British Armour in the Falklands

Above. Though on the way to war, the Blues and Royals still had time for a bit of levity.

Center. The Blues and Royals drive toward Port Stanley with their colours flying.

Left. A Scimitar fords a stream during across-country march.

On 4 April 1982,Z days after the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentinian forces, the Blues and Royals, a medium reconnaissance regiment stationed at Windsor just outside London, received orders to provide two reconnaissance troops for deployment with the Falkland Island Task Force. Each troop was to consist of two Scorpion and two Scimitar combat vehicles, reconnaissance (CVR) with a Samson recovery vehicle in support. Two troops from B Squadron were selected, taking with them their normal complement of officers, NCOs, and troopers. There was no question of stacking the team. All over the United Kingdom, as the national mood evolved through consternation to concern mixed with pride and determination, hectic military preparations were under way. The Blues and Royals were no exception. Within a period of 24 hours, vehicles and weapons were checked and prepared for combat in a subartic climate and crews completed their administration. Some 5 days later the vehicles were safelyembarkedonthe MVElk andthe crews embarked on SS Canberra. Both ships were requisitioned from the merchant fleet. Thus it was that 3 and 4 Troops, B Squadron, The Blues and Royals, now under operational command of Headquarters 3 Commando Brigade, came to form the armoured element of a British force that, under the fascinated gaze of the world, was to effect the liberation of the Falkland I s lands 10 weeks later.

At this point, some background on these famous regiments, the men, and their equipment may be necessary for those unfamiliar with the British Army. The Blues and Royals (The Royal Horse Guards and 1st Dragoons) were formed as a regiment in 1969 by the amalgamation of two of the oldest and most famous cavalry regiments of the British Army, The Royal Horse Guards (The Blues) and The Royal Dragoons (1st Dragoons). The Blues trace their descent from a Parliamentary regiment which established such a fine reputation for itself during the English Civil War that in 1661 King Chailes JI, on his restoration, incorporated the regiment into the British Army. The Royal Dragaons by origin were raised in London also in 1661 for service overseas in the garrison of Tan-giers. Individually, or side by side, the two regiments fought in the majority of the British Army’s major campaigns. Together with the Life Guards, presently an armoured regiment in Germany, the Blues and Royals form the Household Cavalry. Historically they are the Sovereign’s Bodyguard and r,e-tain the additional function today of providing mounted squadrons for 26 ARMOR British Arrnour by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Photo of Household Cavalr ceremonial duties in London. The Blues and Royals are equipped for their reconnaissance role with CVRs manufactured by Alvis Limited. The family of CVR vehicles was developed to fulfill a British Army requirement for a weapons system capable of canying out the roles of reconnaissance, fire support, and antiar-mour and yet be sufficiently light tenable two of the vehicles to be loaded into a C-130 aircraft. They can also be lifted by CH#7 helicopter. The best known vehicle of this family is the Scorpion, a very fast, agile, light tank that, with its 8-ton weight, but low ground pressure, can traverse bog and other rlifficult terrain where even a walking man might have difficulty. Excellent protection for the three-man crew includes aluminum armour and a full NBC system. The main armament is a 76-mm medium-velocity gun capable of firing high-explosive, squash-head (HESH), high-explosive (HE), canister, smoke, and illuminating rounds out to an effective range of 5,000 metres. The turret has a 7.62-mm coaxially-mounted machinegun. A day f-c D 0 10 2 0 3 0 4 0 9

Islandrs, I the Falklands Jones, Royal Tank Regiment kown Copyright Reserved and night capability is provided by a second generation night sight in the gunner’s position.

The companion vehicle, Scimitar, is similar to Scorpion in every respect except that it mounts a 30-mm Men high-velocity cannon, Firing armour-piercing, discarding sabot (APDS), HE, and armour-piercing, special effects (APSE), the Rarden can kill any armoured personnel carrier or mechanized infantry combat vehicle it is likely to meet and is effective against many other armoured vehicles. The Scorpions and Scimitars were supported on this operation by a further CVR variant, the Samson, for recovery and repair. Therefore, the CVRs were ideally suited for strategic deployment, in conditions of limited shipping space, and yet possessed the essential characteristics for tactical deployment in the Falkland Islands where a combination of harsh weather, hostile terrain, and enemy action-was to put the proven versatility of CVRs and their crews to a severe test. Throughout the days of the long voyage to the South Atlantic, the Blues Above. In more peaceful times, the Blues and Royals serve as part of the Household Cavalry.

