Lessons Learned at the NTC: An Observer Controller's Perspective

Lessons Learned At the National Training Center: An 0 bserver-Controller’s Perspective __ Operation TORCH, the code name for the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942, marked the US. Army’s first offensive operation in WWII. As TORCH unfolded, US. and British forces gained strategic surprise with landings in North Africa and moved east into Tunisia to defeat the famed German Afrika Korps. Initial US. Army tactical operations, however, met disaster as elements of the US. I1 Corps were defeated and forced to withdraw through the Kasserine Pass.’ The Army published a report defining the lessons learned during the Tunisian Campaign. The analysis determined that, although there by Major Beaufort C. Hallman, Jr. were many challenges to effective training as the Army prepared for WWII, the basic principles outlined in contemporary training literature were sound. Most tactical failures, it pointed out, occurred as a result of inappropriate application of those basic principles.2 Unlike the US. Army of the early 1940s, the Army today is learning how to apply those basic principles while undergoing the most realistic combat training outside of combat itself.:l The Army’s National Training Center (NTC), located at Fort Irwin, California, provides our heavy forces with the opportunity to prepare to win the first battle of the next war. Using sophisticated computer instrumentation and the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES), units are able to sift through the “fog of war” and enhance their learning of critical combat skills. Training at the NTC includes 14 davs of field training in which a maneuver brigade, organized into two battalion task forces (TF), is matched against a totally professional opposing force (OPFOR) representing a Soviet motorized rifle regiment. During force-on-force operations, the OPFOR actions and MILES equipment produce realistic combat stress levels. These stress levels are heightened as task forces fight a regiment of computer-controlled targets in live-fire opera- t i o n ~ . ~ Throughout the NTC training, realism pervades the battlefield and continuous operations are the rule. OPFOR patrols can penetrate at any time whether on the offensive or the defensive. The OPFOR regiment in the attack advances at the rate of one kilometer every three minutes. OPFOR defensive obstacles and fire attacks are devastating and OPFOR jammers disrupt command and control nets at critical times during all operations. Smoke generators simulate artil- - 30 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare September-October 1986 lery-delivered obscuration, and airburst simulators replicate overhead artillery fires. CS (tear gas) grenades represent chemical contamination; training M-256 kits give appropriate chemical agent colors, and specially modified IM 174s give nuclear contamination readings. Hand grenade simulators replicate air attacks. MILES equipment simulates direct fire, including near misses and kills. Controllers assess the casualties from air strikes, artillery, mines, NBC, and field fortifications that can stop the MILES laser, but would show impact effects from real ammunition. Battle-damaged equipment hs to be reported, evacated, fixed, and returned to the owner. Casualties must be reported, treated, and evacuated to the aid station. Ammunition, fuel, and food must be delivered to the user.6 Throughout the planning, preparation, and execution of all operations, observer controllers (OC) record observations and training analysts signal the computer to record key battle sequences and radio transmissions for inclusion in after action reviews (AAR) and also for unit take-home packages. After action reviews (AARs) follow each tactical mission and are conducted at platoon, company, and task force level. The after action review is a chronological review of the most significant observations, which can be used to improve unit performance.’ For those units that have experienced combat at the NTC, the battlefield realism and comprehensive feedback in the after action reviews have produced a steep learning curve in critical combat skills.8 9 As an observer controller for three years, I coordinated production of 250 task force level after action reviews. Those reviews are based on an analysis of the seven operating systems identified in FM 71-2 and later FM 71-25. The seven systems are intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility /countermobility /survivability, combat service support, and command and control. The purpose of this article is to share some significant lessons learned that I oh-served while assigned to the NTC. I will use those seven systems as a framework for pointing out the techniques that were especially effective and characterized the well-trained battalion task force. “The purpose of this article is to share some significant lessons learned that I observed while assigned to the NTC ... .I Intelligence. The first system an observer controller uses to