The Red Army in Atomic War

e celi-ance on atomic weapons is dangerous. Yet m some uarvrs there is still an exaggerated i&a a4 their power on the bankfield. This de$ciezq til the geaeral outlines o atomic land warfare in &e preseat &tar)-rima-24 in thinking lhdl mt be d e dun-tion are set forth clearly and realistically. -4 considerable amount of information has been published concerning the tactical rnciples of atOmic land warfare. Li ewise well known are the strengths and characteristics of the military forces which may be expected to engage in this type of war, that is, the armies which would fight for the decisive area of Western Europe in the event of Soviet attack. With very little imagination the two fields of knowledge can be combined to estiblish the genera1 nature of the operations to be expected in that crucial theater. Each d the contestants has atomic weapons available for use in the land.baale. Each type of army, Communist and Westem, has charac-ARMOI--March-Apdl, 1953 tabti0 which are dvanntageous in atomic warfare and each has ami-bum which can be saious dcficicn-cia in such warfie. Some of the western drr?mas ignac the aedits on the Soviet si& and conveniently omlook the handiaps of their own forces Intbcirccveriesabomb bunts above a mas of Communist aoops the troops die and the war is over. Realinn is needed.

A number d aspats of the Eastern forces, soviet and SreIIite. will cause material difliculty to an enemy who seeks to use atomic. missiles against them. Consider fiat mobility. one of the primary means of nullifying the new weapon. The commander who has located a possible atomic target, only to have it move on before he can make his decision and launch his missile, is balked. And the Sovia h v has demonstnted, even with in ifla?incd forces of World War 11, that when pre+et plans can be wed and enemy opposition is weak, it is capable ot rapid movement on a large scale. And the pential opponent which the Red Army now faces is far weaker numerically than were the Germans on their Eastern front.

In another characteristic hi_ehlv valuable for countering atomic missiles the Eastern forces are unquestionably excellent. They are known to have the ability to fortify rapidly. A force which digs in before the enemy determines it to be a fit object for atomic attack escapes much of the effect of the burst, and frequently must be c d off as an atomic target. A third outstanding quality of the Soviet forces tending to foil the new weapon is their high standard of carpuflage training. By thus bafeing the enemy intelligence the Red forces will throw delays into the use of the weapon. and during these delays may move elsewhere or dig in. Often the exaggerators of the efficacy of the atomic missile dwell upon its pchological effect. This factor is undoubdy great. but it must not.be supposed that the surviving Red troops in the vicinity of the burst are going to break and run away. Soviet officcn are authorized to apply harsh punishments to Red soldiers on the battlefield, and Communist troops are permeated with secret police, a fect of which the Ivans are well aware.

ARMOR-Md-ApdI, 19U With U. S. troops dug in a bare two miles short of ground zero in the latest Nevada test, and atomic warhead firing of the 280mm artillery gun on the schedule, we are ever closer to tactical atomic warfare’s realities. With this view from the friendly side, what may we deduce in a consideration of an atomic clash with our only logical opponent?

But one of these Soviet capabili-des in contending with atomic weapons compare with the major Red advantage. vast numbers of troops. The Communist forces can make manifold simultaneous attacks some mapr and decisive. o<hm merely initiall! powerful. The Western general will be faced with di&ult decisions. If he misinterprets the feints he wastes his rarce missiles. If he misinterprets the decisive attacks his line may be breached before he can throw in his atomic shells or bombs. If he uses his missiles on all the attack even though with good fortune he stops them all, the Reds can bring up fresh divisions and repeat the assault. Suppose the Western weapons do cripple twenty or thirty Red divisions: the Soviet commander can draw upon some of the remaining three hundred or more to resonsritute his forces. Nor wiU all of the crippled divisions be permanently out of action by any means; a substantial proportion may be rebuilt by requisition on the many millions of trained Soviet reserves.

