Find the Second Echelon

Find the Second Echelon! by Lieutenant Colone Williai I n L. Howard “The most common incorrect decision commanders make . .

i nvo lves com m i tt i n g the reserve.. . / # 8 Introduction Equipment, tactics, and training are among the key aspects of success in battle. A corollary to this is the ability to find the enemy, determine what he is doing and then take appropriate action. This is a team effort, involving the scout platoons, the brigade intelligence systems, and the battalion and brigade operational planners. In the end, all affect the commander’s decision. In consideration of a potential adversary’s mobility and his reported doctrine of rapidly-moving armored forces, the intelligence effort must be concerned not only with what is directly in front of the FEBA but where the enemy’s reinforcements are and their direction of movement. The intelligence effort must be concerned with finding the second echelon. A slow-moving infantry unit can take days to arrive at the front line, but an armored element can reach the front in hours. The battalion and brigade intelligence officers (IO) must be concerned with both the enemy immediately in front and with those follow-on elements which may be 30 or 50 miles away. To successfully accomplish an analysis of the enemy, the IO must have both reports from the troops in contact with the enemy and reports from his reconnaissance elements. Information supplied from higher and deeper intelligence assets is also necessary. Once he has all this information plotted on his S2 work map, he is then in a position to analyze future developments and advise the operational planners and his commander. If any aspect of his analysis is faulty, then the operational plan will be flawed and the commander may make an incorrect decision. The most common incorrect decision commanders make involves committing the reserve. A premature decision to commit the reserve, based on faulty intelligence, can be disastrous. Locating and monitoring the enemy’s second echelon force is of critical concern. Of more immediate concern, especially in peacetime, is how to train the battalion and brigade staffs to function as a team. This article describes a training exercise conducted for a ranger infantry company whose mission was long-range reconnaissance in support of a corps G2 section. The methodology and equipment that was used can be scaled down to division-, brigade-, and battalion-size units. Background In early 1973, the U.S. Army selected several of its Reserve training divisions to form Maneuver Training Commands (MTCs). It was expected that these new commands would plan and conduct training tests (ATTs), map maneuvers, field-training exercises (FTXs), and command post exercises (CPXs) for the battalions and lower echelon Reserve Component units in the readiness regions to which the MTCs were assigned. The 100th Division (Training), in Kentucky, formed one of the new MTCs in June 1973. Its organizational chart resembled a corps headquarters plus a unit called the Umpire Group. By 1974, the unit was fully operational and by the end of the year had conducted two FTXs, four CPXs, eleven ATTs, and three map maneuvers. During 1974, too, plans were laid for a reorganization -the first of many. As a result, branch 40 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare September-October 1986 material teams were set up to conduct the various exercises. (Subsequent reorganizations were based on the troop unit density of the Reserve Component units in the Region.) The final MTC configuration showed nineteen functional teams, with all of the Army’s branches, except Military Intelligence, being represented. The 100th MTC had conducted exercises for a variety of units at all levels. An exercise conducted for Company F, 425th Infantry (Ranger), for example, was the first of its type and was a corps-level intelligence problem. It has also conducted a series of exercises for a COSCOM rear area operations center and several subordinate units. Because of the organizational structure of the National Guard, there was a ranger infantry company and numerous combat service support units assigned to a rear area operations center. While this was done for command and control purposes, each unit, upon mobilization, would go to a different command. The specific purpose of the exercise, for the ranger infantry company, was to show the troops their role in the intelligence cycle. The entire series of exercises required a corps-level scenario. To expedite matters, the Army Command and General Staff College’s ‘%orward Deployed Force Scenario” was adopted. The 425th Infantry company’s mission required the unit to form patrols which would be air-dropped behind enemy lines, where they would conduct reconnaissance missions. Using