Major Alexander F. Wojciki To the Last Man, To the Last Round-Why?

The German Army onslaught against the Soviet Union was to become one of the bloodiest campaigns in history. Russian military battle deaths alone are estimated at 7,000,000. German losses were considerably less. Most historians will agree that the turning point in the war was the battle of Stalingrad in which the entire German Sixth Army was sacrificed. It needn’t have been so. At 0300 on 22 June 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa. The plan called for a 5month campaign whose objective was the destruction of the bulk of the Red Army in the west to prevent its withdrawal into the interior, then to pursue the retreating Russians to the Volga River along three axes. Army Group North would advance toward Leningrad, Army Group Center would advance toward Moscow, and Army Group South would advance toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The siezure of Leningrad in the north would effectively turn the Baltic -Sea into a German “lake” and neu- 34 september-tralize the Soviet Baltic Fleet The capture of Moscow would destroy the seat of communist government and political power. The drive toward Stalingrad would acquire for Hitler badly needed wheat and coal from the Ukraine, oil from the Caucasus, and the industrial complexes of the Donets Basin. Hitler’s generals were of the opinion that the main thrust should be toward Moscow as it was the center of the Russian railroad system and, given its political signifkance, would be defended by the best Soviet formations. The destruction of the Russian forces around Moscow would be disastrous for the Communists. As it turned out, Hitler’s wishes were not those of his generals. The capture of Stalingrad became the focus of his attention. After initial successes in the summer of 1941, the offensive ground to a halt in the winter, having failed to achieve any of its objectives. On 6 December 1941, the Russians launched a major counteroffensive.. October 1983 The attack slowly pushed the Germans back but ran down in late Feb nary 1942, because the German divisions were able to contain the Soviet breakthrough attempts. But the cost in German men and material was high. Both sides had been exhausted in the winter campaign and the spring thaw and mud enforced a general truce until May. But, Hitler badly needed the Caucasus oil to pursue his aims and decided to launch a summer offensive toward Stalingrad (map 1). The German Army of 1942, which was to launch this attack, was infe nor to the German force that had attacked Russia the summer before. Army Group South had received the only replacements. But, many of its formations consisted of German satellite forces from Italy, Romania, and Hungary, all of questionable reliability. Furthermore, German industry had failed to adequately replace the material losses from the previous winter campign. The Army Group South plan called for destroying the Russian forces in the bend of the Don River followed by the seizure of the oil fields and the capture of Stalingrad (map 1). Phase one of the operation cost the Russians 240,000 men and 1,249 tanks. Another 100,OOO Russians were lost at Sevas-tap01 on the Black Sea. The poor showing of the Russians up to that point convinced Hitler that his combined operation, Stalingrad and the Caucasus, would meet little opposition despite the fact that the Russians expeded them to attack in this area. The second phase began on 30 June, with the Sixth Army commanded by General Friedrich Paulus advancing along the Don River in the direction of Stalingrad and linking up with the Fourth Panzer Army on 7 July. Army group South was now reorganized into Army Groups A and

B. Army Group A was commanded by Field Marshal Wilhelm List and was comprised of the Fourteenth Panzer Army, the First Panzer Army and the Seventeenth Army. Army Group B was commanded by Field Marshal Fedor von Bock and was comprised of the German Second and Sixth Armies, the Fourth Panzer Army, the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies, the Italian Eighth Army and the Hungarian Second Army. Phase three began on 9 July with the attack of Army Group A. The attack was a success with many Russian soldiers deserting and Russian units breaking up. Phase four began on 13 July when Hitler ordered Army Group A to turn south toward the Caucasus and cross the Don east of Rostov. The Fourth Panzer Army, minus a panzer corps, was diverted from support of the Sixth Army to support Army Group A’s drive to the Cacusus. The Sixth along with the remaining panzer corps from the Fourth Panzer Army was left alone to continue the drive on Stalingrad. The Sixth Army reached the Volga in September but was not in possession of the city, though ita fall was expected. These expectations were not realized. Instead, the Germans found themselves slowly bleeding to death with few replacements coming to