Table VIII Needs to be Improved

Table Vlll Needs To Be Improved by Major Linwood E. Blackburn Table VIII, the tank crew qualification course (figure l), is a questionable measure of tank crew proficiency. But before Table VIII can be discussed and recommendations made for its improvement, tank crew battlefield proficiency must be defined.

Crew proficiency involves those skills that the crew must possess to contribute to the lethality of their platoon and to remain alive on the battlefield. The major skills include target acquisition, target identification, marksmanship, tactics, mobility, and use of terrain. Target acquisition on Table VIII consists of either the tank crew evaluator (TCE) orally designating the target to the tank commander (TC), or the target being marked by the detonation of a gunfire simulation device. The only target identification process for the tank crew is one of distinguishing between various Threat vehicles (T-72, BMP, etc.) to determine which weapon system to use. This acquisition process is made somewhat more realistic by popup targets, and targets that come into view as the tank negotiates the course. Although realism is enhanced by the variety of presentation, the basic concepts of target identifcation and acquisition are not tested. Crews do not have to distinguish between friendly and enemy vehicles, nor does their survival depend on their ability to acquire enemy targets. Crew marksmanship is measured by hits or misses on a main gun target and by area coverage on machinegun targets. Area coverage for machineguns is subjectively determined by the TCE. If ten troop targets are presented and the TCE determines that eight were engaged, then area coverage of 415th will be awarded. For the main gun engagements to measure crew proficiency in marksmanship, the target must be presented within the range capability of the weapon system. Targets should not be positioned at ranges at which a crew does not have a reasonable chance of hitting the target with at least one of the rounds allocated for that task (for the purposes of this article a “reasonable chance” is defined as a 75 percent probability of hitting the target with at least one of the rounds fired at it). Iftargets are positioned at ranges at which luck rather than skill, is measured (if probability of hitting the target is less than 50 percent with at least one of the rounds fired), then crew proficiency is not measured.

Table VI11 specifies a range band for each of the nine tasks and task 10 is an ammunition conservation task. Crews are awarded bonus points for firing less than the allocated number of main gun rounds. The danger in the inclusion of this ammunition conservation task is that lucky crews will be rewarded. An example would be Task 2, which allocates four rounds to engage two moving tanks at ranges from 1,200 to 1,600 meters. Assuming that the probability of hitting one of the moving targets with at least one of the two rounds is 60 percent, then the probability of hitting with any individual round is 37 percent. Any crew that hits a moving target (with a 37 percent probability of a hit) with one round is lucky rather than skilled, and additionally the crew is awarded bonus points in the form of additional points for ammunition conserved. Extreme care must be taken when incorporating target hits with ammunition conservation to ensure that the condition just described does not occur. The solution is to give the crew sufficient rounds so that if they hit the target it is skill rather than luck, or to reduce the range to the target to achieve the same effect. Tanks crews negotiating Table VIII should be asked to perform the types of tactics that they would be expected to perform on the battlefield. The two tactics a tank crew would most expect to use are defend and attack. In the defense, a tank crew would expect to see multiple Threat targets moving toward their position (stationary firer-moving target engagements). Initial engagements would be at long ranges with increasingly shorter range engagements as the Threat approaches the defensive position. The problem for the attacking tank is exactly the opposite. He would expect to engage Threat targets in hull defilade positions as he assaults a Threat defensive position (moving firer-stationary target engagements).

Of the four main gun tasks performed during the day on the current Table VIII, one is a moving firer-stationary target type engagement (task 1) with targets in hull defilade positions. Two tasks, 4 and 5, are stationary firer-stationary target engagements that do not directly relate to either of the expeded crew tasks previously discussed. Task 4 is a multiple engagement, but the targets art not moving toward the firing tank. Task 5 is also a multiple engagement, but again the targets and firer are stationary. In addition, two of the targets are in hull defilade suggesting that the fuing tank should be assaulting, rather than stationary. Task 2 is a stationary firer-moving target engagement with multiple targets. Unfortunately, all ranges are currently configured with targets crossing in front of the firing tank rather than moving toward his position, a tactic one would not expect to see on the battlefield. The other two tasks during the day are multiple-target, machinegun engagements.

