1st Armored Division Leads Army in Re-examining Mission Com- mand ‘Initiatives’

During 1st Armored Division’s recent distributed command-post exercise (CPX) Iron Resolve 14.2, the division leadership sought to re-examine and potentially adopt tried and proven mission-command methodologies that were once embedded within Army force structure but were set aside dur ing the Army’s shift toward the brigade modularization critical to supporting the nonlinear, decentralized nature of the counterinsurgency (COIN) fight. Previously, Cold War-era U. S. Army for mations organized their staff structures and mission-command processes not only on the capabilities of then-available information-sharing technol ogies and prevailing knowledge-management techniques, but also on the centralized command and control (C2) needed to manage the fight of multiple maneuver brigades augmented with sizable numbers of attached support ing-arms formations. The 1st Armored Division’s challenge during Iron Re solve 14.2, therefore, was to revisit and reimagine these structures and processes prevalent more than two decades ago through the new lenses of 21st Century mission-command system technology and associated, updated in formation-sharing and knowledge-management techniques. Iron Resolve 14.2’s main purpose was to practice mission-command and staff processes during expeditionary operations with a primary emphasis on offensive tasks. The desired endstate was a division staff trained on conducting mission command for decisive action and prepared for Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) 14.2. (During NIE 14.2, the division’s initial focus was on per forming the role of higher control (HI CON) for the brigade combat team (BCT) conducting the specific NIE ex periments; it later transitioned from HICON to training audience, conduct ing a division-level joint tactical exer cise that trained the division as a com bined joint task force (JTF) headquarters.) The division’straining objectives for this preparation included:

• Establish and operate a division command post (CP) to exercise mission command of decisive-action operations;

• Conduct and synchronize tactical operations by creating and main taining a common operational picture using assigned digital systems;

• Validate and refine the division’s tactical standard operating procedures; and

• Execute daily reporting require ments and update briefs to higher headquarters according to the corps battle rhythm. Mission-command capabilities now en able a division commander’s increased span of control of his formations. These capabilities appropriately (and in reality) implement the commander’s desired model of centralized planning and decentralized execution through mission-type orders. Divisions con ducting decisive combat operations against a near-peer enemy within ULO will rely on such a model – and indeed will demand it. For example, Joint Publication 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, states: “Unity of command is necessary for effectiveness and effi ciency. Centralized planning and direction is essential for controlling and co ordinating the efforts of the forces. De centralized execution is essential be cause no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals.” To adopt a revised version of this cen tralized mission-command methodol ogy, Iron Soldiers experimented with adopting three “new” mission-command and staff organizational structures and processes to facilitate coordination, integration, synchroniza tion and execution of fire and maneuver, to include operational fires for the division:

• The Joint Air-Ground Integration Center (JAGIC);

• The Deep-Operations Coordina tion Cell (DOCC); and

• Division artillery (DIVARTY). Lessons-learned from Iron Resolve 14.2 indicated a significant learning curve is ongoing and will continue for the current generation of COIN-savvy warfighters within the division staff – and likely for the rest of our Army. The previous generations of Cold War Soldiers with training and experience on conventional combined-arms maneu ver are nearly depleted from the force. Only the most senior officers and non commissioned officers have the firsthand experience and historical knowledge of the warfighting skills necessary to succeed in the protracted and dy namic environment that characterizes

ULO.

This point is amplified when consider ing the ability of division staffs to exe cute decisive operations against a po tential near-parity, nation-state enemy. To address these ULO training short falls, the division is adopting accelerated collective-training programs and instituting fundamental staff and force-structure changes. The division is implementing these multiple command-and-staff structure changes con currently as it supports the Army-directed NIE program at Fort Bliss, TX, and White Sands Missile Range, NM, while at the same time completing JTF headquarters training.

