Armor in Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC): The Soviet Experience In Afghanistan (Part II of two parts)

Although armor was born on the high intensity battlefield, both superpowers have employed mechanized forces in low intensity conflict. At lirst, the U. S. Army expected no role for armor in Vietnam, but the employment of mechanized forces grew steadily throughout the conflict (see July-August 1988 ARMOR). In contrast, the Soviets overrated the role of armor in Afghanistan. Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in a number of articles which discussed mountain warfare, several military authors writing in Voenrtvi Vestrtik confidently asserted that tanks could operate "jointly with motorized rifle and artillery units, and even sometimes independently."' By 1982, after three years of fighting, articles discussing armor operations in mountainous terrain were much more cautious.? In the same year, the popular press in the West claimed that the Soviets had chan ed their tactics in Afghanistan. F In both Vietnam and Afghanistan, the success of armor depended upon the function it fulfilled within the combined arms team. J. F. C. Fuller defined these functions as finding, holding, hitting, protecting, and smashing. In a previous article, 1 examined the role of armor in Vietnam using these functions to analyze the doctrine for armor in LIC. Now, I propose to do the same for the Soviet employment of armor in Afghanistan and then suggest the implications for armor doctrine in

LIC.

The first Soviet postwar (WWII) experience in low intensity conflict began on 24 December 1979 when the Rcd Army invaded Afghanistan. In a well-planned operation, an airborne division seized the capital at Kabul, while two motorized rille divisions attacked from across the Soviet border. The invasion force grew into the 40th Combined Arms Army, with seven motorized rille divisions and an airborne division, supported by five air assault brigades. The Soviet divisions came into Afghanistan with no specific doctrine for counterinsurgency. They came armed only with their superior technology and a conventional doctrine to employ it. Combat operations in Afghanistan essentially mean mountain warfare. The range of the Hindu Kush covers half the country, with peaks rising to 17,000 feet. Although the Soviets consider combat in mountains as warfare under special conditions, they have no specific doctrine for fighting guerrillas in mountainous terrain. Apparently, they believe that tactics suitable for combatting regular forces will work equally as well against guerrillas. The key elcments in their offensive doctrine for mountain warpare are their unshakeable faith in combined arms and the importance of mechanized forces. Soviet doctrine forsees an important role for all the arms of service in mountain warfare. Recognizing the difficulty of massing artillery fires and "the limited accuracy of artillery in the direct-fire role, tanks supplement the artillery and provide support by fire for maneuver forces."' The Soviets consider the BMP particularly suited for combat in mountainous areas because its armor can protect the infantry squad while its armament can hit the enemy? With the exception of special operations forces, the entire Soviet army is mechanized. The very force structure of the Red Army suggests that primarily mechanized forces will fight mountain warfare. The doctrine does state that motorized rifle troops will dismount to attack, but they will attack with support from both tanks 6 ARMOR - September-October 7988 and BMPs. Airmobile infantry is also important and can secure high ground otherwise inaccessible to the motorized troops. All combined arms encircle and destroy the enemy in a coordinated attack. infantry combat vehicles swept rapidly northward, ploughing through whatevcr was lcft of thc settlements."' The offensive drove many of the Afghans into exile, but failed to crush the resistance. In a typical attack, helicopters conduct reconnaissance ahead of the main body. On the ground, combat reconnaissance patrols scout ahead to identify less accessible routes for possible use by the outflanking detachment. The main body proceeds up the most accessible route. The next take the commanding heights along the route of advance or to the rear of the enemy at all costs. The outflanking detachment, which can be either motorized rifle units or airmobile troops, does this. The outflanking detachment would ideally contain artillery and engineers. Once the dominant heights are secure, a coordinated attack - preferably from two directions - completes the encirclement and destruction of the enemy. 6 The functions of the various arms determine their employment. Helicopters and ground reconnaissance units find; tanks and mechanized infantry protect, hit, and destroy; airmobile infantry also fm and destroy; finally, artillery, rotary, and futed-wing aircraft hit. Soviet officers probably had little idea how to adjust this tactical system in order to work in the low-intensity environment of Afghanistan. Shortly after the invasion, the Soviets began large-scale offensives to pursue the Miijuliediri, the resistance forces, to their strongholds. In February 1980, 5,000 Soviet troops attacked into the Kunar Valley. For two days, the Soviets hammered the area with artillery and air strikes. Troops then airlanded onto the nearby ridges. Following the air assault, "columns of tanks and BMP A year later, the Soviets were unable to do any better. Some Western observers claimed the "Soviets' tactical reliance on armor curtailed their effectiveness in dealing with the guerrillas."