Can’t Get There From Here: Moving the Heavy Force

by Captaln Harry Schute, Jr. In days of old, when all infantry moved on foot and all cavalry on horse, the expression of the time was, “march to the sound of the guns.” Today, with conflict frequently thousands of miles from one’s shores, that expression easily could be, “deploy to the sound of the guns.” When Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army invaded Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia in August 1990, the modem version of the tested axiom almost became a mission impossible for the U. S. Army’s heavy forces. Iraq committed to Kuwait a large conventional force, consisting of vast quantities of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery. Iraq’s forces dictated that the Allied Coalition deploy a similar mechanized force to meet the heavy threat. Our Army’s heavy focus for the last 40 years, however, has been on reinforcing Central Europe, not Southwest Asia (SWA). This meant that our deployment and buildup in SWA was in a completely immature theater, with no Pre-positioned Materiel Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS), or support inhstructure. The initial Allied deployment was a major undertaking, and although well executed, could have been a disaster if Saddam had decided to invade Saudi Arabia in September or October 1990. That, however, is a completely different story. An operation after the deployment - just as difficult and vitally important - was the movement of the combat divisions from their Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPOD) to their Rear Assembly Areas (RAA) and Tactical Assembly Areas (TAA). It is this operation - and some of the “what if‘s” and “what should we learn” - upon which I will focus. Army Transportation’s focus on Europe is readily apparent in its published doctrine: “The most challenging situation is that posed by the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. It is for this challenge that the bulk of the U. S. Army forces are organized, equipped, and trained.”’ The focus on Europe is further evident in the following planning assumptions: that units will be in deployed positions before hostilities, dependents will be present, host nation (HN) and Allied transport will be readily V il-able, heavy transport will only be needed for high priority units in moving POMCUS materiel, and rail will be heavily relied upon to move heavy equipment to the corps rear or division support area? With the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the conclusion of Operation DESERT STORM, it should be obvious that we need to plan better for intratheater transportation of heavy forces in other contingency areas. Many potential areas of conflict, such as the Middle East or Central America, do not have well established rail networks, or even extensive road networks. Consequently, transport of heavy equipment in these areas of operation would have to rely on Heavy Equipment Transporters (HET). This was the case in Saudi Arabia. When faced with the prospect of moving hundreds of miles from SPODs to RAAs and TAAs, with no rail and limited roads, the Army’s Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, howitzers, etc., etc., had to move by HET. The wear and tear of a move ARMOR - November-December 7997 37 over long distances in the harsh desert environment - really in any environment - without HETs would have caused much higher rates of vehicle mechanical failure. In SWA, we were able to marshal enough HETs to meet the minimum requirements, but the simple fact remains that our Army is not readily configured to provide large scale HET support to heavy forces. Currently, you can find HETs at three levels in a theater of operations. At division level, the Division Sup port Command’s (DISCOM) Transportation Motor Transport Company (TMT) has two HET platoons with a total of 24 tractors and trailers. The primary purpose of these HETs is to move heavy equipment back to maintenance collection points? At corps level, the organization is a bit more complex. The Corps Support Command (COSCOM) has a Transportation Brigade with a flexible number of direct support (DS) - avenge of three - and general support (GS) - average of four - battalions. The DS battalions include a number of light and medium truck companies. The GS battalions are similar, but also have a heavy truck company of 24 HETS? The purpose of these HETS is for unprogrammed movements and supporting corps rear area operations! Finally, at theater level, the Transportation Command has a flexible number of motor groups or brigades that have a flexible number of motor battalions. Each of the motor battalions has a HET company of 24 vehicles. The primary purpose of these HET companies is for administrative movements. Based upon the assets that may reasonably be available from corps and theater, a division commander can expect to have a tank-to-HET ratio of between 7:land 15:l. Two assumptions used in developing this ratio m that only tanks will be moved by the HETs, and the HETs will have an operational readiness (OR) rate of 100 percent. Of course, neither of those assumptions is valid, because the divi- 4 7 sion will have to move at least as many other armored vehicles as tanks, and the planning OR rate for HETs is 75 percent.8 Some additional planning guidance for IETs includes having each of the HET company’s trucks capable of making either four local haul round hips, or two line haul round trips? Each line haul is expected to have a 90-mile one-way distance.” So the bottom line is that a division commander could have significant trouble moving a tank battalion administratively across a distance of more than 90 miles. As DESERT STORM drew near, Army forces in SWA were at an average tank-to-U. S. HET ratio of approximately 7:l. Once again, that figure only provides for tanks, and counts all HETs on hand, without regard to o p erational readiness. It was only with considerable host nation and Allied HET support that units were able to move from the port to the RAAs in a matter of seven1 days instead of weeks. Likewise, the same was true as forces moved forward from RAAs to TAAs. As the result of four problems - receiving HET support from a collective grab bag of sources, moving over distances that exceeded the 90-mile planning factor, moving the divisions’ other armored systems, and dealing with a HET fleet that was regularly near its doctrinal planning OR rate, meant that our force was very wlner-able during the entire deployment. Units were fragmented because of extreme transportation schedules, command and control were strained, and any desire to achieve rapid mass remained a dream. Ironically, our adversary, Iraq, had a tank-to-HET ratio of nearly 3:l. Its favorable HET ratio, and intemal supply lines, made it relatively easy for Iraq to realign forces. And if the Iraqis had been wise to the brilliant Allied flanking maneuver, they might have preempted our initiative by moving some of their armored force into a better position to react. When the time came in February 1991, to see if the HETs - Allied and U. S. - had done their job, the answer was apparent. Our tanks, Bradleys and howitzers entered the ground war with all fleets above 90 percent OR rates. “his figure would have been far worse if those vehicles had road marched to their RAAs and TAAs. In future contingencies that require heavy forces, we may not be as fortunate to enter a scenario in which the host nation and Allies can provide large numbers of HETs to ease our transportation burden. In fact, our own doctrine acknowledges that infrathea-ter transportation may be one of the most restrictive operational elements!’ And more specifically, that “HETS are scarce, vital assets in the delivery of heavy equipment...”’* In such a future scenario, we would be in the midst of a situation in which the HET ratio would be far below the minimum requirement to move a heavy force from one point to another in a matter of days instead of weeks. The simplest way to plan properly for this contingency is to increase the number of HET units available to the division and corps commanders. I am sure many readers will wonder where we would get the spaces to man my proposed HET units, but that is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that in this age of reduction, the “easiest” place to make the HET units would probably be in the Reserve Component (at the expense of other units). The HET organizations I propose would become roundout organizations to their parent support commands. And, let’s face it, it is sure easier to synchronize the battlefield employment of a HET company than it is a combined arms maneuver brigade. Putting aside the some of the HET assets, what I will do now is outline what I think is a good short-term solution to contingency HET support. At division level, I would replace the DISCOM’s TMT company with a TMT battalion composed of a 38 ARMOR - November-December 7997