For the three tasks at night, two are main gun engagements and one is a machinegun engagement. Task 7 calls for engaging multiple main gun targets (stationary firer-stationary target). Task 9 involves a moving target, crossing in front of the firer, and another stationary firer-stationary target type engagement.

Clearly, many of the tasks specified on the current Table W I do not simulate any of the expected tasks for a tank crew on the modern battlefield. If the tasks tested do not involve the necessary battlefield skills, then the measurement of a crew's performance while negotiating the course cannot be one of battlefield proficiency.

Table VIII incorporates tactical use of terrain and mobility in the sense that tanks must negotiate a "course road", seek TABLE VI11 A

C 0 N 0 1I T lo N S STANDARDS

-ALL TARGETS

HIT

MACHINEGUN

COVERAGE

TlME RATIN

SUPPRESSED

llNr SOL), rGI TARGET S(TUATION

AMMO

2 Engsge 2 moving tanks.

COAX

W$th 900 1,lOOm 50 machmeguns 4 YES

NO 4 Engage 2 tanks. mulliple I 800-2.000m TPDS-T slarionarytanks 1 ATGM team.

50 Cat and ATGM 1 OW 1,200m 50 team SlmYltaneDuSly 0-28 sec D 29-405ec 0 41 + SeCu 5 YES

NO 5 Engage 3 tanks multiple 12 hull-down1 HEAT-TP.T statlonary tanks

800. I , I nom with main gun TABLE VI11 B

7 Employ range card lay to direct fire 10 engage multiple tanks Simultaneously engage mlantry squad B Engage infantry squad and ATGM team simulraneausk machine-guns 2 lank% I1 hull-down) 8M)-l.WOm Infantry squad.

800-1.WOm NBC environment. hatches closed Pasive'lR Infantry squad.

6o0-8Wm ATGM team.

800 1.000m Passive IR 10 conserve ammo 8 rounds cOnSeNed 6 or 7 rounds conserved 5 oi fewer rounds conserved D 0 U Figure 1. defilade where feasible, and engage targets on the move. What is not adequately included is the use of terrain and mobility in a defensive position. A friendly tank in a defensive position will see many Threat targets at about the same time and will have to engage them while avoiding fatal Threat fire. Logically, he would engage one or, at most, two targets from one defilade position and then relocate to another, pre-selected, defilade position. At each position he would have to reinitiate the target acquisition process to engage the remaining Threat targets. Additionally, other Threat targets might present themselves based on the different lines of sight the friendly tank would have from these subsequent positions. This type of mobilility and use of terrain is not currently acquired on Table VIII.

From this discussion, it may be concluded that Table VIII is an inadequate measure of crew battlefield proficiency.

This conclusion is based on the following:

Target acquisition is not adequately incorporated into the tasks the crew are asked to perform. Based on range to the target, marksmanship may be as much a measure of crew luck as a measure of crew skill. Crews are not asked to perform the types of tasks that they would be expected to perform on the battlefield. Proper use of terrain and mobility, at least in the defense, is not properly stressed.

To include the suggested changes in the current Table VI11 is not a simple matter. Before incorporating any changes, the following question must be answered: should Table VI11 be a measure of crew marksmanship, or should it measure crew battlefield proficiency? If the answer is marksmanship, then the current Table VIII may be a sufficient framework on which to base the modifications. At a minimum, the areas that need to be concentrated on are the ranges at which targets are presented, and the methods by which individual targets are engaged. This will entail a minianalysis of each “The crews should be presented with the kinds of targets in this phase that they would realistically expect to see: fully exposed tanks and BMPs moving toward the crew’s position.” task in the current Table VIII. An examination must be made of the probability of hit curves for each type of tank to insure that the target is located in a range band that affords each crew a 75 percent probability of a hit with at least one of the rounds fired at it. Additionally, two types of engagements must be stressed moving firer-stationary target and stationary firer-moving target. This type of analysis and the eventual implementation of the results would substantially improve the crew marksmanship aspects of the Table VIII, but would do nothing to improve the measure of crew battlefield proficiency.