analyze unit performance is intelligence. A smooth-functioning intelligence system allows commanders to see the battlefield.’O To be useful, both friendly and enemy information gathered before the battle must be provided to the key leaders of the task force. One technique used by the OPFOR commanders eliminates the problems of transmitting information by radio. Several hours before commencing an attack, the OPFOR gathers leaders for an intelligence update briefing. This allows their intelligence officer (S2) to provide the latest information, lets the commander confirm or adjust his scheme of maneuver, and aids coordination while maintaining radio silence. Denying information to the enemy is equally important. During one defense mission, OPFOR reconnaissance forces penetrated an armor task force sector. The TF scout platoon had the mission of screening the TF front, but spent 8 hours recovering from the previous battle. During this delay, the OPFOR established observation posts, reported information, and remained undetected until the battle began. AAR discussions showed a tank or mechanized infantry unit could easily have established the initial security force. Had there been a change of mission, the result of that battle would have been in favor of the friendly forces. Maneuver. The second system used to analyze a battle is maneuver. Using the task force’s combat elements, the maneuver system destroys the enemy or takes terrain.” Armor units must provide their own security when infantry support is not available. For example, during an attack in which a tank company was extremely successful in restricted terrain, the company OC observed the following technique. As a tank stopped in defilade, the loader dismounted, moved to a vantage point, searched for targets, and used arm signals to direct the fire of the crew. This technique allowed the company to fight through the restricted terrain. Another concern of the task force (TF) is the integration of obstacles and fires to destroy the enemy. Leaders should develop methods to check this integration. I observed the following method used by an armored TF commander in preparing a battle position defense. He Prior to starting each rotation, observer controllers and civilian technicians conduct instrumentation checks. The NTC instrumentation allows for instant replays of training battles during after-action reviews. ~ September-October 1986 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 31

I I 3 P c -- Troops breaching obstacles in the open desert are extremely vulnerable to both direct and indirect fire. Author suggests breaching at night and urges assignment of engineers on reconnaissance patrols. however, of Redeve or Stinger checked each platoon position, and on a map posted with theTF graphics, he added obstacles, platoon locations, platoon engagement areas, and the target reference points that each platoon could engage with direct fires. When compared with an overlay of the enemy avenues of approach, this variation of a TF fire plan allowed the commander to determine the number and type of weapons covering each avenue of approach and the TF obstacles. It also identified dead space and allowed him to adjust his defense plan to cover those areas. The result of this technique was a decisive victory over the OPFOR when they attacked the friendly defensive position. Fire .Support. The third system used to analyze results on the battlefield is fire support. The fire support system integrates available fires to support the maneuver system.12 To ensure synchronization, the fire support concept must be understood by key leaders of the TF. The fire support officer (FSO) usually briefs the fire support plan when the TF issues an operations -order. In order to ensure, however, that the commander’s intent is conveyed, one proven technique is to have the task force commander brief his scheme of fire support just as he does his scheme of maneuver. Having the commander personally outline responsibilities and the timing of planned fires allows the staff and subordinate leaders to gain a better understanding of the commander’s intent. Even with a clearly defined concept, execution of fires still can be difficult because of the required accuracy in map reading. During defensive preparations, one successful artillery battalion commander used the artillery Position Azimuth Determining System (PADS) to verify the location of target reference points (TRPs), obstacles, and maneuver unit positions. Consequently, both fire support and maneuver leaderis had accurate points of departure to execute artillery fires. The results were devastating in the application of indirect fire support. Air Defense. Air defense is the fourth system used to assess battlefield performance at the NTC. The air defense system incorporates support from attached air defense units in conjunction with active and passive air defense measures.13 Early warning is a critical aspect of air defense. Normally, air defense early warning is relayed to the task force by attached Vulcan and Redeye