Battalion Command and Control

Battalion Command and Control by Major Richard P. Geier Combat operations at battalion level require an experienced commander, an efficient staff and a superb organization. Army doctrine for the command and control of a maneuver battalion is described in general terms in FM 17-1 7, Coordinating Draft of the Division 86 Tank Battalion Task Force. Building upon the manual, the 1st Battalion, 13th Armor, 1st Armored Division, has developed a set of operational procedures that has proven effective in the command and control of a tank battalion during command post exercises (CPXs) and an externally evaluated army training evaluation program (ARTEP). This article will describe these procedures by detailing the organization and operation of the battalion tactical action center (TAC), tactical operations center (TOC), combat trains and field trains. The commander of the 13th Armor commands from his tank. The tank has been modified to meet the' requirements of a command and control vehicle by adding an extra radio and secure device and removing the turret ammunition rack thus creating an additional storage area, covered by a map board (see photo #l). The tank also has a small desk mounted over the ready rack for writing and dome lights have been moved to provide proper lighting (see photo #2). The map board uses Velcro fasteners on the board itself and on individual map sheets. The map sheets were cut and mounted on a thin Masonite board and covered with adhesive acetate (see photo #3). The map sheets are pieced together like a checkerboard and when units move off the map, the sheets are shifted and the new map sheets are added. The unused maps are stored upright in an empty Hoffman charge ammo box. These boxes are large enough to store all the 1:50,000 map sheets required for operations in Southern Germany. This system, used by all command and control elements in the battalion, makes operations on an extended battlefield (which require many map sheets) easy. Photo 1. Modified command tank has mapboard at turret rear. Photo 2. A small desk has been installed over the ready rack. September-october 1985 9 t Both battalion headquarters tanks were identically configured. The commander and S3 ride in the HQ66 tank with the HQ65 tank acting as the wingman. I:' HQ66 develops maintenance problems, the S3 and commander simply shift over to the HQ65 tank and continue operations. Inside the tank, the commander occupies the tank commander's (TC's) position and the S3 the loader's position. Both monitor the battalion command frequency. The gunner monitors the brigade command frequency and informs the battalion commander of any Photo 3. Maps are mounted on Masonite.

calls on t that the 7 is not sunicient. Many times tne battalion commander was required to talk to the brigade commander at the same time that the S3 was giving instructions to the companies. Also, the unreliability of the VRC lz-series radios requires the backup of an additional radio. Our battalion S3 rides with the commander. The battalion executive officer (XO) may assume this role. It depends upon the operations experience of the S3 and the battalion XO. The most operationally-experienced officer should be the battle captain and in charge of the TOC. The least experienced should ride with the commander. It is important, however, that thecommander has either his XO or S3 with him. It gives him someone to bounce ideas off of; someone to read the fragmentary order (FRAGO) before it is transmitted; and someone to be awake while the other sleeps. If the operation requires the presence of the commander on one part of the battlefield and supervision on another part, the S3/XO will get on the wingman and move to that location. Until the successful use of the command tank by the 13th Tank Battalion commander, there was a myth that battalion commanders cannot command from a tank. A - ,f of manaer t r i e suitable. He figure the tank and this, plus the lack of the backup wingman tank, doomed his trial to failure. Having the battalion commander and S3 in a tank gives them the protection and mobility to lead from up front where all successful wartime armor commanders have lead. Externally, the tank looks no different than any other tank in the battalion. Internally, the command tank gives the commander the tools he needs to command for extended periods of time. In addition, the tank thermal sights give the commander the ability to watch the battalion’s maneuver during darkness and periods of limited visibility. The commander and S3 also have a M577A2 that acts as a TAC. This vehicle normally belongs to the Sl/S4 (more on that later). The TAC is manned by a driver and the battalion master gunner. Additionally, the battalion commander’s M151 follows. The driver provides some security, acts as a coilrier or radio relay, and provides backup communications equipment. The M577 is configured with two secure radios (one on the battalion command net, the other on the brigade net, and a modular map board. The TAC is normally located on high ground, for good communica- ,errain feature behind line of troops (FLOT). :ts as the battalion al-mand post and a place tor the commander and S3 to meet and plan during lulls in the battle. The forward air controller (FAC) and fire support officer (FSO) are normally not with the TAC or command group for reasons explained later. If the battalion receives an attached engineer platoon, experience has shown that the engineer platoon leader should stay with the command group to