T-64, IT-1 22 and IT-1 30: The Soviet Advantage

When a requirement for anew weapon system or combat vehicleis identified within the Soviet military, a vehicle is designed (or reverse-engineered) to satisfy that requirement. Once such a vehicle is fielded it will continue to be developed and modified over a usually long active service life. During these in-service developmental years, the Soviets gain very valuable experience and expertise concerning the vehicle’s capabilities. It is this expertise that can give the Soviets an edge. When the time comes for anew vehicle to replace the fielded one, or the established vehicle is sent into combat, the practical experience the Soviets have acquired over the years may give them and their fielded vehicle a dangerous advantage. Such an advantage may prove to be the deciding factor on the battlefield. While the number of vehicles that fit into the Soviet advantage category is fairly numerous, three vehicles stand out far and above the rest: the T-64 battle tank and the IT-122 and IT-130 assault guns. Prior to the first public appearance of the T-62 battle tank in 1965, anew Soviet tank, designated the M1970 or T-70, was identified by western intelligence sources. The appearance of the T-70, not only confirmed that a still older vehicle known as the T-67 was in fact an interim design “probably configured for vehicle running tests of the T-64’s hull and the turret of the T-62,”l but, also, that the Soviets had identified the requirement for anew tank. This new tank would not be evolutionary, as was the policy of Soviet tank designers, but instead would be revolutionary. The T-64 that was put into production in the mid-1960s appeared to be the service model of the T-70; a tank 40 T-64, IT4 22, and IT4: The Soviet Advantag By Captain James M. Warford that, according to several sources, never went into production. The West was suddenly faced with anew, very modem Soviet tank that had no counterpart in any other army. The T-64 mounted the fully smoothbore 125-mm RAPIRA32 main gun, which fired anew APFSDS round at a muzzle velocity in excess of 1,600m a sec- n d. This gun, while still being the largest main gun mounted on any tank in the world, was only one aspect of the T-64’s offensive capabilities. The tank was also fitted with a fully automatic loading system, allowing the crew to be reduced to three men wk lowing a useful amounl ammunition to be cam system is unusual on ah but was developed anc fulfill an identified re Another important as T-64’s firepower was its system, which include dence rangefinder. The such a system for fittin also marked a departui policy. “While some as like the IT-122 and IT-1: fitted with optical ra (stereoscopic or coincidc had been equipped wit

