Voices in the Sand: Deception Operations at the NTC

The U.S. Army has gathered a significant treasury of lessons learned from the many rotations at the National Training Center (NTC). With experience and study, these lessons have developed into refined skills - in gunnery, command and control or, in more recent times, intelligence gathering. The employment of new equipment and internalization of proven doctrine has greatly increased the amount and detail of intelligence data available to maneuver commanders. The ability to monitor numerous enemy radio nets and to see far behind enemy lines has given task force commanders a rather devastating weapon to add to their arsenal of combat multipliers. But, as is the case with many lethal weapons, this sword cuts both ways. The ability to acquire, transmit, and use intelligence data stopped being original after the battle for the Marathon Plains. Since then, we have evolved the system, but the tenets remain the same: the way to overcome superior intelligence capability is to provide the gatherer with large quantities of believable information - while the real plan is executed elsewhere. Hence comes deception, "the art of the possible." The stated doctrine for diversionary brigades, PSYOP battalions, and deception platoons, as discussed in the 100-series FMs and many other sources, is that the opposing forces (OPFOR) at the NTC focus deception activities on a Blue unit's failure to adhere to a basic precept of intelligence gathering. That grain of sand, not yet polished into a diamond, is that yoti mist al-wavs ~ 0 1 i f i l i i t !lour iiitelligence. A discussion of deception operations at the NTC, and their value and applicability to U.S. operations, can be conducted in a manner as simple as the "illusions" themselves, by explaining what, how, and why. The "what," ol course, is the use of minimal internal assets, and/or deception sections from division or combined arms army-level, to attrit the enemy's combat-effectiveness by accomplishing three major tasks: confuse, deceive, and weaken his forces. Iconfuse the enemy by: 1 0 Drawing simultmneous attention to several areas. An effective deception will show several major actions occuring in several locations. This will spread out the enemy's intelligence assets and make confirmation more difficult. The enemy will now have less room for error, and his intelligence personnel will be under greater pressure to correctly analyze the situation. .Make the enemy attend to details he thought had been completed. This is done through radio deception discussing the clearing of enemy obstacles, securing of terrain 26 ARMOR - September-October 7988 features, and other such actions that will lead the enemy to waste time rechecking details he has already spent precious time completing. The benefit of this is that time spent reconfirming known data is not spent detecting the rest of the deception plan. e Make OPFOR available Forces appear larger than they are. The enemy will probably have visual confirmation or reports from higher intelligence sources that tell him where the actual OPFOR elements are located. Visual and radio deceptions can make it appear that other elements of comparable size are also located in the sector. This action leads the enemy to be overcautious in his planning, thinking he is up against a much larger force than really exists. e Make enemy intelligencv sources contlict with each other. This is easily done by providing his electronic warfare elements with large quantities of false radio traffic. The next step is to hinder other, less "foolable" assets, such as scouts and ground surveillance radars, by screening the sector with smoke and jamming radio capabilities. The end result is a confusing barrage of intelligence that does not make sense. Deceive the enemy by: e Causing him to anticipate attacks andfor counterattacks From fictional locations and keeping his attention devoted to areas other than where we want to operate. As the enemy watches and listens with EW assets to preparations for false attacks and counterattacks, he will begin to "lean forward" by moving forces to positions of advantage against the movement he anticipates. If this is accomplished, the real attack may find little resistance in its path on the side of the sector opposite that of the deception plan. @Causing him to believe the