* At least one analyst pointed simply to the Soviet inability to execute their own doctrine. The motorized rifle divisions that took part in the invasion had at least 50 percent reservists on 90-day call-up. Training was certainly an important factor. A year after the invasion, however, an eyewitness account of a battle that took place at Paghman, 15 miles northwest of Kabul, offers some insights. In the three-day battle, the tanks and BMPs made headway over the hilly terrain. However, only a few reluclzant Afghan infantry units (forces of the Soviet-backed regime) supported the armor. The Afghan infantry failed to close with the enemy. The Mujahcdirt roamed the battlefield in small groups, armed with RPG-7s and antitank grenades. Despite their advance, by the third day, the Soviets were forced to withdraw their armor? Obviously, when the infantry failed to fulfill its function, the combined arms team was broken. The reluctance of the Afghan units to attack their countrymen was understandable. Within a year of the invasion, the Afghan army disintegrated, from a force of 90,oOO men in 1979 to 30,000 in 1981. The Soviets looked for solutions by increasing their troop strength and adjusting their tactical system. Less willing to depend on their allies, the Soviets annually increased their troop strength by 10,ooO in 1981, 1982, and 1984. Soon these Soviet troops were taking the field and assuming more of the combat burden. The Sovicts also hegan what one oh-server called, "a trial-and-error searcv for tactical solutions." By 1982, the Soviets continued large-scale offensives, but with some new tactical adjustments, principally with a marked increase in the use of airmobile and special operations forces. In May and June, the Soviets and their Afghan allies massed 15,000 troops against 3,500 Mujuliediri in the Panjshir Valley, 40 miles north of Kabul. The Soviets attacked into a 300-meter to two-kilometer-width gorge. Air assaults descended on the ridges, while an armored column attacked up the valley. The air assaults ran into stiff resistance and had to withdraw. Without command of the dominating heights, the Soviets took heavy losses. After a good deal of fighting, the Soviets declared victory and returned to their permanent garrisons. The Miijaltediri returned also, which prompted another Soviet offensive into the Panjshir later the same year. On better ground, the Soviet mechanized forces found it much easier to encircle and thus obtain better results. The city of Herat sits at the western foot of the Hindu Kush near the desert. It had long been a hotbed of resistance. Following the Panjshir operation, the Soviets surrounded Herat with more than 300 armored vehicles and conducted a house-to-house search. Most of the Mirjulrediri had fled, so the Soviets met little resistance." All the same, the Soviets reestablished their control of the city. The most effective tactical adjustment made by the Soviets was the increased use of special forces (Spetsrtai and airborne units) in small-scale search-and-destroy mis-ARMOR - September-October 7 988 7 sions. Curiously, even these operations occasionally involved armor. A British journalist traveling in Afghanistan reported a mechanized ambush. Six BMDs were airlifted into a Mtijaltedirt infiltration route along the Pakistan border just before dark. In a 10-day period, the small armored force destroyed six insurgent sup ly groups and killed 18 Mtijalreciiu. P2 Most heliborne operations were still in support of large-scale offensives, which depended mainly on mechanized forces in the combined arms team. The Kunar Offensive, which took place in May 1985, is a good example of the evolution of the Soviet tactical doctrine and its effectiveness. The primary objective of the Kunar operation was to open the Jalalabad-Chagha Sarai road and establish security posts to block Mtljahediri infiltration routes into Pakistan. The operations also had the subsequent mission to destroy insurgent strongholds in Pesh Dara and Asmar. Finally, the Soviets intended to relieve the garrison at Barikot, which had been besieged by the Miijaltedin for over a year. To accomplish these goals, the Soviets gathered two Afghan infantry regiments, two Afghan commando units, a border brigade (all Afghan units were at 50-percent strength), a Soviet motorized rifle - "Soviet success, however, was only temporary-Once the Soviet troops returned to their permanent bases, the Mujahedin eliminated the isolated securitv posts... I' regiment, and a Spetsrraz battalion. On 23 May, the Soviets led the way from Jazlalabad to Changa Sarai. After establishing security posts along the highway and a strong firebase at Changha Sarai, the Soviets launched attacks on two axes, with a supporting attack toward Pesh Dara. An air assault, planned to assist the advance, became isolated when the pound attack stalled. The air assault force suffered heavy casualties and had to withdraw by helicopter. The main attack to Asmar was also supported by Spetsria: commando teams, which seized key points along the route. The Spefsrra: teams leapfrogged ahead of the main body during the day, but withdrew at night. Fierce battles broke out near Narai, but with the help of 150 helicopter gunship and aircraft sorties a day, the Soviets pressed on toward Barikot. As the main column approached Barikot, the Soviets airlifted a strong striking detachment into the garrison. They then launched a pincer attack simultaneously from the garrison and the relieving column. In the face of such pressure, the Miijahedirr withdrew into the rnountains.13 Soviet success, however, was only temporary. Once the Soviet troops returned to their permanent bases, the Mtijaltedin eliminated the isolated security posts and once again besieged Barikot. In 1985, Soviet offensive tactical doctrine still called for mechanized forces to protect, hit, rk, and destroy the enemy.14 In practice, 8 ARMOR - September-October 7988

