The Challenge of F o m Modernization

The greatest challenge facing our Army in the next several years is the simultaneous reorganization and equip ment modernization of its combat forces. For the unit commander, the challenge is multiplied by the need to integrate the Division 86 reorganization and its hardware modernization with the many training and support requirements that are a normal part of garrison existence. For the armored force, it is the most significant advance in combat capability in over 40 years. The Challenge of F By Colonel John D. Borgman i Historical Perspective Many think that Force Modernization is something new to our army. However, our army, like all successful armies, has modernized continuously throughout its history. The reason for modernization is twofold to deter aggression or, failing that, to win on the battlefield. The army’s modernization efforts have never proceeded at a smooth pace. We have modernized irregularly during the last century, and technological advances have generally been the catalysts for change. In the past, we have modernized either during hostilities, or under threat of immediate war, and a single new weapon has often been responsible for profound changes at the tactical level. Today we have entered the latest cycle of Force Modemi-zation, and the Abrams main battle tank and Bradley fighting system are changing much of the “way we do business” on the battlefield with our heavy forces. As with the past modernization cycles, this one is driven by the availability of new technology and by the threat posed by potential adversaries. What distinguishes this cycle from others is that we are not only acquiring significant new technology for the maneuver forces, we are also placing a much-needed emphasis on our combat support and combat service support organizations. We are significantly modifying dodrine, making great changes to the organizational structure of our divisions, and we are doing this in a relatively short period of time. Our ability to accomplish all this is enhanced by the fact that we can make this transition while in a peacetime posture. (See table 1 for a more detailed listing of new equipment for Division 86 elements.) Grass Roots Modernization Much has been written about the grand strategy of modernization, but relatively little has been done to define the process for the tactical unit commander - o n his terms. We sometimes forget that hardware modernization alone is not force modernization. It is only on part of the process. As an army-wide function, modernization has five key elements Equipping the force.... Equipment modernization Manning the force.. Attract and retain good soldiers Training the force...... To fight and to maintain Organizing the force........ Division 86/Army 90 Fighting the force....... AirLand Battle doctrine Although this view of the modernization process is valid, it does not address the reality of force modernization to the battalion undergoing transition, nor to the division and installation supporting and assisting in that transition. At that level, it is more useful to refer to the five “Rs” of force modernization.’ These can be viewed as the unit’s mission statement for force modernization: Reorganizing the unit 30 septern ber-October 1983 m e Modernization j Major Alexander F. Wojcicki Reequipping with new or modernized equipment Retraining our soldiers to fight and maintain the new Redistributing displaced equipment 0 Readiness Reorganizing. To meet the threat of mid- to high-intensity combat in the NATO environment, the Army has developed the AirLand Battle doctrine, which is to be implemented by the Division 86 force structure. The major change for the armor battalion is the addition of a fourth tank company and reduction of the tank platoon from five to four tanks. The cavalry squadron undergoes changes that give it two air troops equipped with attack and scout helicopters, and two ground troops equipped with Bradley cavalry fighting vehicles. The mechanized infantry battalion has four companies equipped with Bradley infantry fighting vehicles that give the battalion 60 25mm automatic cannon and add 51 TOW launchers for a total of 72 TOW platforms. Reequipping. Once a unit has been reorganized, it draws its new combat vehicles. This is the last step of a very complex effort on the part of the materiel developer, the personnel community, and the training establishment-all coordinated by the division or installation Force Modernization Office. Items that have to be accounted for before the vehicles can be successfully fielded are support and ancillary equipment, including: 0 Components; tools; and test, measuring, and systems diagnostic equipment Authorized stockage list, and prescril Validated technical, supply, and sa and an Army Training Evaluation Progr Ammunition Training aids, ranges, and range construchon New equipment training and materiel fielding teams Added military and civilian manpower spaces Funding Military construction requirements Documentation associated with the new system At this stage, the most critical element is getting an approved modification table of organization and equip ment into the hands of the unit at least 6 months before the anticipated reorganization date. The effective date (E-date) of the implementing orders should match the reorganizinglreequipping date as closely as possible. Should the E-date follow the issue of the major new system by several months, the personnel and equipment requisitioning cycle may not be long enough to get the needed new personnel and required materiel to the unit in time to participate in the retraining effort. (See table 2 for a detailed commanders check list for transitioning to anew organization and equipment.) Retraining. After it has been reorganized and re equipped, the battalion enters the most demanding phase of the modernization process-retraining. Anew equipment training team (NETT), funded by the materiel developer and manned by the training establishment, teaches the battalion’s soldiers how to operate and maintain the equipment. Additional skills are taught to the direct sup port and general service maintenance personnel who will support the battalion. Anew organization training team,

