Infantry in Desert Armor Operations

L The desert, with its deep, high-speed avenues of approach and unobstructed fields-of-fire, provides the ideal habitat for the armored task force. But the desert’s terrain advantages are neutral, and the force that best develops them while simultaneously denying their use to the enemy is the one that will succeed in accomplishing its mission. Tactical success in the desert is directly dependent upon the ability of the task force to gain and maintain a mobility advantage over the enemy, both offensively and defensively. Although desert operations are normally characterized by greater dispersion between elements and by extended frontages and depth, combat power can quickly be massed over high-speed surfaces, and fires can rapidly be concentrated at maximum ranges. A force held up for even a few minutes by natural or manmade obstacles can be decimated before that unit can identify the situation and effectively react. Offensive Operations The results of extensive tactical exercises conducted at the National Training Center (NTC) clearly show that only when the armored task force aggressively and creatively employs its infantry assets to increase its mobility can it survive and succeed in the desert. The task force that habitually leaves its infantry mounted as part of the armored formation routinely loses it to antitank guided missile (ATGM) and tank fire before it can enter the battle and then find its tanks destroyed quickly and massively at unbreached obstacles or unsecured choke points. Although the tanks of the armored task force are the key to its mobility and firepower, tanks by themselves cannot gain or maintain a mobility advantage. This mission is best assigned to the attached infantry. Although slower and considerably outgunned by armor, the infantry can greatly increase the mobility and survivability of the tank task force through reconnaissance, obstacle reduction, and preattack raids on enemy strongpoints along the planned 26

Infantry in Deser by Major route of the armored advance. Extensive reconnaissance in support of the advance must be conduded during periods of limited visibility before the attack. Depending on the distance to the enemy’s forward positions, this reconnaissance can be conducted either dismounted or from the infantry’s armored carriers. As a minimum, one patrol from each team-sized element should reconnoiter the team’s preplanned route to locate and identify obstacles, passage lanes, or bypasses, and all enemy tank-killing systems between the line of departure and the team’s objective. At the company-team and even task-force level, every effort should be made to develop an intelligence picture in such detail that all enemy tanks and ATGM positions and infantry platoon positions within the sector are identified. To futher assist the team commander in navigation and in identifying known enemy positions and obstacles, the patrol leader should routinely ride in the loader’s hatch of the team or task force commander’s vehicle during the mounted assault. Squad-sized infantry patrols with attached engineers are the ideal unit for such reconnaissance patrols. The extended distances typical in the desert between enemy company-sized strongpoints allow small infantry elements to penetrate the enemy’s forward defenses and develop an accurate picture of the depth of his defenses. The task force commander and team commanders use the information provided by these patrols to make any necessary revisions to the planned routes to avoid enemy obstacles and to bypass strongpoints, thus enabling the task force to penetrate quickly and deeply to the enemy’s rear to destroy reserves, combat support, and logistical assets and to dist Armor Operations ivid J. Ozolek rupt the enemy’s scheme for reinforcing his defense. When the reconnaissance effort indicates that bypassing obstacles is impractical or impossible, the infantry, with attached engineers, can begin preattack obstacle breaching under the cover of darkness. These infiltrating elements, either stay-behind teams from the reconnaissance patrols, or separate elements dispatched independently, can effectively reduce obstacles by cutting wire, removing mines or emplacing charges, and creating lanes across enemy tank ditches by ming them in with shovels. When in danger of discovery these elements retire to pre viously selected concealed positions, and upon the advance of the mounted elements detonate the replaced charges, mark lanes with smoke, pyrotechnic, or other prearranged signals, and guide the armored elements through the passages. When the preattack mission is completed, the troops mount their carriers and travel with the attacking armor, to assist in breaching any undiscovered obstacles deeper in the enemy’s defense. When the enemy has emplaced extensive obstacle systems, which are beyond the breaching capabilities of infiltrating infantry, or when he has developed an insurmountable obstacle security plan, preattack breaching may become impractical. In this case it sometimes becomes more effective to concentrate the infantry’s preattack effort on attacking the positions covering the’obstacles rather than the obstacles themselves. This allows for the task force engineers to mass their efforts at key locations along the route of advance, breaching the obstacles in the course of the advance while directly supported by the task force’s firepower and heavy equipment assets such as blade tanks, engineer vehicles, and recovery equipment. This attack on positions covering enemy obstacles requires a dismounted infiltration by infantry heavily armed with antitank weapons. The assault on the enemy positions should not be launched until the advancing armor comes almost within range of the enemy’s antitank weapons. This delay increases the impact of the surprise assault and acts as a combat multiplier to decrease the enemy’s ability to react to eliminate an inferior assaulting dismounted force. The desired result of the dismounted effort is to cause the enemy tanks and ATGM crews to fight for their personal survival with coax machineguns and individual infantry weapons so that they cannot effectively cover the obstacles or engage the approaching tank force with high-volume antitank fire at extended ranges. Another suitable mission for the infantry of an armored task force is a preemptive maneuver to seize key terrain in the enemy’s rear area that is not occupied at the time of attack but, that if occupied by the enemy during the course of the battle, would allow him to reinforce his defending forces along the friendly route of advance. When enemy reserves moving forward or laterally to concentrate along the axis of the penetration are engaged by the infantry, they are forced to deploy from their column and are slowed and attrited. This delay decreases the enemy’s ability to concentrate at critical points, denies him terrain advantage, and can be instrumental in disrupting his entire d e fensive plan. Defensive Operations When the task force assumes a defensive posture, it becomes vulnerable to the efforts of the enemy’s dismounted infantry. Soviet doctrine stresses the use of infiltration to conduct reconnaissance, reduce obstacles, and conduct preemptive strikes on enemy strongpoints and to seize key terrain. Denying the enemy the opportunity to conduct such operations requires a detailed effort on the concept calls for Team A initially to defend BP 31, and to prepare and on order defend BP 60. Team B defends BP 17 and prepares and on order defends BP 83. The TF commander plans to use the dominating terrain from BPs 60, 83. and 92 to channel the OPFOR into Engagement Area (EA) Blue, then to contain him there between the lake m d the barriers connecting the battle 3ositions. In EA Blue the remains of the,egirnent will be destroyed by the concen-ground and air reconnaissance, has elected to concentrate his main attack against Team Ain BP 31. The main attack will consist of two Motorized Rifle Battalions (MRBs) echeloned approximately 3-5 kilometers (9-15 minutes) apart. The 3rd MRB will provide an advance detachment of one dismounted Motorized Rifle Company (MRC) to infiltrate to attack BP 92 from its left and rear to fix Team C and prevent it from displacing to BP 60 or 83 to IX m r I I. I ne result IS I eams u ana t being fixed by one MRB, and Team I being attacked and overwhelmed by twc MRBs, with the regimental second echeloi continuing the attack to successfully envelope the TF northern flank and penetratc deep into the Brigade sector. A successful infiltration could have bee! prevented if Team B had constantl! patrolled the ground betwen BP 17 and thc brigade to the south, and if Team C hac provided 360" security for BP 92. part of the defending armored task force's limited infantry ambushes using night vision devices along likely routes of assets. infiltration. Obstacles between positions must be physi-Local security plans for combat support and service cally manned during periods of reduced visibility. Engi-support areas must be developed and strictly enforced. Off- neers should be constantly improving obstacles through-duty cooks, mechanics, and clerks must provide for the out the night while simultaneously providing security to security of their elements so that the infantry can be con- prevent enemy sappers from beginning undeteded breach-centrated well forward to interdict or intercept infiltrating ing operations. enemy infantry. Tank platoons on battle positions must Security elements must be placed on all assigned subse institute surveillance and security plans with at least one quent battle positions to prevent enemy infantry from seiz-crew fully alert on the platoon night battle position, con- ing them before the defending force arrives. Patrols must stantly surveying the area with the tank's night vision frequently check each position to insure that the enemy devices. At least one crew, or a composite patrol from sev- has not silently neutralized the security elements defend-eral crews, must patrol the local area to deted any infil- ing them. trating elements. The enemy doesn't have unlimited infantry assets Because of the large gaps between team-sized battle either, and an aggressive counterreconnaissance plan, positions, the task force's infantry must be committed to that incorporates small raids and reconnoiting the ene patrolling between strongpoints. These patrols can be amy's forward positions by fire, can cause the enemy to combination of mounted security patrols and dismounted significantly reduce his infiltration effort in order to 28 i - u t v s u a a t v v n q v v w r t p n g v - i i i i