The division is adopting the JAGIC con cept to expedite clearance of fires and airspace deconfliction within the division area of operations. The JAGIC evolved from a concept to enhance joint collaborative efforts to integrate joint air-ground assets. Located within the division Current-Operations Integration Cell (COIC), the JAGIC provides commanders a method to coordinate, integrate and control operations in the division-assigned airspace. The JAGIC co-locates decision-making authorities from the land and air components, co ordinating fires to achieve the support ed maneuver commander’s objectives and intent. The JAGIC facilitated effective mission execution while reducing the level of risk.1 In short, the JAGIC concept brings the air-support opera tions center down to the division level instead of maintaining it at corps level. The JAGIC’s design fully supports and enables division-level current operations through the rapid execution and clearance of fires and airspace decon fliction. It is a modular and scalable center designed to integrate and syn chronize fires and airspace control within the division area of operations according to guidance received from the division commander and the joint-force air-component commander. As expected, integration of the JAGIC into 1st Armored Division’s Division-Main (D-Main) CP provided improved airspace deconfliction and coordina tion. The ability to dynamically retask previously distributed joint air assets in real time to support the division commander’s priorities allowed the staff to fully execute the detailed integration of fires. Through the course of two division exercises, JAGIC integra tion has proven to be a success; how ever, this hasn’t been without chal lenges. First, the current division fires cell, air and missile defense (AMD) and G - 3 /Av i a t i o n s e c t i o n s are not organized to man the JAGIC. Also, going into these exercises, the staff did not fully understand the roles, responsibilities and functions of each JAGIC member. Current fires, AMD and G-3 Aviation manning are designed around the division’s CPs, principally D-Main and Division-Tactical (D-Tac). The current structure has evolved to support a COIN fight focused on personality targeting in a slower-developing environment and not on the execution of unified ac tion or a deep-targeting effort. Given this organization and pace, modern CPs are often tied to product development in support of battle-rhythm events (i.e., commander’s update, battle update and battle-update-assessment briefings). These functions are manpower-intensive and were disrupt ed when the staff transitioned to JAGIC integration. Figure 1. The JAGIC is adjacent to the COIC. In the foreground (from left to right) are MG Sean B. MacFarland, 1st Armored Division commanding general; LTC Michael A. Ellicott Jr., 1st Armored Division’s division engineer; and BG Joseph

P. Harrington, 1st Armored Division deputy commanding general for support. (Photo by SGT Ben J. Kullman, 1st Armored Division Public Affairs)

As outlined in Army Training Publication 3-91.1, The Joint Air-Ground Integration Center, the JAGIC is an execution cell and, as such, use of it to its full capability requires a mindset shift away from the management of the several asymmetric brigade areas of operation to the prosecution of the division’s fight. To doctrinally man the JAGIC, 212th Fires Brigade had to provide augmentation to the division’s fires cell while still meeting its own significant, competing demands. During the initial integration of the JAGIC into the division’s mission-command structure, 1st Armored Division was supported by representatives from the Air Force’s Air Combat Command and the Army’s Fires Center of Excellence. These experts brought standardized battle drills that had been developed during previous exercises with hopes of using Iron Resolve 14.2 as further validation of the JAGIC concept. Following the CPX, JAGIC members from 1st Armored Division and 7th Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) used this expert assistance to develop a training program that further defined roles and responsibilities, and refined the battle drills for use in a less controlled environment. These efforts developed situational understanding among the staff and drove adjustments to the division’s COIC layout to allow full integration of the JAGIC.

Division deep operations normally focus on the main defensive belt, second-echelon units and support. Fire support for deep operations may include the fires of field artillery, rockets, missiles and air support, as well as lethal and nonlethal C2. Usually, targeting for lethal and nonlethal attack focuses on planned engagements. A planned engagement entails some degree of prearrangement such as general target location, weapon-system designation and positioning, and munition selection. Planned engagements may be scheduled for a particular time or may be keyed to a friendly or enemy event. Other planned engagements may be specified by target type and may be on-call based on the characteristics of the target – for example, dwell time or high-payoff considerations. Unplanned or dynamic targeting may be conducted, but they must satisfy the same relevancy criteria as those of the planned engagement.2 The DOCC was historically adopted at the corps-level headquarters, with limited division employment, as a Figure 2. The DOCC is situated immediately adjacent to the COIC within D-Main.

