Soviet Enveloping Detachments

A Woria vvar II Formation Lives on in Afghanistan Soviet Enveloping Detachments by Captain Gilbert0 Vlllahermosa The Soviet Army places great emphasis on rapid offensive action and has developed a number of special formations to ensure continuous movement of its forward elements. Some of these special formations, such as the forward detachment and the operational maneuver group (OMG), have been publicized in the Western press, but others remain unknown despite widespread use during WWII and in the current fighting in Afghanistan. One such formation, the enveloping detachment, is widely discussed in the Soviet military literature but little mentioned in the West. Seldom a month goes by without an article on this type of formation appearing in Military Herald (Voenny Vestnik) and Military Historical Journal (Voenny Istoricheskiy Zhurnal). Indeed, it is not uncommon to find three or four articles in a single issueon this formation. According to the Soviet definition, the enveloping detachment can vary greatly in size, from a platoon to a regiment. It is administratively self-contained. Its mission is “to envelop the enemy with the aim of striking him in the flanks and rear in order to seize his positions.” The Soviets specifically define the enveloping detachment as an offensive formation which - while it can be used under normal terrain conditions - lends itself to difficult terrain, specifically mountains, deserts, forested areas, swamps, and northern regions. “Depending on the trafficability of the terrain, the enveloping detachment is normally composed of motorized rifle (platoons, companies, or battalion-size) elements reinforced with portable antitank weapons, mortars, artillery and other special (units) such as engineer troops.”1 The Soviet Military Encyclopedia also notes that the enveloping detachment usually operates on foot “in those sectors where terrain proves difficult,” working in cooperation with forces attacking the enemy frontally. Soviet military journals point out that enveloping. detachments can also be inserted by airborne, amphibious or airmobile operations. Pack animals are to be used in those areas where terrain limits the use of vehicles. Use in WWII The use of enveloping detachments during WWII led to high rates of advance in mountain fighting. In the Northern Caucasus, the Crimea, the Balkans, the Carpathians, in Central Europe and in the Far East, success was often achieved when regular infantry troops were made the foundation of special combined-arms formations which were used to attack the enemy flanks and rear areas after having infiltrated through gaps in his defensive positions. In some cases, tanks were used in direct support of infantry, with decentralization down to single tanks in support of platoons. With the use of these special detachments, the Soviets were able to achieve rates of advance of 1-2 kilometers per hour, even against the best prepared positions.2 There are a number of combat and combat support elements that make up company and battalion-size enveloping detachments. Examples are common in the present mountain fighting in Afghanistan. Airborne Troops During the invasion of Afghanistan, elements of three Soviet airborne divisions were employed. These units have since borne the brunt of the fighting. These troops can be employed either in airborne or airmobile operations, but were initially parachuted into action. This proved to be costly - the troops suffered heavy losses to Afghani freedom fighters equipped with obsolete rifles but employing very accurate aimed fire. For this reason, the Soviets now prefer to use airmobile operations whenever possible. Because airborne units seldom have the artillery assets available to the motorized rifle unit, and airborne company or battalion is supported instead with 120-mm mortars. A battalion-size enveloping detachment will be reinforced with an air defense platoon, a combat engineer platoon, and chemical personnel. Companies receive similar reinforcements, but on a smaller scale. When in the role of an enveloping detachment, an airborne battalion will normally operate independently. It’s most typical missions include “capture of mountain passages and passes, capture of positions favorable for the defense, and holding them until arrival of troops from the front.”, Motorized Rifle Troops Just as the enveloping detachments of WWII were based on regular infantry units, the modern-day enveloping detachment as used in Afghanistan is based on motorized rifle troops. Because they can operate on any terrain under any conditions, the Soviets see these troops as best suited to operations in the mountains. They recognized that special training is necessary for mountain operations and intensively practice negotiating mountainous terrain on foot and in vehicles, the use of weapons in the mountains, mountain climbing, map reading, and small unit tactics. Great emphasis is placed on the development of a spirit of initiative in junior officers. A company-size enveloping detach-September-October 1984 13

