Team Battle Drills:

Team Battle Drills: Actions On Contact Translating Doctrine into Action by Captain Ed Smith Well-rehearsed battle drills are the hallmark of a good unit. Most units understand and can quickly prioritize individual training, but the number of collective tasks that a company/team must be able to execute often overwhelms them. Battle drills are the key building hlocks for performing more complex tasks, such as a night attack against a strongpoint, and also provide a framework for training specific skills, such as scanning and target acquisition. In addition, they ease the rapid assimilation of new units and new soldiers. Battle drills enable the small unit leader to translate doctrine into specific actions on the battlefield. Examples of the following seven battle drills for offensive operation-sare: 0 Actions on Contact 0 Hasty Attack 0 Hasty Breach 0 Movement Formations 0 Hasty Defense 0 Reaction to Indirect Fire 0 Reaction to Air Attack Although not all-inclusive, these battle drills generally address the most frequent small unit engagements that will occur during offensive operations. They are in order of importance, and cover those engagements where we stand the greatest chance of killing the enemy or of suffering the greatest number of casualties. These drills are not a substitute for the detailed planning so necessary for a deliberate attack, but rather serve as a quick reaction to the unexpected. Record the battle drills in the unit’s tactical SOP, and be as specific as possible at the squad and tank level. The use of matrices to detail individual squad and crew membcr actions for each drill is a good way to spell out expected standards. In garrison, practice the drills dismounted on a weekly basis and reinforce with mounted drills when resources permit. The drills in this article are for a tank-heavy team (Ml-M113 mix) with Stinger (V4- ton mounted) and attached FIST. Our doctrine states that, upon contact, the team returns fire, seeks covcr and concealment, reports and then develops the situation. However, doctrinal publications fail to emphasize that the primary reason for actions on contact is to survive long enough to destroy the enemy by some other maneuver. The team’s only recourse may he an immediate assault of the enemy force, but survival remains the underlying purpose. The commander translates these general requirements into specific actions. The reaction must be violent and it must be automatic. Unfortunately, most units do not develop violent battle drills for actions on contact. The typical unit makes contact with the enemy, stops, and dies. It does not return fire because it doesn’t see the enemy. It doesn’t move to cover and concealment because there isn‘t any. It often dies before it can report. Actions on contact are easier to understand if we think of the enemy fire sack as either a near or a far ambush. Far ambushes are much more common, because the enemy retains his standoff distance to shoot at us longer with his direct 12 ARMOR - September-October 7988 and indirect fires. In a well-designed fire sack, the nearest thing to a covered and concealed position can only be found by moving out of the enemy's fire sack or by seizing the enemy positions. In the far ambush, backing out of this fire sack offers the shortest path to a "position" not covered by direct fire. Moving 500 meters to the rear temporarily pulls our chestnuts out of the fire and enables the command to survive the initial contact with maximum forces intact. However, if the enemy positions are closer than the nearest "position" outside the fire sack, the tcam faces a near ambush. In this instance, the lead platoon assaults the enemy position with all weapons firing in the direction of contact. Of the two types of ambushes, the near ambush is the most dangerous. Fortunately, it is the least likely of the two, due to its high risk for the enemy (exposed flanks and rear) and the limited availability of natural reverse slope positions in most terrain. As a result, the team's initial actions on contact are always for a far ambush. In both cases, the team fires rapidly, regardless of whether it has a target in its sights or not. During the operations order sequence, the Commander must template at what point along the unit's axis of advance he anticipates a near ambush (defiles, built-up areas, and woodlines) and where he expects a far ambush. Anyone may initiate the actions on conlact drill. All crews immediately rcturn fire in their assigned orientation, or at identified targets. Simultaneously, the drivers put the vehicles into reverse (unless they can see a covered and concealed position within 100 meters), activate the on-board smoke system, and back up 500 meters. The designated crewman (it doesn't have to be the vehicle commander) gives a brief alert over the radio, per unit SOP. Most units don't return fire because they do not see a target and they cannot find enough dead space to obtain cover and concealment. One quick radio transmission, by any crewman: "CONTACT FRONT (or LEFT, RIGHT, REAR)," weapons firing, and the lead platoon moving to the rear at high speed in a cloud of smoke will let everyone know that the team has made contact, that it's a far ambush, and the general direction. The lead platoon and the ovenvatching platoon are now moving back out of immediate danger, and the commander can enjoy a brief respite while he obtains more information and decides upon his options (hasty attack, hasty defense, bypass, or continue to develop the situation). The FIST requests fires, the executive officer reports to task force, and the platoon leaders look for favorable indirect routes to assault the flanks of the enemy position. Only a platoon leader or the team Commander initiates the actions-on-contact drill. He announces "ACTlON FRONT (or LEIT, RIGHT, REAR)." He then leads