facilitate immediate engineer reaction to mobility/countermobility requirements. Coordinating combat support is the responsibility of the tactical operation center (TOC) under the direction of the battalion battle captain (either the S3 or battalion XO). The TOC is composed of three M577s shown in figure 1. The TOC is manned by the battle captain, a day-shift of the S3 air, S2, FSO, FAC, assistant operations sergeant, intelligence NCO, and chemical NCO. The night shift is made up of the chemical officer, tactical intelligence officer, assistant FSO, senior intelligence analyst, and the operations sergeant. The TOC’s mission is to control the combat support assets, send reports to brigade, prepare intelligence estimates, plan for future operations and keep the battalion commander informed. This opera-Figure 1 years ago, a highly ’ tank battalion com- !d it and declared it un-did not, however, recon-tions, one t the forward The TAC ac ternate com . . . - - - -

S2 Track Status Board S3 Track Bde Bn Bde OBI Net Cmd Net Cmd Net -- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ J ops sgt TOC extension ured only during formation/publication of wriilen orderr s2 Banla Captain I 10 september-october 1985

2400. At 2400, the battle captain or .S3 Air, who is on duty, reviews the days’s activities and prepares a daily summary to be posted as the last journal entry of the day. The 1-13 Armor liaison officer (LNO) has an important role in TOC operations. The LNO is normally at the Brigade TOC. He brings to the Battalion TOC any orders or messages from brigade. If possible, he places himself inside the brigade TOC to get a flavor of the divisiodbrigade and flank unit situation. Every 6 hours the LNO travels to the battalion TOC to pick up a written battalion commander’s situation report that is prepared by the battle captain. Every 12 hours he stops by the combat september-October 1985 1 1

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rn mcfi Figure 2. above, and 3 are samples of ready-reference “mind-jogger” cards -acetate-covered 5- by 8-inch file cards used to keep track of personnel and maintenance status. These are posted next to the situation map in the TOC 577. A twin 577. used as an intelligence center, is capable of being switched to a TOC, providing backup. trains to pick up the personnel and logistics reports for the battle captain’s review before taking them to brigade. A key player in the TOC is the operations sergeant. He is responsible for the proper configuration of all the-vehicles in the TOC. He is signed for all the equipment. The S3 and S2 separately tried to construct identical M557s. This was not successful. The successful solution was to make the operations sergeant responsible for all vehicles. He is also solely responsible for the movement and erection of the TOC. Rapid, accurate TOC movement requires one boss, and in this battalion, that is the operations sergeant. The S2 and S3 M577 are powered by one 4.2 KW generator. Generators are not dismounted. One track’s generator will power itself and through a long slave cable, the other track. When that generator runs out of gas, the other generator is started and the system reversed. This reduces the noise level and allows maintenance on the non-operating generator. One generator can easily pull the power load of the two tracks. One track driver is on duty at all times to service the generators. The two identically configured TOC M577s not only provide expanded command and control capabilities and redundancy, but also allow the TOC to move by echelon. A very precise system to move the TOC has been developed. The system is designed to allow recon/ quartering, continuous operations and rapid accurate moves. The system has four phases: Phase 1. The battle captain determines the requirement to move. Planning guidance in this battalion is to move every 6-8 hours. The battle captain does a map recon and points out potential sites to the operations sergeant. (During periods of high activity, the off-duty operations sergeant is also briefed). The operations sergeant then takes the battalion XO’s jeep and moves to recon the site. Upon his return to theTOC, he and the S2 M577driver take the track to the new site. At the new site, the operations sergeant makes communications checks with the companies on the battalion command net, and brigade on both the command and the operations intelligence net. The operations sergeant then informs the battle captain that he is “set.” Phase 2. The battle captain posts an acetate drop of the current enemy and friendly situation from the situation map and packs up any reference material (OPORDS, etc.) that he may need. He then has the on-duty S2 officer mount his jeep while the off-duty S-2 officer takes his place in the TOC track. The battle captain then moves to the new site followed by the on-duty FSO and FAC in their jeeps. The XO’s driver knows the way, as he drove the operations sergeant on the recon. The on-duty S3 officer is in charge of the TOC operation until the battle captain is ready to operate at the new site. Phase 3. The battle captain arrives at the new site; posts the enemy and friendly situation; and gets an update from the TOC. When this is completed, the battle captain announces that he has the battle, and the old TOC prepares to move. The XO’s driver is then sent back to the old TOC site. Phase 4. The XO’s driver arrives at the old TOC site and guides the rest of the TOC to the new location. These phases may seem redundant and time consuming, but