Figure 1 x4 light/medium truck company and four HET companies (see Fig. 1). The TMT battalion’s HET companies would have a minimum of 24 trucks each. The HET companies in this new TMT battalion would operate much like the other division-level units, in that they would be sliced to the maneuver brigades in a direct support role. The fourth company would either remain under division control or become DS to the brigade or division that has the most critical transportation needs. The light/medium truck company would continue to fulfill its present role except it would have expanded capabilities. The addition of the TMT battalion to the DISCOM would change the scenario from one in which the division can expect a tank-to-HET ratio under optimum conditions and augmentation of 7:l to a scenario in which the division can expect an everyday, unsupported tank-to-HET ratio of 4:l. Remember, that is tanks only, no other combat systems are included in these calculations. At corps level, I would add to the COSCOMs transportation brigade DS battalions configured exactly like that of the division’s new TMT battalion (see Fig. 2). The number of battalions would be dependent upon the number of divisions normally assigned to the corps, with a planning average of three. These battalions would be assigned to the division in a DS relationship to augment its transportation needs. Much like the situation at division level, the corps battalions could have their habitual support relationship changed to meet the unforeseen critical transportation needs of another division. A division’s augmentation by a DS battalion from the COSCOM would further improve the division commander’s tank-to-HET ratio to approximately 2 1. Of course, the COSCOM’s GS battalions, with their one HET company each, would still be available to perform their intended mission to provide unscheduled support. Emergency use of the GS assets would place the tank-to-HET ratio solidly at 2:l. This is obviously a vast improvement over the current best case 7:l ratio. As with any organization that relies upon support relationships, and works tactically with units other than those in its in garrison, this new organization would need periodic training. The armored vehicle crews would need to gain experience loading their equipment on HETs rather than trains, and the HET operators and units would need to get used to working for a brigade or division commander on a regular basis. I x 3 - 4 x3-4 I x 3 - 4 Figure 2 ARMOR - November-December 7991 39