OPFOR

has made massive repositioning maneuvers since his last confirmed intelligence. Enemy artillery barrages are a significant threat to OPFOR maneuver commanders, often accounting for up to 50 percent of OPFOR losses. Enemy barrages will not be on target. however, if the enemy thinks he is shooting at where the OPFOR has "moved.' @Causing him to believe he is under threat of imminent destruction by ambush, penetration, attack, or counterattack The adage that "haste makes waste" is applicable when an enemy commander hastily sends part of his combat power to guard a flank that his intelligence indicates the enemy will attack. Weaken enemy actions by: e Causing early deployment OF reserves andor counterattack Forces. Command and control of a task force or brigade is a difficult thing to maintain in the heat of battle. Once a reserve or counterattack force is deployed, it is difficult to get it to change course and redirect its offensive into another area. Early deployment, at the very least, deprives the maneuver commander of a timely deployment when and where he really needs it. e Causing unnecessary repositioning. If the enemy is repositioning against imaginary threats, he is not rehearsing in his chosen battlc position, and he is not executing sleep plans. This will help to fatigue him, as well as attrit his preparations for the coming battle. e Diverting attacking Forces From the main effort. Such diversions are the benefit of making the enemy believe he is about to be ambushed. Combat ratios in the actual fight change to the OPFOR's favor when the enemy commander sends teams off to guard against non-existent counterattacks. Thus, the OPFOR can defeat the enemy in detail at even or better odds. @Causing the waste of combat multipliers such as artillery, air defense, close air support and FASCAM fires. A common response to unexpected "attacks" is to fire conventional artillery or FASCAM to slow the assault and attrit the attackers. This, if the "attack" was real, would allow the enemy time to ready himself for the "surprise attack." The end result is that the enemy wastes critical combat multipliers against empty ground. 0 Causing command and control elements to question the intelligence and spend needless time analyzing simple data and courses of action. As the deception plan comes together, the enemy will spend long hours trying to figure out what is going on, and wondering why the "attack that higher intelligence has reported as imminent never comes. Once the maneuver unit begins to doubt its intelligence sources, the value of the intelligence gatherers is compromised. It is the general goal of deception operations to accomplish the above tasks in most phases of combat, including attacks, meeting engagements, defenses, reconnaissance activities, and night operations. With the above description of the goal of deception planning, we can move to the methodology of how to plan and execute these operations. The key is to depict a scenario that the eiteiny is willing, if riot arttioils, ARMOR - September-October 7988 27

"Show the enemy what he expects to see; it will make him think he is in control of the situation ...." h 28 ARMOR - September-October 7988 to accept as real. The success of the deception is directly proportional to the number of reliable intelligence sources that can be contaminated with the various forms of false data within the context of the deception plan. Put simply What is seen and heard, again and again, becomes believable. (Incidentally, this is the favorite tactic of dictators; constant repetition creates belief.) Show the enemy what he expects to see; it will make him think he is in control of the situation. Few overconfident commanders take detailed precautions. The preparation of the deception must be made at the tactical planning level, in the maneuver unit's operations order, thereby making the false operation an integral part of the real maneuver plan. This brings the deception plan into phase with all of the other combat multipliers at a maneuver commander's disposal, thereby ensuring that the illusory operation enhances the mission without hindering the commander's intent. It is unlikely that this would be accomplished if the deception was planned in the war room of a military intelligence battalion. In common with U.S. doctrine, the OPFOR uses METT-T analysis as the core of deception planning. At the

NTC,

the

OPFOR

has developed different styles of deception for offensive and defensive operations. In offensive operations, mainly division and regimental attacks or meeting engagements, assets internal to the motorized rifle division and combined arms army are used, but parceled out to the controlling headquarters. The main emphasis of deception in the offense is to deceive the enemy with false avenues of attack and false times when the attack will occur. This allows the regiment or division to retain surprise and momentum. Many media provide the desired picture: .Sound: Tapes of a MRR's vehicles in a combat line will provide both the straightforward audio presence of a "regiment" in the pre-dawn hours, as well as an excellent background for battle traffic on the radio. This can be accomplished with $400 worth of used car stereo equipment and a few hours to fit the system to the

BRDM-11.

.Visual: Test fires,

MILES

checks, heat signatures, covering smoke, and dust signatures will replicate a regimental-size march to the attack. As the enemy begins to see the "attack," he will react with security upgrades, indirect fires, and repositioning. After all, seeing is believing. artillery: This can provide false illumination and false preparatory fires. Areas the "regiment" appears to be interested in will shortly be of interest to the enemy. .Radio: Enemy intercepts of a "busy command and control net are often the pivotal intelligence source. If the enemy hears "us" talking about doing what his people are seeing and hearing, he will believe it. Flanking: During meeting engagements especially, the enemy is concerned about flanking actions, ambushes, and surprise attacks. If the deception (including FASCAM fires) can convince him to send elements off to the various flanks, the real combat ratio is significantly improved. Misfires: Misplaced or poorly-timed FASCAM and ICM fires can greatly assist the real maneuver element. As the other elements of the deception are completed and misfired enemy artillery occurs, the enemy maneuver elements on the ground will believe their headquarters is shooting at the real attack. Putting It All Together These techniques can combine to provide an excellent battlefield effect, as occurred in a recent MRR night attack against an MllM2- equipped task force in the central corridor of the NTC maneuver area. The OPFOR conducted the attack from east to west with a line of departure at Hill 720 (See Map 1.) Phase One: Radio traffic concerning rehearsals in the north end of the sector, as well as the clearing of defiles along the march route, cluttered the air all afternoon. As a result, .The enemy expended about 4,800 rounds of enemy artillery in vain attempts to destroy the "forces" in the north. .The enemy was convinced that two MRBs would attack in the north, with LD no later than 2100 hours.