Mission: “To capture dominant heights, passes and passages in the depth of the enemy’s defenses. . .” ment in support of a battalion consists of a motorized rifle company reinforced with a mortar battery, a tank platoon, a chemical squad, an engineer squad and an ADA section or squad. A battalion-size enveloping detachment consists of a motorized rifle battalion reinforced with a mortar battery, an artillery battalion, a tank company, engineer and chemical platoons, and ADA platoon, and various service support elements. Both size enveloping detachments have the same mission: “TO capture dominant heights, passes, and passages in the depth of the enemy’s defenses in order to destroy his weapons of mass destruction and command posts and to accomplish other tasks.”4 This is to be achieved by taking advantage of the rugged terrain and mountain weather conditions to infiltrate through gaps in the enemy’s defensive positions into his rear and flanks to conduct surprise attacks in order to capture the assigned objective and to destroy or capture the enemy. The success of the battalion-size enveloping detachment in the Afghanistan fighting has apparently led to creation of a new type of Soviet battalion called the Combined Arms Reinforced Battalion (CARB). According to Jossef Bodansky, who described this formation in a recent articles, “These units have become the core unit for the conduct of small unit military operations in mountainous terrain.” Bodansky, one of the first to describe this new formation, noted in a related article, “The reinforced battalion is a highly mobile force capable of carrying out autonomous operations. It is saturated with fire support means, especially artillery and air support. It has its own tank company.”b The composition of these CARBs - a motorized rifle battalion, a tank company, an artillery battalion, a mortar battery, an air defense company, an antitank company and various service support elements - is so strikingly similar to the battalion-size enveloping detachment that this author is convinced their creation was heavily influenced by the extensive use and successes of enveloping detachments in Afghanistan. The creation of these CARBs is an indication that motorized rifle troops are regaining their predominance in the field of mountain fighting. It should be stressed that the CARB is presently employed only in Afghanistan. It is also interesting to note that while there are presently 100,000 to 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, “only 12,000 to 15,000 of them are actively engaged in fighting Afghan resistance forces and of those, only an average of 500 to 700 are involved in offensive sweeps on a daily basis.”’ Tank Troops Terrain restricts tank employment in the mountains so the Soviets seldom use tanks on any scale above battalion level. Tanks are normally employed only in support of the infantry with platoons and companies allocated to company and battalion-size enveloping detachments. Additionally, individual tanks may support the action of motorized rifle platoons. During the attack, the tanks move behind the dismounted infantry and their carriers and support their assault with fires. The fires are conducted over the heads of friendly troops and to their flanks, with the tanks moving about 250 meters behind them. Apparently because of problems when firing on the move near dismounted infantry, the Soviets hedge their doctrine by firing from the short halt or from stationary positions. Other problems have been encountered as well. The limited gun tube depression and elevation of Soviet tanks, designed for operations in relatively flat terrain, limits their use against high-angle targets. To solve this problem, an officer writing in Military Herald suggests that the tank be driven up on to boulders or into depressions in the ground to compensate for the limited gun elevation and depression. He also recommends extensive use of the tank’s antiaircraft machinegun to engage ground targets.8 Target acquisition is also a problem for tanks working in the mountains. “The uniform color of the terrain and targets and large numbers of boulders, caves, and other natural cover have a negative influence on the effectiveness of tank fire in the mountains and complicate reconnaissance, detection, and identification of small enemy targets.”9 Artillery The artillery battalion of the enveloping detachment is tasked to neutralize any enemy systems that prevent the enveloping detachment from accomplishing its mission. Artillery units also provide smoke cover to mask movement and deceive the enemy as to the detachment’s intentions. According to several articles in Military Herald, artillery is also used in the direct-fire role in the mountains. In this type of situation, the battery may be broken up and targets allocated to individual guns. While the Soviets normally resist this type of decentralization, they seem to have accepted it as a necessity of mountain fighting. When employed in the mobile role in support of forces in the attack, the artillery will move 500 to 1,000 meters behind the tanks and personnel carriers and will engage enemy infantry and antitank assets. This compensates for the tanks’ limited antipersonnel capability, while supplying immediate suppressive fires for the motorized infantry. It is interesting that while this employment technique is not approved Soviet doctrine, it is widespread in Afghanistan. The Soviet military press makes little mention either of multiple rocket launchers or FROGS, in the mountains. This isn’t surprising when one considers the limited elevation of Soviet MRLs and the poor cross-country performance of the FROGcarriers. Mortars The Soviets see the mortar as the ideal weapon for mountain fire support because of its light weight, the increased lethality due to fragmentation and the mortar’s ability to cover dead spaces in the terrain. They recognize that there may be long periods during which the envelopment detachment commander will have to rely on mortar fire support, which accounts for the presence of both artillery and mortars in the battalion-size enveloping detachment. Soviet mortars range in size from the 82-mm series (M-37, M-41, M-42) to its 120-mm replacement (M-38, M- 43). The latter are commonly found in motorized rifle battalions (18 tubes per battalion) and are used extensively in Afghanistan, both by motorized rifle and airborne troops. 14