This plan to increase the HET support available to the heavy force is certainly not the total s$ution to the myriad problems in an administrative move. This plan could, however, be a step in the right direction, making a heavy force movement less of a challenge. The image of hundreds of tanks, Bradleys, and howitzers stuck at Ad Damman, waiting for HETs to move forward, as the Iraqis roll across the Saudi border is not an attractive thought. Just as unattractive is the thought of that armored force being told to road march forward several hundred miles before going into combat. Oh, by the way, your OR rate probably will have dipped below 70 percent during that road march. Fortunately, time and our Allies were cards that we held in our deck during our buildup in SWA. Those cards allowed us to get our armored force in position in a reasonable amount of time, ready to fight. Do we want to bank on having that same hand for the next contingency? Or would it be better to fu the planning and force structure now so that we can support the next contingency? I do know that I don't want to be the guy that tells that future division commander, "We can't get there from here." Notes 'FM 55-2, Division Tramptcrtion O M - tiom, Washington D. C.. 31 Jan 85, p. 2-1. 2FM 55-1. Army Transportation Services in a Theuter of Oprutions, Washington D. C., 30 NOV 84, pp. 1-1.16. 3FM 55-2. pp. 3-5.64. 4FM 55-1, p. 2-5. 'lbid, p. 6-3. 61bid, p. 2-6. 'Ibid. p. 2-3. *FM 55-15. Transportation Reference Doh. 90p tit, p. 6-3. "FM 55-10. Movement Control in a Theater of Operations. Washington D. C., 22 Jul 86 Washington D. C.. 9 Jun 86. p. 3-8. wK1, p. 5-2. Lett e r s (continued from Page 31 Captain Harry J. Schute, Jr. was commissioned in Armor in 1985 from the

USMA.

A graduaie of AOBC, AOAC, CAS, and Airborne School, he has served in 3AD in FRG as an M1 tank platoon leader, subcommunity operations officer, and company XO. He served as a training battalion adjutant, company commander, and at Directorate of Total Armor Force Readiness ai Fort Knox. He is currently in the

USAR.

"FM 63-31, Combat Service S u p r t O M - tions - Corps, Washington D. C.. 12 Aug 85, p. 14-1 1. 12FM 100-10, Combat Service Sqport, Wwh-ington D. C., 18 Feb 88. p. 94. I was there for Tet, which raged for a bit more than 100 hours itself. Our Alpha Troop received a unit citation for saving Bien Hoa Air Base by tanks effecting firepower, shock action, and by running over several hundred VC bent on capturing the airfield. They didn't. And I recall reading about a few tankers being in Korea, although on my last visit to the Patton Museum in 1989, you would have thought that armored warfare ended in 1945. It didn't. Then of course there was The Big War itself, in which tanks played certainly a key role in the European Theater and a vital supporting role in other theaters. Let's not forget those whose actions brought The Combat Arm of Decision to where it is today. Lers join to support both a combat tanker badge and a combat cavalryman badge however we can. But let's make the awards retroactive to recognize all treadheads wha B actions deserved them. Let's re award since the combat infantryman badge has been around. Fair's fair.

Leavenworth. Kan. Dlstlnctlon Is Justlfied Dear Sir: Alter reading 1LT Ronald J. Bashista's letter. 'War Revives Armor Badge Issue,' I feel he's only concerned with those men who actually saw combat, and not those who make up the armor community. It's true that M l N l A 1 crew members are jealous of their Infantry brothers, and feel they are worthy of distinction. For an Infantryman to receive an 'EIB' (Expert Infantryman's Badge), he must go through a rigorous test of individual skills and physical endurance, the same is true of the p- 'EFMB' (Expert Field Medical Badge) worn ar medics. - Why not develop a TAB" (Expert Armor Badge) program for the whole Armor community and award a math for those who served in combat as an Armor crewman. The fact is there are expert tankers; there are expert scouts. This was proven when we sent expert tankers to transition M1 crews to M1 A1 just weeks before DESERT STORM. It was those "expert' crews who brought victory home to the armor community. So, who dewbps this program? I feel that a collective effort by the commanders, staff officers, and master gunners of the Armor Branch could develop such a program, one the entire Armor community would be proud to see. The men of 'Armor are proud and gallant - they need a challenge; they need distinction. Let's give them something to strive for.

SSG, Master Gunner