or Stinger units, which monitor the division early warning radio net. Without attached support, air defense early warning may be relayed from the brigade headquarters over the brigade command net. This procedure is identified in FM 71-25. Maneuver units must refine their techniques to ensure they are clearly understood by operational personnel at brigade and TF level. During on exercise, a tank TF fought three battles before it was able to establish procedures to ensure air defense early warning flowed from the brigade down to company/team (Co/Tm) level. Obviously, air defense early warning can facilitate engagement of enemy aircraft. Survivability, teams constrains tLe use of them forward in the TF sector because their wheeled vehicles are vulnerable to enemy fires. Many successful battalions have used an organizational technique to solve the survivability problem. When in direct support of a Co/ Tm, the Redeye or Stinger team separates. The gunner is placed in a Co/Tm armored vehicle, and the team leader remains with the Co/ Tm combat trains. This organization provides armored protection for the gunner who is forward and increases air defense coverage with the team leader further to the rear at the combat trains. This technique requires practice because the missile gunner and armored vehicle crew have competing requirements during air attacks. The gunner needs to dismount and gain a vantage point to engage the aircraft, and the armored vehicle crew needs to seek defilade. Additionally, reporting procedures are necessary to ensure resupply of missiles to the gunner. Mobility/Countermobility/ Survivability. The fifth system used-to analyze unit tactical operations is mobility/countermobility/ survivability. The attached engineers provide the basis for the mobility/countermobility /survivability system.14 One major concern is to maintain mobility. Breaching obstacles close to the enemy is dangerous, but darkness can provide concealment. For example, during one operation, a patrol was able to breach a wire and mine obstacles near an OPFOR position. The Co/ Tm commander discussed the ac- 32 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare September-October 1986

A typical OPFOR fighting position fora BMP is constructed in two tiers, allowing the vehicle to hide in turret defilade and fight from hull defilade. tion in the AAR. The patrol attached lines to the wire and replaced it after completing the breach. On a prearranged pyrotechnic signal, the patrol used these lines to pull the wire open as the Co/Tm attacked the objective. Consequently, the friendly unit’s mobility was not restricted by that enemy obstacle. During defensive operations, friendly obstacles are emplaced to restrict enemy mobility, but the trick is to ensure they are covered by fire. This requires close coordination with the engineers or the troops who actually construct the obstacle. One technique reported by an armor Co/Tm OC addressed this problem. The sequence begins with placing weapon systems into position. Then a target vehicle is placed at the obstacle start point. Gunners sight on the vehicle to determine whether they can engage a target at the start point. If so, then a stake is driven in the ground. This procedure is repeated as the target vehicle moves along the entire obstacle trace. If the target vehicle cannot be engaged, the choice is to move the obstacle location or displace some weapon systems. The unit ultimately has a line marked by stakes which represent the position of the obstacle and ensures coverage by direct fire weapons. Combat Service Support. The sixth operating system is combat service support. This system sustains the combat power of the TF.15 Since the TF combat trains are vulnerable to indirect fires, successful task forces have achieved protection by echeloning their combat The Seven Systems Tested at the NTC * Intelligence * Mobility/CountermobiI- * Maneuver ity/Survivability * Fire Support * Combat Service Support * Air Defense * Command and Control trains during the battle. Armor protection allows the track vehicles to be forward in the TF sector while operating the Admin/Log Center and aid station. Emergency ammunition, fuel, and wheel vehicles are further to the rear where they are less threatened by indirect fire. To be effective, procedures are necessary to communicate between the two elements. Another consideration in supporting the TF is handling of casualties. Units cannot wait until after the fight to begin this process. One first sergeant did a superb job in casualty evacuation. He ensured the medics reconnoitered the routes to the aid station. As casualties occurred, platoon sergeants reported losses and ensured the wounded were moved to a company/team collection point. The first sergeant moved the medics to that point and gathered appropriate data to report to the combat trains. The medics treated the casualties and began immediate evacuation to the aid station. From the first sergeant’s discussion of this technique during the TF Combat Service Support AAR, it was