REC at the NTC

Radio Electronic Combat a bY ~t the NTC Captain Mic :I Ilael T. Pierso The Opposing Force (OPFOR) Electronic Warfare/Radio Electronic Combat (EW/REC) Detachment at the National Training Center (NTC) has the unique mission of simulating a Soviet REC unit in support of the OPFOR 32d Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment. The 40- member detachment provides communication intelligence (COMINT) monitoring, imitative communications deception (ICD), direction finding (DF), ground surveillance radar (GSR), and signal jamming support. Jamming equipment used by the detachment includes two XM-330 electronic counter measures (ECM) systems. These systems are based on Soviet EW equipment and operate within the parameters of actual Soviet doctrine. Another simulation of Soviet equipment operated by the detachment is the XM-834 ground base air-to-air jammer. Each of these systems is on a 2%- ton truck and is powered by a 60KW generator. Either system is capable of jamming three frequencies at the same time with a maximum output of 1,500 watts. In addition to the larger ECM systems, the detachment can also employ 2 AN/VLQ-4 “Piranha” VHF jammers on W-ton trucks. These systems can jam from 20 to 76 MHz with a maximum possible output of 300 watts. An advantage of this system is the capability to jam on the move. The detachment also uses thirteen VRC 46/47 radios for intercept and for gathering communications intelligence. These have proven particularly effective since they are the same radios most training units use for communication at the NTC. Within the vast area of the desert, direction-finding equipment is most beneficial. The REC unit employs AN/GRRS direction-finding systems in support of the OPFOR. The detachment has devised a mounting system that allows the receiver and the azimuth indicator to be in Truck-mounted XM-330 jammer and jeep-mounted direction finder, with azimuth indicator and receiver on rear fender, used by OPFOR at the NTC. mounted side-by-side on the rear fender of the jeep. Hence, the DF team is more mobile, having only to set up the W5-9880 DF antenna upon reaching their desired operational location. The systems are normally deployed approximately 6,000 meters apart. The teams can effectively locate enemy transmissions to within one hundred meters and provide a six-digit map grid location. The flat, open terrain in the desert enables GSR to be effective to its maximum range. Detecting movement of vehicles to 10,000 meters and personnel to 6,000 meters is possible with the AN/PPSd. In addition, the GSR guides friendly patroldraids into or out of enemy lines. The REC detachment can employ up to three systems at one time. BRDMs (visually-modified M880 trucks) transport these systems. One point which has been noted as a result of REC at the NTC is that none of the communications sys tems or data transfer systems presently used by the tactical units in the field are invulnerable to deliberate interference. Examples of the systems which have been targeted are the TACFIRE digital system and the KY-57 (VINSON) voice encryption system. While it has not been possible to decrypt the digital traffic, it has been possible to disrupt the digital signals and force personnel to talk in the clear. Also, personnel using VINSON seem to develop a false sense of security, leading to extensive use of lengthy transmissions which permit OPFOR ~~ September-October 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 35 direction-finding teams to locate their position accurately. The majority of units rotating through the NTC do not practice communications security (COMSEC). This allows the REC unit’s interceptors to monitor enemy frequencies and gain valuable intelligence. Key frequencies, such as the task force command, artillery, and the scout platoon can be identified and passed to the jammers. In instances which are becoming more common, rotational units have not used daily changing callsigns, but have relied on such things as Red 6, White 6, Black 6 to identify platoon leaders and the company/team commander. These callsigns make tracking and following such units from day to day a very easy process and allow non-friendly stations to enter the net and pass bogus information. A prime target for imitative communication deception (ICD) is the artillery net. Misdirect-ing fire and giving the impression that artillery is on the way have proven to be extremely successful ploys. This success is largely due to a lack of authentication and proper encoding and decoding of messages by “friendly” forces. Recently a task force commander of a mechanized unit using a nonsecure radio transmitted the following message to his TOC: “Get the S3 and the other five main guys (Co/Tm commanders) to meet me on HHC push in 15 minutes for a final update.” The OPFOR REC interceptors had already identified the enemy’s HHC frequency, and this information was passed directly to the regimental commander. Simply by monitoring the VRC-46 radio on his vehicle, the commander of the 32d Guards MRR listened while the task force commander passed the follow information (Figure 1): The two Co/Tms forward, spread across the sector, were “thin.” The TF Cmd instructed the Co/Tm Cmds not to become decisively engaged from the front, but allow the OPFOR to pass and engage them from the rear with their tanks. 0 The majority of E Company TOWS were in place on Hill 899. The Co/Tm on Hill 910 was instructed to move back, on order, to their alternate position north of cerned that this move take place because he considered that the weakest point of the defense. The two Co/Tms to the rear were located south of Hill 876 and toward Hill 985. 0 All obstacles (concertina wire and mines) were in place at the crossings. Chopper support would be coming from the rear of the sector (to the south). The scout platoon was located in the same place as the previous day and would supply intelligence on direction and location of the second echelon. 0 The second task force, farther to the east, was still preparing defensive positions and could handle only small breakthroughs. The information and intelligence the commander of the regiment gained was as follows: The regiment was facing a mechanized task force with a second task force preparing positions in depth to the east. defense and the TF Cmd had not had the time to get all his Co/Tm Cmds together for a final briefing at the TOC. Chopper support would be coming from the south. 0 The mission of the scout platoon was to identify the second echelon. The task force commander believed his biggest weakness was North of Hill 876. The MRR Cmd now had in his possession the locations of all the following: the two forward Co/Tms The jeep-mounted AN/VLQ-4 “Piranha” jammer, used by the OPFOR to interfere with 20- 76 Mhz radio traffic. Hill 876. The TF Cmd was con- 36 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare September-October 1986

"...With this much intelligence on the enemy, the outcome of the battle was never in doubt ... I . The XM-330 can be used to jam three frequencies at the same time. Maximum output of the system is 1,500 watts. and their mission - to engage from the rear; the two rear Co/Tms; E Company TOWS, and all obstacles in place, by type. With this much intelligence on the enemy, the outcome of the battle was never in doubt. The regimental commander took advantage of the intelligence gained and changed his orders to ensure he attacked the enemy's weaknesses. The regiment attacked and overran the mechanized task force and had 80 percent of its combat power left when it engaged the second task force. Throughout the battle, the REC unit continued supporting the regiment by jamming the scout platoon frequency so no SPOT reports reached the task force commander on the location or direction of the approaching regiment; by jamming the artillery frequencies so that not a single round of artillery fell on the advancing regiment; and by jamming the command nets so that the task force commander was not able to effectly control his forces to maneuver against the approaching echelons. This task force learned a valuable lesson the hard way. If it had set up proper radio procedure and if it had ensured encoding and decoding of messages and short radio transmissions, the task force commander's message would have never been intercepted. Additionally, the loss of command and control and artillery support could have been avoided if an alternate means of com-munciations had been established (such as different color star clusters to indicate phase lines or direction of movement). For years, maneuver commanders have disregarded the importance of electronic warfare. At the NTC, the Electronic Warfare/Radio Electronic Warfare Detachment is reminding them that EW can be a major battlefield contributor.

CAPTAIN MICHAELT. PIER-

SON served at the NTC as the commander of the OPFOR EW/REC. S2 of the OPFOR Motorized Rifle Regiment, and as scout platoon leader. He is a graduate of the Military Intelligence Basic Course, Imagery Interpretation Course, and the Military intelligence Advanced Course. He received his BA from Carson-Newman College and his M A from East Tennessee State University and is presently the S2 of the 1st Battalion, 35th Armor, 1AD Germany. September-October 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 37