Table 1. Some Major New Tactical Systems Affecting thc Heavy Division Armor M1 Abrams MET Cavalry Infantry Willery M3 cavalry fighting vehicle (CFV) M2 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) M901 improved TOW vehicle (ITV) M270 multiple launch rocket system AN/GSG-70 tactical fire direction system ANIGYK-29 battery computer system YMQM-705 Aquila remotely piloted vehicle ( R W AHlS Cobra (fully modernized) UHGOA Blackhawk utility helicopter CH47D Chinook OH58D Kiowa (AHIP) M9 armored combat earthmover (ACE) M247 Sgt York division air defense gun MlM48 improved Chapparal air defense m issi le FlM92 Stinger manportable air defense missile Aviation AH64 advanced attack helicopter Engineer 4ir defense Signal ANlTTC-47 automatic telephone central ntelligence EH-IHIEH-60 Quickfix ECM aircraft Trailblazer and Tearnpack intercept and direction finding systems ASAS (the all-source analysis system) 2ommon TSECIKY-57/58 Vinson speech security tems equipment M977 Series heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) M939 Series 5-ton trucks e (OTT) teaches the leaders how to employ the new organization, and explains the reasons for the new unit organizations. Formal new equipment training is followed by a period during which the unit trains together and develops its skills with the new system and organization. The entire transition process from turn-in of displaced equipment to completion of training, can take up to 6 months. Redistributing. One factor often overlooked in the modernization process is the magnitude of the repair and redistribution effort needed to get the displaced equipment moving to its next destination. This equipment rarely ends up at the property disposal yard. In the case of displaced M60Al tanks, there are a number of possibilities. They can go to a rebuild and conversion line for refitting to become M6OA3s; be sent directly to another active or reserve component unit to become their new tactical system; or be transferred to another service. Depending upon the next destination, the repair and refurbishment effort at the installation can range from turn-in and shipment in an “as is complete” condition to a requirement to bring the tanks up TM transfer standards before shipment. In any event, without a well-designed plan of action, the unit can suffer through an extended period of repair and turn-in. Extensive coordination with the logisticians and the installation director of industrial operations is critical. The unit must know well in advance exactly what is expected of it. Readiness. The goal of the transition is to achieve a state of readiness to fight and win. The sustainment of soldier skills and equipment readiness will continue to be a major challenge, given the increased knowledge required to operate and maintain the unit’s new weapons systems. Supervisor shortages, personnel turmoil, and the many training “distractors” we experience will remain a fact of life. The entire installation chain of command must be committed to reducing the external factors that prevent the new unit from sustainkg its new-found skills and capabilities. 32 september-October 1983 Organize to Modernize Some form of ad hoc staff organization has been established at most installations to oversee the modernization process. These “Force Mod” offices range from a single individual on the G3 staff, or in the operations division of the directorate of plans and training, all the way to complete transition teams working directly for the chief of staff. Duties range from coordination of staff activities to complete responsibility for planning for and executing all modernization actions. The size, source, and duties of these offices are different at each installation. At Fort Hood, where over 250 new tactical systems or major components are being fielded to 111 Corps units over the next several years. the modernization process is seen as something affecting all units-and as being affected by all tactical and installation staff agencies. Therefore, the Fort Hood Force Modernization Office is used as the focal point of the modernization effort to facilitate rather than execute transition-related actions. The Fort Hood modernization program does not employ a large central transition team, but uses a network of action officers throughout the staff instead. The command group provides emphasis to the program, and the action officers and their staff agency chiefs work in close coordination with the Force Modernization Office to anticipate, identify, and resolve problems before they become roadblocks to a unit’s transition activities. As an information and action integrator, the Force Modernization Office screens and evaluates the vast amounts of often conflicting information and guidance received by the installation. A major activity for the Fort Hood Force Modernization Office is the automation of much of the classified information published in support of the modernization effort by higher headquarters. This is done with secure microcomputers that execute word processing, data processing, and special applications computer software. This permits a comparison of new distribution information with previous data and analysis of the changes. New information can then be reformatted and provided to each unit on post. Classified word processing permits preparation and updating of the installation Force Modernization Master Plan to provide the latest planning information to the units. The use of electronic spreadsheeting in the classified mode permits easy preparation and updating of the Modernization Resource Information Submission, which is the key fiscal planning document. Access to the Advanced Research Projeds Agency computer network, the Army Materiel Data File, Remote Terminal Query Service, the Logistics Intelligence File, the Force Mod Conference of DELTANET, and the Integrated Logistics System Milestone Reporting System has been obtained by adding a computer telecommunications capability. The information obtained from these data bases and teleconferences is critical to keeping our local files accurate and coordinating key modernization actions. Total System Fielding Traditionally, the concept of total system fielding has been applied to the practice of fielding new hardware in support of the modernization effort. Under this concept, all factors affecting the fielding of anew system are taken into account: TO&E; manuals, support equipment, training, and personnel implications. For some time, the Army has been attempting to change the focus of the total system from pieces of hardware to the “type” battalions that will use the hardware. The term “force integration” is being applied. This “total battalion” concept indicates a shift away

