Airland Battle Defeat Mechanisms

This article continues the discussion of the armor force and the Airland Battle begun in the January-February 1982 ARMOR. Our purpose is to explain how Airland Battle proposes to work at the conceptual level, its defeat mechanism. As such, this article not only continues the discussion just mentioned, but serves to complement the lead article of the May, 1982 Military Review, “The Operational Art of the Airland Battle,” by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Doerfel. In a prefab? to Lieutenant Colonel Doerfel’s article, General Glenn K. Otis, Commanding General, TRADOC, urged a continuing professional discussion of Airland Battle. Accordingly, a bibliography of recent articles from professional journals is included. While the bibliography is not exhaustive, it constitutes a useful primer. Lieutenant Colonel Doerfel’s article suggests how Army groups and corps must employ operational art at the theater level to come to grips with the Soviet operational concept. The defeat mechanisms themselves-“operational art,” if you will-must be understood at a level once removed in abstraction from specific application if their logic is to be compelling. First, though, defining “opergtional art” is in order. The easiest way to do this is to put the term in a context with more familiar terms-strategy and tactics. Writing in International Security, winter 1980/1981 (Vol. 5, No. 3), Edward Luttwak differentiates the terms this way: In theater strategy, political goals and constraints on one hand and available resources on the other determine projeded outcomes. At a much lower level, tactics deal with specific techniques. In the operational dimension, by contrast, schemes of warfare such as blitzkreig or defense-in-depth evolve, or are exploited. Such schemes seek to attain the goals set by theater strategy through suitable combinations of tactics. Battalions do not collide by chance; rather, tactics and their application at the maneuver unit level against an o p ponent parallel a more abstract effort wherein the operational art, or concept, and the plan of one commander are pitted against those of the opposing commander. In the case of our most obvious threat, it is Airland Battle against Soviet echelonment.

Theater strategy aside, if we place two armies opposite each other and the ultimate objective of each is to defeat the other, there are really two ways to do this. The first way is to destroy the opposing force’s combat power. A force accomplishes this, whether on the offense or defense, by attacking enemy combat units and destroying armored fighting x X -

-Phase 1.

Here, the defending corps disrupts the coherence of the main attack by maneuvering air and ground combat units against the sustainment capacity and command and control of the attacking forces. In fact, the enemy force is trying to Figure 2. Corps Executed Counterattack. rupture the forward defense to get at the defender’s supporting structure, collapsing the defense along the entire corps front-roughly the same tactical objective of the defender’s flanking counterthrust.

It is worth noting that while we think of the Soviet concept in terms of echelonment, most modern armies attack and defend in depth, even if their deployment is not so stylized. The discussion here will consider the Soviet operational concept of echelonment.

We talk so often of echelonment, thinking of it in terms of wave upon wave of massed combat systems, that we sometimes overlook the operational function of echelonment. Tactical flexibility at all levels of command is the point. The Soviet commander is able to hold and employ considerable combat power to reinforce success after the battle is joined.

This can happen in two ways:

First, succeeding echelons bypass units held in contact. If the Soviets cannot attack everywhere, we surely cannot defend everywhere. In fact, we allow that we must take risks in certain areas to defend others against main thrusts. With our tired and weakened battalions held in place by first echelons, second echelons attack whc Second, should leading eche penetration of the forward del?re we are not.

Ions succeed in forcing i fense, following echelon!

D ISR U PTl ON

The corps commander employs his maneuver and combat support assets, both out of the corps base and with the mission he gives his division commanders, to use both destruction and disruptive mechanisms. The armor force at the maneuver battalion and brigade level, when appropriately task-organized with fighting elements that make up the combined arms team, is the executor of two of the defeat mechanisms of Airland Battle. Armor, as a "state of mind"-high speed, maneuvering firepower-is adept at the cut-and-thrust of firepower-based force destruction as well as parry and counterthrust of maneuver-based force disruption. Airland Battle is an operational concept that can defeat the echeloned scheme of Soviet doctrine, but it must be seen as aimed at the enemy commander's plan and not just at his Armor will play a key role in overthrowing both.