Right. A Scorpion and Scimitarat a halt during a lull in operations. Note the kinetic energy recovery rope draped across the bow. and Royals joined with the rest of 3 Commando Brigade in a rigorous training routine of fitness, first aid, personal weapon, and specialized training. During a short stop at Ascension Island, crews and vehicles were reunited for a few hours of valuable gunnery practice when, for once, there was no limit on the allocation of ammunition. Vehicles were prepared for wading. The Task Force was organized for operations in the South Atlantic into a carrier group, amphibious warfare group, of which 3 Commando Brigade was the land force element, and a logistic tail. The staff of the amphibious warfare group on board the assault ship HMS Fearless, off Ascension Island, were by now deeply involved in planning the operation in which 3 Commando Brigade would make its landing in force on the Falkland Islands. The pause at Ascension Island was used not only for training for the forthcoming landings but also to redistribute the men, vehicles, weapons, and supplies into a more logical order for the assault. Among these, 3 and 4 troops were transferred to HMS Fearless. On 25 April an advanced detachment from the Task Force retook South Georgia Island, an essential prerequisite to domination of the South Atlantic operational area. As the task force sailed south from Ascension Island, it gathered the potential of a coiled spring increasing in compression and strength, but time, atrocious weather, and the enemy threat seemed likely to corrode that strength unless a landing on the Falklands were to be made within a few weeks. When HMS Fearless, together with the amphibious group, entered the total exclusion zone off the Falklands on 18 May, the time and place for the landings had, therefore, been decided on.

The plan proposed a landing in the San Carlos area on East Falkland Island. 40 Commando and 2d Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (2 Para) would land first in the area of San Carlos settlement, to be followed by 45 Commando at Ajax Bay nearby, and 3 Para at Port San Carlos (Map 1). In the early hours of 21 May, concealed by darkness and covered by a deception plan of diversionary raids around the coast of East Falkland Island, the amphibious force made its approach through Falkland Sound to the shelter of San Carlos water. From there, under a bright, starlit sky, the landing craft launched towards the clearly visible shoreline. As in all such operations of war, the unexpected is to be expected. In particular, 40 Commando discovered that overhanging rocks on its designated beach prevented the disembarkation of its CVRs. Table 1.

British Order of Battle 3 Commando Brigade 40 Commando, Royal Marines 42 Commando, Royal Marines 45 Commando, Royal Marines 29 Commando Rgmnt, Royal Artillery 59 Commando Sqdrn, Royal Engineers 5 Infantry Brigade 2 Battalion, Scots Guards 1 Battalion, Welsh Guards 1 Battalion, 7 Gurkha Rifles 4 Field Regiment, Royal Artillery 36 Regiment, Royal Engineers Attached for Operations 3 & 4 Troop, Blues and Royals 3 Battalion, Parachute Regiment 2 Battalion, Parachute Regiment By daylight however, all objectives had been secured against only isolated opposition and the light tanks were safely disembarked on an alternative beach. The commandos and paratroopers rapidly set about digging a strong defensive position. Patrols were sent out on a vigorous programme aimed at domination of the area. Air defense was coordinated as both the soldiers and the sailors of the amphibious group braced themselves for the inevitable air attacks. Nothing, however, could be allowed to interrupt the relentless pressure to build up a strong logistic base on which future exploitation would depend. Throughout this phase the Blues and Royals formed an essential component of the defenses providing potential direct fire support from dug-in positions. They were given plenty of opportunity to try their skill in the air defense role when enemy air attacks commenced shortly after noon on D-Day. The Argentinian aircraft flew in low over the ships clustered in San Carlos water inflicting a growing number of casualties. The coaxially mounted 7.62-mm machineguns of the Scorpions and Scimitars added their part to the weight of fire directed at the enemy aircraft skimming low through the anchorage. One Scimitar claimed a 30-mm hit on a Skyhawk at a range of 1,000 meters. Over the next several days of the buildup, as the helicopters and landing craft plied incessently between the ships and shore, the light tanks were frequently employed in the role of carriers as every available vehicle was pressed into service for the logistic effort.