I Armor author Steven Zaloga com- I posed this drawing of the Soviet IT-

130. at left. by combining the chassis of the M1977 recovery vehicle, lower left, with the M-130 field gun that was adopted for the tracked vehicle. welding marks where the original gun was removed. At right, aside view of the T64A MBT. J 6 - The photo at lower:ett clearly shows.? I ple stadiametric rangefinders which were not effective at long range^."^ The T-64 MBT The T-64’s powerplant is one of the most radical aspects of the tank’s design. It consists of a 750-hp diesel engine that represents a drastic change from conventional designs, “being a flat, five-cylinder design, with horizontally opposed piston^."^ Several sources report that the engine is plagued by problems, and is constantly breaking down. The Soviets, however, seem to be happy with this innovative engine and apparently have solved the problems that confronted the British with their flat, opposed-piston engine in their early model Chieftain battle tanks. Perhaps the single most discussed aspect of the T-64$ design is its armor protection. While no conclusive unclassified information has been released concerning the type of design of armor used, the feasibility of fitting a T-64 era tank with composite armor (that includes a cast armor turret) has been confirmed by the design and testing carried out on the American T-95 prototype tank from 1 June 1958 to 1 August 1960. The T-95’s fused silica (glass) composite armor, having been designed to defeat primarily HEAT rounds, would fit very well into the Soviet concern over western antitank missiles (ATGMs). Since it is known that the Soviets began work on composite steel/ ceramic laminate armors as long ago as 1940,6 it can be determined that the T-64 is protected by at least a first generation of advanced armor. Whatever the exact composition of the armor turns out to be, one thing can be said for certain: the Soviets were faced with are quirement for a tank that was fitted with advanced armor, armor that was more survivable than earlier designs when faced with the growing numbers of ATGMs that it would encounter on the modern battlefield. The exact role the T-64 plays in the overall Soviet tank plan, as well as the reason the Soviets fielded a tank with the capabilities of the T- 64, are the subject of much speculation. One theory is that the T-64 is the modern embodiment of the Soviet heavy tank. The combination of an accurate, long range, large caliber gun (coupled to an advanced opticaVcoincidence rangefinder); with what probably was the most advanced and heaviest armor of its era, might allow the T-64 to be labeled anew heavy tank. Another theory is that the T-64 is a true battle tank, designed from the ground up to fight on the battlefield of the future. A third theory is that a tank like the T-64 was demanded because of the appearance of the M60Al and Chieftain in the West. These tanks, combined with the latest technological breakthroughs, brought out the weaknesses and the drawbacks of the T-62 very clearly. The Soviets needed a tank to deal with the threat from the West. Whichever of these three theories (or any combination thereof) turn out to be correct, the Soviets have made one thing very clear: the time had come for a tank like the T-64 to be fielded. The requirement was identified and using the most modern technology available, was satisfied. Soviet TD Doctrine In the Soviet Army, the tank destroyer(IT-ISTREBITEL TANK0V)I is seen as a vehicle designed from the ground up to be particularly well suited for destroying tanks. They are vehicles that combine a large caliber main gun (larger than the main gun of the tanks with which they are employed), heavier armor than what is possible to fit to turreted tanks, and a much larger ammunition-carrying capacity than a conventional tank. All of the above characteristics are then mated to the hull and suspension system of whatever current battle tank the Soviet Army made available. This meant that the tank destroyer could use the same hull and suspension of the tanks that were deployed with each unit they supported. According to Viktor Suvorov (the author of the book Inside the Soviet Army), “Every motor-rifle regiment (inside the USSR, but not abroad) has one battery of heavy assault guns,”E (tank destroyers). The IT-122, which first appeared in the Soviet Army in the 19508, replaced the SU-1OOM. This earlier vehicle gave the Soviet tank and mechanized units the ability to defeat the German Panther, Tiger I, and Tiger 11 tanks of WW 11. The IT-122 apparently was first seen in photographs taken of the DNIEPR exercises in 1967. They were also employed during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Again, according to Viktor Suvorov, they are employed “at times of acute tension.”S Once the situation in Czechoslovakia had been quieted, the IT-122s were returned to the Soviet Union. The IT-122 itself is based on the T-54/T-55 hull and suspension with the turret removed, and replaced by a heavily armored superstructure. The main gun is the 0-74 122-mm cannon. Perhaps the most interest ing feature of the IT-122, while not overlooking the huge jump in main 41 gun caliber over the T-54/T-55, is the mounting of a coincidence or stereoscopic rangefinder. The device, mounted at the commander’s station, “provides a very clear indication that the IT-122 was developed primarily for long range elimination of NATO heavy tanks.”lO It was not until the appearance of the T-64 in the mid-1960s that a Soviet tank was equipped with such a modem and accurate ranging system. The IT-122 was replaced in the 1960s by the IT-130, this time mating the T-62 hull and suspension with the excellent M46 130-mm gun. According to some sources, the IT-130 stayed in production after the deployment of the T-64. This was probably due to the performance of the 130-mm gun. The reason the Soviets decided to mount this field gun on a tank destroyer is twofold. First, the gun had been available for many years, and its capabilities were very well known; second, the Soviets were faced with the requirement to defeat the new tanks fielded in the West. Whilethe earlier 0-74 122-mm gun was very capable, the Soviets were faced with anew problem. This started with the American M-103 and British Conqueror heavy tanks and evolved into a tank with which the Soviets became very concerned, the British Chieftain. The answer to this problem was simple: develop a heavy tank to shoot it out with these new Western tanks, or update the tank destroyer fleet by choosing a newer base vehicle and re-fielding the 130-mm gun. There is some speculation that the Soviets decided to do both; however, it is known for sure that the IT-130 was fielded. In the same way that the SU-100 supplemented the IT-34/85, the IT- 130 was able to provide “the high accuracy and hard punch to supplement the scores of medium smoothbore-armed tanks firing at close range on the move.”ll In addition to the capabilities already mentioned, two more must be discussed. First, the 130-mm gun gives the IT-I30 the additional ability to provide very long range and accurate indirect fire support to suppress Western defensive/ATGM positions. Second, the extreme size of the gun not only offers the possibility of 130-mm APFSDS ammunition, but also the possibility of a heavy metal “aluminum-based heat round, where overkill is such an important factor in armor penetration.”12 It can easily be seen that the Soviet decision to field the IT- 130 with the 130-mm gun may have been one of the smartest moves the Soviet military has ever made. The M-46 130-mm field gun that was first shown to the public in May 1954, allowed the Soviets to field a tank destroyer that was “certainly capable of defeating any NATO tank of its day.”13 Exactly how successful the IT-122 and IT-130 were (are) is hard to determine. The reason for this is that these two vehicles have been surrounded by an extremely high level of secrecy. The explanation for this secrecy is not known, although the Soviets have historically been very protective of their antitank weapons. The only antitank weapons that are displayed and well known in the West are the ones that the Soviets are willing to export. “The systems which may not be exported are never demonstrated but remain unknown from their birth, throughout their secret life and often, even after their death.”14 The Soviet ability to keep the existence of major weapon systems a secret has been demonstrated more than once in the past. Perhaps the best example of this was the total surprise the Germans experienced when suddenly faced by the T-34 in WW 11. The Germans were not only not aware that the T-34 was in mass production; they were unaware that it existed. Any final assessment of the IT-122 and IT-130 cannot be made without the explanation of two additional points. IT-122 The IT-122 was not suddenly developed to solve anew problem that Soviets observed. It was fielded as the latest answer to a continual problem that was becoming more important as new vehicles were developed in the West. The IT-122 had at least two predecessors and, as mentioned above, was replaced by the IT-130. The question now is, “Where will the Soviets go from here?” It is highly unlikely that the Soviets will stop with the IT-130. The adoption of the T-64 or T-72 as a base vehicle mated to the new long barreled 152-mm field gun of the 2S5 self-propelled gun (which has been fielded since 1981) would 42

