Defending the TOC

Defending the TOC by Captain Douglas R. Boulter The tactical operations center (TOC) is the heart of command and control for the combat elements of a brigade or battalion. The headquarters commandant, or adjutant, is responsible for finding a suitable site and moving the TOC into position. It is not an easy task. The pressures of finding a site that will meet the requirements of all staff members, of trying to get all of the TOC elements to the site, and of trying to support the TOC, once it is in place, often obscure the equally vital need to protect and defend it. The TOC is a prime target for enemy attack and the loss of a TOC will seriously disrupt the battalion or brigade’s command and control of the battle. The measures we routinely take to defend the TOC occur because “it has always been done that way,” rather than because we are consciously trying to protect the TOC.

A typical scenario of a TOC’s destruction could be as3ol-lows: An enemy rifle company has been inserted several miles from the TOC and moves to destroy it. Their mission is made easier in that they are guided by the TOC signs at the road intersections. They approach the TOC without being spotted by the sentry who is trying to operate the switchboard while keeping watch. The TOC itself is on the edge of a circular perimeter near the top of the hill, and two enemy rifle platoons maneuver to make a direct assault. On a pre-arranged signal, all of the enemy elements attack. They catch the TOC and attached personnel completely by surprise, preventing them from reaching their fighting positions and resisting. Those personnel not killed are captured. Since a staff meeting was taking place at the time, the enemy takes the brigade commander, four battalion commanders, and the brigade staff prisoner. By the time a reaction force can arrive, the TOC complex is a smoking ruin, and the enemy have departed with their prisoners. This is clearly a “worst case,” but could easily happen if the proper defensive measures are not taken. The enemy was successful because they easily found the TOC, surprised it, and prevented an effective defense. Such results are clearly preventable.

A TOC‘s vulnerability depends on whether it can be found by the enemy and, if found, whether it can be successfully attacked.

There are several ways that TOC‘s can be located: Enemy aircraft may spot the TOC from the air either visually, through aerial photography, through infrareadetecting (IR) or radar. A TOC may also be located by direction finding (triangulating) its radio transmissions. A communications security violation may reveal the TOC’s location. Finally, a reconnaissance patrol may find the TOC by accident, or because of poor enforcement of noise and light discipline. Once the TOC is found, it may be attacked by aircraft, missiles, artillery, airborne or heliborne insertions, or by mounted or dismounted elements.

First, we will discuss how to keep the TOC hidden and then we will suggest how to defend it. Location of the TOC. The enemy knows from our doctrine how far from the forward battle positions we locate our TOC‘s, and that we often locate on hilltops for good communications. To avoid having the enemy find the TOC through a simple map reconnaissance, we must avoid hilltops because they are not necessary for good communications. Our primary means of communication should be by wire. At a brigade level TOC, this involves the use of high frequency multichannel “shots” which, though line-of-sight, do not have to co-locate with the TOC; they may be wired into march-april 1983 37 the switchboard from a remote location. Further, since “shots” are directional, they are very difficult to direction-find. We can, therefore, have good wire communication from any location. Our FM radios can always talk to the battle positions using moderately high ground, 292 antennas, retrans when necessary, and reliance on the jump element, or the S-3, both of whom will normally be farther forward than the TOC.

TOC Visual protection. There are several ways in which we can keep the TOC from being spotted from the air. First, we can locate the TOC in a town, conceal the vehicles in buildings, and blend our antennas in with the TV antennas on the roofs of most houses. In Europe, we can use the metal window shades to help maintain noise and light discipline, and we can locate our generators in basements. It is critical, however, that any vehicle not be parked, even temporarily, outside buildings occupied by the TOC. If the TOC is located in a village which has not been evacuated, enemy agents will report its presence. This problem can be minimized by not letting them know who we are and what we are doing. In a friendly area, civilian police can assist in the TOC’s security. And the local populace will probably report suspicious persons. If the TOC is not sited in a built-up area, we must use natural concealment and camouflage nets to keep its position hidden. If the enemy is willing to fly low enough and slow enough, he will be able to spot the nets. Even good aerial photography (excepting infrared), will not enable him to see what is under the nets, and he will not know what he has found. And, if the TOC is well dispersed, which part to attack. Needless to say, we should not make bullseye circles with our TOC vehicles, defensive wire, or positions. It is also very important that tents be camouflaged so that the enemy cannot estimate personnel strength and guesstimate that he has located a TOC.