M M U R

r “Reconnaissance is provided by the chemical reconnaissance patrol.. .” While rarely seen, the Soviets also have 160-mm and 240-mm mortars available for deployment. Mortars of this caliber were found at battalion-level supporting mountain operations in WWII. The Soviets’ continuing com-mittment to large caliber mortars continues with the new 240-mm M-1975 self-propelled mortar recently reported in the Western defense press.10 Another new mortar is seeing extensive employment in Afghanistan. With a maximum rate of fire of 120 rounds per minute (the practical rate of fire is probably much lower) and the ability to fire both explosive fragmentation rounds and shaped-charge antitank rounds, the Vusilek mortar can be used for both direct and indirect fire. June’s Defense Weekly recently reported that the Vasilek is also vehicle-mounted. “It is believed that there are three or four self-propelled versions of the Vusilek, although comprehensive details are lacking. There are reports from Afghanistan that the system has been seen in a turreted mounting on either the BTR-60 or BTR-70 armored personnel carriers. The system is also apparently mounted in the turrets of modified BMP-I and BMD-1 infantry combat vehicles.”ll All these factors serve to make the Vusilek a superb fire support weapon in the mountains during both offensive and defensive operations. The Vusilek is currently replacing the 120-mm mortar in select motorized rifle battalions and is issued on a scale of six tubes (one battery) per battalion. Engineers Engineer support of enveloping detachments in the mountains involves laying and clearing mines, clearing road obstructions, rebuilding road sections and bridges along the route of march, and constructing bypasses where necessary.12 In order to accomplish this, the engineers themselves operate as detachments. These include the obstacle reconnaissance and clearance detachment, the engineer reconnaissance patrol, the movement support detachment, and the mobile obstacle detachment. The Soviet concept of engineer support is based on forward deployment of engineer personnel and equipment with reconnaissance and combat elements in order to ensure the continued movement of the main body. In the mountains, this concept is refined, with engineer assets assigned down to the platoon level in order to provide support during the final assault on the enemy. The mobility mission appears to be the principal mission of Soviet engineers operating with combat elements and is a full-time job. Denying the enemy use of key sectors of terrain and canalizing him into prepared kill zones through the use of mines is another principal mission. Chemical Personnel Chemical troops reconnoiter routes for traces of chemical contamination and DrOVide the enveloDine detach- . - meni with decontamination assets when needed. Reconnaissance is provided by the chemical reconnaissance patrol, which usually travels with the c o m b a t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e patrol, although it can operate independently. Soviet doctrine calls for chemical troops to use chemicpl agents “to protect the flanks of Soviet troops from ambush during an advance through mountain passes exposed to controlling heights.”l3 They also dispense chemical agents “to create lethal blocks in order to deny the resistance access to narrow creeks and caves that are inaccessible to mechanized troops or helicopter fire.”l4 Chemical personnel are also responsible for the use of smoke pots and grenades in support of the enveloping detachment. The Soviets place great emphasis on the use of smoke both to screen movement and to mark targets. One of the most important missions of chemical personnel is the destruction of the enemy with incendiary weapons. Flamethrower teams are often used during assaults on fortified positions in the mountains. “They are assigned combat missions of destroying enemy personnel in mountain crevass-es, caves, protective works and other cover.”ls According to Soviet doctrine, “In the attack, flamethrower operators advance and dismount together with the motorized riflemen and function in their skirmish line at intervals up to 100 meters. On encountering perman- e n t a n d o t h e r powerful weapon emplacements hindering the attack, they move forward, taking advantage of folds in the terrain, and fire on embrasures, entrances and trenches. Their actions are usually covered by smokescreens and the fire of tanks, artillery, machineguns and subma-chineguns. After flamethrowing is accomplished, the (accompanying units) attack and complete the enemy’s destruction.”16 Air Defense Artillery When possible, air defense assets are placed on commanding terrain to maximize range and minimize terrain interference. If that is not possible, they operate from roads, despite the limitations.17 In mountain fighting, the enveloping detachment often has to rely on shoulder-fired missiles when terrain won’t accomodate tracked self-propelled systems. The March The organization of the march takes on greater significance during operations in the mountains, according to Soviet doctrine, because of the possibility of ambush.18 On the march, the enveloping detachment is configured much like a company or battalion-size advance guard and consists of a combat reconnaissance patrol, forward security element, and the main body, along with associated flank and rear security elements. Operating icdependently, the combat reconnaissance patrol travels 10 to 15 kilometers ahead of the main body. It performs reconnaissance by observation as well as by ambushes and raids. The combat reconnaissance patrol generally consists of a motorized rifle platoon or section (for battalion or company size enveloping detachments, respectively) as well as scouts. More often than not, it will operate in con-