With the vitally important landings successfully consolidated, the CVR crews had time to contemplate what lay ahead for them. The most cursory assessment of the Falkland Islands terrain will show that the going for any vehicle is tough and, in many places, impossible. With the exception of the vicinity of Port Stanley there are no graded roads as such, only tracks joining the widely-dispersed settlements. These tracks frequently become impassable in winter and the majority of intercommunication in the Falklands in peacetime is either by light aircraft or by coastal shipping. The most significant feature of the islands is the bare and open moorland. There are few trees that can survive the severe climate. The openness is deceptive however, because quite extensive areas are bog and waterlogged ground. As the ground rises to the central mountainous area, steep outcrops of rock interspersed with small ravines, impede movement. It is understandable that the prevailing view was the CVR would be very restricted in mobility and, after being “bogged,” recoverable only by considerable digging effort. Therefore, it was believed that the light tanks would be able to play little useful part in the infantry battle. Happily, the inherent mobility of CVR and the skill of the crews was to prove otherwise. When, on 27 May, the impatiently-awaited moment arrived to exploit outwards from the bridgehead, 3 and 4 Troops were task-organized in support of 45 Commando during their move round the northern route towards Stanley, and of 3 Para in their advance to Teal Inlet. The advance of 2 Para on Goose Green and Darwin to the south was unsupported by CVR, partly as a consequence of the prevailing view of CVR mobility.

The move of 3 and 4 Troops went well for CVR. Drivers quickly adapted their techniques to the rugged terrain. Aggressive driving and maintenance of vehicle momentum paid off. The sensation of driving across the waterlogged surface was described as similar to driving on a water bed. Following vehicles learned not to cut through the crust. On the few occasions when vehicles did become “bogged,” they were quickly recovered by companion CVRs using the single kinetic energy recovery rope with which each vehicle was equipped. By the end of May, when 45 Commando and 3 Para were completing their gruelling 50-mile march through the bleak landscape to the high ground to the west of Port Stanley, the accompanying CVRs had proved themselves as the only type of vehicle in the Falklands capable of effective operations in the terrain. On 1 June, the leading element of 5 Infantry Brigade landed at San Carlos. The brigade had been dispatched to the South Atlantic in the requisitioned liner, Queen Elizabeth ZZ, (QE2), as the second major formation of the land forces. At a rendezvous off South Georgia, QE2 had transferred her 3,300 troops and their supplies to the ships of the amphibious group. By 3 June, the brigade had completed its disembarkation at San Carlos without a single casualty. They brought with them the Commander, Land Forces, Major General Jeremy Moore. On 1 June, 2 Para at Goose Green came under command of 5 Infantry Brigade and, having been relieved in place by 1/7 Gurkha Rifles, were flown forward to seize Fitzroy and Bluff Cove. Thus, the two brigades were closing in on Port Stanley. It became clear from these moves that the 5 Brigade position at Fitzroy was in some danger until the remaining battalions could be brought up from the west. It was decided to place 3 and 4 Troops under command of 5 Brigade, transferring from 3 Commando Brigade in the north. The best estimate was that the Scorpions and Scimitars would take about two days to make their way through the mountains. In fact, they took just 6 hours. The commander of 5 Brigade, faced with the urgent task of consolidating his hold on Fitzroy against possible counter attack, described the occasion. “I never expected them to make it so quickly over the difficult ground. When I looked and saw them winding down the side of the mountain toward us, their leading troops mud-spattered and rain-soaked and their commanders half-frozen in the turrets of their vehicles, it was one of those moments I am not likely to forget.”

The next few days saw the process of redeployment and logistical preparation for the attack on the Argentinian positions on the high ground dominating Port Stanley.

At BluECove, on 8 June, the troopers ofthe Blues and Royals were to witness the ravaging attack on the logistic ships Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram in which 1st Battalion, Welsh Guards, in particular, sustained heavy casualties. The Scimitar crews of 3 Troop were able to engage the low-flying aircraft with their 30-mm Rardens. Some local civilians, observing nearby, claimed to have seen a 30-mm shell hit its target. One gunner loaded and fired the cannon himself while the commander was temporarily out of the vehicle. In the aftermath of the strike, the vehicles were put to use canying some of the ws E Q more seriously wounded survivors from the beach to the medical aid post. Despite the loss at Bluff Cove, the process of preparation for the critical battle for Port Stanley continued at an inexorable pace. Helicopters were ubiquitous and in heavy demand with priority going to the buildup of ammunition stocks in the gun lines. The question of resupply elsewhere was critical. The Scimitars, for example, were loaded and stowed with over double their normal capacity for 30-mm rounds in preparation for the battle. A strict fuel economy routine was imposed, and engine running time was minimized.