.The enemy was out of artillery ammunition, pending resupply, when he tried to fire indirect at the OPFOR dismounted attack at 1900 hours. Phase ' b o : At 2030, the "regiment" passed the LD en masse with smoke, sound, illumination, dust, chemlites, and prolific "battle traffic" on the radio. As a result, 0 More wasted enemy artillery ammunition. The brigade informed the enemy task force to expect the main attack within 30 minutes. The task force cancelled sleep plans, bringing the task force to 100- percent security. Phase Three: At 2300, the "regiment" conducted a second attack, with sound, smoke, illumination, chemlites, dust, heat signatures, fake battle damage, and heavy battle traffic on the radio. The results were that: 0 Ineffective enemy

FASCAM

tires. 0The enemy task force came to 100-percent security again. 0The enemy brigade told task force that two MRBs were confirmed to attack in the north. Phase Four: When the real regiment attacked in the south at 0100, the deception regiment attacked north. The end result was that enemy forces repositioned to the south too late, and an MRB(+) secured the objective. The task force was combat ineffective. The benefits of the deception were that the OPFOR retained surprise, initiative, and momentum, while depriving the defender of critical artillery assets and execution time. 1 Deception In the Defense I ~~ ~~~~ ~~~ At company, battalion, and regimental levels, deception has a key role in the success of the defensive mission. The primary goal of deceiving the attacking enemy is to seize the initiative, thereby draining his attack's lifeblood. Also gained by a successful defense deception is protection from air and artillery barrages, as well as mounted and dismounted infiltrations. Such combat multipliers, if the attacker uses them effectively, can unseat a defender, however well prepared. The tasks involved with defense deception planning are to deceive the enemy about where the defensive positions, avenues, and routes for counterattacks and repositioning are, and where the reserve forces are. This can be done as low as motorized company level, but must be coordinated with higher com- ~~~ ~~~~ ~ mand levels, as with any combat multiplier. The following media can be useful in developing effective illusions in the defense: e Sound: Tapes of repositioning and/or counterattacking forces, as well as vehicles idling in false positions, provide a deceptive radio picture. The same inexpensive sound system on the BRDM-I1 will suffice here. 0 Visual: False barriers, vehicle and infantry positions, and artificial heat signatures, not to mention simulated battle damage (supposedly destroyed vehicles in flames, etc.) will paint an extremely believable tale of a main defensive belt forward. Flashbulb trip flares will add greatly to the reality of the ruse, and are relatively cheap and easy to make. e Artillery: Smoke and guiding illumination, or special signal flares, will give a physical signature to a deception plan involving repositioning or counterattacking elements. 0 Radio: Lengthy discussions of vehicle locations, rehearsals for counterattacks, and loose talk such as, "Are routes Green and Red clear for my Charlie-Alpha?'' paint a picture of an overconfident defcnder with poor OPSEC. Combinations of these techniques can keep the enemy guessing for extended periods of time, as well as having the following effects: 0 Misfired artillery preparation. ARMOR - September-October 1988 29

