Time Management — The Combat Trains

Time Management - The Combat Trains by Major Daniel J. Klecker and Lleutenant Colonel Charles S. Kaune “Go, gallop. and don’t forget that the world was made in six days. You can ask me for anything you like, except time.” - Napoleon Time is one of the most valuable resources of leaders and planners at all levels. It is a very limited and nom-newable resource. Once used, it is gone forever. A key to success is to maximize the utility of this very limited resource. In combat, effective time management is always a major ingredient to success on the battlefield. A principle cause of mission failure is ineffective time management. Experience at the Combat Maneuver Training Center has continually validated these premises. The purpose of this article is to share some of the lessons learned at the CMTC that help to contribute to effective time management. The framework for this discussion is the Troop Leading Procedures, along with some basic principles developed over the course of several years of observation of numerous units that have trained at the CMX!. These principles are: *Prioritize work *Maintain a time line (reverse plan- *Track the progress of essential *Delegate authority to subordi- *Develop the 2nd-tier leadership *Adhere to the M-U rule *Develop effective SOPS, and use them Effective application of these principles contributes to the final, and most important, principle: ning) tasks nates/fix responsibility. Conduct a multitude of tasks, at all echelons, simultaneously. Prlorltke work Analysis of the mission renders an extensive list of tasks required for completion. List these tasks. Many of them will be tasks inherent to the duties of subordinates. Many of them may be unique to the specific mission. Prioritize the tasks. The priority assigned to these tasks should reflect their importance to the success of the mission. By prioritizing tasks, subordinates will have a better focused approach when Preparing for the mission. There will seldom be occasions when a leader has sufficient time to accomplish all tasks to his satisfaction. Prioritizing tasks will help to ensure that those tasks of greatest importance will be accomplished. Tlme Line Develop a time line indicating when these task are to be initiated and completed. This time line should be apart of the warning order and the operations order. Ensure changes to the time line are posted and disseminated to subordinates. Track Essentlai Tasks Track the progress of essential tasks. Have a list posted to the Combat Trains Command Post (CTCP) reflecting the current time line and the progress of essential tasks. Establish a system for updating the status of essential tasks. By having this status posted and frequently updated, the CTCP will have a clear picture of the status of preparation for the mission and will be better able to shift assets or priorities consistent with the task force commander’s intent. The efforts will be better focused. Often, there will be a requirement to track progress of activities within a task on the time line. For example, a unit may be given the mission to defend in sector. The S4 is charged with the responsibility of orchestrating the movement of all barrier material forward to various locations within the task force sector. The task on the time line reflects ‘’transport barrier material.’’ Within this task are the numerous details to be coordinated as to which bucks are assigned missions to haul what lo&, and the configuration of each load If the cM3p is tracking the progress of the work, the S4 will be able to change his guidance if his original time line cannot be met. The plan may require adjustment if there is an unanticipated shortage of concertina wire, or some of the trucks suffer mechanical problems, etc. Regardless, if the work is prioritized and hacked, the most critical work will be accomplished. Delegate Authority A common tendency of leaders at all levels is to attempt to do too many things personally. Delegate authority to subordinates and fix responsibility to ensure the task is accomplished to standard. This frees key leaders from doing one task so that they are able to supervise or check many others. The unit cannot afford for a key leader to become so engrossed with a single task that he loses perspective of his role in the accomplishment of the mission. A leader should never do 22 ARMOR -

-WARNING ORDER #l

-WARNING ORDER #l

-ISSUE WARNING ORDER x3

CSS ACTIONS lTRAlNSl -CONTINUE BDAlCAS EVAC AND RECOVERY OPNS -WARNING ORDER t l

-STAFF GROUP MOVES TO TOC (Sl, s4. BMO,

SERVICE (JUMP AID, AXPs). MAINTENANCE (MCPs)

-ISSUE WARNING ORDER a

TO NEW CBT TNS LOC WfiRAPHICS (BOUNDARIES, MSRs. BAS. AXPs. MCPs)

MCPs, DECON TEAM)

-FORWARD SUPPORT ASSET COORDINATION (AXR.