Soviet experience in Afghanistan parallelled the U. S. Vietnam campaigns against similar indigenous guerrillas. The Soviets discovered that while they might win set-piece battles, it was difficult to find and fix the Mujahedin. And even if they gained control of an area, they had to remain there if they wanted to keep it. I... An uphill fight In Afghanistan, the Soviets quickly learned that they could not maneuver along valley floors unless they controlled the heights along the route. These photos are from Soviet publications. I 9 ARMOR - September-October 7988 special heliborne forces most often compromised the outflanking detachments to Ti the enemy. As is evident in the Kunar operation and others, the mechanized forces could hit and protect, but rarely could they fuc or destroy with significant results. The Soviet doctrine remains basically the same; seize the heights, then encircle and destroy with a coordinated combined arms attack. The Soviet mechanized forces were unable to fulfill their prescribed functions, and so their role in the combined arms team changed. Mechanized forces continued to be the primary instrument in largescale offensives to protect Soviet troops while hitting the enemy. Special heliborne forces fvc and in small-scale operations find, fur, and destroy. Other adjustments to the offensive tactical doctrine have included saturation bombing from high-altitude bombers, and chemical weapons. The failure of Soviet mechanized forces to perform as prescribed is probably due to terrain, organization, and the influence of their operational plan for victory. Years ago, J. F. C. Fuller granted that truly steep terrain was unsuitable for mechanized forces. Instead, he emphasized their utility in securing the valley Obviously, there are places where tracked vehicles simply cannot go. When the Mtijaltediii withdrew into the mountains, often they could be pursued only by foot and fire. A doctrine that called for outflanking detachments composed of mechanized forces and other combined arms elements, such as engineers and artillery, was bound to undergo some adjustments. The organization of the Soviet Army, most of which is mechanized, encouraged the Soviets to try the same old hammer and anvil tactics. Their insistence on combined arms is certainly correct in the right place, but operations in difficult terrain - mountain or jungle - call for a high order of cooperation. In many of their operations, they appeared unable to execute their doctrine or the adjustments they made due to poor synchronization of the combined arms. Isolated air assaults, failure of the infantry to close with the enemy, failure of the combined arms to fulfill all the tactical functions required to destroy the insurgents, were all key problems. Some readers may point to poor training or reluctant allies, but part of the reason may lie in tactical organization. If the U. S. Army was any better using mechanized forces in Vietnam, it may have been due to the concept and organization of armored cavalry. Although the Red Army has reconnaissance units, it has no comparable organization for an organic combined arms force. The American ACR is a balanced force, combining all the arms in a tightly-knit unit, which constantly trains as a team. Finally, to a much greater degree than was the case in Vietnam, the Soviet operational plan influenced tactics. Apparently, the Soviets intended to defeat the insurgency at an operational, rather than tactical, level. They used military force not so much to destroy the insurgents, but to exhaust and attrit them. The Red Army protected the urban areas and lines of communication, patiently waiting for the insurgency to collapse, or for Sovietization to remold the country. In order to minimize political and military costs, they maintained a relatively small force to deal with an insurgency in a large country. In short, the Soviet doctrine for mechanized forces in Afghanistan did not work to crush the resistance because the number of troops was insufficient. The Soviets, "in contrast to American policy in Vietnam, would apparently rather risk losing tactically than spending more on their purely military adventures."" Whether in Afghanistan or Vietnam, history demonstrates that armor does have a role in LIC. The most appropriate tactical doctrine for mechanized forces in depends upon the combat function they will serve within the combined arms team. As noted, these functions will vary with terrain and the operational plan. At the very least, armor has demonstrated that in the LIC environment it can protect and hit. When properly organized and employed, it may also be used to find, fur, and - in conjunction with the other arms - destroy insurgent forces. To make the most of armor on the LIC battlefield, an army must have a good combined arms doctrine before it is committed to fight. The evidence suggests that mechanized forces are best employed in battalion- to brigdde-size small-scale cordon search operations. Their mobility and firepower are best employed in encirclement operations, or as a reaction force, or reserve. Keeping Fuller's battlefield functions in mind, the implications for armor in LIC may look like this: Protect: In the near term, operations require alight armor vehicle of 15-20 tons to meet deployability requirements. Strap-on armor might be an alternative once the vehicle deploys to the contingency area." If money is not available for research and development of anew vehicle, modified M2s or M3s would be preferable to less effective alternates, such as the HMMWV or a product-improved M551. In fact, weight of the vehicle is less a deployability problem for LIC than other lcvels of war. Light forces can initially secure the endangered government until the heavier and better protected armored vehicles 10 ARMOR - September-October 7988 arrive. Although alight tank may be the optimum solution, we should not hesitate to deploy M60 or M1- series tanks with follow-on contingency forces involved in LIC. In the future, the next generation of armored vehicles should have a common system base. If weight could be reduced to the 35- to 40- ton range, similar to the current family of Soviet tanks, deployability of main battle tanks would greatly improve. In this case, a standard organization for armor units would become possible, perhaps eliminating the need for light armor units. Since deployability drives armor to reduce weight and thus reduce protection, research and development should focus on improving the means of transporting heavier vehicles and developing lighter armor. Hit: In the near term, lire systems that suppress, such as the 25-mm automatic cannon and the grenade launcher, should be most effective in permitting forces to close with the enemy. Large-caliber direct-lire weapons, such as the 105-mm tank cannon, remain effective against insurgent fortifications and point targets. In the future, a ma.jor concern in LIC is to limit the destruction caused by military operations. We should push technology to develop acquisition systems that permit the delivery of direct and indirect "smart" munitions. Discreet fires would limit collateral damage. Find: Local and battlefield intelligence play a large role in locating the enemy. The combined arms organization on the LIC battlefield should have an attached or organic military intelligence company. Organic aerial reconnaissance assets would also increase effectiveness. Fix: In the near term, using airmobile and ground forces to f i i the enemy through encirclement will continue to be the most viable method. Whether airmobile infantry or fast-moving mechanized troops do this will depend upon the terrain and the urgency of the situation. In the future, technology and doctrine should look at the development of armor vehicles that a helicopter can deploy to the battlefield. In appropriate terrain, this would give the fixing force the advantages of protection, firepower, and mobility after commitment. We may also wish to consider the poten-, tial of anon-lethal incapacitating gas. Once such a chemical weapon is delivered into a suspected insurgent area, protected troops could quickly move in to search and sort out insurgents from civilians without loss of life. Destroy. Combined arms will remain the most successful way to conduct offensive operations in LIC. A single combined arms doctrine, which prescribes the tactical employment of all arms, to include the armored cavalry, will contribute strongly to our chances of success in the most frequent level of war -low intensity conflict. Notes Larry A. Briskey, Soviet Ground Forces in Afahanistan: Tactics and Performance. unpublished graduate paper, Georgetown University, 1983, p. 5. 1. 21bid, p. 6.