Table 2. Commander‘s Transition Checklist Do I: Know when the unit will convert to Division 86 (J-Series)? Have a copy of my MTOE with E-date? Have a distribution plan of all new tactical systems the battalion will receive? Have a clear picture of what the unit will look like after conversion and retraining? Have a detailed plan of action for the entire transition process, and is each subordinate leader intimately familiar with it? Have an information and education program to ensure that the soldiers really understand what is happening to them? Have a materiel fielding plan for each new system I am scheduled to receive? Have a detailed displaced equipment plan? Have I appointed a transition project officer to be the main point of contact for all transition-related actions? Who is my point of contact in the division or installation Force Modernization Office? What does my unit’straining, exercise. and support schedule look like for the 6 months before. and after, conversion? What will be the effect of moving up or slipping conversion by several months? Have sufficient Force Modernization funds been made available to pay the added costs of the new system? Will I have barracks or motor pool space problems because of the conversion? Have I been able to contact the commander of the NETT? Will required TMDE tools and components be on hand prior to start of NET? Will I have adequate numbers of personnel in the right MOS to undergo NET? Is the initial ASUPLL for the new system on hand? Am I satisfied with the DS/GS maintenance scheme for my new system? What are the plus-ups in common items (trucks, generators, radios) authorized for the new TO&E. and will I be able to get them? Do I have sufficient range priority to accomplish needed training? What resources are available to train the leaders on capabilities of the new organization and how to fight it? Will I be receiving qualified soldiers from the training base after conversion? What sort of personnel stabilization scheme is being proposed to ensure that I haven‘t lost most of my newly trained personnel within 2 months? from the over-emphasis on the fielding of materiel toward a greater concern for the overall effects of all the changes that are occurring. Unfortunately, neither concept is fully adequate for describing modernization. Each is useful, but each is limited by its scope. The key to successful Force Modernization is a concept of integration that recognizes the hierarchical nature of the task. We do need “total battalion” managers to look at that structure. We also need “total division” and “total corps“ managers who are responsible for those levels of command. While a total battalion integrator or manager would focus his attention on a “type” unit (infantry, armor, cavalry, or engineer), the total division manager would look at task forces and their supporting forces (artillery, engineers, signal, and direct support mainte nance). The total corps manager would view the general support maintenance capability as well as the critical assets available only at the corps level. These facilitators would not be theoretical analysts, but practical managers who would translate theoretical force designs into functional organizations by tracking and assisting the transition progress of each of their organization “types.” While this is an implied task for all military staffs, their function should be explicitly defined and assigned. To permit these officers to get the job done, they must be given two tools: a team of staff specialists in the areas of personnel, materiel, and organizational development; and better communication assets. The speed with which change has been occurring has made the traditional means of communication less than adequate. Reliance on faceto-face meetings with their significant costs in temporary duty funds and time, slow automatic data information network messages and letters, and telephone calls to conduct much of our business has perpetrated an inefficient, compartmented information exchange mechanism. Industry has been quick to adopt more productive information management practices as the technology of computer networking has matured. Given the present cost of managing the modernization effort, it would seem appropriate to investigate the effectiveness of computer-based teleconferencing and the design of a Force Modernization Data Base to enhance the ability of modernization managers at all levels to coordinate their efforts. In this way, many of the planning and execution failures that affect the transitioning battalions could be prevented. Victory Depends on the Man Behind the Gun In this age of high-technology weaponry, we often forget that it is ultimately the men and women in uniform who will win our battles. The soldier is the key to success. General Patton sai&“Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads that gains the vi&ry.”2 This applies as much today as it did in 1933, and it helps us put the present modernization cycle into the proper perspective. Footnotes 1 The idea for the 5 “W was 6rst posed as a symbol for unit moder- 1982, while he was 2 General George S. Patton m Cavalry Journal, Sep 1933, and Bartlett’s nization by Lieutenant Colonel Bill F?%is in Janu Chief of the Force Modernization Division, Fort H Z T X Familiar Qiwtatwns. p. 791.

MAN is AC of S G3, Ill Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. He previously was assigned as commander, Lightning Brigade and chief of staff, 2d Armored Division. He has served as G3, 2d Armored Division; G1, 1st Cavalry Division, and commanded the 1-13th Armor, 1st Cavalry Division. He served in Germany, Korea, Vietnam and CONUS. He is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

ClCKl was commissioned in graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic Course and the Airborne School, the Special Forces Officer Course and the Infantry Officer Advanced Course. He has served as platoon leader, brigade 52, assistant district senior advisor in Vietnam, XO, company commander, S2 and assistant S3. brigade and group chemical officer, corps chemical officer and as chief, support systems branch, Force Modernization Division, Ill Corps.