Integrating Armored Warfare and What That Could Mean for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team

The Army’s current lack of an effective armored-warfare platform has created a capability gap within specific infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs). MG John Nicholson (former commander, 82nd Airbornes Division) noted as much when he said, “The idea of having mo bile protected firepower that can be delivered by air – either air-drop or airland – and get into the fight immedi ately enables us to retain the initiative we gain by jumping in. But if all we’re doing is jumping in and then moving at the speed of a World War II paratroop er, we’re going to rapidly lose the initiative we gained by conducting a stra tegic or operational joint forcible en try.”1 MG Nicholson has framed the problem well for 82nd Airborne Division in terms of how the Army reintegrates an airmobile, light- to medium-armor ar mored-warfare system into IBCTs that require that capability to retain/exploit initiative after forcible-entry opera tions. The current situation highlights the same capability gap the M551 Sheridan came to fill for light forces in the Vietnam Conflict and even saw use via air-drop and air-land for 82nd Air borne Division during Operation Just Cause.2 The Sheridan was decommis sioned and out of service by the mid- 1990s. The Armored Gun System (AGS) program in the early ‘90s, which led to development of the M8 AGS proto type, would have been capable of fill ing the void left by the Sheridan; how ever, the AGS program was cancelled before entering service to the Army, creating a capability gap for some forc es that has persisted for more than 20 years. The Army remains committed to pursuing an armored multi-purpose vehi cle to replace the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier; supplementing our wheeled fleet with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle; and continuing to fund more double-V-hull Strykers; however, development has ceased on the new Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV).3 Suffice it to say that current fiscal conditions obviously affect the immediacy with which any future armored-warfare concept could be developed and integrated into the force. However, as the Army looks to refine “concepts, requirements and key technologies in support of a future IFV modernization program,”4 discussions such as this that highlight the requirements for an armored-warfare platform for certain IBCTs should draw more attention and discussion among military profession als. According to a National Defense report, within the next 24 months, the Army has plans to field the XVIII Air borne Corps with a small group of re purposed light armored vehicles to fit their immediate need and use for test ing.5 As one of the small but growing popu lation of mid-career armor officers having only served within light and air borne IBCTs, this topic has increased significance to me as we discuss the potential for away forward with armored-warfare integration within IBCTs. Armor Branch clearly has a unique opportunity to benefit from any such program as its mounted ma neuver and reconnaissance specialists would be prime candidates to field and operate the equipment. That said, the central themes of the discussion should revolve around requirements (in terms of capabilities and platforms) and force integration. Requirements: capabilities and platforms In addition to being air-drop/air-land capable and providing an adequate level of protection against small-arms and machinegun fire, the armored-warfare platform must effectively traverse rug ged terrain, provide close-protected fires for infantry and/or deliver long-range precision fires to assist the sup ported unit with both seizing and maintaining the initiative. Those are the base requirements. So, when look ing to develop the platform, wheeled vs. tracked is of little importance, as ar guments could be made for each based on mission and capability; however, it is critical to adequately balance levels of protection vs. desired performance. Some risk has to be assumed in levels of protection to effectively meet the air-mobile capability gap and, perhaps more importantly, not produce a plat form that will overburden alight/air borne infantry task force with a heavy logistical tail. An armored-warfare plat form that is productive for initial entry but reduces the light IBCT’s capability to rapidly expand and/or exploit success due to logistical/mobility con straints of the armored-warfare plat form degrades the “light” capability for which the organization was designed. With the desired capabilities in mind, where do we proceed in terms of plat forms? As discussed, the current fiscal envi ronment has little appetite for costly research and development to acquire alight-armor solution for the IBCT. So, a low-cost to no-cost commercial-off-the-shelf solution automatically be comes preferred. That said, the aforementioned M8 (AGS) has a strong argument to re-enter consideration given the scalable levels of armor protection originally designed to vary its use from light (“air-droppable”) to medium (air-land capable) to the heaviest anti-tank (AT) resistant package. Moreover, after its program discontinuation, United Defense (now BAE Systems) continued to develop the platform. In 2003, United Defense successfully upgraded the 105mm main gun with a 120mm main gun, and the M8 AGS evolved into the “Thunderbolt 120mm.”6 Assuming the entirety of the light tank, C-130 Hercules-capable qualities remained from the original M8 105mm AGS design; this concept is intriguing for its cost savings, lethality and availability with in the limits of a constrained timeline. Also, it serves as a legitimate advancement from an existing capability al ready provided to the force by the 105mm Mobile Gun System (MGS) Stryker in terms of armament, protection and off-road capability. (Editor’s note: The AGS is completely out of production, so a commercial-off-the-shelf type of acquisition is not possible.) There are likely a number of other existing technologies that could be repurposed to meet the gap, but I would caution against framing the solution thought process in such away that the Army seeks a single design to meet a variety of needs in another “Pentagon Wars-esque” Bradley production. For example, to meet the aforementioned capability gap that MG Nicholson high lights for airborne-infantry units, a val id argument could be made that the required capability gap is best filled with multiple platforms. Alight version with minimal armor but heavy firepower, with greater survivability for air-drops, could be used to provide imme diate boosts to the initial direct-fire power needs of forcible-entry opera tions (similar to the German “Wiesel”) before the tactical situation permits air-lands. Meanwhile, the force could be equipped with a second heavier, better-protected armored-warfare plat form designed to follow on after the air-head is secured. The second plat form would provide longer-range AT capabilities, improved protection and the capacity to best enable the IBCT to secure the air-head and build combat power while ensuring maximum fire power forward to help retain the initia tive. This would provide multiple tools for a variety of packages vs. trying to develop a one-size-fits-all solution for the identified capability gap. Given the current availability of existing plat forms to repurpose, this approach may affect greater cost savings to outfit the requesting units with the desired capability. In any case, the end product(s) must effectively integrate Armor and infantry ground forces in close combat with in varied terrain, which forces the de sign team to consider: 1) talkboxes for dismounts to communicate with crew;