coded messages and burst transmitters, these patrols would report what they had observed. These messages would be received by their company headquarters, who would then deliver the messages to the Corps G2. The first major questions were: What were the patrols going to see, and how would they see it? The solution was to use various identification and recognition guides, plus commercially available models of Soviet equipment. Other problem areas were administrative in nature and in most cases were resolved prior to the start of the exercise. During the exercise, the patrols were gathered at tables with a controller for each patrol. All the patrols were located in a large drill hall in the armory, while the company headquarters was set up in a separate office. In an adjacent office, the Corps G2 section was established. Because of personnel considerations, three officers (two intelligence officers and one infantry officer) and one NCO made up the entire corps headquarters. A corps situation map and an intelligence work map made up the corps headquarters. By prior arrangement, ascenario was developed in which the opposing force was attacking on three major axes in the corps sector. The personnel manning the corps headquarters had to generate most of the raw information needed to support the scenario. The front-line trace was plotted, air photo missions were plotted and, based upon the order of battle of the opposing’ force, numerous units and activities were created on the intelligence work map. Meanwhile, “behind enemy lines,” patrol controllers were placing the various vehicle models and photographs out for the patrols to observe. Reports by the patrols were recorded on tape cartridges to be transmitted at the appointed time. Because of the short period allowed for this exercise, twelve hours of exercise time were compressed into four hours of real time. During the four hours, the different patrols submitted their reports. These were decoded at the company and delivered to the corps headquarters where they were plotted on the intelligence work map. The basic information on the work map was consolidated on the corps situation map. At a predetermined time, both maps were taken to the drill hall and the patrols were allowed to watch as a simulated briefing of the corps G2 was conducted, using the intelligence work map. Then a simulated briefing of the corps commander and his staff was conducted using the situation map. Recommendations for action were proposed by the G3 and requests for additional information were levied on the G2. Once the briefing was concluded, all elements returned to their work areas. The next four hours saw the patrols relocated, a new front line trace, new air photo missions and the generation of other intelligence indicators. Four hours real time later, another brief-ingseasion was conducted. The exercise was conducted on Saturday and Sunday so there were a total of three complete briefing cycles, which in exercise time was almost two days. . At the conclusion of the exercise, the Maneuver Training Command team conducted a review of the exercise and its objectives. The patrol personnel gained a much better understanding of the intelligence process and their roles in the operation. The MTC personnel also learned a great deal about corps-level planning and operations. Lessons learned were incorporated in future exercises. The basic scenario was also used later for the Rear Area Operations-Center exercise. The use of the plastic models greatly enhanced the realism of what might have been considered a dull, map maneuver. This fact was transmitted to various Army commands and served to inspire the development of the current Soviet models now in use by the Army. While the exercise was designed to provide training to long-range reconnaissance patrols, it has excellent potential to provide training to intelligence analysts as well as other intelligence personnel. In addition, it has the potential to provide training to all personnel involved with AirLand Battle planning and the location of enemy second echelon units. Application This exercise, while done for a company-size unit in support of a corps intelligence section, can be scaled down for a battalion-size unit to provide training to the scout platoon and the battalion S2 and S3 sections. It also has the potential for use by a brigade to train all scout sections and brigade intelligence systems. The minimum requirements are a large room with a large scale map for the main battle area; a separate area for each element of a scout platoon; a separate room, away from the main battle area, for each battalion S2/3 element, and another room for the brigade S2/3, or control element. ~~ ~ ~~ September-October 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of MobiIe Warfare 41

