Forgotten Principles: The 28th Division in the Huertgen Forest

On today’s modem battlefield, dominated by the microchip, computer screen, and laser technology, there would seem to be little use for a military theory over 150 years old. But that seemingly venerable theory -the principles of war -remains as viable and vital today as it was in the early 19th Century, when the Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz devised it in its earliest form.

Although still a cornerstone in the doctrine of today’s AirLand Battle, the principles of war have not always been as strictly regarded and practiced as they are in today’s Army. In the fall of 1944, in the forests of western Germany, one U. S. division forgot what the principles were all about. This account will describe just what can happen to a unit, now as well as then, when the principles ‘are forgotten, oc ignored. The unit then was the U. S. 28th Infantry Division, and the place, the Huertgen Forest. The fact that the principles of war are a vital part of current AirLand Battle doctrine is undeniable. The latest compendium of tactical doctrine, FM 100-5, states that, ‘The nine principles of war are fundamental to U. S. Army doctrine.”’ As an application of this doctrine, the principles are taught today at most levels in the Army military education system. And they are directly linked to the tenets and the imperatives of AirLand Battle? It is also a matter of record that the Army first began listing principles of war in its Training Regulations 10-5 in 19212 The principles listed then had gone through along evolution, beginning with Clausewitz’ conceptualization of them in the Napoleonic Era. His work culminated with their posthumous publication in On War, published in 1832.4 Several other theorists and authors, including Jomini and Foch, contemplated principles of war, and the young J. F. C. Fuller analyzed them again in the period before World War I.

After Fuller spent some time analyzing earlier theory on principles and formulating his own in 1911 and 1912? his work fmally made its way into print in 1916, in a British Army professional journal? It was these “modernizedw principles, published anonymously, that the US. Army Americanized and assimilated into its own doctrine in 1921.7 Some further modernization led to our current principles of war, part of AirLand Battle doctrine. As a refresher for some, our principles now are: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity? hese are the principles that I will use to analyze the action in the Huertgen Forest. Whatever the fonn, and whatever the period, the principles are unchanging. Given this fact, and the fact that the U. S. Anny recognized the principles of war in World War II, the 28th Division - for whatever reasons -chose to place little credence in them, with disastrous consequences. Sltuatlon: November 1944 A short review of Allied action in the summer and fall of 1944 is necessary to set the stage for the 28th Division’s actions that November. Two months earlier, the rapid Allied advance across France had slowed as supply lines lengthened. In mid-September, General Eisenhower had authorized the only divergence from his “Broad Front” strategy. That was the ill-fated Operation MARKET-GARDEN, which tied down thousands of soldiers in Field Marshal Montgomery’s 21st Army Group sector. In addition, the operation had diverted millions of tons of supplies from other areas of the Western Front. The lack of replacements and new equipment forced the soldiers of LTG Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group to halt and regroup at their forward positions along the German border. This halt also gave the battered German Army a much needed respite.

The first foray into the Huertgen Forest was in September 1944. The U. S. 9th Infantry Division entered the region as a supporting attack of a reconnaissance in force by the 3d Armored Division around Aachen, to the north. With the failure of MARKET-GARDEN, and given the lack of progress in the First US. Army area, the 9th Division action became a deliberate attack. This renewed effort was launched on 6 October. By 16 October, the 9th Division’s attack had been completely blunted. Two regiments of the division had succeeded in taking only 3,000 yards of forested land, far short of their objectives, at a As late October approached, the Allied leadership set on anew course. General Eisenhower wanted to press on beyond the German border area and seize a crossing point on the Rhine River south of Cologne. To do this, he designated General Bradley’s 12th Army Group as the main attack, with LTG Courtney M. Hodges’ First Army to be the main effort.” Within the First Army, VII Corps would lead the assault with a thrust between cost of over 4,500 casualties? ARMOR - Jul’AUgust Aachen and the Huertgen Forest. LTG Hodges had serious misgivings about the Huertgen Forest. He was a veteran of World War I, and had seen how the Germans had launched major counterattacks out of the Ardennes into the Allied flank during the Meuse-Argonne offensive of the summer of 1918. He feared the Germans, striking out of the Huertgen, would do the same to his attack. He decided that the Huertgen must be physically taken, and so as not to weaken the main effort, he adjusted his Corps boundaries and gave the task to LTG Gerow's V Corps." (See Map 1.) LTG Gerow further assigned the mission of taking the Huertgen Forest to one of his newly arrived divisions, the 28th ID of the Pennsylvania National Guard. The unit had recently come forward after a short rest in Belgium.