By 11 June, the British land forces were ready for the final battle for Port Stanley, a battle that was to test not only the aggressiveness and technical skills of the British commandos, paratroopers and infantry, but equally the ability of the artillery, naval gunfire support, light tanks, and fighter ground attack and their various headquarters to coordinate their limited logistic resources into a controlled and devastating attack by firepower. Throughout the slopes and rockfalls of the mountains of the Eastern Falklands the soldiers made their last preparations. Patrols probed and scouted the enemy positions and artillery registered on the opposing heights. Major General Moore’s plan was for a three-phase attack. In the first phase on the night 11/12 June, 3 Commando Brigade were to capture Mount Longden, Two Sisters, and Mount Harriet. In the second phase, on the night 12/13 June 5 Infantry Brigade and 2 Para, now back under command of 3 and Environs Commando Brigade, were to capture the high ground closer to Stanley, namely Wireless Ridge, Tumbledown Mountain, and Mount William. Finally, in the third phase, Welsh Guards, reinforced by two companies of 40 Commando, were to capture Sapper Hill. The enemy was in strength on all these terrain features. All the attacks were planned to take place at night (Map 2).

The first-phase attack was opened by 3 Para with their assault on Mount Longdon. Initial surprise was achieved in the darkness, but the enemy were soon alert and resisted fiercely with heavy and accurate fire. 4 Troop provided valuable direct support with their 76-mm, firing HESH. The battle for the eastern sector of Mount Longdon was to last 6 hours and, for the western half, a further 4 hours. The enemy positions were captured by a process of calling for very close fire support, at times within 50 metres of the leading British troops, by the systematic destruction of enemy bunkers using light antitank weapons and grenades, and finally by closing with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting with fixed bayonets. The position was finally cleared as daylight came through a thick dawn mist. 3 Para had lost over 20 killed in this attack and 47 wounded.

Meanwhile, 45 Commando had successfully taken Two Sisters, again by a process of closely coordinated fire support and skillful infantry tactics. 42 Commando made an indirect approach to Mount Harriet and, after a brief firefight, were in possession of their objective, taking 300 prisoners. By first light on the morning of 12 June all of the 3 Commando Brigade objectives had been taken, frequently against fierce and very determined opposition, and the attack was a complete success. Later on 12 June as battalion commanders of 5 Infantry Brigade were issuing their orders for the phase-two attack that night, news came of a 24-hour postponement to allow more detailed reconnaissance. 3 Troop were to be in support of 2 Para for their attack on Wireless Ridge to the North, and 4 Troop were to support 2nd Battalion, the Scots Guards against Tumbledown Mountain.

The Scots Guards attack on the night of 12/13 June was preceded by a sharply fought diversionary action against an enemy position lying to the south of the battalion objective that covered the main track from Fitzroy to Port Stanley. A strong patrol of Scots Guards supported by 4 Troop moved after darkness eastward in search of the enemy position. As the time for the main battalion attack approached no contact had yet been made in the pitch darkness when suddenly the troop leader’s Scorpion struck a mine and was immobilized. Although badly shaken, none of the three-man crew was hurt. “Shaken but not stirred” was to be their later comment. The troop leader quickly moved to a neighbouring CVR to direct fire support from there. Now separated from the CVR, the infantry pressed on and shortly found themselves among an Argentinian platoon position. The ensuing fight, lasting about 1% hours, ended with the capture of the enemy trenches and the destruction of the Argentine defending force. The patrol then extricated itself carrying its wounded through a minefield where two more of its members became serious casualties. Harrassed by accurate mortar fire they finally rejoined the CVRS. 4 Troop then resumed their direct fire support this time for the main battalion attack which was developing against Tumbledown Mountain. There the enemy was able to bring down accurate mortar, machinegun and sniper fire. It was only by means of a rapidly coordinated bombardment and determined company assaults that the last of the objectives was finally taken by daylight. The Argentine commander subsequently admitted that he had been entirely deceived by the diversionary attack into thinking it was the main attack on his position.