-VEHICLEMIEAPON MAlNT

ARMOR - 23 anything that a less occupied subordinate could do. 2nd-Tier Leadership Develop your second tier of leadership so it becomes intimately familiar with the responsibilities and requirements of the duty positions the next level up. In the CTCP, the senior S4 NCO needs to be able to respond to logistical requirements in the absence of the S4. He should be trained and able to accomplish those tasks of the S4. He should know that he has the authority and obligation to act on the behalf of the S4 in his absence. The same is true for the S 1 and his personnel. The large number of responsibilities required of the CTCP poses a special challenge to the leaders there. The austere work force creates the need to cross-train the assigned subordinates. Any individual answering a radio call should be trained and capable of properly processing and recording the data. A first sergeant should be able to pass logistical and personnel reports to a single individual. This cross training also pertains to the S1 and S4. Development of the second tier is applicable and neceSSary at every level. The One Third-Two Thirds Rule Allow appropriate planning and prepamtion time for subordinates. At a minimum, adhere to the 45-24 rule. Give subordinates more time, if possible.

Many units fail to have a functional Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) or fail to use their SOP effectively. The SOP is a reference that governs the routine functions of a unit. It helps to facilitate rapid assimilation of new individuals and cross-attached units. If a unit is habitually cross-attached, ensure it has a copy of the parent unit SOP. Once all parties have a copy of the SOP, it is important they understand and use it. The more functions that you can codify and incorporate into your SOP, the less you have to direct in an operations order. Supplementing the task force SOP should be an internal SOP that governs, by duty position, the routine functions required to operate the CTCP. Obviously, enforcing the use of an effective SOP is far less time consuming than attempting to coordinate, direct, and supervise every aspect of every operation. TIme Management Matrix 'Ihe matrix at Figure 1, using the Troop Leading Procedures as a framework, shows a simplified example of the activities that occur in the task force TOC, and what should occur in the n C P and the combat trains. The intent is to maximize the time management principles discussed previously, most importantly: conduct a multitude of tasks, at all echelons, simultaneously. Effecthre Tlme Management: A Scenarlo The task force has been involved in continuous operations for several days. The brigade has just issued a waming order. The task force receives a change of mission and will transition from the attack and prepare to defend from the positions it now occupies. The TOC issues Warning Order #l. Upon receipt of the task force warning order, the S4 prepares and issues a waming order to his subordinates. This warning order includes the mission statement, general and special instructions, and a time line. Within 30 minutes of receipt of the brigade warning order, the combat trains staff collects the combat status from the forward companies, separate platoons, and field trains CP, collates and provides this information (FM) to the commander and staff at the TOC. Included in this situation update are all CSS limitations (internal and external) that impact on mission execution. Internal limitations may include a shortage of ambulances in the medical platoon due to maintenance problems, while external limitations may include a reduced backhaul capability from the supporting medical company due to enemy activity. Execution of CSS activities for the present mission is placed in the hands of the capable second tier, that is, the S4 section's NCOIC, the medical platoon sergeant, and the senior mechanic in the UMCP. Casualty evacuation and recovery operations continue and the emergency Class V requested by a forward company is promptly dispatched. The unit CSS reports continue to be sent to the CTCP, are collated, recorded, and processed. The focus of the primary CSS leaders becomes planning for the next mission. The TOC issues Warning Order #2. Per SOP, the S4 issues Warning Order #2 to his subordinates and provides specific inshuctions to his NCOIC. He verifies that the support platoon leader in the field trains has been notified of any changes in the task organization that might affect the configuration of the LOGPAC. He also checks to see that the field trains is activating the appropriate annex of the SOP that tailors packages of Class V for the purpose of prestock in the defense. With an updated unit status and estimates, the S4, S1, BMO, and medical platoon leader report to the TQC for the planning process. While the primary CSS planners are absent from the combat trains, there is no break in the activities conducted at the CTCP. Casualty evacuation and vehicle recovery continue. Reports continue to be processed and the unit status continues to be refined and verified. The CSS planners are at the TOC for the development of the task force plan. They continue to advise the commander and other staff members of any CSS limitations to the courses of action being wargamed. The commander selects a course of action. The CSS plan to support that course of action is finalized. The S4 confiis the 24 ARMOR - site selection for the combat trains primary and subsequent positions and