mechanism to facilitate targeting and synchronizing combat enablers in sup port of movement and maneuver. The DOCC’s mission is to apply operational fires (lethal and non-lethal) according to the commander’s guidance to cre ate the conditions for success on the battlefield. The DOCC was traditionally chartered with three tasks to achieve the commander’s intent:

• Facilitate maneuver in depth by suppressing the enemy’s deep-strike systems, disrupt the enemy’s operational maneuver and tempo, and create exploitable gaps in enemy positions;

• Isolate the battlefield by interdict ing enemy military potential be fore it can be used effectively against friendly forces; and

• Destroy critical enemy functions and facilities that eliminate or sub stantially degrade enemy operational capabilities.3 The DOCC normally consists of representatives from aviation, fires, G-2 and G-3 planners, with additional support from the electronic-warfare officer, air-defense officer, air-liaison officer, in formation operations, Staff Judge Advocate and civil-affairs representatives as required. With these doctrinal principles in mind, and within the exercise conditions, the division established an ad hoc DOCC adjacent to the JAGIC. The division did not have enough manning to stand up a full-time DOCC organiza tion due to the requirements to staff the COIC and JAGIC. While the COIC fo cused entirely on supporting the BCTs’ current fight within the next 24 hours, the DOCC focused on targeting and co ordinating intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in sup port of near-term operations for the 24-48-72-hour time periods; the DOCC therefore did not attempt to plan fires beyond the 72-hour air-tasking-order cycle. G-5 Plans was focused on planning operations beyond the 72-hour threshold and the division’s contingen cies. While DOCCs previously existed at the corps, given the expanded capabilities and responsibilities allocated to Army divisions, this cell is necessary to execute the division’s fight beyond the coordinated fire line (CFL). The prima ry lesson-learned from this initiative was how the DOCC was used to bridge the gap between plans and current op erations, setting the conditions based on both time and events. Using these factors as entry arguments (time: 12- 24 hours; event: next decision on the decision-support matrix), the staff was able to focus efforts by prioritizing finite resources to shape the deep fight. The increased capability of Army tacti cal missile systems and guided multi ple-launch rocket systems, and the shift in Army aviation doctrine from cross-forward-line-of-own-troops to close-combat attack, provided the di vision more abilities to engage targets within and beyond the CFL, well within even 12-hour planning thresholds. Development of the DOCC also forced the staff to break out of COIN-centric thought process to identify the division’s place in ULO. This paradigm shift reintroduced the concepts of depth and shaping to the organization.