the platoon into an immediate assault of the enemy position. All tanks guide on him in a wedge and place all fires at either identified targets or likely enemy locations. The crews do not activate onboard smoke systems and do not stop until the platoon leader issues further instructions. In both versions of this battle drill, the overwatching platoon leader gives an immediate support by fire command to his platoon. Target priorities, in order, are: observed enemy positions, lead platoon's tracers, and likely enemy positions. The overwatching platoon leader places the highest possible volume I the commander must template at what point along the unit's axis of advance he anticipates a near ambush (defiles, built-up areas, and woodlines) and where he exDects moves as necessary to prevent the lead platoon from masking his fires and to see his target area. Hasty Attack After the initial actions on contact, thc commander analyzes his options and determines, based on his understanding ol the mission and his wargaming, that a hasty attack is the appropriate option. By definition, the sequence of events for any attack involves the troop-leading steps and the concomitant decision-making process. However, since companies hcquently conduct hasty attacks, a drill-like series of steps will increase the unit's chances of success. The commander delays the assault to ensure the positioning and availability of dismounted infantry, indirect fires, and the support-by-fire etement. The hasty attack battle drill uses the lead tank platoon as the support-by-fire element and the other tank platoon, followed by the mounted infantry platoon, as the assault element. First, the commander queries the FIST to determine if he can suppress the position the commander wants to assault, isolate mutually supporting positions (real or templated), and screen the movement of the assaulting platoons. Next, the commander places the I ARMOR - September-October 1988 l3 I support-hy-fire element in the most advantageous position not masked by the assault. The commander will also cast about for other elements in the task force that may be available for supporting fires. In a mechanized task force, the antitank company/team will be the most responsive and the task force commander usually places it in a support-by-fire role. Don't overlook the availability of a supporting Vulcan unit. Finally, the commander refines the exact route for the assaulting platoons. The route crosses as little of the fire sack as possible and seeks the likely flank of the nearest enemy platoon position. The commander's frag order to the key leaders includes control measures "Don 't overlook the availability of a supporting Vulcan unit.. . " that are easily identifiable on the ground and a tentative dismount point for the infantry platoon. The commander strives for a large volume of indirect and direct fire to achieve fire superiority. If indirect fires are not available, the attack will rapidly become a multiple-arms fight instead of a combined-arms fight. The absence of indirect fire support will reduce the chances of success and will require very responsive supporting fires. justs the rate of fire. The FIST attacks the team objective with artillery before the team reaches the fire sack, and uses mortars for assaulting fires. He continually adjusts the mortar fircs to move 600 metcrs in front of the lead platoon. Six hundred meters from the first enemy position, the lead platoon leader calls for the artillery to lift and to shift to the closest mutually-supporting platoon. Before the assault force begins to move, the commander issues a support-by-fire command to the supporting tank platoon, and adjusts indirect fire. For example, the command, "Sierra 11, support-by-fire, 2 and 3, checkpoint A12," orders the platoon to support-by-fire with two rounds main gun per tank and three bursts of automatic fire per tank, per minute at checkpoint A12. However, if the tank platoon sees another target, it may engage it with the most appropriate weapon. The tank platoon leader confirms the target by using a white phosphorus round or any type of tracer ammunition that will reach the target reference point. The commander adjusts this as necessary. The assaulting platoon leaders will be keenly interested in this process. The supporting platoon commences firing and continues to fire until the assault element masks its fire. The platoon leader continues to reposition his platoon to support the assault. The support-by-fire platoon sergeant reports ammo levels, by 10 percent increments, over the company net. At a predetermined ammo level - for example, 40 percent - the platoon leader questions the commander about continued ammo expenditure rates. At this point, the first sergeant begins emergency Class V resupply for that platoon, and the commander ad-The assaulting tank platoon leads, firing coax at all likely positions. The platoon leader reserves main gun fire for actual infantry positions and likely armor vehicle fighting positions. The infantry platoon moves mounted until the tank platoon encounters a position that it cannot destroy, or reaches terrain it cannot traverse. The infantry platoon then dismounts and assaults. To distinguish between enemy and friendly infantry at distances over several hundred meters is difficult. Consequently, the commander must continue to designate control measures (no fire areas, engage-mcnt areas, and target reference points) in order to shift fires away from friendly forces as they advance. Once the infantry dismounts, he may order support elements to cease engaging all infantrymen, unless attacked or requested by the infantry platoon leader for a specific area. The dismounted infantry lcadcrs mark their positions. The infantry can use colored smoke, aircraft recognition panels, tracer fire, and relationships to terrain. The infantry platoon destroys enemy infantry and pressures enemy armored vehicles to displace. The enemy vehicles now have a choice to either stay to die from a Dragon round, or to withdraw. The enemy 14 ARMOR - September-October 1988