At left, a bogged-down IT-122. showing top-mounted 14.5-mm antiaircraft machinegun. The chassis is de-rivedfrom theT-54/55. At right.one window of the coincidence rangefinder on the T-64A can be seen immediately to the left and below the TC’s station. create a tank destroyer that would be able to not only deal with the new special armored tanks from the West, but also give the needed long range fire support to the aging 125-mm main gun of the newer Soviet medium tanks. The lack of detailed information, clear photographs, and white parade paint must not be allowed to show these Soviet tank destroyers as anything of the fielded Western tanks of the less than the real threat they are. T-64 era were outclassed from the It’s very clear from the above very beginning. The ZT-122 and ZT-discussion that the Soviets were 130, on the other hand, were truly faced with requirements for new unique vehicles. There is simply no vehicles, and that these require- Western equivalent for these very ments were satisfied. The T-64 was capable tank destroyers. needed in the mid-1960s; and once it When the Soviets fielded these was fielded it caused a reaction that three vehicles, they suddenly gained is still influencing tank design 18 to an advantage over the West. This 20 years later. The ZT-122 and ZT- advantage was first realized when 130 were not new concepts in the the Soviets were able to identify the Soviet Army. They were, instead, requirements for anew or updated modem solutions to a requirement vehicle and then satisfy these re-that made itself clear during WW quirements by fielding the proper

11. Perhaps the most interesting tank or tank destroyer. The Soviets aspect of all three Soviet vehicles have been able to use this advan- (and any new vehicles that may tage and develop it into something have been developed from them) is even more important: expertise. that they have no Western equiv- This expertise - 18 to 20 years old alents. While the Western armies with the T-64 and its technologies are equipped with modem battle and even older with the IT-122 and tanks with many similarities to the ZT-130 - could be a deciding factor T-64, they were fielded several on the battlefield. The Western years later. A comparison between countries, led by the U. S., missed them and the T-64, therefore, would their opportunity for the same ex be one of apples and oranges. Any pertise. The various armored vehi- I Footnotes ‘Burniece. Joseph R., and Hoven, Paul A.,

Understanding Soviet MBT Development, Military Technology, May 1984, p. 128. ZZaloga, Steven J., “Soviet T-72 Tank,” Jane’s Defense Review, May 1983, p. 425. 3Jenkins. D. H. C., “T-34 to T-80 The Evolution of Soviet Battle Tanks, plus IDRs T-62 Test Report,” International Defense Review, December 1981, p. 124. ‘Zaloga. Steven J., “Soviet Assault Guns,” Jane’s Defense Review, April 1983, p. 851. SWarford, Captain James M., “The T-95 A Gamble in High Risk Technology,” Armor, September-October 1983, p. 41. GZaloga, Steven J., “Soviet T-72 Tank,” Jane’s Defense Review, May 1983, p. 425. ’Zaloga, Steven J., “Soviet Assault Guns,’’ Jane’s Defense Review, April 1983, p. 850. BSuvorov, Viktor, Inside the Soviet Army, (New York Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.

1982) p. 207. Suvorov, Viktor, “Inside the Soviet Amy, Suvorov Replies,” International Defense Review, June 1983, p. 762. IOZaloga, Steven J., “Soviet Assault Guns,” Jane’s Defense Review, April 1983, p. 851. ”Burniece, Joseph R., and Hoven, Paul A., “Soviet Heavy Tanks,” Armor, March-April 1983, p. 24. lZIbid. 13Zaloga. Steven J., “Soviet Assault Guns,” Jane’s Defense Review, April 1983, p. 852. ‘‘Suvorov, Viktor, Inside the Soviet Army, (New York Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.

1982) p. 194. cle development policies in the West must be changed to allow anew vehicle to be fielded when it is required. Fielding armored vehicles to satisfy specific requirements as they are identified will not only allow the Western armies to maintain the pace of modem armored vehicle development, but would also provide the practical experience and expertise that will be needed to put steel on the Soviet advantage.

FORD was commissioned in armor in 1979 as a distinguished military graduate from the University of Santa Clara, CA. He has served as a tank platoon leader and support platoon leader in the 1 st Armored Division and as the G4 force modernization officer in the 2d Armored Division. He is currently commander of D/1-66th Armor Regt. (Cohort), 2d Armored Division. 43