While the Army initiates the imple mentation of DIVARTY within the cur rent force structure, the division is rap idly moving forward with the requisite manning and tactics, techniques and procedure (TTP) changes necessary to (re)adopt the DIVARTY concept accord ing to U. S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)’s DIVARTY implementation order dated April 9, 2014. These chang es included converting 212th Fires Brigade to 1st Armored Division’s DIVARTY with an effective date of July 23, 2014, and transferring authority between the BCT and DIVARTY commanders for the incremental attachment of the BCT field-artillery battalions no later than January 2016.4 A DIVARTY is to be assigned to each Active Component division and ideally stationed with the division headquarters. The DIVARTY has no organic firing units but can be provided a variety of field-artillery battalions (rocket and cannon) and other assets as required to accomplish its mission for the division commander. The DIVARTY’s primary role is to coordinate, integrate, synchronize and employ fires, including operational fires, for the division commander. DIVARTY’s role further includes the ability to mass fires, employ radars, plan and oversee resupply rates and, importantly, execute division-level suppression of enemy air defenses. The DIVARTYs will provide mission command for training management and certification of the BCT field-artillery battalions and fire-support cells. The DIVARTY will work with the division fire-support cell to achieve coordination, integration and synchronization of fires.5 Although the transition of 212th Fires Brigade to 1st Armored Division’s DIVARTY is officially codified in the aforementioned FORSCOM order, this effort began months earlier. Based on recent initiatives to reduce the size of division staffs, 1st Armored Division be gan an alignment in August 2013 of the division fires cell and 212th Fires Brigade staff to find and leverage efficien cies between their redundant capabilities. During Iron Resolve 14.2, this ini tiative came to fruition through the integration of 212th’s fire-support and targeting sections into 1st Armored Di vision’s JAGIC and DOCC, and the management of the division’s counterfire fight out of the fires brigade’s tactical-operations center. Outside the exercise construct, 1st Armored Division has further solidified this relationship by at taching the BCT fires battalions and di vision fires cell to DIVARTY. A division rebuild ing and relearning The Old Ironsides division commander is leading a concerted and focused effort across all warfighting functions to ensure 1st Armored Division’s promi nent role in supporting an expedition ary Army. Simultaneously, the division has assimilated the current lessons-learned from the decentralized brigade- and battalion-level COIN opera tions of the past 13 years while rein vigorating many tested warfighting practices that were commonly practiced before 9/11. The commander is setting in motion the structural changes and TTP adjustments necessary to support the dynamic and potentially chaotic pace of decisive action against a range of enemy capabilities within

ULO.

The division is incorporating the les sons of the past 10 years by adjusting the way the D-Main is manned and structured to improve the division’s ability to leverage all joint and Army fire-support assets. The leadership faces some exceptional challenges, how ever, as it attempts to make these structural and functional changes. Challenges include:

• The division’s anticipation of a manpower reduction within its headquarters and headquarters battalion (HHBN) from 775 personnel to around 500; despite this reduction, 1st Armored Division main tains the requirement to simulta neously, functionally man D-Main and D-Tac headquarters elements as well as the HHBN life-support area (LSA).

• The division will also require more transportation assets not currently on the HHBN modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) to physically move and establish these multiple headquarters elements.

• Lastly, the HHBN MTOE does not support a functional LSA required to enable the D-Main headquar ters. The current MTOE lacks maintenance and dining facilities, a bat talion aid station and sleep areas – all essential to supporting an ex peditionary headquarters. These facilities would need to be either built or contracted to meet the di vision’s daily support require ments. With the demise of the division sup port command (DISCOM), mission command for division support-area op erations is resurfacing as a significant challenge, one that is currently the re sponsibility of the task-organized ma neuver-enhancement brigade (MEB). There are not enough MEBs allocated to the current Army force structure to cover down on all active divisions. There are currently only two active-du ty MEBs; 19 MEBs are assigned to the Reserve or Guard components. The historical role of DISCOM’s Division-Rear (D-Rear) area mission was to provide division-level logistics and health-service support to all units of the division. In addition to its assigned mission to provide direct support to the fighting forces and general support to the entire division, DISCOM also planned, coordinated and supervised base and base-cluster defense operations within the division support area. It did this in conjunction with D-Rear. It is important to note the sustainment elements do not work for division commanders. They are instead an area as set that works for a corps-level sustain ment command with a logistical foot print that is often larger than a typical division-rear area. In essence, the Army removed from the division force structure a key capability, complicating how heavy divisions train. Overcoming these chal lenges will require force-structure re alignments above and beyond division authority. By implementing these division internal-structural initiatives, 1st Armored Division is providing more tools, processes and systems necessary to sup port the commander’s rapid decisionmaking within the operations process es of plan, prepare, execute and assess. The collective structural changes should help reinforce a battle rhythm that supports both the division and subordinate BCTs by streamlining functional activities within a single action cell. Co-locating directors and planning staffs across functional warfighting areas within the JAGIC and DOCC en hances joint collaborative efforts to se cure joint fires and ISR assets in sup port of the division. This structure also facilitates targeting and synchronizing combat enablers in support of move ment and maneuver. The experience of Iron Resolve 14.2 confirmed that the division fight cen ters on coordinating ISR and fires in support of subordinate BCT opera tions. These “sometimes new” and “sometimes old” staff and force struc tures provide 1st Armored Division the means to assume and indeed win this fight. The division employed and refined many of the ideas and processes men tioned in this article as part of the joint training exercise and the Army’s NIE. It is clear that much of the Army’s knowl edge and expertise required to execute the once-vaunted AirLand battle doctrine has atrophied. The hard-won les sons-learned from 1st Armored Division’s CPX program suggest, however, that 1st Armored Division leads the Army in re-examining, relearning and indeed reimagining these core ULO-centric competencies and capabilities. BG Joseph Harrington is the deputy commanding general for support, 1st Armored Division. His past duty assign ments include lieutenant in 1st Armored Division’s 6-1 Field Artillery in Zirndorf, West Germany; commander of 2-3 Field Artillery in Giessen, Germany; Combined Joint Staff, Seoul, Korea; Figure 3. The D-Main footprint demonstrates some of the material and trans port necessary to establish and relocate.