selects the main supply route (MSR) and three alternate supply routes (ASRs). Several potential decontamination sites are identified. Based upon a METT-T analysis, the medical platoon leader determines that the most efficient casualty evacuation technique will be using a split aid station configuration, with the treatment teams positioned well forwad and additional ambulances attached to the company designated as the main effort. A treatment team is designated as the on call “dirty aid station” and will be prepared to move to the decontamination site if a persistent chemical agent affects elements in the task force sector. If necessary, an ASR will be designated as the “dirty supply route.” The BMO expands the maintenance time lines, permitting more vehicles to be “fixed forward.” For example, those organizational or DS jobs requiring up to six hours to repair will be repaired in the company trains, and those requiring 6-24 hours will be recovered to the UMCP. These times are based upon the task force mission. The S1 verifies the commander’s guidance for priority of personnel replacement if it differs from the SOP. The plan is complete. The TOC issues Warning Order #3. The S1 calls the n C P with Warning Order #3 and instructs the S4 NCOIC to dispatch the quartering party to the new combat trains location. Per SOP, the S4 NCOIC directs the consolidation of all combat trains and UMCP assets and orders them to prepare to move. They continue to refit, refuel, resupply, and conduct PCIs preparing for the next mission. Prior to departing the TOC, the S1, BMO and medical platoon leader secure copies of the CSS graphics and execution matrix. The S1 returns to the CTCP. The medical platoon leader and BMO return to the aid station and UMCP respectively, and brief their subordinates on the plan for the next mission. All assets prepare to move to the new location as the quartering party completes their quartering mission. The S4 remains at the TOC providing CSS expertise and supervising the reproduction of the CSS graphics and matrix. He briefs the CSS plan at the Task Force Operations Order. The CSS assets are moved to their new position. As the CSS plan called for a split aid configuration of the Battalion Aid Station, these assets are emplaced accordingly, positioned well forward to reduce casualty evacuation time. Recovery assets and ambulances are placed forward in the selected positions to facilitate prompt evacuation of wounded soldiers and recovery of NMC vehicles. Early emplacement also facilitates daylight route reconnaissance of the medical and maintenance teams from the company positions to the UMCP and to the forward treatment teams. Upon completion of the Task Force Operations Order, the S4 retums from the TOC to the new CTCP location. He briefs the combat trains personnel on any changes and ensures they understand the plan. Graphics and matrices are disseminated. He assigns tasks and ensures all personnel understand the priorities of work and the time line. Per SOP, the time line and the progress of the key events are tracked in the C K P. The S4 posts all graphics to the CP map. Appreciating the importance of the CTCP’s mission to perform the functions of the task force TOC if the TOC is destroyed, he verifies that he has all graphics and a complete copy of the TF and brigade OPORDs. He conducts a communications check with the brigade tactical and main CPs, and the DS FA battalion. Per SOP, the S1 meets at the LRP with all first sergeants and specialty platoon sergeants 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the LOGPAC. A rehearsal of the CSS plan is conducted to ensure that all CSS executors understand the plan and possess the associated graphics and matrix. Routine CSS coordination is performed. The CSS philosophy of this unit emphasizes planning. It recognizes that planning in the CSS arena is an investment that always pays huge divi-ARMOR - March-April1993 dends when done well. The more thoughtful and detailed the plan, the greater the efficiency in execution. As such, all key CSS planners are present for the development of the task force order. The second-tier leaders have been well trained and are capable of exercising their good judgment and great initiative when they understand the plan and the commander’s intent. The CSS executors understand the principles of effective time management, Through the use of an effective SOP, prioritization of work, and valid time line, they are able to effectively and efficiently conduct a multitude of tasks, at all echelons, simultaneously. The end product is superb combat service support enjoyed consistently by the task force. Major Daniel J. Klecker is an Infantry officer currently attending Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kan. A graduate of Infantry Officer Basic Course, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and the Marine Corps CGSC (non-resident), he served at the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany, as a company/team observer controller and S1. Lieutenant Colonel Charles

S. Kaune is an Infantry officer currently serving as S3, Operations Group, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany. He formerly served as deputy task force observer/controller, Tim-bewolves O/C Team, CMTC; XO, 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry; and S3, 3d Battalion, 41st Infantry. A graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, he holds a MMAS from the Command and General Staff College. 25