"Support requirements are minimal as organic communication equipment can be used ... .. Prior planning must include a detailed OPFOR plan of attack along with appropriate intelligence indicators, to include air photos, spot reports and P W interrogations. The plan can afford to be rigid and inflexible since the purpose of the exercise is to train our forces in teamwork, not to demonstrate the prowess of the OPFOR commander! In addition, once the OPFOR basic plan is completed, several terrain models should be constructed to represent areas on the map in which the recon elements might operate. Enemy situations and formations can be simulated using items from training aids and by using the 1/300 scale models used by wargamers. Personnel requirements are minimal. There should be two controllers for each reconnaissance element, a controller for each ,9213 element, and an exercise director. One additional person would be required for the senior headquarters not actually involved in the exercise. Support requirements are minimal as organic communication equipment can be used. In the event that the exercise is conducted at brigade level, several field telephones should be used to link the brigade and division G2/G3 elements. In conclusion, this article describes a method whereby a commander from battalion level upward can conduct his own training which will provide experience for the scout platoon sections, the S2 and S3 elements in a minimum time with limited space, equipment and support. It will provide more realism for the scout section personnel and improve their performance on SQT recognition testing. It will allow the commander to develop teamwork in his unit and to do so prior to the critical test of combat.

LI E UTE N A NT C 0 LON EL

WILLIAM L. HOWARD graduated from The Citadel in 1964 and was commissioned in the Ordnance Corps. He is a graduate of theTank-Automotive Maintenance Officer Course, the USA Command and General Staff College, the MIOAC and AOACcours-es. He served as commander, 1 l t h Military HistoryDetach-ment, and prepared the official historyof themoveof US logistic base from France. He also served with the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center, Vietnam, and as a company and battalion commander at Fort Polk, LA, and was also with the 100th Maneuver Training Command. In 1978, he transferred to Armor and was an instructor attheAOACat FortKnox, KY. As a Reserve officer, he was attached to DIA and INSCOM and has also been a consul-tanton Sovietarmorandanti-tank weapons at Battelle Memorial Institute and has worked for Leatherwood Industries. He is presently a member of the Individual Ready Reserve. Recognition Quiz Answers

1. EE-9 CASCAVEL (Brazil). Crew, 3; combat weight, 12 tons; maximum road speed, 100 km/hr; maximum road range, 750 km; armament, 1 x EC-90 90-mm main gun, 1 x 7.62-mm or .50 caliber AA machine gun; engine, 6-cylinder 21 2-hp diesel; armor protects against small arms up to .50 caliber.

2. M106A1 107-MM MORTAR CARRIER

(U.S.). Crew, 6; combat weight, 11,966 kg (13 tons); maximum road speed, 67 km/hr (water, 5-8 km/hr); maximum road range, 483 km; armament. 1 x 12.7-mm machine gun, 1 x M30 mortar; engine, 6-cylinder 21 5-hp diesel.

3. LAV PIRANHA (U.S.). Crew, 3 + 6; combat weight, 12,882 kg (14 tons); maximum road speed. 100 km/hr; (water, 10.46 km/hr); maximum road range, 668 km; engine, 6-cylinder 275-hp diesel; armament, 1 x 25- mm M242 Chain gun, 1 x7.62-mm coaxial machine gun, 1 x 12.7-mm AA machine gun (optional).

4. M2 BRADLEY (U.S.). Crew, 3 + 7; combat weight, 22,666 kg (24 tons); maximum road speed, 66 km/hr (water, 7.2 km/hr); maximum road range, 483 km; engine, 8-cylinder 500-hp diesel; armament, 1 x 25-mm Chain Gun, 1 x 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun, 2-tube TOW launcher.

5. BMP (USSR). Crew, 3+8; combatweight, 13.500 kg (14 tons); maximum road speed, 80 km/hr (water, 6-8 km/hr); maximum road range, 500 km; engine, 6-cylinder 300-hp diesel; armament, 1 x 73-mm main gun, 1 x 7.62- mm coaxial machine gun, one launcher rail for Sagger

ATGW.

6. T-62 MBT (USSR). Crew, 4; combat weight, 40,000 kg (44 tons); maximum road speed, 50 km/hr; maximum road range with added tanks, 650 km; engine, 12-cylinder 580-hp diesel; armament, 1 x 155-mm main gun, 1 x 7.62-mm coaxial machine gun, 1 x 12.7-mm AA machine gun. 42 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare September-October 1986