experience has shown that “Murphy” can and will kill you on TOC jumps. This system ensures that no one gets lost (if the XO’s driver is 12 September-October 1985 sharp), someone is in control at all times, and communications are checked. Using this system, this battalion’s TOC displaced nine times during a 3 4 day exercise without losing control. Most of the jumps were not more than 2 to 3 kilometers. The longest jump was 7 kilometers. This movement allows the TOC to stay where it is needed during mobile operations and provides a measure of security, but movement requires a “no frill” operations. M577 ramps are kept up. The tracks are wired together with a hot loop for internal communications. One extension is deployed only if the battalion is required to publish an order. If the battalion receives a written order, the 1/3rd rule is immediately applied. If the staff can assemble, do an estimate and publish the order in 1/3rd of available time before execution of the order, it will be prepared and published at the TOC. If not, the companies will receive a FRAGO. If sufficient planning time is received, the following steps are taken: .Upon receipt of the brigade OPORD, the battle captain immediately issues a warning order; the commander, S3/XO and battalion staff assemble at the TOC. .At the TOC, the commander reads the brigade order, restates the mission, gives guidance and the staff prepares an estimate. .Within 15 minutes, the staff is usually ready to brief the commander on courses of action. The commander chooses or modifies a course of action and the staff prepares the order. .The order is handwritten; each staff officer is responsible for his portion. The order is written on spirit alcohol reproduction paper and published on a hand-cranked spirit alcohol duplicating machine. The battalion commander feels that a good order now is better than a great one later, so our orders are simple and direct, giving mission-type orders to the company commanders. .Overlays may also be reproduced on the reproduction paper if the operation covers no more than about 20 kilometers (the length of a long sheet of paper). If not, the operations sergeants and the drivers engage in an overlay making Photo 5. A Z%-ton truck, configured as a sleeping van, can accommodate six men off-duty. The truck eliminates need to set up tents and can redeploy fast. drill. The operations sergeant makes one copy of the S3’s overlay on clear acetate and hands the copy to his assistant operations sergeant. They both then make a copy and hand one copy to the two drivers. Then all four each make two copies. This system gives you 11 copies in a very short time. .The orders process usually takes no more than 90 minutes from the time the commander gives the staff his planning guidance. .The company commanders and the mortar and scout platoon leaders arrive and are given their copies of the order. They read it, ask questions, and then are sent back to their units. Formal orders briefings are not given, as they are too time consuming. The company commanders and platoon leaders must be given time to prepare their orders. During the orders process, the XO ensures there is staff coordination. If the XO is the battle captain, however, he may be tied up running the current operation; thus allowing the commander to focus on the future planning. In this case, the S3 is the staff coordinator. One of the biggest challenges in the TOC is to ensure that TOC personnel receive adequate rest. This challenge is made more difficult if the TOC moves a great deal. We feel we have met this challenge by taking the following measures: .“No frills” - one extension is erected only if a written order is to be published - a relatively rare occurrence. No duck boards, exotic charts, or barbed wire are put up. No barbed wire? The common one roll of barbed wire seen around a TOC is ridiculous. It would take a minimum of three staked rolls placed 50 meters all the way around the TOC to provide the minimum amount of security. TOE TOCs don’t have the manpower, haul capability or time to erect such an obstacle. Securitymust depend upon site selection, good intelligence and most importantly, movement. .Use camouflage nets only when absolutely necessary. Pick sites with overhead cover whenever possible. Try to find sites with thermal cover as well. Setting up in a village or town is ideal. Setting up and taking down camouflage takes too much time. .Construct the S3 242 ton truck into a sleeper. This gives TOC per. sonnel a dry, warm place to sleep without setting up tents, stoves, etc. Our S3 truck can sleep 6 people at a time, plus store our equipment and give the operations sergeant a place to make overlays and run off orders. During lulls in the battle, the battle captain sleeps and the S3 Air or chemical officer assumes the role of battle captain. september-October 1985 13