Noise and light discipline. These are difficult problems in wooded areas, because personnel assume they are always under cover. To prevent light leaks, the vent flaps on the tents must be closed, tent vestibules will help prevent light leaks. Also, the troops should be fed from a GP medium tent rather than a larger kitchen tent, or be fed only during daylight hours. Vehicle & equipment maintenance must be pulled under reduced red light, or under no light. Troops must not use flashlights.

A TOC may be located simply by looking in the most obvious place-high ground. At night, light from the TOC may give it away, generator noise may also pin down the TOC’s site. How often have you found a TOC at night by shutting off the jeep’s engine, hearing the generators, and going straight to the TOC? Generators are clearly necessary, but power generation should be consolidated so as to operate the minimum number. Generators not mounted in trailers or on the tracked vehicles should be sandbagged to baffle their noise. Trailer-mounted generators should be baffled by the trailer canvas and spotted in thick vegetation which will help to baffle their noise. Vehicle radios should be operated with headphones and the speakers “off to avoid compromising the TOC’s position.

In all cases, we will have to do without the convenience of TOC signs.

Communication discipline. Another way the enemy can locate the TOC is by electronic direction finding. This is probably the TOC‘s weakest s&-ty area, for Americans are not accustomed to maintaining strict radio discipline. A good solution is to minimize radio use and depend, instead, on wire systems, or messengers. If the distance, or the speed of the operation, prevents the laying of wire, most of the FM communications should come from the commanders’, or S-3s’ jeeps which, since they are highly mobile, prevent accurate 38 ARMOR march-april 1983 I c direction finding. TOC radios should be operated on low power settings and the retrans capability used when necessary.

It has often been suggested that the FM radios be remoted. This is probably the most difficult solution. Antennas located more than one cable-length away from the radio suffer significant signal loss. If we locate both the vehicle and the radio some distance away from the TOC and use the AN/GRA 39B to remote to the TOC we are immobilizing a wheel or tracked vehicle and removing the protection afforded by that tracked vehicle because it will then be too far away in the event of a ground attack. The TOC commander must make the ultimate decision, but experience indicates that remoting the radios will not be a popular or a workable solution.

If the radio must be used at high power, the solution is to keep the transmissions very short. Current training in this area is weak. Our operators send trivial messages, conduct frequent radio checks (“give me a long count”), using the radio-telephone procedure they have been taught to create unnecessarily long transmissions. How often have you heard the set keyed while the operator tries to remember callsigns while he or she sends “Whiskey two Zulu tree fower, this is Whiskey two Zulu seven niner, roger out,” where “seven niner, roger out” would be much better. We must practice keeping transmissions under three seconds. A second communications problem involves the radio tele-typeriter (RATT) rig. The radioteletype sends through the AN/GRA 106, an AM radio with a very high power output. If the enemy direction-finds this strong signal he will know he has located either a TOC, or a major logistical site. The TOC commander might want to locate the RA’IT rig well away from his TOC, or to do without hard copy messages all together. Using a directional antenna would help if the rig is sending in only one direction. Unfortunately, there is no low power switch available on the AN/GRA 106. In the end, a RATT rig might have to send all messages while on the move.

TOC defense. If the enemy finds and attacks the TOC, it is imperative to minimize TOC damagekasualties and to inflict maximum damage/casualties on the attacker. A TOC site can defend against aircraft by putting its air defense assets on nearby high ground with good fields of fire. It can defend against artillery or rockets with counter-battery fire called for by the fire support officer (FSO) (who, being at the TOC, will have a vested interest). Dispersion is a good defense against air or artillery attack, but is not entirely practical because the more dispersed the TOC, the more difficult it will be to defend against ground attack. The best solution is to dig-in personnel and equipment. Foxholes are the minimum requirement. Engineer equipment from the attached engineers is very useful, but, realistically, barriers and fighting positions for line units will have higher priority than TOC defenses.

Protection against NBC attack requires the use of the chemical agent alarms and mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP). Once the TOC is set up personnel can maintain a high MOPP level. The TOC should work in at least MOPP 11, whenever possible.