The W Corps attack was scheduled to begin no later than the beginning of November, so as to secure the flank before the main attack began. I2 Hodges. Gerow, and the 28th Division commander, MG Norman Cota, planned for their Huertgen operation to achieve three objectives. First, this attack on the VII Corps southern flank would give them additional maneuver space and supply routes into their sector in the north. The supply routes would open up along the Monschau Comdor, which ran northeast through the Huertgen along three prominent canalizing ridge lines, and through the villages of Huertgen and Schmidt.

Second, the 28th attack would protect the VII Corps southern flank from German counterattacks out of the Huertgen Forest.

Third, the 28th attack would pull German reserves away from the VI1 Corps area of operations, allowing the main effort to proceed with less threat of enemy reinf0rement.l The three Regimental Combat Teams of the 28th were given three very divergent objectives. Cota had little choice in the positioning of the objectives - all were selected by Gerow and his staff. All that was left to Cota was the fine-tuning and the execution.

The 109th Infantry would attack to the north from Germeter toward Huertgen, with the objective of countering any German counterattack from the area, as had happened to the 9th Division one month earlier. The 109th Infantry would protect the left flank of the division, and secure a departure line for future operations. The 110th Infantry would attack south from Germeter through dense forest and Westwall defense positions to secure the Rollesbroich-Strauch-Steckenborn road network. This would ensure a more secure supply route into Schmidt.

The remaining regiment, the 112th Infantry, would conduct the division main attack, striking east from Germeter into Vossenack It would leave one battalion at Vossenack, turn south down the Kall Trail into the dense forest. cross the Kall River, and then head back up the Kall Trail to secure the village of Kommemheidt. It wwld leave one battalion at Kommerscheidt. and attack with its remaining battalion to seize the vital crossroads and division main objective, Schmidt. The 112th would also be charged with holding the Division main supply route (MSR), the Kall Trail, open until the 110th could complete its mission. To accomplish these tasks, the 28th also received attachment of several battalions of Engineers and Reld Artillery. In addition to one Medium Tank Battalion stroyer Battalions (one self-propelled [893d], the other towed [630th]).14 (See Map 2) The 28th ID attack was originally scheduled to commence on 1 November, however, it was postponed due to poor weather, which prevented any close air operations. On that day, Eisenhower also delayed the beginning of the main effort from 5 November to 10 November, or at the latest 16 November, due to the slow arrival of some units into the VII Corps sector. Under the original plan by Hodges, the 28th attack had to begin the next day, 2 November, regardless of the weather. Yet (707th) and two Tank De-Map 2. The 28th ID - Positions Prior to Attack with the new guidance from Eisenhower, no one, from Hodges to Gerow or Cob, suggested anew start date far the 28th attack. This meant that under the worst circumstances, the 28th attack could proceed for fourteen days before the main W Corps attack ever began, leaving the German reserves to potentially chew up the 28th and tum to counter VI1 Corps. The 28th attack date stood at 2 November.’

To summarize the 28th attack into the Huertgen as a defeat would be an understatement. It was a complete disaster. The division achieved two days of moderate success on 2 and 3 November, and even succeeded in taking Kommerscheidt and Schmidt. From the 4th until complete relief on 19 November, however, the 28th lived in pure hell, The 109th Infantry only succeeded in taking half of its objectives before being decimated, relieved by the 12th Infantry, 4th Division, and ordered into Vossenack to assist in the defense there, The 110th Infantry made NO progress. By the end of the action, they had secured objectives three and four, but left numerous subsequent objectives untouched, while being ground to pieces in the process. The 112th Infantry secured its objectives on 3 November, but was rapidly driven from Schmidt. Its remaining forces were pounded in Kommerscheidt and Vossenack by ceaseless artillery, endless counterattacks, and the bitter elements. Ultimately, the 112th was forced to evacuate Kommerscheidt, leaving behind numerous wrecked tanks, TDs, and supply vehicles, and only held onto Vossenack and part of the Kall Trail. Even then, the 112th had been reinforced by most of the attached engineers, who were fighting as infantry, and the remnants of the 109th Infantry, The relief of the 28th began on 14 November and was completed by 19 November, as the division was pulled back to a rear area in Luxembourg. The second phase of the fighting for the Huertgen Forest was over. l6 The cost of the fighting by the 28th Division in the Huertgen Forest was incredibly high. In the 14 days that it actively participated in fighting from 2-16 November 1944, it suffered a minimum of 6,184 casualties. This figure gave the 28th the undesired distinction of being the most battered American unit in all of the combat in Europe during World War II.17 And why did this all happen? It was because of some amateurish planning, which virtually ignored any accounting for the principles of war. Why the poor planning? It’s hard to say 45 years later. Maybe it was because the Allies had become overconfident after their rapid assault through France, Maybe they thought the Germans were finished, even though they were on the German’sown soil for the fmt time. Maybe they were unduly intimidated by the Huertgen and should have bypassed and isolated it. Maybe Cota was intimidated by Gerow, and Gerow by Hodges, to the point where none could question the insane plan. Whatever the reasons, and whoever was to blame, the lessons for the AK-Land Battle and the applications of the pinciples of war are numerous and distinct.