3. Aernout Van Lynden, "Soviets Change Tactics Against Afghan Rebels," Washinaton Post, 27 Dec 1982, p. A-26. General Lieutenant D. Shrudnev, Vovennvi Vestnik, July 1978, quoted in Briskey, Soviet Ground Forces, p. 17. 5C. N. Donnelly, "Soviet Mountain Warfare Operations," International Defense Review, June 1980, p. 829. 4. ARMOR - September-October 7988 " Ibid, p. 831.

7. Edward Giradet, Afahanistan. The Soviet War, St. Martin's Press, NY, 1985, 8Van Lynden, "Soviets Change Tactics," 'Ibid. 10'Zalmay Khalilzad, "Moscow's Afghan War," Problems of Communism, Jan-Feb 1986, p. 4. "Charles Doe, "Soviets See Time on Their Side in Afghanistan," Army Times, 21 Jan 1985, p. 28. 12'David Isby, The Better Hammer, Soviet SDecial Operations Forces and Tactics in Afahanistan. 1979-1986, unpublished paper, 1986, pp. 26- 27.255P255D 13'This account is taken from COL Ali Jalali, The Soviet Militarv Operation in Afghanistan and the Role of Liaht and Heavv Forces at Tactical and ODerational Level. Light Infantry Conference, Seattle, 14'F0r a discussion of Soviet offensive tactical doctrine see COL G. banov, "Battle in a Canyon," Krasnava Zvezda, 1 Oct 1985, translated by JPRS-UMA-85068.

15'J. F. C.

Fuller, Armoured Warfare, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1983. Originally published in 1931 as Lectures on FSR 111, p. 168. l6'COL Jalali, Soviet Owrations, p. 163. "*Directorate of Combat Development, Armor Support of Liaht Forces, transcript of concept briefing, 17 Jan 1984.

p. 33.

p. A-26. WA, 1985, pp. 178-179. Major Michael R. Matheny taught history at the Armor Advanced Course at Fort Knox, KY, and at the USMA at West Point, NY. He is a graduate of the CGSC and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He commanded a tank company and served as a tank battalion S3 with the 3d Infantry Division in Germany. He is currently assigned to the G3 Plans section of the 1st Cavalry Division, Ft. Hood, TX. 71