the front. The Russians, however, were able to bring up fresh forces from east of the Volga. In the battle for the city, Stalingrad was reduced to rubble. The siege lasted 66 days. The fighting was hand-to-hand, house-to-house, and day-today, with neither side scoring a decisive victory. As the battle for the city was taking place, the Red Army was planning a counteroffensive to secure the Dneiper River line and to cut off Army Group Ain the Caucasus. The Russian counteroffensive was planned in three phases. Phase one was to be the annihilation of the Sixth Army by attacks against the Romanian-held sectors on the flanks of the Sixth Army. Phase two was to be the overruning of the Italian Eighth Army and then advancing to the mouth of the Don. This would cut off the retreat of Army Group A except by the Kerch Narrows in the Sea of Azov. Phase three was to be the destruction of the Hungarians around Kortoyok, thus opening up the road to the Dneiper River (map 2). At 0720 on 19 November, Russian artillery fire deluged the Romanian positions and by 0850 Russian infantry surged out of the Serafimovich bridgehead. The Romanian Third Army held until noon but the Russians broke through with cavalry and tanks and headed for Kalach. On 20 November, the Russians struck the Romanian Fourth Army which panicked. The Russians broke through, trapping elements of the Fourth Panzer Army. The northern arm reached Kalach on the 21st. By the 23d the trap was closed and the Sixth Army was encircled (map 3). As the Stalingrad trap was closing, General von Seydlitz, commanding LI Corps of the Sixth Army, worked out, in conjunction with the Sixth Army’s Chief of Staff, a plan for a breakout in a southwesterly direction. He held a conference with General Heitz, commanding WI Corps; General Strecher, commanding XI Corps; and General Hube, commanding XIV Panzer Corps. All of the generals were of the opinion that a breakout should be effected immediately and Paulus agreed. Sixth Army, then issued the “Flower Order” effective on Hitler’s permission. This plan was a three phase breakout that had a 10-to-1 chance of success. Troops would be withdrawn from the perimeter and massed in waves. The first breakout wave would have 130 tanks, armored reconnaissance vehicles, combat vehicles of the 3d and 29th Motorized Divisions, and 17,000 combat troops. The second wave would have 4,000 men. General von Weichs, commanding Anny Group B, also believed it necessary to evacuate the Stalingrad position and ordered Paulus to fight his way out and, if necessary, abandon his heavy equipment. It still remained to be seen what Hitler’s decision septern ber-October 1983 35

, I would be. At 0115, 24 November, General Paulus wired Hitler for permission to break out. At OKH, some 1,400-1,500 miles from the scene, General Zeitzler, recently appointed Chief of the German General Staff, was constantly attempting to convince Hitler of the need to evacuate Stalingrad. Engaging in many heated conversations, many of them in the middle of the night, Zeitzler almost convinced Hitler to allow the breakout. He even took the initiative and told von Weichs, and Paulus to be prepared. The order never came because Air Reichs Marshall Goering promised Hitler that the Luftwaffe would supply Stalingrad by air if Paulus could maintain control of the three airfields at Stalingrad. Goering believed that 500 tons per day (less than was needed) could be supplied by the Luftwaffe but this was impossible, a fact which was not evident when Hitler made his decision. Hitler’s intention was that the Sixth Army would stand fast. He intended to supply them by airlift and send relief forces as soon as possible. In the meantime, he designated them “Fortress Stalingrad.” The situation at the front was critical, the Russians having pushed 23 divisions through the Romanian Third Army and had 23 more advanc ing towards the Chir River. Soviet troops in Stalingrad and to the north of the city were being reinforced from across the Volga. To meet the threat, the Germans reinforced the Don Army Group under Field Marshal von Manstein. Army Group Don was to consist of the Sixth Army with 22 divisions, remnants of the Fourth Panzer Army, and the Romanian Third and Fourth Armies. The Sixth Army was surrounded, low on food, fuel, and ammunition and had little hope of replenishing anything. The Sixth Army holding “Fortress Stalingrad,” though subordinate to HQ Army Group Don “on paper,” had come under the direct control of the OKH (German High Command, ie., Hitler). The Germans fought off the Russians through the early days of December but their semicircle in the city was constantly shrinking. In an attempt to save the Sixth Army, the Fourth Panzer Army under the code name “Winter Tempest” attacked from the south in the direction of Stalingrad on 12 December to link up with and relieve the beleagured forces in the city. This attack was to cover 