"Infantry fighting vehicles lack the necessary firepower and protection to survive the initial actions on contact and to rapidly kill all types of enemy armor. Therefore, tanks should lead unless the commander's need for security requires the use of dismounted infantry. It vehicles will probably displace. During the time the enemy vehicles are moving they are most vulnerable to the supporting tank's fire, This "bird dog and shotgun" routine enables the infantry to flush the enemy and the tanks to kill them. Although the infantry will be doing most of the work, the tank cannon will kill the bulk of the enemy armor. The commander now designates control measures for consolidating the enemy position. The designated target reference points identify mutually-supporting enemy positions on the flanks, likely counterattack routes, and the most likely route for continued team movement. The executive officer announces the location for the company combat trains and decides whether he will require the platoons to evacuate casualties to the company combat trains or if he will "tailgate" the trains to the line platoons. The first sergeant receives the personnel and equipment status from each platoon sergeant in order to direct cross-levelling of people and equipment and request urgently needed items. Hasty Breach The lead platoon detects an obstacle and immediately begins contact drill actions. This drill assumes that the enemy will cover his obstacles with fire. The initial report describes enemy activity and the obstacle type. The first vehicle turns left, the second vehicle turns right and both reconnoiter the obstacle. The two crews seek the following information: 0 Feasibility of forcing the obstacle 0 Location of bypass, if any 0 Likely breach site (one with 0 Location for support-by-fire most dead space) position The remaining vehicles of the lead platoon also identify near-side security positions (support-by-fire positions). The FIST requests indirect fires that will obscure enemy observation of the team's hasty breach and fires that will suppress known and likely enemy positions that can place direct fires onto the team. The closer he can place the smoke to the enemy, the better. The FIST avoids placing smoke on the team and on the obstacle. The infantry platoon leader moves forward, selects a place to dismount his far-side security force. This element, led by the platoon leader, clears a footpath, using wire cutters and grappling hooks. This force moves to those positions that can place direct fires on the obstacle. The far-side security force maneuvers with all of the platoon's Dragons. The far-side security force places suppressive small arms fires and antitank fires on those enemy forces that can disrupt the breaching and assault force's operations. The far-side security force communicates with the near-side security force in order to adjust the near-side security fires onto positions the tank platoon may not have identified. As a result, the far-side security force may have to move as far as two kilometers in open terrain. Under no circumstances does the far-side security force breach a footpath and just flop down on the other side of the obstacle. The near-side security force can already cover that far. The remaining squad-sized force conducts a hasty breach using explosives or grappling hooks to physically move surface-laid mines. If the mines are buried, the breaching force must use mine detectors and probes to locate and destroy (or remove) the mines. The breaching force then marks the breach site using smoke, engineer tape along the boundaries of the lane, or aircraft recognition panels elevated on long pickets near the entrance of the lane. The assault platoon moves through the lane, proofing it, and continues the mission. Movement Drills Although there are a large number of possible formations, consider limiting the team to five basic formations: column of platoon wedges, team diamond, staggered column, column, and the line formation. The keys to security during movement are good target acquisition skills, overwatch elements, platoon leaders alert to changing requirements for dispersion, and making contact with the smallest enemy force possible. Consequently, do not shortchange unit alertness for the sake of a tidy appearance. Infantry fighting vehicles lack the necessary firepower and protection to survive . 1 ARMOR - September-October 7988 15 I the initial actions on contact and to rapidly kill all types of enemy armor. Therefore, tanks should lead, unless the commander's need for security requires the use of dismounted infantry. The platoon wedge should rarely exceed 200 meters in width. The platoon is not the element we want to spread out. The commander should consider the diamond or column of platoon wedges when his estimate dictates greater dispersion. Except during a movement to contact, most company/team formations should not exceed 800 meters in width. Distances greater than 800 meters make it difficult to achieve mass, and strain the command and control lunctions. This becomes more obvious once the entire battalion or brigade is viewed, rather than the company in isolation. The company combat trains, executive officer's tank maintenance track (with the first sergeant onboard), medic track, and the recovery vehicle follow as a fourth platoon in a like formation equidistant from the other platoons. None of the formations include wheel vehicles; due to their vulnerability to small arms and indirect lire. If speed is important, and forward units provide security, then the commander may elect to use the column or the staggered column. Periods of low