Further to the north, 3 Troop were simultaneously engaged in support of 2 Para who, learning from their victory at Goose GreedDarwin, were determined to ensure maximum fire support M M O R Two Panhard armoured cars were among the war trophies captured by the Blues and Royals. from artillery, naval gunfire support and Scorpions and Scimitars for their attack on Wireless Ridge. At 2030 hours, the first company moved to take its objective supported by 3 Troop. As in all these night actions, the CVR passive night sights proved to be an essential tool for locating enemy positions. They were described by one battalion commander as the eyes of his battalion. At this point in the battle one of the Scimitar commanders was knocked unconscious. By good fortune, an officer of the Blues and Royals, a member of the brigade staff, was nearby and quickly took command of the vehicle. The troop moved forward, against a background of flares and flying tracer, to new positions from which to support the main attack on Wireless Ridge. It was here that a gunnery technique known as “Zapping” was put to good use. The CVR crew would engage the Argentine position with a brief burst of machinegun fire provoking a response, which was promptly silenced by the maingun. The 30-mm Rarden cannon, with its high velocity and great accuracy, was much favoured for this technique. Few Argentines felt able to reply after being “Zapped.” The CRV in their turn were engaged by.50 calibre machineguns firing armour-piercing ammunition and by 20-mm air defense guns firing in the ground role but no hits on a CVR were recorded. The commanding officer of 2 Para reported that the suppressive fire provided by the Blues and Royals during the final phase of clearing Wireless Ridge was accurate and every effective. 3 Troop had by now moved onto the newly-taken eastern end of a ridge overlooking Port Stanley. The end was in sight. The final assault on the centre sector of Wireless Ridge took place against two enemy companies. As the paratroopers closed with them, the enemy broke and ran, harassed on their way by machinegun fire from the Blues and Royals. 2 Para were now in a dominating position overlooking Port Stanley and its approaches. The battalion commander pressed brigade headquarters for permission to move on Port Stanley as the enemy resistance mumbled. The brigade commander authorized the advance at 1300 hours. Covered by the guns of the Blues and Royals on the high ground, 2 Para moved swiftly along the road to Port Stanley. As the paratroopers approached the outskirts of the town, the Scorpions andScimitars, together with 2 Para, were among the first to enter the town. There, in the outskirts, they were ordered to halt while the delicate negotiations for the Argentine surrender were made. At 1600 hours, a cease fire was agreed on and at 2100 local time on 14 June the Argentine commander formally surrendered all his forces. In the words of the British Task Force Commander, Major General Moore, ‘‘... the Falkland Islands were once more under the government desired by their inhabitants” In the inevitable anticlimax, the crews of 3 Troop true to their tradition found comfortable accommodation in Stanley. They were joined there later by 4 Troop from Fitzroy to go aboard HMS Fearless for the return to the United Kingdom. Among their trophies of war were two Panhard armoured cars. The mine-damaged Scorpion was recovered by Chinook helicopter and shipped back home for examination. The crews of the damaged CVR were later to remark that they would be quite happy to go back to war in a Scorpion.

The Falkland campaign was notable for its coordination of sea, land, and air power over vast distances, each component of the force playing an essential part. In the land battle, the importance of reconnaissance, simple plans, and coordination of the all-arms battle were all lessons relearned. If any single arm might be singled out for its part in these battles, it is the foot soldiers for their endurance, courage, and skill in extreme conditions. The crews of the Blues and Royals, with their trusty Scorpions and Scimitars, could feel nevertheless that the part they had played in the liberation of the Falklands was a battle well fought and one which could take its rightful place in the traditions of their Regiment. LIEUTENANT COLONEL

ANDREW R. JONES, Royal Tank Regiment. was commissioned from Sandhurst. the Royal Military Academy, in 1959 and served in Hong Kong and Germany until 1963. Later, he served as a helicopter pilot and air troop commander in Aden, South Arabia, and as an air squadron commander in Germany. He attended the Army Staff College in 1971 and became a staff officer in the Headquarters, Director of Army Aviation in 1972. From 1974 to 1975 he served as reconnaissance squadron leader in Northern Ireland and Hong Kong. As a staff officer attached to Director General of Intelligence and Security, he served in Ottawa, Canada and later as staff officer, Ministry of Defence, London. In 1980 he became the British Liaison Officer to the USAARMC. Fort Knox.