The TOC and command group are supplied with Class I and I11 by the battalion communications officer, who is normally located in the combat trains. When the HHC first sergeant brings Class I to the combat trains, the signal officer takes the TOC/command group’s portion along with any required Class I11 vehicles to the TOC first and then to the command group. This reduces the burden on the HHC first sergeant and establishes a periodic visit to the TOC/command group by the communications officer to fix/evacuate radios, update CEOIs and encryption devices. The TOC and command group radio configuration described thus far is not in accordance with the MTOE. The radios to make this system work come from the Yi ton trucks. Extra radio mounts, cables, matching units and antennas were purchased thru the Class IX supply system and mounted in the command tanks. The extra radio in each command tank comes from the battalion commander’s and battalion XO’s jeeps. The S2 track is authorized the required three VRC 46s. The S3 is authorized six VRC 46s. Three radios are installed in the S3 M577, one radio in the FAC track and one radio in the S1/S4 track. The last radio is installed in the S3’s wheeled vehicle, if authorized. Our current MTOE does not give the S3 a light tactical wheeled vehicle and thus the extra radio is used as a float. Effective and efficient TOC operations are a result of training. The system described thus far took 60 days to implement due to construction requirements. During those 60 days, and an additional 30 days thereafter, training in TOC operations was conducted by the battalion battle captain. This training consisted of weekly 5-hour periods. During these periods, orders were developed and published, TOC movement was practiced, both day and night, and communications nets were exercised. In addition, the battalion participated in 2 CPXs that were instrumental in eliminating unnecessary equipment and polishing procedures. TOC operations can be reduced to a series of drills. Movement, orders publication, communications, and coordination drills must be developed and practiced. Initiating a TOC operations system is not as hard as sustaining a system. Units tend to peak before an exercise or evaluation and then go on to other seemingly more important tasks. 1-13 Armor sustains its system by conducting one 5-hour training period per month. During this training period the TOC will do a staff estimate, publish an order and make a jump. 1-13 Armor deploys echeloned trains, a combat and field trains, both of which have a unique yet supporting logistics functions. The battalion combat trains has an operations role in 1-13 Armor equally as important as the TOC and command group. It is responsible for the battalion’s logistical operations and, as such, must organize and train in a manner similar to the battalion TOC. The combat trains are located 4 to 10 kilometers behind the companies. The combat trains use the following criteria (in priority) to pick a trains site. communications - as the battalion A/L net control, the combat trains must be sited to insure FM communications with companies and battalion field trains, which is located in the vicinity of the brigade field trains. Cover and concealment - Built up areas are usedwhenever possible. .Near the battalion main supply route (MSR). The combat trains is controlled by the S4 assisted by the S1. They operate out of the radio-teletypewriter (RATI3 M577. As stated earlier, the TOE S1/S4 M577 is used by the command group. The RATT track, with modification, functions well as the combat trains command post. A great deal of the battalion’s administration and logistics communications with brigade is passed on the long range AM RATT. CO-location of the RATT and CP helps eliminate the “tyranny of the message center.” The authorized RT 524 in the RATT has been exchanged with the pushbutton RT 246 from the HQs 65 tank. The auxiliary receivers from the two headquarters tanks, with secures, have also been installed in the RATT M577. The S1/S4 are unable to operate inside the M577 due to space limitations and the RATT noise, so they operate in the extension. A long cable running from the M577’s 1780 to a jack box mounted on a plywood board is used. A speaker and a microphone is attached to the jack box. In addition, a long cable is run from the face of the pushbutton RT 246 to a remote switch. This is also mounted on the plywood board. Speakers from the 2 auxiliary receivers are mounted on the back of the track. This allows the S1/S4 to keep the receiverkransmitter on the battalion A/L net and monitor the brigade A/L and battalion command nets. The remote switch enables the logistics operators to switch to the brigade A/L net when necessary without disrupting the teletype operators. The battalion standard M577Vel-croed map board hangs in the extension. The map board uses the same modular map system used at the command group and TOC. The S1/S4 keep abreast of the tactical situation by monitoring the battalion command net. They are required to post the friendly and enemy situation and could, if necessary, function as the battalion tactical command post should both the command group and the TOC be destroyed. The combat trains is made up of the RATT track, the two medic M577s, the S1 2-% ton truck, two M88 recovery vehicles, two prescribed load list (PLL) trucks with tool trailer (one PLL truck carries the NBC decon equipment), 2x5-ton cargo trucks loaded with tank ammunition, 2x5-ton tank and pump trucks loaded with diesel fuel, each pulling a trailer mounted pod filled with MOGAS. The combat trains also has the S4, chaplain, retrans, signal officers, and battalion physician’s jeeps and the maintenance warrant’s M880. The combat trains is manned by the S1 and S4 (one of whom is awake and in charge at all times), the battalion chaplain, physician, physician’s assistant, medical platoon headquarters, maintenance warrant, battalion motor sergeant or maintenance service section sergeant, PLL clerks, PAC clerks and vehicle drivers. During offensive operations, the combat trains must move often to maintain responsive support. Prior to movement, the maintenance warrant discusses proposed new combat train’s