evident that he and his platoon sergeants had practiced the technique at their home station. Command and Control. The last operating system, the command and control system, ties the other systems together by providing the process, organization, facilities, and communications necessary to make decisions, issue orders, and supervise operations.16 It is vital to develop standard operating procedures (SOP) to ensure each staff officer provides timely information. After observing extremely effective command and staff actions by a mechanized infantry task force, an observer controller’s discussions with the commander and operations officer (S3) revealed extensive home station training. The TF commander and S3 reviewed AAR tapes of their previous NTC rotation to determine the information and coordination requirements of various offensive and defensive missions. To train the staff, an orders day was incorporated into the unit’s weekly training sched-September-October 1986 ARMOR: The Magazine of Mobile Warfare 33

The most effective use of on-board smoke generation is during actual contact. Indiscriminate use of smoke can compromise a vehicle‘s position. ule. Through repeated practice of command and staff actions, the TF was able to develop an SOP that satisfied the commanders information requirements and reduced the time required to generate operations orders. The reproduction of orders and graphics often is a necessary irritant. The “old jelly roll” is not reliable. Reproducing by hand consumes time and increases quality control problems. One unit overcame these difficulties by using commercial equipment. An operator typed data from the staff into a microcomputer which was programmed with formats of the five-paragraph field order. The computer then produced the order. A master copy of the graphics overlay was produced by hand, and grid register marks were spaced on it to facilitate cutting the overlay into sections which would fit into a commercial copier. Then, using the copier, the operations order was reproduced on paper and the graphics overlay was copied on transparencies. Throughout the rotation, this technique produced quality, hard copy orders, and overlays. Conclusion Unlike the Army of 1942, we have a realistic combat environment in which to hone the skills of war. NTC training creates the stress of battle and provides timely feedback keyed to the issues which produce success or failure. Experience at the NTC provides a unique opportunity to learn the key tactics, techniques, or procedures necessary to build a cohesive fighting force. Just as with the lessons learned in Tunisia, our doctrine is sound. Application of the basic principles offers many difficult challenges in training for combat. Tough opponents and high tempo battles often produce a very narrow margin of victory. Ultimately, our margin of strength in a rear war may well be the extent to which solutions become second nature to us. Bibliography ‘US. Department of the Army, American Military History, 1607-1958, ROTCM 145-20. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 17 July 1959, pp. 425-428. W.S. War Deparment, Training Lessons from the Tunisian Campaign., Washington D.C.: War Department, 15 October 1942, p. 1. 3Nordeen, Lon O., “Training Realism - A Force Multiplier,” National Defense, MayJune 1984, pp. 71-74. 4CombinedAnnsMonitor,2April 1985,p.3. SFetig, James, MAJ, USA, “Live Fire, Smoke, Mud The Army’s National Training Center Duplicates a Real Battlefield,” Defense Systems Review. May 1984, pp. 22-25. 6Rules of Engagement, Fort Irwin, California, 2 May 1985. ‘U.S. Army National Training Center, Operations Group Organization and Functions Manual, Fort Irwin, California, 18 September 1985. BFetig, p. 24. sRichardson, William R., GEN, USA, “Top Leadership Qualities Have Roots in Schools,” ARMY, October, 1985, p. 91. l0The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force, FM 71-W, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 1984, pp. 2-13. “Op. Cit., p. 1-34. lZOp. Cit., p. 7-5. 130p. Cit., p. 1-35. 140p. Cit., p. 1-35. 1SOp. Cit., p. 8-1. 160~. Cit., p. 2-7.

MAJOR BEAUFORT C.

HALLMAN, JR. was commissioned in Armor in 1969 after completing Army ROTC and receiving a Bachelor of Science Degree in Industrial Management from Clemson University. He is a graduate of the Armor OfficerAdvanced Course and the Air Command and Staff College. He has served as a tank platoon leader at Fort Hood, Texas, and in Vietnam, as an armored cavalry platoon leader with the America1 Division and as an adviser to the Vietnamese 1 st Armored Cavalry Regiment. He has been a battalion scout platoon leader and a tank company commander in Germany. He commanded an antitank company and served as a tank battalion S3, brigade assistant S3, and division assistant G3 operations officer in the 1st Cavalry Division. During his assignment at the NTC, he served as the S3 observercontroller on the Armor Combat Trainer .Team and observed33 battalion task force rotations. 34 ARMOR The Magazine of Mobile Warfare September-October 1986