visibility may also lorce the use of a column formation. Finally, the line formation can quickly posture the team for a support-by-fire mission or a hasty defense. The unit staggers the line formation to achieve some depth and flexibility. Regardless of the type of fornia-tion, the lead platoon routinely dismounts crewmen before crossing danger areas. Each crewman dismounts with essential equipment (weapon, binoculars, and protective mask). The commander gives specific responsibilities to the platoon for scanning; for example, "Lead platoon to the front, second platoon to the left, third platoon to the right, and keep the team aligned with Bravo Team. The combat trains will maintain air guard and alignment with Co C to our rear." "Under no circumstances does the commander permit the Stinger crew to fight from the assigned wheel vehicle ... Since there is not enough room in a tank, the commander selects an infantry vehicle, the maintenance track, or the recovery vehicle, for inside protection for the two-man Stinger team. 'I Hasty Defense Often, we use the hasty defense to assume a support-by-fire role or a counterattack-by-fire mission, rather than for a defense. Calling the drill a hasty defense places attention on the necessity to mass fires on TRPs along avenues of approach. The commander's frag order addresses the threat size and direction, the avenues of approach designated by his control measures, the indirect targets with thcir trigger points, likely air approaches, and the surveillance responsibilities for each platoon. Reaction To Indirect Fire The comniandcr must cover the indirect fire threat in his instructions. He should template the maximum engagement lines for artillery and mortar fires. The team needs a good idea of where to expect fires. the typical sheaf dimensions, and when vehicles must mask during the operation if attacked with indirect fires. The unit must move out of the impact area as quickly as possible while maintaining command and control. When under indirect fire, the unit cannot accurately return fire and cannot observe. If the unit does not move, all it can do is rcmain suppressed and become casualties. Jf the team has not yet engaged, then it moves at an increased speed along the direction of march. If within range of direct fires, and not overwatching another element, it moves back 400 meters. If defending, it moves to alternate positions. When supporting-by-fire, the team moves forward 400 meters and then moves back as soon as the fires lift. The support-by-firc unit's overriding concern is its ability to continue to provide fires. Reaction To Air Attack Under no circumstances does the commandcr permit the Stinger crew to fight from the assigned wheel vehicle. The supply sergeant supervises the movement of the Stinger 16 ARMOR - September-October 1988

1 wheeled vehicle to a more suitable area. Since there is not enough room in a tank, the commander selects an infantry vehicle, the maintenance track, or the recovery vehicle for inside protection for the two-man Stinger team and its missiles. Place half of the missile load on another vehicle. Passive: If not attacked, the air guard platoon announces, "Bandits, East. Freeze," and the team ini-mediately stops. The Stinger gunner dismounts and prepares to engage. Active: When attacked, the unit returns fire and disperses. The air guard platoon announces, "Bandits, East. Fire." The air guard platoon acknowledges any early warnings relayed by stations monitoring other nets. Due to the rapid nature of air strikes, each shooter judges when he should fire. Massed fire commands, while desirable, are usually impractical. All weapon systems, except tank cannon, engage attacking futed-wing aircraft that close within one kilometer. Crews use tank cannon against rotary wing aircraft. After each Stinger engagement, the gunner reports the number of missiles fired and the number remaining. At the 50-percent point, the first sergeant obtains emergency resupply of Stinger missiles. Each platoon leader reports the number of automatic weapon engagements from his platoon. Conclusions Based on experience at the NTC, battle drills do not lend themselves well to a defensive operation. The uniqueness of each avenue of approach and thc resulting engagement areas, TRPs, siting of obstacles, and selection of fighting positions require original thought. Nor do battle drills appear to work "Many units training at the NTC do not sutvive the initial actions on contact simply because the team lacks a rehearsed battle drill. An appropriate battle drill enables the unit to react quickly and devote attention to the unique aspects of each combat situation. 'I I I well at the task force level for more than a movement to contact because of the greater spectrum of options and unccrtaintics present in larger formations. These battle drills do not cover every aspect of offensive operations. However, they do cover the most important actions a unit will encounter during most offensive operations. Commanders can use these drills as a starting point and modify them to fit their theater of operations and thcir unit's mission essential task list. Many units training at the NTC do not survive the initial actions on contact simply because the team lacks a rehearsed battle drill. An appropriate battle drill enables the unit to react quickly and devote attention to the unique aspects of each combat situation. ARMOR - September-October 1988 Captain Ed Smith was commissioned in Armor from West Point in 1977 and served as a company commander with the 1-68 Armor in West Germany. He also served as high school ROTC liaison officer in the 1st ROTC Region. Since 1985, he has been assigned to the National Training Center, where he has taken part in more than 37 rotations. He is presently assigned as the NTC's mechanized infantry task force battle staff analyst. 77