62 miles. Originally the plan called for two relief attacks, but due to the difficulty of bringing up reinforcements this was abandoned. By the 19th the 4th Panzer Army stalled 30 miles short of the Sixth Army. Sensing the gravity of the situation and acting on his own, von Manstein ordered Paulus to prepare to break out. General Paulus refused, claiming his now depleted fuel supplies would permit an advance of only 20 miles, 10 miles short of a link up. Back at Hitler’s headquarters, General Zeitzler was again trying to convince Hitler of the necessity of breaking out of Stalingrad. Hitler finally agreed, providing that the Volga River line could still be held. Word was then received that the Sixth Army lacked suf6cient fuel for the proposed breakout. When Hitler learned of the problem, he ordered Paulus to remain in the city since he did not want the stranded tanks to become standing targets in the middle of the steppes. Conditions within the city were growing worse because the promised 500 tons of supplies per day were not being flown in. Two hundred and seventyeight transport planes were lost in December attempting to land at the three airfields that were subject to constant artillery fire. Combined with difficult flying conditions were administrative blunders. One such mistake resulted in the delivery of one ton of marjoram (a food seasoning), ten cases of pickles, fifteen type writers, and a dozen cases of contra-ceptives. Most of the artillery and transport horses had been converted to meat and soup. Finally, dogs, cats, and even mice and rats disappeared from the streets. Elsewhere on the front, the Russians had pushed the Germans back and were preparing for the final annilihation of the Sixth Army. In an attempt to prevent unnecessary slaughter, General Rokossovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Don Front, sent Paulus a message pointing out that he was surrounded, was unable to receive adequate sup plies and could not possible expect to effect a breakout. Rokossovsky called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and promised safety, medical treatment, and food for all who sur- 36 septern ber-October 1983 rendered. Hitler immediat Sixth Army was ing to the last mar of ammunition. (‘ letzten Mann UI Patrone,” themes The Soviet plan the Sixth Army u large pocket holdii eral smaller ones, destroy piecemeal. 2-hour artillery ba approaching attac sians attacked, bi man resistance, th ting the large PO January, the Gern operate after the I into Russian hand continued to be I chute). Paulus’ k resupply had vanished and he radioed Hitler for permission to breakout in organized groups to the south. This was again refused and by 25 January, the Germans were split into two pockets and 3 days later into three pockets: the XI Corps holding the northern factory area, VIII and LI Corps holding the center pocket, and nondescript remnants holding the area around Paulus’ headquarters On 31 January 1943, LI Corps could no longer resist and the central pocket surrendered. In the basement of the Univermag Department Store, Paulus, newly prompted by Hitler to the (map 4). immediately, despite Hitler’s orders to stand and fight, and later, not seizing on the second opportunity when the Fourth Panzer Army fought to within 30 miles of Stalingrad. A breakout is not an unsound tactic. The US. Army covers this in FM 7-20. It states that units must plan for encirclements and must be prepared to breakout if the mission requires. It emphasizes the need to breakout before the enemy can organize an effective containment. The breakout should have two attacks: a diversionary attack to throw the enemy off balance and the main attack in the direction of friendly forces. rade of Field Marsh& surrendered Paulus had his fikt chance to break- - - - -. -. - Group Band Paulus to prepare to execute the plan. Paulus’ request to Hitler for permission to breakout was an error in judgment since he knew of Hitler’s strong feelings about defending Stalingrad. In the end, of course, Hitler refused At this point, Paulus should have seized the initiative, and presented the High Command with a fait accompli since the stage had been set. He had been exposed to enough chaotic blunders to realize “der Fuhrer” was not a competent tactician and that remaining at Stalingrad was tantamount to ultimate capitulation. 37 september-October 1983

WILLIAM L. HOWARD was commissioned into ordnance from the Citadel in 1964. He is a graduate of the tank-automotive maintenance officer course and the CGSC. He served as a commander, 11th Military History Detachment in France and with the Combined Material Exploitation Center in Vietnam and, later, as a company and battalion commander at Ft. Polk, - LA. In 1973 he transferred to armor and was an instructor in all phases at the AOAC. He was employed by Battelle Memorial Institute as a consultant on Soviet armor and antitank weapons. 38