Protecting against ground attack will be difficult, given the small number of TOC personnel and the fact that they all have critical, battle-related tasks, to perform and are not primarily fighting troops. At battalion-level, TOC personnel will have to protect the TOC complex. A brigade-level TOC will normally have a military police (MP) platoon attached to assist with this task. Protective wire should be laid so as to keep the TOC center out of hand grenade range, roughly 50 meters. Since enough personnel to defend a circle with a 300-meter circumference will not be present, fighting positions will have to be placed well inside the wire. At a brigade TOC, the MP’sMGO machineguns should be dismounted and dug in. They will be the heaviest on-site TOC armament available. All TOC personnel must prepare fighting positions and man them at the first sign of danger. A second perimeter around the living and work areas of the attached elements will have to be manned by the remaining on-site personnel; the communications personnel, maintenance, and attached elements including signal, air defense artillery (ADA), chemical, engineers, etc. Fighting positions must be dug, wire laid on likely avenues of approach, antipersonnel and antiarmor mines laid, and direct fire lanes planned. Even with limited personnel such a perimeter can provide a strong initial defense line which can, if necessary, fall back to reinforce the TOC perimeter. Finally, if the danger of a dismounted attack on the TOC is high, the commander may use a scout or infantry platoon to man an outer perimeter at least 100 meters beyond the living area perimeter. (A scout platoon will be added to the brigade headquarters company as part of Division 86). Although such a perimeter would would spread the platoon too thin for a strong defense, the platoon would be able to provide excellent early warning, allow the employment of long-range antiarmor weapons, and provide for an early call for indirect fire.

When attacked, the platoon leader will have to immediately assess the situation, notify the TOC, and control the situation to gain time to allow the TOC defense reaction force to arrive. He will have to decide whether to maneuver his elements to flank the attack, or to redeploy all or part of his personnel to the living area perimeter. At no time can any of the perimeters give up 360-degree security, for simultaneous attacks from several directions are probable. The successful defense of a TOC could occur as follows: An enemy rifle company has been inserted several miles from the TOC and moves on foot to destroy it. They are spotted by an outer perimeter scout who opens fire. They begin to deploy as the scout platoon leader notifies the TOC. The S-3 decides to call for indirect fire and requests assistance from two mechanized platoons of the company tasked to provide the reaction force. At the same time, the forward area support team (FAST) reports a similar attack, and the rest of the reaction company is sent there. The sound of firing has alerted the TOC personnel, and they man the living area and TOC perimeters. One enemy platoon attacks from a different direction, but the Claymore mines and direct fire are too much and their advance is stopped. The Vulcan anti-aircraft guns have been called down from their overwatch position on a nearby hill, and their direct fire is directed on another enemy platoon trying to reinforce the assault platoon which has been pinned down. Meanwhile, the scout platoon leader has maneuvered two of his squads to reinforce the living area perimeter. The HHC commander has taken change of this perimeter, using the internal wire communications to control the action. By now, most ofthe claymores have been fired and the HHC commander fires a green star cluster to signal the movement back to the TOC perimeter. The artillery fire is adjusted so as to continue to fall on the enemy. The attack stalls. As the HHC commander is organizing a counter-attack, the arrival of the infantry platoons make this unnecessary. They mop up the decimated elements of the enemy, and the TOC resumes normal functioning. Casualties are attended to, and personnel begin rebuilding the defenses.

This time, the defense was successful and depended on: (1) early warning by the outer perimeter; (2) good dug-in fighting positions; (3) good communications; (4) use of all available weapons; (5) preplanning of signals and routes of withdrawal and, (6) trained personnel.

In short, the best defense is to keep the TOC from being found, and, if it is found, its successful defense. We have only to think through our passive and active defense measures and train our soldiers accordingly. TOC survival is vital and rests on concealment, security, and integrated and coordinated defense measures. CAPTAIN DOUGLAS R.

BOULTER was commisioned in Armor from Dickinson College in 1973. He served as tank platoon leader, support platoon leader, and brigade S5 with the 1st Brigade, 3d Armored Division, Germany. He attended AOAC and was assigned to Ft.

Hood, Texas as Technical Inspection Quality Control Officer, HHC, 2d Brigade 2d Armored Division. He is now assistant professor of Military Science at Duke University, NC.

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