locations with the S1/S4 14 September-October 1985 and then conducts a reconnaissance. Upon his return, he leads the quartering party to the new site. When the quarteringparty is ready, the Sl/S4 lead the combat trains to the new location assisted by a guide who went on the reconnaissance with the maintenance warrant. During a recent ARTEP, the combat trains displaced four times while maintaining support. The company first sergeants control their medic and maintenance M113, M88 recovery vehicle and a fuel and ammunition GOER. Normally, the first sergeants keep the maintenance contact team and medics forward in a company trains and leave the fuel and ammunition GOERS with the combat trains. He will then bring fuel and ammunition forward when needed, usually at night. The combat trains CP is the line company’s single point of contact for A/L support. Empty fuel and ammo GOERS are taken there by the first sergeant and S4 ensures they are dispatched to the field trains for refill. The combat trains can also serve as a relay between the first sergeant in the company trains and his supply sergeant in the battalion field trains. The first sergeant uses the supply sergeant to interface with the company mess teams and to bring rations, mail replacements and supplies forward. The first sergeant designates the time and location the supply sergeant is to meet him. Usually it is at the combat trains. The field trains is the coordination point for logistical support from the forward support battalion. It is located near the brigade field trains and uses a site selection criteria similar to the combat trains. The field trains is controlled by the HHC commander. He and his command group (XO and 1SG) are responsible for site selection, quartering, movement, security and operational control. The HHC first sergeant is additionally responsible for the Class I, 111, V support of the scouts, mortars and combat trains. The battalion motor officer, motor sergeant and the remaining PLL trucks are in the field trains. They ensure that required repair parts and major assemblies are received from the FSB and pushed forward to the combat trains. Maintenance operations are characterized by the followinrr doctrinal statements: *Fix as far forward as possible. *Keep recovery assets forward. If the company contact team cannot fix the vehicle because of a lack of a required part in the combat trains or time (2-3 hours) to receive and replace the part, they drag the vehicle to the battalion MSR and drop it off. Recovery vehicles from the combat trains will pick up the vehicle and drop it off at the organization maintenance collection point (OMCP) established near the combat trains. Vehicles that cannot be repaired within approximately six hours are recovered directly to the battalion field trains. It has not been determined what recovery assets will accomplish this. The battalion does not have the assets to move broken vehicles the 20-30 kilometers to the field trains and return; and the FSB currently does not have the recovery assets. The support platoon leader and platoon sergeant are located in the field trains and are responsible for the following: *Coordination, pick up and delivery of all classes of supply except Class IX. *Supervision of the mess operation. *Supervision of the company supply sergeants. The support platoon leader builds logistics packages based on company requests and dispatches these packages to the company first sergeants under the supervision of the company supply sergeant. The S1 operates a replacement receiving point (RRP) in the field trains. The RRP is manned by two PAC clerks in the field trains CP. The field trains CP is manned by the HHC commander/XO/PAC clerk and is located in a 1 4 ton trailer belonging to the communications platoon. The HHC commander’s jeep radio is remoted into the trailer and maintained on the battalion A/L net. Wire communications are established from the CP to the battalion maintenance officer (BMO), support platoon, mess teams and to the brigade field trains CP. The combat trains is responsible for keeping the field trains abreast of the tactical situation. With the XO in either the TOC or command group, the role of logistics troubleshooter falls on the battalion command sergeant major (CSM). The battalion’s senior noncommissioned officer has the experience and, more importantly, the clout to do this well. Many battalions feel the battalion XO is the only person capable of energizing the logistical system. We have found that the CSM has equal if not greater motivational power than the XO. In summation, this is how we operate in the 1-13 Armor. The operations and logistics system described in this article is based on doctrine, evolved through trial and error, practiced by training and executed successfully on an externally evaluated ARTEP. This system is as simple as it can be made but is still complex. Executing this system requires construction and training. Sustaining proficiency in the system requires periodic training. We feel we can sustain proficiency thru 5-hour practical training exercises for the entire operations and logistics system conducted at least once a month.

was commissioned in Infantry from Pittsburgh State University and received a masters in military arts and sci-encesfromtheCGSCin 1981. He commanded an infantry company and, after transferring to Armor, commanded a tank company. He has served asa brigade S3, division training officer, and tank battalion XO and is currently serving with the 9th ID. september-October 1985 15