The plan’s fvst e m lay with Objective. The division had no clear, deci-Maybe. sive and attainable objective. The plan called for the 28th to attack in three different directions, to support three different mission objectives. This greatly reduced the 28th’ combined combat power, reducing its chances of achieving any one objective, let alone the so-called main objective of Schmidt. Furthermore, the delay and ultimate cancellation of the VI1 Corps attack removed the decisive factor from the 28th attack. They were conducting a supporting attack in support of no main attack, Even more incredibly, they were the only American unit attacking along the whole Western Front at the time, allowing the Germans to maneuver any reserves against them that they so desired. The plan was minimally offensive in nature. It called for rapid seizure of pieces of land by infantry and then holding them indefinitely against counterattack, with minimal armored support. Unfortunately, the plan failed to include the most lethal close offensive assault arm, tanks and TDs. Their only firm planned use was in Vossenack, and their only mission there was to augment division artillery in the indirect role. It would seem that the planners expected to see no enemy tanks, counted on constant air support, or had complete confidence in their infantry antitank capabilities, all obviously ludicrous assumptions. As history shows, antiarmor support was desperately needed, but the tanks of LTC Ripple’s 707th. and the TDs of LTC Mays’ 893d could not negotiate the treacherous nine-foot-wide Kall Trail in sufficient numbers. Also, foul weather effectively kept the IX Tactical Air Force out of the skies. The effects of Mass and Economy of Force can be analyzed together in this case and are closely related to the Objective. Having been assigned three divergent objectives, none of which allowed support of the other, the 28th whittled its combat power down to a level where no sufficient force was available at any place or time to achieve any marginal result. Additionally, the plan called for seizing the prime objective of the whole operation and holding it with practically the smallest maneuver force available, when the strongest force possible should have been given the task. In conjunction with Mass, the smallest possible forces should have been allocated to the flank support missions, merely to maintain them, so as to allow additional forces for the main effort.

The principle of Maneuver was ignored at the outset with the plan to attack head-on into the Huertgen. The enemy could have been placed at a serious disadvantage by making his position untenable, either by isolating him through bypassing, or by flooding the Kall Valley after capturing, controlling, or destroying the Rur River dams. And if assault into the Huertgen was absolutely necessary, an assault from the flank through one of the mobility conidors on favorable terrain would seem much better than going across corridors through dense, fortified forest.

Unity of Command in the operation was not at all appmnt. Cota was forced into most of his planning actions by his superiors, Gerow and Hodges. Also, Cota was never fully in touch with the battle. He never visited the front line, relying instead on the reports of his staff officers, who appeared to be attempting to mislead him. or paint a better picture than actually existed, The only division staff officer really in touch with the situation was the assistant division commander, BG Davis, who seemed to be everywhere on the front, personally directing numerous actions. But even this attempt at command had no unity. Davis would give directions to individual tanks, or platoons, or soldiers, frequently without the knowledge of their superiors. Thus; occasionally instances would arise w h m subordinate commanders would unknowingly countermand Davis’ orders, or expect their units to be performing one mission when they were actually elsewhere doing another mission.

Security operations w n also poor. There were no orders given for prc-operation patrolling by any commander, at any echelon, to attempt to find enemy positions or strengths, or to ascertain the viability of the Kall Trail as a division MSR. The absence of patrolling and intelligence gathering gave the enemy units an unnecessary advantage by keeping their locations and strengths unknown until the attack actually began. The inadequacy of the Kall Trail proved to be fatal also, as it was inadequate for armored support or supply. The poor state of the trail should have been determined before the attack ever began. Finally, Simplicity was comp mised from the start. Two of the regiments (the 110th and 112th), were given orders to attack initially along several axes towards one objective, then to split their force and turn more than 90 degrees to attack towards several other objectives. Such a maneuver is difficult on open terrain in peacetime, much less in dense forest under direct and indirect fire. The 28th Division plan today seems to have been doomed from the start. Not only did it strain good logic and ignore the experience of the 9th Division, but it ignored virtually every principle of war. The why of the violation of the the principles of war is not important at this time. What is important is the fact that they were violated and that a U. S. division was completely decimated as a result. World War I1 was not that long ago. And World War I1 action may not be all that different, in essence, from action on the AirLand Battlefield. The same principles apply throughout. If it could happen then, to the 28th Division, it can certainly happen now. 'PM 100-5, Opemfionr, May 1986. p. 6. '/bid, p 14 & 22, I deicription of the Ah-Land teneta md impemtives and their &tho to the principles. 'Bernard Brodie, Strutcdy In Thr Miuile &e, Rinaton. NJ.. Rinatoa Univenity h s r, 1965. p. 24. 'cad vou lurevitz. On War, iaatoa. NJ.. PrinCaaa Univenity h, 1976, p. 27. 'Anthony John Tlyth. U, 'Eoney Fuller,' New Bmnswick, NJ.. Rutgen Univenity Presa, 1977. p. 31.