September-October 1984 15

junction with engineer and chemical reconnaissance patrols. In some cases, an artillery reconnaissance patrol will travel with the unit. The forward security element, traveling 5 to 10 kilometers behind the combat reconnaissance patrol, is to provide “security to the main body against a surprise attack. . . and advantageous conditions for the deployment of the main body.”l9 The forward security element amounts to a third of the enveloping detachment’s assets and includes motorized infantry, tanks, mortar, artillery, ADA, chemical and engineer troops. This subunit also includes the engineer route reconnaissance and obstacle clearing detachment, movement support detachments, and mobile obstacle detachments. The forward security element normally operates with flank pickets in mountainous terrain. They occuov kev that can be up to 5 kilometers to the flanks and 2 to 3 kilometers to the rear of the main body. As the main body approaches areas where ambushes are likely, an artillery battery deploys to cover the movement and later rejoins the column. Along the march, vehicles maintain 50 to 100-meter intervals and move at a speed of 15 to 20 km/hr. The Attack An attack in the mountains is to be conducted on a frontage two to three times greater than normal for a company or battalion. The attack begins along mountain roads or trails, valleys, canyons, and along the gentle slopes of ridges after the enveloping detachment has infiltrated through gaps in the enemy positions or has approached a flank undetected. An intense artillery or aviation preparation precedes the attack. Elements of the envelooinn detach-terrain along the march route until the column passes, then leap-frog forward. The main body of the enveloping detachment follows 2 to 3 kilometers behind the forward security element with mobile flank and security detachments ment will often operate alongseparate axes. Whenever possible, they will try to seize terrain overlooking or bordering the objective. While bringing direct fires to bear from these positions, the enveloping detachment will attack the “During the attack, motorized r i f l e m e n r e m a i n mounted as long as possible. . .” enemy from above whenever possible and attempt to seize his uppermost defensive positions. Once these positions are captured and cleared, the detachment then works its way down to the enemy’s lower level positions, progressing until the enemy is captured or destroyed. Once the objective is seized, defensive preparations are made for a possible enemy counterattack. During the attack, motorized riflemen remain mounted as long as possible. When terrain or enemy resistance precludes attacking mounted, the riflemen dismount with supporting chemical and engineer personnel, forming platoon-size assault groups. They advance on the enemy position along covered and concealed routes wherever possible, supported by smoke, direct and indirect fires. The dismounted infantry are followed by their BMPs or BTRs which support the attack with ATGMs, cannon and machinegun fire. Vehicles carrying the AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers are deployed with the infantry carriers, suppressing the enemy as the dismounted troops advance. Behind this first line of vehicles, follows a second, composed of tanks which engage the enemy using main gun and machinegun fire. This line is about 250 meters behind the infantry. If automatic self-propelled mortars are available, they will be found behind the tanks, firing in both direct and indirect modes. The Soviets prefer to use their artillery from stationary positions. If terrain permits, the artillery will continue to advance behind the tanks and mortars, ~ NOTE: The order of march of the various A Battalion-Size Enveloping Detachment arms within each element are not necessarily accurate. in March Formation 16 ARIWlPm September-October 1984

M A W

(-) (-1 (-) (-) (-) (-1 Combat ‘-)

MORTAR

5 irn Rear Detachment Reconnaissance Forward Security Element f Main Body Patrol Flank Detachment

