The Role of the Fourth Company

The Role of the Fourth Company by First Lieutenant Ralph Peters Despite th fanfare, much of the U.S. Army’s response to its new tactical and organizational doctrine can be summed up as, “It really doesn’t change anything.” But the addition of the fourth line company does change things if properly employed on the battlefield. First, i t offers a commander jTexibiIi@, if it offers nothing else. But it does more than that, too, bringing into focus new possibilities in depth, concentration, sustainability and speed. There are many ways to operationalize flexibility. One of the most basic is the designation of a local reserve. Unfortunately, our present idea of a reserve is both overblown and unnecessarily passive, partly because in Europe, forward commanders have been conditioned to get every weapons system into a good firing position early on. While the rear echelon of battle positions are, de facto, a reserve, we think of them as committed, if only to defending a position. Reserves are casually viewed as a distant force tucked away in a rear assembly area, more understudy than actor on the corps- and division-level stage. This should not be the case. At very least, the fourth company is a localreserve, ready to be factored into the commander’s battle plan. While awaiting its turn in the battle, this reserve may be gainfully employed in preparation of alternate and subsequent battle positions, but what the reserve does before its commitment is less important than how the commander thinks of it. It is the commmander’s mental attitude about his reserve that matters. Rather than seeing this force as a unit married to a specific piece of terrain, he should perceive it as his free player to kill the enemy, a force capable of maneuver and movement, a responsive tool to alter or accentuate the course of the battle. Even when designated as a local reserve, the fourth company provides new depth to the defense (figure 1). Whether the task force commander intitially organizes with two up and two back, two up and two back in echelon, three up and one back to cover an especially broad front, or in any other terrain- or Threat-driven combination, there is a depth to the battalion task force defense that did not previously exist. A

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Rearward companies may prepare positions, but are considered as local reserve for limited-objective counterattacks. Figure 1. x Along with that depth, flexibility is improved: the decision to shift a company team is simply not the momentous decision it was before. Improvements in flexibility and depth apply to the offense as well. A reserve is often every bit as critical in carrying through a successful attack as it is to a defense. In the offensive, depth is achieved with echelonment, offering the potential of greater concentration and sustainability (figure 2). Echelonment allows the concentration of sufficient force - of local mass - to overcome the defender’s advantage. Furthermore, echelonment allows the sustainment of that concentration. Of the countless variables in the attack, perhaps only surprise has proven to be of such constant value as having concentration of fires and physical mass on the decisive point. Mass is another concept we don’t fully appreciate. It summons up images of the Red Hordes, shouting “Ura!” as “. . .Perhaps only surprise has proven to be of such constant value as having concentration of fires and physical mass on the decisive point. . J 9 they crowd toward the slaughter. But properly understood and applied, mass is more valuable to the outnumbered force: the smaller element’s most foolish course of action would be to try to be everywhere at once. Mass and economy of force complement each other. Elevated to the level of a principle of