0ui-u ivui i i m u w i i i r u uLLuII\ Uu..ll. I I I u I I I I I 1. U L a v I I...- -.. -.. r.- -...-....... --..---.- d tanks defends to block a high-speed will be conducted by two platoons of the on Axis Yellow by Company C with one avenue of approach in a defilade between attached mechanized company. The infil- engineer squad. Indirect fires will be used two high terrain masses impassable to trating element’s missions are toconduct a to suppress the center and southern pla-tracked vehicles. OPFOR‘s defensive silent breach of the northern tank ditch toons during the assault and to isolate the scheme is to use tank ditches and an anti- and any other undetected obstacles along northern platoon from the supporting fires tank (AT) minefield to funnel the attacking Axis Green, to emplace the TOWs on the of the center and south with a smoke task force into the MRC’s planned dominating terrain overlooking the objec- screen (Target AFOOlO). Carrier teams engagement area. tive, and to conduct a coordinated dis- from the infiltratina element will accom-After a ground reconnaissance in which mounted close assault along Axis Blue on OPFOR platoon locations and the barriers the enemy’s northern flank simultaneously were located, the task force commander with the mounted attack. The main attack decided to attack in a two-phased opera- will be on Axis Green, and will consist of platoon the infantry remounts and the tion with an infiltration bv infantrv pany Team Band i d d additional suppressive fires in support of the main attack. After destruction of the northern OPFOR Team B (Company B. one mech platoon, attack will continue against the remainder one AVLB, and the engineer platoon (-)). of the OPFOR’s flank and rear along Axis The supporting attack against the center Black. equipped with two ground-mounted TOWs during the hours of darkness, and a increase local security. These raiding parties can be reinforced with tanks and supported with artillery to deceive the enemy as to the strength, composition, and intent of the force, thus further increasing its effectiveness. In spite of the infantry’s limited firepower and inability to keep up with assulting tanks, combined arms efforts are as important in the desert as in any other type of terrain. However, because of the long-range, high-speed fight the armored task force can expect to encounter in the desert, its limited infantry assets must be creatively employed to achieve maximum effect. The infantry missions described here are practical and are routinely employed by the NTC‘s OPFOR against visiting task forces. With detailed planning and aggressive execution, they can be successfully employed by any armor-heavy unit.

was commissioned in the infantry from John Carroll University as a Distinguished Military Graduate in 1970. He has served as a platoon leader; advisor to the ARVN; battalion S1 and S2; mechanized infantry company commander, and assistant professor of English, USMA. He is presently S3,6th Battalion, 31st Infantry. (Mechanized), Fort Ord. California. He is a graduate of the infantry officer basic and advanced courses.