Clarke, Bruce D. GEN, USA (Ret) The Battle of St Vith Established a Concept in Defensive Tactics of Armor." Clarke. The Principles of the Employment of Armor." Lecture, Naval War College, academic ear 1948-1949. (Note both of GEN Clarke's arhcles are Armor School handbuta.)

Deal, C. Lanier, Jr., MAJ, USA. The Key to the Deep Battle." Military Reutew, March 1982, 51-54.

Doerfel, John S., Lf'e; USA. The Operational Art ofthe Airland Battle." Military Reurew, May 1982, pp. 3-10. Field Artillery School. "Implementing the Airland Battle." Field Artillery Journal. Se tember-October 1981, pp. 20-27. Franz, &lace P., COL, USAR. "Grand Tactics." Military Review, December 1981, pp. 32-39.

Grange, David E. Jr. LTC, USA. "Infantzy and Air Defense in the Airland Battle." Air Defense. OCtober-Decemter 1981, pp. 24-25. Gnffis, Jimmy, LTC, USA et. al. The Mechanized Infantzy Battalion Task Force in the Airland Battle." Infantry. July-August 1982, p Holder, L. D., LTC, USA. "Maneuver in the Deep Battle."bilitary. Review. May 1982, pp. 54-61.

Lancaster, M. S., MAJ, USA. The Armor Force in the Airland Battle."

ARMOR. January-February 1932, pp. 2632:

Luttwak, Edward N. The Operational Level of War." IntenLcrtional Security. Winter 1980-1981 0'01. 5, No. 3), p McCaffrey, Bany R. LTC. USA. The Eattie on the Gennan Frontier." Military Reuiew. March 1982, pp. 62-70. 20-24 61 79 McNair, Carl H. Jr., MG, USA and Josef Fteinsprecht, CPT, USA. "Army AnationForces intheAirlandBattle." US. ArmyAuiationDigest, July 1981, pp. 613.

Noah, Max W.

MG, USA. "Combat Engineering in the Airland Battle." The Military Engineer. November-December 1981, pp. 378-382. Oblinger, John B. Jr. MG, USA. "Air Defense in the Airland Battle, Part I." Air Defense, July-September 1981, pp. 3640. Oblinger. "Air Defense in the Airland Battle, Part Two: Contingency Areas." Air Defense, January--1982, pp. 3538.

OMeara, Andrew P., Jr., COL, USA. "Dimensions of Mobility."ARMOR. January-February 1982, pp. 22-25.

Richardson, William R. LTG, USA. Tinning on the Extended Battlefield." Army. June 1981, pp. 35-42.

Sinnreich, Richard Hart, LTC, USA. Tactical Doctrine or Dogma." Army. September 1979, pp. 1619.

Starry, Donn A. GEN, USA. "Extending the Battlefield." Military Review. March 1981, pp. 31-50.

Starry. The Principles ofWar."MilitaryReview. September 1981, pp. 2-12. Tate, Cl$e. J. COL,. USA and LTC L. D. Holder. "New Doctrine for the TRADOC Pamphlet 6255, The Airland Battle and Corps 86." 25 March Wass de Czege, Huba LTC (P) USA and LTC L. D. Holder. The New FM Defense."

1981.

100-5." Milifmy Review. July 1982, pp. 53-70. ilrtary Reuzew. March 1982, pp. 2-9. MAJOR MICHAEL S. LANCASTER is a USMA graduate and is presently chief, Scenario-Oriented Recurring Evaluation System at Fort Knox. KY. He is a graduate of the Naval Command and Staff College and holds an MA degree in literature and language MR. JON CLEMENS is a writer-editor at the USAARMS Training Literature Division.

Prior to joining the civil service, he was a reporter for a New Jersey daily newspaper and later for the Louisville Times.

He is a graduate of Union College, Schenectady, NY. from the University of Kentucky. He has served in Germany and Southeast Asia and on the staff and faculty of USMA.

january-febtuary 1983