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(Pass forward after penetration is made) Echeloned Attack: In the echeloned attack, the mechanized infantry battalion task force is organized as a balanced task force. Fiaure 2. war, mass means the disciplined application of more physical force at the decisive point, coupled with the commitment of that force so swiftly that the enemy cannot respond in time. A phrase in current vogue is “operating within the enemy’s decision cycle,” but in the simplest terms, it means getting the other guy on the ropes and keeping him there. There is a resultant multiplication of force in the echeloned attack that cannot be explained in terms of high school physics. Perhaps it is the sustainability of the echeloned attack, the momentum of the fresh, follow-on force, that keeps the enemy on the ropes. The echeloned attack gives the commander another advantage; it allows him to take that most dangerous of steps, changing the plan in mid-course when it becomes clear the original plan isn’t working. With the additional time and forces available, he can consider this kind of option when, otherwise, it would expose his force to great danger. The fourth company also contributes the potential of greater speed. The reorganization into four lean direct-fire companies is intended to simplify the commander’s troop-leading procedures to give him a more manageable organization. These four lean elements can load up and go when the situation requires. The overall speed of a battalion task force movement should also increase, despite the additional maneuver element. More responsive sub-elements will mean a quicker total organization, as long as commanders and operations officers thoroughly grasp the changed coordination requirements at the battalion level. This will require attention, planning, and practice. Just as mechanized infantry company commanders too often forgot their 81-mm mortars as the pace of operations accelerated, the fourth company might also be more easily forgotten than a glancing consideration suggests. The task force commander will need to issue this new maneuver element clear orders and give it meaningful missions. Facing a high-tempo, confused battlefield, subordinate commanders will have to have a sure grasp of their commander’s overall intent. This presupposes that the commander himself knows what he wants to accomplish, which is not always the case. But without well-defined goals and effective synchronization, much of what the commander has potentially gained in flexibility, concentration, and speed will remain undeveloped or generate into confusion. In this one respect, the commander’s job will be harder than before. It will be especially hard on commanders who have not yet learned to integrate their own combat multipliers, their engineers, air defense troops, or even their organic antitank forces. Having considered the role of the fourth company in the offense and the defense, let us turn to two more specialized situations, the movement to contact and the covering force fight. How will the added element change things? An advantage in the movement to contact is that the commander has an improved capability to balance his advance over multiple axes. He can shape his movement to fit the mission as never before. He can tailor his attack to provide the greatest possible shock effect or the fullest flank protection. He can narrow his frontage to penetrate the expected enemy force or he can open up his frontage to locate a more elusive enemy. Or he can seek any degree of balance between these extremes. In the movement-to-contact mission, several recent elements come to the commander’s aid. He has a greater number of more agile formations and the increased speed, firepower and protection of the new generation of combat vehicles. As a result, the advance guard task force of a brigade-sized attack could, for example, move up on three parallel axes and still retain an integral reserve of company size. Upon contact, there are more maneuver elements available to turn the enemy’s flank or envelop him. If the enemy is encountered in superior force, the U.S. commander should have better internal security and the ability to fight a more coherent delay until the brigade main body arrives at the scene. These new opportunities certainly do not come without attendant dangers, however, There is no question: the fourth element makes the commander’s role more complicated in certain respects, but he must resist the temptation to make his plans and orders more complicated as well. While simplicity is not always preferable, it generally is best. If the overall plan cannot avoid some complications, then the missions to subordinate elements must be kept 38 as simple as possible. Attempting to mesh a number of complicated sub-actions invites disaster and increases the possibilities of confusion. It is likely that more battles have been won by clear orders than by genius. While we should never underestimate the value of cunning and brilliance, our talents are better applied to outwitting our enemies than in bewildering our subordinates. Perhaps a good rule of thumb to strive toward is that plans should be simple enough that the accompanying graphics can stand alone, without a briefing, in communicating manuever tasks. Conversely, it should be possible to understand the written orders without graphic aids. In ordering the covering force battle, the addition of a fourth company changes things significantly. On the one hand, the maneuver commander’s task force can now cover a traditional frontage and wage a more energetic maneuver fight. The earlier organization of the company team was probably too ponderous for the swift, fluid actions expected within the covering force area. The classic delay mission has always had the potential for turning 101 101 El

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Movement to Contact: In this case, the emphasis of the armc;i battalion task force is to maneuver around unit that makes contact. Figure 3.

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G - - Cover i n Althoug t talion ti lished ini tions, a is anticir into a stumble ba, organization of thc itself better adapte crisp countering ac the covering forc possess a highly exploit enemy wer or indecision. Along with adc depth, the coverin sustainable. No IC delaying actions c the covering force its own counterbluwJ W l L l I U u L IIGLGJ-sarily baring a flank or stripping a sector and so jeopardizing the overall mission. Now, the covering force can not only fire back; it can fight back in a much fuller sense of the phrase, so long as the additional force element is not merely used to reinforce and complicate a delay on successive positions. Certainly, there are more possibilities than these in developing the role of the fourth company. The details sketched in here are really only crude outlines that need to be colored in by more expert hands. And no amount of theorizing can fully substitute for experimentation in the field. Our attitude must change from “It really doesn’t change anything” to “New game, gentlemen.” Otherwise, we may get little value in return for the trouble and expense of the present maneuver battalion organization.

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RALPH PETERS i s t h e chief, Intelligence Production Section, G-2. of the 1st Armored Division. An OCS graduate who first entered the Army as a private in 1976, his previous tactical assignments have included a tour with the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Bad Kreuznach, FRG, and as S-2 of the 1-46 Infantry at Erlangen. FRG. Rated as a native speaker of German, his articles on operations and tactics have been published in ARMOR, ARMY, and INFANTRY Magazines. September-October 1984 39