Acronym Quick-Scan AMD – air and missile defense ASOS – air-support operations squadron BCT – brigade combat team C2 – command and control CFL – coordinated fire line COIC – Current-Operations Integration Cell COIN – counterinsurgency CP – command post CPX – command-post exercise DISCOM – division support command DIVARTY – division artillery D-Main – Division-Main (command post) 82nd Airborne Division’s 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (served there twice); and commander, 75th Fires Brigade, Fort Sill. Other assignments include the Office of the Secretary of Defense and multiple assignments to the Army Staff and Joint Staff. He also served as the executive assistant to the 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Harrington recently completed an operational deployment as director of Central Command Forward-Jordan. He was the exercise director for CPX Iron Resolve 14.2. Harrington holds a bachelor’s of arts degree in accounting from Stockton State College and was commissioned a second lieutenant in field artillery through Rider College’s ROTC program. Dr. William Rierson served as a fires observer-coach/trainer during CPX Iron Resolve 14.2. He is a retired field-artillery officer with more than 23 years’ active-duty enlisted and commissioned service. He is a contractor with the Canadian firm CGI (Conseillers en Gestion et Informatique) Federal, assigned to Training and Doctrine Command’s G-2, ISR Integration Training Team. His past duty assignments include 1st Armored Division, 3rd Armored Division, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 197th Infantry Brigade (Separate) and 193rd Infantry Brigade (Separate). He served as afield-artillery battery commander during Operation Desert Storm. He holds a doctorate in education from the University of West Florida. Notes 1 Wertz, Stephen A., “Joint Air Ground Integration Center,” Fires Journal, March 2012, http://www.readperiodicals. com/201203/2650589471.html. 2 Field Manual 6-20-30, Tactics, Tech niques and Procedures for Fires Support for the Corps and Division Operations, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, U. S. Department of the Army, 1989. 3 Sevalia, Roy, “Fighting Deep with Joint Fires,” Call Newsletters, 2003, https:// www.jllis.mil/ARMY/index. cfm?disp=cdrview. cfm&doit=view&cdrid=20992. 4 FORSCOM DIVARTY implementation or der, FORSCOM headquarters, Fort Bragg, NC, April 9, 2014. 5 Whitepaper, “Field Artillery Brigade/ DIVARTY” (staffing version), U. S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK, 2014. D-Rear – Division-Rear (command post) D-Tac – Division-Tactical (command post) DOCC – Deep-Operations Coordination Cell FORSCOM – (U. S. Army) Forces Command FUOPS – future operations HHBN – headquarters and headquarters battalion HICON – higher control ISR – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance JAGIC – Joint Air-Ground Integration Center JTF – joint task force LSA – life-support area MEB –maneuver-enhancement brigade MTOE – modified table of organization and equipment NIE – Network Integration Evaluation SSO – Security Support Office TTP – tactics, techniques and procedures ULO – unified land operations