For Table VIII to measure crew battlefield proficiency the crews must be asked to perform the tasks that they would be expected to perform on the battlefield. To do this, Table VIII, as tankers have known it since World War 11, would be substantially modified.

Target acquisition and identification would be the first area modified. The time-honored tradition of the TCE alerting the crew with “your next engagement will be . . . . .” should disappear. Target acquisition should follow the following scenario: All members of the crew search their assigned sectors, A target is acquired by one of the crew members, The tank commander makes the determination if the target is friendly or enemy, Should the target be enemy, or if there are multiple targets, the commander must make a determination as to the magnitude of the threat (a T-72 at 3,500 meters is not a substantial threat, while a BMP at 2,000 meters is). Targets must be engaged in the order of threat that they present to the crew. With the target acquisition process just discussed, it is obvious that the time lines used in the current Table VIII are unrealistic. New time lines would have to be developed, concentrating on determining what are reasonable times for a tank crew to accomplish the five tasks above. Not only should the target acquisition process be changed, but the physical layout of Table VI11 should be modified. The course road currently used should be abandoned in favor of an assault and defense phase. In the assault phase, crews would be required to employ tactical movement toward an objective. Areas that should be graded include style of movement across open terrain, duration of exposure to enemy fire, and selection of defilade firing positions should the crew be required to halt. Implicit in the assault is the fact that the crew should be buttoned up and in all probability wearing chemical protective clothing and protective masks. All of the targets presented in this phase should be in hull defilade, with the new crew using the target acquisition process described above. The crew would make the determination when to engage the BMPs and when to engage the tanks (at what range does ATGM fire become less of a threat than tank main gun fre?) Any machinegun engagements would be at relatively short ranges and consist of tank hunter/ killer teams and troops in the open. The completion of the assault phase should signal the start of the defensive phase; when the crew is on the objective. The defensive phase should begin with the selection of primary and alternate firing positions and the occupation of a suitable hull defilade firing position. This phase should include the requirement for the crews to distinguish between friendly and Threat vehicles, and to be required to make the decision not to engage friendly targets. One would expect this type of decision to be necessary by crews occupying the Main Battle Area with covering force elements to their front. Once crews have determined the targets to be unfriendly, they must go through the same decision process as in the assault phase-determining which targets are the most dangerous and engaging them accordingly. Once targets have been engaged from the primary position, scoring procedures should deduct points from crews that fail to move to alternate firing positions.

Once movement has been made to the alternate positions, crews must initiate a re-acquisition process and time lines adjusted accordingly to provide for this. The crews should be presented with the kinds of targets in this phase that they would realistically expect to see: fully exposed tanks and BMPs moving towards the crew’s position. As with the assault phase, targets must be presented at a range at which crew Skill, not luck, will be evaluated. The final evaluation point of this phase would be the tank commander’s decision to remain in the position or to request permission to withdraw to a subsequent position in the face of overwhelming odds. These odds should be determined by the success with which the crew had succeeded in destroying the targets presented to them.

I realize that range and ammunition constraints may limit the ability to immediately include all of the recommended changes. However, to be an effective measure of battlefield proficiency, the changes discussed in this paper must be incorporated into Table W I . Until this is done, Table VIII cannot adequately aid a commander in determining the battlefield proficiency of the crews that he has trained.

M A J O R L I N W O O D E.

BLACKBURN ISa 1 9 6 9 graduate of USMA. He has served in cavalry and armor units in Vietnam, CONUS and in Germany. He holds a master’s degree in industrial engineering and operations research from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and he is a graduate of the British Army Long Armour Infantry Course and the Command and General Staff School. Currently, he is XO of the 3d battalion, 67th Armor, 2d Armored Division at Ft. Hood, Texas.