61bid, p 35. '/bid, p. 269. 'FM 100-1. The Army, A u 6 1981, p. 13.

9Chrles B. MlcDoaald. The Bank of the Huertgcn Forest. Philadelphia, J. B. Iippincctt Ca., 1963, the rummrry of d min the Huertgen Fmat before Nov. 1944 cane f m Chapten 4-8. 'o/bid, p 88. "/bid. Ihe mnrmuiution of dm Pint Army Md VI1 corp plM Wmc from Ievenl pI8ccI in the book.

York. Stein md b y. 1984, p. 60. "Cecil B. amy, Follow Me and Die, New I31bid, p.63. '?bki, p 63-66.

"MLcDondd, p. 93. %hadea B. MIcDauld & Sihey T. Mathzws. Three Battlu: Anwiile, Alhuro. and Schmidt, Washimgton, D. C.. Dept. of the Amy. 1952. p 257-414. a awnmuy of the unit actions wag obuimd froan there pages. "Cumy, p. 264. "/bid, p. 46 & 48, Maps. '9MecDonald, Three Banlrs. My, VI. bade mer.

Captain Harry J. Schute Jr. was commissioned in Armor in 1985 from the U. S. Military Academy. A graduate of AOBC, AOAC, CAS3, and Airborne School, he sewed as an Mi tank platoon leader, subcommunity ops officer, and company XO in 3d AD, FRG, and as a training battalion adjutant, company commander, and in the Directorate for Total Armor Force. Readiness at Fort Knox, Ky. He is currently in the USAR.

Safety Notes; POV Accidents: Serious Business When asked, the majority of armor soldiers would say that the most serious type accidents confronting them deal with operating and maintaining armored combat vehicles. Some would be shocked to learn that the majority of deaths and serious injuries occur while soldiers are off-duty operating their privately owned vehicles (POV). POV accidents kill and injure more soldiers throughout the Army than all other accidents combined. The table below shows the impact that POV accidents have had on the Armor community. Since Fiscal Year 1988, nearly 60 percent of the armor soldier fatalities have been a result of POV accidents. Accident investigations reveal that in most fatal POV accidents, the driver is speeding. This includes not only exceeding the posted speed limit but also driving too fast for road and weather conditions. "A soldier driving to work at 0530 hours rearended a truck, which had slowed for a traffic light. Visibility was poor due to dense fog. The soldier struck the truck without applying his brakes, and he was not wearing a seat belt. He was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival." This example highlights another factor in POV deaths: soldiers not wearing seat belts. Accident records show that drivers wearing seat belts are 70 percent less likely to be killed or seriously injured than unbelted drivers. Although excessive speed, fatigue, and failure to wear seat belts are all factors in many POV accidents, the number 1 cause of fatal POV accidents is drinking and driving. "Two soldiers were returning from a party where they had been drinking heavily. The driver lost control of his POV and ran off 1-70, rolled across the median, and was struck by an oncoming vehicle. Both soldiers were pronounced dead at the scene.' Information and education programs are the heart of POV accident prevention. Command interest and accountability are vital elements. Leaders must set an example and educate their soldiers starting with the following: *Stress safety every day -not just as a checklist item before holidays. *Use supporting safety professionals to help your unit develop POV *Make soldiers aware of penaities for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Leaders can have a significant impact on reducing the probability that their soldiers are not involved in life-threatening POV accidents. And if, by chance, they are involved in a POV accident, leadership involvement can increase the soldier's chances of survival. accident prevention programs targeted at Mentified problem areas. ARMOR SOLDIER FATALITIES

FY88 34 fatals (23 POV)

FY89 30 fatals (14 POV)

FY90 31 fatals (20 POV)

FY9 1 17 fatals (10 POV)

FY92 6fatals ( 3 POV)

IT93 (as of 17 May) 10 fatais ( 6 POV) fatats (76 POV)