The advantages of the Communist forces in atomic warfare are thus seen to consist of. their capability, under present circumstances, of moving 1 rapidly, tberr ability to fort+ quickly and to camou9agc well. Jwir am-mI of panic, and above all in tbcir great numerical smngth.

But the Red Army wehmscs against the at& weapon are man); andserious Theyloomlargeinany estimate of the situation in the a& warfare of today.

In spite of their ability to move rapid! when plans are pres the Red Army’s combat units arc poorly organized and equipped for q*L unexpected movement. The)- lack the necessa? personnel and trucks to pick up and m e their numerous weapons promptly. nor is their communications equipment yet &cnt for this type of warfare. This inep-ness in maneuver. which is high]? disadvantageous in conventional war. is even more of a drawback in atomic bade. Delay in movement gives the watern commander amre time to estimax the situation as to wbm and where to use his atomic weapons Another weakness of the Red.%my in fluid. mobile warfare is the confusion caused by unforeseen situations. Its & are accunomed to ha\ing their thinking done for them. There is great fear. on their put. of acting without orders. Between organic weakness in its combat units a d kk of initiative in its ledcrr substantial Red foms can at tima be eacirckd by a strong opponent and perbps compressed into a limital area and there blasted with atomic bursts. This use of the new W Q p saves Lime andunmunition. andmav permit th ailmhhmoftbe*Rcd trap fected. before their relief can be d-2s... ten& Heavy atomic attack on such an assaulting corps, properly timed, in addition to inflicting many thousands of casualties, might change the situation from a Communist attack to a segment of temporary impotence in the Red line, presenting an excellent opportunity for a counteroffensive breakthrough. that they are not idea redpiarts of atomic blows, whik their wealmezt inirolva a limitatian in ability to de-viet forces have fewa atomic bombs available for battlefield use than do the NATO powers Prearwdlack of an atomic artillap piece, the ad-later, is a dgnifiant disability. But whatever steps the Reds may take to remedy these weaknesses, one of their inherent command defects is certain to be detrimental to their use of atomic weapons: the Communist incapacity to delegate authority. It is only logical to expect that within their armies the decision to use this scarce weapon in a given situation will be made only by the most senior Red commanders. Such a system must inevitably result in delays in the allotment of atomic missiles to specific areas of the battlefield or on specific targets. During the time-lag, the Westerns can move, disperse or dig in. Red Army weaknesses in atomic war are lack of mobility (except under pre-set plans with little opposition), ineptness in maneuver, inability of commanders to act without orders, necessity to concentrate in relatively dense formations for attack against serious opposition, presumed shortage of atomic missiles and lack of an atomic artillery piece, and the tendency to retain power of decision on high levels. In comparison with the communist forces, the qualities of the armies of the NATO powers for waging atomic warfare are very high, and their disadvantages relatively few.

The primary element of their superiority over the Communists is one of long standing, the ability to attain dispersion while retaining combat efficiency. The West has continually sought means of avoiding the huge casualties which would otherwise be inflicted by the ever-increasing fire power of conventional weapons. This characteristic stands them in good stead as a point of departure in tactical doctrine for atomic war. Their methods of communication and control permit them to alternate quickly from the highly dispersed formations which prevent effective exploitation of atomic weapons by the enemy, to the closer concentration required for decisive action, and to re-disperse promptly as soon as the situation permits. movement and change of direction the time the Red commander is Z g the necessarp steps to use his atomic wea n Rapid movement onto the J k i or rear, or exploitation through a gap created by Western missiles throws a dift;cult problem onto the Communist commander. His enemy may strike him decisively b e fore he can estimate the strength and location of the opposing main forces his atomic missiles against them. In addition to the advantages in-haited from pieatomic days, the Western land forces now entering the atomic era have promptly established another mapr superiority over the Communists by producing the atomic artillery piece.

Little reflection is required to become aware of the extreme value of this weapon. On the battlefield, when the Western ground commander decides upon an atomic target or group of targets, he can strike immediately with his gun before the target disappears or digs in. He can integrate the gun’s action with the rapid operation of his troops.