“. . . They can be utilized in any terrain that presents gaps in the defender’s line of resistance.. .” firing from short halts against enemy strongpoints, ATGM teams, and troop concentrations, but when terrain begins to restrict the advance, the artillery will take up stationary positions. Strongpoints and other defensive positions that cannot be eliminated with supporting fire are engaged by assault groups, using flamethrowers, demolition charges, and rocket-propelled grenades fired by motorized riflemen. The attack of the enveloping detachment, as described, takes place while other forces are conducting a frontal attack, exposing the enemy to pressure from several directions. The Soviets believe that this type of attack can rapidly destroy an enemy, even in well-prepared defensive positions. Events in Afghanistan seem to bear this out. Problems Encountered Despite wide use and frequent success in using enveloping detachments, the Soviets have encountered some difficulties, brought about by the nature of the terrain itself. According to Colonel K. Bregman, writing in Military Herald, “The meager nature of the road network and the almost complete impossibility of road movement by all types of transport vehicles, tanks and other fighting vehicles off the road because of the great steepness of the slopes and ascents, dense vegetation, and snow cover in the winter greatly hinder the movement of troops and equipment, delivery of supplies needed for combat and the evacuation of the wounded.”20 Another problem encountered is the unreliability of radio communications in mountain terrain. The mountain ridges screen radio waves and cause frequent losses of communication.21 The NATO Prospect Created during WWII and perfected in Afghanistan, the enveloping detachment has proven itself a hard-hitting, highly mobile and flexible formation that can operate independently in rugged terrain and under the most severe weather conditions, day and night. While this article has concentrated on Footnotes 1 Soviet Military Encyclopediu [in Russian], Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1978) Volume 5, p.676. 2See A.I. Radzievsky, Army Operutions [in Russian], (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1977). pp. 122-135. and Tuctics in Combur Exumples-Division [in Russian], (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976). pp. 126-132. 3COL M. Muslomov, “A Battalion Seizes an Objective in the Mountains”, Militury Herald tin Russian], No. 2,1982, p. 34. 4MG S. Kovachev, “In an Enveloping Detachment”, Militury Heruld [in Russianl, No. 8. 1977, p. 115. ’Yossef Bodansky, “The Bear on the Chessboard: Soviet Military Gains in Afghanistan”. Wor/dMfuirs, Vol. 148, No. 3, Winter 1982-83, p. 283. 6Yossef Bodansky, “General of the Amy D. T. Yazov: Victor in Afghanistan”, June’s Defense Weekly. Vol. 1, NO. 12, p. 485. 7Yossef Bodansky, “The Bear on the Chessboard: Soviet Military Gains in Afghanistan”, WorldAflairs, Vol. 148, No. 3, Winter 1982-83, p. 219. *LTC I. Sobran, “Firing from Tanks in the Mountains”, Militury Herald [in Russianl, No. 5,

1982. p. 83. slbid, p. 83. “khristopher Bellamy. “Conventional Quick Kill”, June’s Defense Week&, Vol. 1, No. 19, p. 783. 11“AM Vasilek Automatic 82mm Mortar”, June’sDefense Weekw, Vol. 1, NO. 5, p. 150. 12LTG of Engineer Troops Gorbachev, “Engineer Support of Troop Operations in the Mountains”, Military Heruld [in Russian], No. 3, 1981, 13Yossef Bodansky. “The Bear on the Chessboard: Soviet Military Gains in- Afghanistan”, WorldAflairs. Vol. 148, No. 3. Winter 1982-83, p. 285. Illbid, p. 285. lSLTC I. Mukhin, “Chemical Support in the Mountains”, Militury Herald [in Russian], No. 1, 1982, p. 34. pp. 95-98. 18LTC Bartkevich, “An Advance Party in the Mountains”, Military Heruld [in Russian], NO. 2, 1982, p. 26. 19Soviet Milirury Encyclojwdiu [in Russian], (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976), Vol. 2, pp. 594-595. 2oCOL Bregman, “Mountains Are No Hindrance for the Capable”, Militury Heruld [in Russian], No. 2 1981,p.l. Illbid, p. 1. 22“An Enveloping Detachment in Battle Formation”, Soviet Militury Review, No. 5, 1983, pp. 20- 21.

the Soviets’ employment of these detachments in the mountains, they can be utilized in any terrain that presents gaps in the defender’s line of resistance.22 Such terrain is typical of NATO’s northern and southern flank areas of poor mobility, sparse road networks, marshes, forests, and forested mountains. A future war will see enveloping detachments used on a wide scale. Inserted by airborne and airmobile operations (and along NATO’s northern flank by amphibious operations), enveloping detachments will be used to seize bridges, key mountain passes, and other critical objectives, holding them until the arrival of the main body. They will be seeking out and destroying command and control centers and other key installations. Enveloping detachments will continue to advance parallel to the main body along rugged terrain, striking the enemy unexpectedly in his flanks and rear. Because of the key role enveloping detachments will play in military operations on NATO’s flanks, the next war may see considerably higher rates of advance than those of the last war on such terrain.

CAPTAIN GILBERT0 VIL-

LAHERMOSA is a 1980 graduate of U S M A . He has served as an armored cavalry troop platoon leader, line troop XO and squadron S4 in the 3-1 2 Cavalry, FRG. H e is a graduate of the AOBC, AOAC, Airborne and Junior O f f i c e r M a i n t e n a n c e Course. H e is presently attending the Joint Firepower Course at Hurlburt Field, Florida and will be assigned to XVlll Airborne Corps at Ft. Bragg, N.C. September-October 1984 17