0 Enemy wastes time probing and breaching empty positions, making himself a vulnerable artillery target. 0The enemy attack is hindered, forcing night attacks to take place in daylight. .After the enemy has "overwhelmed" the bogus position, he ends up doing his reconsolidation in the main fire sack. During a recent MRC dcfense, deception operations effectively helped defend the area known as "No-Name Valley" in the NTC maneuver area. An MRC( +) of six T-72s and 14 BMPs defended that terrain against a night attack from an M1-heavy task force with 41 tanks and 20 Bradleys (See Map 2). Phase One: The MRB commander directed his MRC(+) to dig in at the western mouth of the valley, leaving the eastern end open, except for a COP consisting of three BMPs. False positions, obstacles, and vehicles went in three kilometers forward of the main defense belt. Initial laager of the MRC( +) was well forward of the defensive position. Heavy engineer activity was evident in the deception area. Result: Enemy templated an MRC( +) forward, in the eastern end of the valley. Pre-planned artillery barrages were prepared against the "known" positions. Enemy reconnaissance went out in the late afternoon to probe the templated defense. Phase Two: The MRB commander placed 100 flashbulb trip flares in the deception battle positions and along the perimeter of the false barriers. COP BMPs were placed in three of the fake fighting positions, while the remaining positions were prepared with charcoal fires, iron-gratings, and simulated vehicle antennas. False OPSEC violations on the radio discussed feeding Class I to the 13 vehicles east of OP-2. Result: The COP destroyed seven enemy scouts when the Bradleys began probing the initial barrier line. The scout's dying rcport was that they had been destroyed in the main defensive belt. The COP withdrew to the rear of the deception position until after the enemy artillery barrage that evening. As the barrage ended, the COP reoc-cupied and provided harrassing fires against the enemy main body as it moved to seize the battle position. The enemy main body set off numerous flashbulb trip flares and fired on the flare pits with 25-mm cannon, thinking they were tank signatures. Withdrawing OPFOR reconnaissance vehicles, in conjunction with the COP, destroyed the seven Bradleys near the first line of false positions. Phase Three: Enemy tanks continued attacking the fake positions throughout the night, taking occasional casualties from the withdrawing COP. End Result: The sun rose at OS45 as the task force was reconsolidating in the main OPFOR engagement area. The MRC( + ) executed volley fire over the next two hours, destroying the confused vehicles. At change of mission, the enemy task force had lost all 41 Mls and 17 Bradleys. OPFOR casualties were one BMP by 25-mm direct fire and one T-72, an artillery fire casualty. Throughout the course of the battle, the defender used deception to take initiative and momentum away from an enemy whose equipment was built for, and relied upon, speed and violent momentum. As noted before, the assets required to execute effective deception operations at all levels are mini- 30 ARMOR - September-October 7988

"...There is no reason why deception tactics cannot be used within tactical operations at the US. division and brigade levels. By so doing, the enemy would be forced to refine his own intelligence processes, confirming what he gathers." mal. They include little more than the following.: Organization & Equipment of OPFOR Deception Team 0One BRDM-II with tape deck and 0One HMMWV command and con- 0 Two RPG-7 launchers. 0About a hundred deception trip 0Ten smoke pots and 10 false heat loudspeakers. trol vehicle. flares and 500 chemlites. signatures (charcoal). For every good plan there are drawbacks, and deception operations are no exception. The equipment listed above does not include protection against direct or indirect fires. Survival and vulnerability are a thorn in the side of a deception plan. If engaged, the deception team will be destroyed. It is not a true fighting force. The good news, however, is that a successful deception operation has the enemy looking for at least an MRB-size element, not a lonely BRDM. During 15 deception missions conducted in recent months, NTC deception teams have sustained no casualties. Recently, an M1 platoon drove within 15 meters of the OPFOR deception team's BRDM-11, but failed to engage it. They were looking for a regiment and disregarded the single vehicle. Perhaps the following quotation applies: "Wten a inan is seaxitirig for the soiirce of the voices, he pays small heed to the sand in his eyes. - Lawrence of Arabia OPFOR troopers prepare to dismount after a successful NTC exercise. I Deception planning, within doctrinal framework, is an integral part of OPFOR mission execution at NTC. The operations are kept simple and require little manpower and few assets. More important, the operations work. In the offense, they allow the OPFOR to achieve surprise; in the defcnse, they disarm the attack and transfer initiative and momentum to the defender. These are the bencfits of good deception and the cost of failing to confirm intelligence, a failure that is not uncommon, although often difficult to avoid. When confirmation and effective evaluation are internalized into the intelligence process, the maneuver commander need not fear deception. He need only detect it, and then disregard the erroneous data. On the other hand, there is no reason why deception tactics cannot be used within tactical operations at the U.S. division and brigade levels. By so doing, the enemy would be forced to refine his own intelligence processes, confirming what he gathers. The simple deception techniques illustrated above can be and, indeed, have been used against the

OPFOR.

After all, sand can obscure the vision of any man whose eyes are unprotected - regardless of his uniform. Captain George L. Reed was commissioned in Armor in 1984 from the USMA. He has served in the 1-63 Armor, the OPFOR at the NTC, as mortar platoon leader, tank platoon leader, tank company XO, battalion liaison officer, and regimental fire support officer. A graduate of the AOB, IMPOC, and JOTC, he is currently assigned as the 1-63 Armor S4. His duties include OIC of OPFOR tactical deception operations. I ARMOR - September-October 1988 31