The accuracy of the gun is a tremendous asset, particularly at the decisive time when the opposing forces are closely engaged. The ground commander can strike all but the very foremost elements of the enemy without damage to his own troops. Accurate timing permits forewarning of his own front-line troops to enable them to take cover at the time of the burst.

A final major advantage of the gun is its independence of weather conditions or darkness. Without the gun (or an armyconaolled guided missile) in his hands, the Westem commander's atomic p a could be large bility.

The atomic gun, of course, cannot be considered a bng-time Western monopoly. The Soviets will surely make an atomic day piece, although it can be expected that their initial model will not match the Awricaa. Andintechnicllartilkrp skill in Collmlling the h e of tbe piece, or a battery or battalion of atomic urillery, the sovias will be unlikely to overtake the Westerners in the f-bk future An& major advantage of the Western powers in atomic warfare is poJsess In fastmoving situations, ly caacelled by communist forCCS OFting during periods of poor visi-the superiority in numbers of atomic missiles which, by inference. they when the exact location of impartant enemy forces is particularly hard to determiae, the Westan commander may be able to rkk the use of the ent weap when he is not farget is remunerative. Red m e s, moving to counta a fast action by a Western force, will be particularly The Westem commander may sub ject such reserves to atomic attack merely to insure the success of the In the more stabilized situations the Western commander may have available sueScient missiles to support a breakthrough of a odd position. The very difficulty d such a break-AIMOI--Msch-Agcil, 1953 competciy new p" certain that his poposed difficult to d e as to strength. maneuver. through being arried out quickly creates a surprise siruation-a condition which the Red Army is not One more important aspect of atomic war favorable to the Western cause is its defensive role. To whatever sent the SAT0 foms plan adept in meeting. to carry out this mission by position defew. their forrifications will afford a coadderable degree of prrwcc-Soviet atomic atock, a d forces with the problem of concentrating their troops relatively heavily in the face of numerous atomic weapons. The land fames of the West have few weakwsvs in atomic warfare. to operate if crippled by atomic attack, and the alternative of unloading acro beaches is expensive in manpower.

But overshadowin this and all pow? in the present situation is lack of noop strengih. Due to this condition many of the Communist weaknesses in atomic w& must remain unexploited. The sensitivity of Red forces to disruption during rapid their enemy has s&cicnt troops to accom lisb the upse Much lea are likely to be sutrounded and compressed into atomic for his requires considerable numbers of highly competent tmops. Even the if aon we1 "$"* manned will present the Red Their supply pons would be difficult other de6cienaes o f the Western mOvcment signifies nothing unless large L of communist troops nowaandvd dream of great rmocs of communist troopI ahancing elbow to elbow against westan dr fensive lines has lit& validitv unlea these lines are manned in s;tl6cient spength to face the Red ka&n to such an action.

Sor does the lack 04 mops merely loseforthwmmmanders much of thir ability to kill or cap rure large numbers of Communists (x to diaup a rapid advance of the RedforcesItteadsinadditionto -of ex-pbiting make futile dgisivelp any -the positive was-ures which the West couM otbawiise engagein. soriftmovementsaqaiasi the 9anLs or rear of so\ict troops tackd are merely haMing aids. -4s communinlinescreatedbppr0tiKe unless in force somewhat canmcn-surate with the bodies of troops at-for pouring through a gap in the expenditure of Western atomic missiles the few mops availabk to "pour" would merely be swaIbwed UP.

In summary. the Red Army is ill adapted by its nature to wage am-force is well quali6cd. But in Eu-a palliative in the p m d situarion of the X4TO powers, and the Communist fams cannot be made to feel its full brunt unka suGcient con-ent to exploit its pat potentialities. warfare. and the watern y e of rope today, the new weapon is merely ventional qpe corn& troaps are pres-27