AD and WID as the divisions advanced.w Leaving the corps southern flank open was a risk worth taking, because the Germans were unable to react effectivelY * Results The VI1 Corps’ attack at 0300 on 1 March w0rked.3~ The lack of depth in the German defenses ensured success.36 At 0420 on 4 March, patrols from 3AD reached the Rhine at Worringen?’ On 4 March, Collins ordered 3AD to attack Cologne from the northwest.% At 0710 on 5 March, 3AD entered Cologne from the northwest, followed by 104ID at 0923 from the west. Resistance in the city was generally light except at crossing sites held as escape routes. At 1800, First Army enlarged the corps sector southward to facilitate 8ID clearing the west bank of the Rhir1e.3~ The 104ID reached the Rhine at 1400 on 6 March. By 1845, 3AD reached the demolished Hohenzollern Bridge over the Rhine. Three-fourths of the city was clear of resistance. VI1 Corps eliminated all resistance west of the Rhine by lo00 on 8 March. First Army enlarged the corps sector on 8- March to include the 1st Infantr Division’s attack against Bonn? The Rema en bridgehead caused this decision. 4B Conclusions MG Collins’ employment of 3AD to seize Cologne was not the doctrinally preferred mission for an armored division. However, Army doctrine acknowledged the potential for such a mission and addressed it. Even though there may be some question as to the doctrinal soundness of MG Collins’ decision, the decision was a good one. The 3AD that made the attack was a mix of infantry and armor. February casualties, 3AD’s strengths, the terrain, reduced German resistance, and the mission supported sending 3AD northwest of Cologne. Speed and VI1 Corps’ flexible approach to combat reduced the need for a division in reserve. VI1 Corps’ actions in this battle point out several lessons: 0 Combat requires combined arms operations. Infantry and armor must work together to use each other’s strengths. 0Tanks have utility in urban terrain. They are protected firepower and provide large-caliber direct fire. 0 Infantry must accompany tanks into urban terrain. Infantry can go places tanks cannot. I 34 ARMOR - September-October 7988 I a Commanders and subordinates must be flexible in thought and execution. 0Doctrine must be flexible so that a unit can perform a mission that is not its primary one. Endnotes 'VI1 Corps, Mission AccomDlished, pp. 'lbid., pp. 51-52. %I Corps, "Field Order 15," p. 1 and Amendment 1, p. 1. 4Collins, Liahtnina Joe, pp. 298-299. 'MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 165, 169, 186-187. 6V11 Corps, "Field Order 16," Annex 2, In-tellgience, pp. 1-2. 'MacDonald, The Last Offensive, p. 190. 81bid., p. 186. 'lbid., p. 187. "FM 100-5, 1941, pp. 263, 270. "FM 100-5, 1944, pp. 306, 309,311. 12FM 17-100, p. 3. 48-49. 13FM 100-5, 1944, pp. 311-312. 14FM 17-100, p. 91. 151bid., p. 21. 16FM 100-5, 1944, p. 111; US Forces, -0, Oraanization. EauiDment, and Tactical EmDlovment of the Armored Division, pp. 56. 17Army Field Forces, Tank Panel Final Re~ort, Tab B, p. 1. 181bid., p. 2. 19V11 Corps. "Field Order 15," p. 6 2 201st Army, Combat Operations Data, 21The Armored School, Exploitation by 22The Armored School, Armor in the At- 23Collins, Liahtnina Joe, pp. 243, 246, 241bid., p. 301; VI1 Corps, "Field Order 14," pp. 1-2; US Forces, Qraanization, EauiDment. and Tactical EmDlovment of the Armored Division, p. 24. 100-5, 1944, p. 305.

p. 50. the 3d Armored Division, pp. 30-31, 54. tack of Fortified Positions, pp. 25, 28, 55. 314. 25Collins, Liahtnina Joe, p. 301. Infantrymen pass a burned out Bergepanther recovery vehicle as they move through a forest near the Rhine River in March 1945. 26During February 1945, VI1 Corps sustained 2357 casualties. 810 had 1167, with 1111 of them in its infantry regiments. 1041D had 746, with 499 of them in its infantry regiments. 3AD had 260, with 80 in its infantry regiment. Even with the losses, 3AD's infantry regiment's strength rose from 2529 to 2600 during the month. 991D remained out of action so had no casualties. Corps troops had 184 casualties. VI1 Corps, "History, 1-28 Feburary 1945," Daily Battle Casualties Annex, p. 1; 81D, "Report After Action, February 1945," p. 1; 36 AIR, "Action Against Enemy," p. 1; 1041D, "After Action Report, 1-28 February 1945," p. 5. 27Collins, Liahtnina Joe, p. 301. 283AD, "Narrative Battle Report, March 29MacDonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 3oV11 Corps, "Field Order 16," p. 2. 311bid., p. 1. 32Macdonald, The Last Offensive, pp. 33FM 100-5, 1944, p. 38. 1945," pp. 2-3. 169, 186-187. 187- 1 88. %S Army Combat Studies Institute, Conversations, p. 6. VI1 Corps attached the 4th Cavalry Group to 991D at 1800 on 1 March. The day before, VI1 Corps ordered the 395th RCT to revert to 9910 control (Oool, 3 March), and 4th Cavalry Group to again be attached to 3AD (1800, 3 March). VI1 Corps, "History, 1-31 March 1945," pp. 1, 7-21. 35V11 Corps, "History, 1-31 March 1945," 36MacDonald, The Last Offensive, p. 37V11 Corps, "History, 1-31 March 1945," p. 1. 188.

p. 21. 38V11 Corps, Operations Memo 167," p. 39Vll Corps, "History, 1-31 March 1945," 401bid., pp. 33-44. 41Collins, Liahtnina Joe, p. 305. 1.

p. 26. Major John M. House is a 1975 graduate of Auburn University who holds masters degrees in business and history. Commissioned in the Field Artillery, he is a graduate of the basic and advanced courses, Airborne School, and C&GS Officers Course. He has served in artillery units in the 82nd Airborne and 1st Armored divisions. He is currently enrolled in the Advanced Military Studies Program at Ft. Leavenworth. . ARMOR - September-October 7988 35