2) a commander’s cupola and driver’s view that provide maximum situation al awareness of dismounted Infantry;

3) amphibious operations-capabilities if fording sites/bridging assets are lim ited; 4) limited self-recovery capabili ties to reduce the need for more heavy assets sent forward to recover vehi cles; 5) varied weapons platforms (protected machinegun and main gun) and

6) varied munitions (sabot, high-explosive, heat, etc.) Force integration Primarily, fielding should be looked at in terms of need, regional alignment and existing/potential future facilities based on each IBCT and its mission set. This means that fielding would have to avoid the tendency to want to make all units the same. For example, MG Nich olson has identified a need that 82nd Airborne Division requires to most effectively meet its global-response force/joint forced-entry mission sets. However, 25th Infantry Division has a Pacific-focused area of operations with alight, expeditionary mindset that may not necessarily share the same re quirement. Also, Schofield Barracks, HI, would certainly face greater facility challenges than Fort Bragg, NC, to ad equately stable, maintain and provide adequate maneuver space for training an armored-warfare fleet. Once it is decided who will be fielded armored-warfare platforms, the Department of the Army would have to decide if it is better to grow organizations or transform existing structures. Existing paradigms should be challenged to find the best force-integration solution, but inherent branch parochialism will likely hinder that to some degree. There are intrinsic pros and cons with any force-integration solution; however, I think the danger of worsening a separate existing capability gap in brigade-division reconnaissance could oc cur if we solely target existing organizations (likely defaulting to the cavalry squadrons of IBCTs) with leading the change and fielding the new capability when/if it comes available. This discussion parallels the need to look at redesigning the cavalry squadrons as a whole within light IBCTs. As it stands, the cavalry squadron in alight IBCT is poorly equipped to effectively perform as the principal reconnaissance effort for the BCT. In my opinion, two primary courses of action (CoAs) exist that would enable the incorpora tion of the armored-warfare platform and better provide a more useful solu tion for cavalry-squadron restructur ing:

• CoA 1: Placing the armored-war fare platform within the cavalry squadron should be done in a man ner that does not further degrade the reconnaissance capability the cavalry squadron provides to alight IBCT. To achieve this, the cavalry squadron could retain the dis mounted troop and bolster it with a Combat Observation and Lasing Team (COLT) capability (recommended for CoA 2 as well), which provides the BCT commander a highly mobile/more lethal long-range ground-reconnaissance force capable of answering priority intelligence requirements while delivering more effective fires and providing timely battle-damage as sessments for the deep fight. Next, the mounted elements of the cav alry squadron would then absorb the heavier armored-warfare pack age; however, I recommend against eliminating the light-wheeled troops entirely. Instead, look to reestablish the new cavalry squadron with light-wheeled (reconnaissance, guntruck-centric) capabilities and the light- to medium-armored capability by either maintaining a 2x mounted troop model (1x light wheeled; 1x armor) or growing it to a 3x model (1x light; 2x armor). This configuration provides greater options and lethality that enable the cavalry squadron the ability to fight for information if/when required or serve as an effective protection or finishing force in offensive operations alongside the infantry in the close fight. Finally, moving the military-intelligence company (MICO) under the cavalry squadron (also recom mended for CoA 2) would create a self-contained unit capable of truly performing all facets of the cavalry squadron in full service as the bri gade’s primary reconnaissance as set. The varied platforms and capabilities in this construct would provide the BCT commander with a variety of options for task organization and employment for of fensive operations when cavalry squadron assets are not dedicated to a brigade reconnaissance mission.

• CoA 2: This CoA recommends creating relationships with infantry and armored-warfare crews at the lowest level (battalion). For exam ple, I think it is reasonable to con sider replacing guntrucks, in whole or in part, within the infantry bat talion’s heavy-weapons companies with an armored-warfare platform. This CoA offers habitual armored-infantry integration, better protec tion and greater firepower to the light-infantry battalion that has an existing armored-warfare capabil ity gap. This lower-level integration of light infantry and mounted/ heavy forces has proven effective in the company team concept as well as in other organizations that use it with permanence. For exam ple, albeit in an opposing-force mission role, 1st Battalion, 509th Air borne Infantry Regiment’s integra tion of light-heavy forces at the battalion level was (is) largely suc cessful due to the trust and relationships of operating and training under the same battalion colors. Also, this CoA creates the potential for two to three more command opportunities within the IBCT for Armor officers who would be a nat ural fit to command a weapons company with an armored-warfare platform. Like CoA 1, this CoA rec ommends the incorporation of the COLT and the MICO into the caval ry squadron but otherwise leaves the cavalry squadron intact to per form its reconnaissance mission (wheeled and dismounted). In conclusion, a clear need exists for the integration of armored warfare into the force structure of certain IBCTs. However, continued profession al discussion and analysis needs to occur to best define the requirements, which will determine the appropriate capabilities, platform and force inte gration/restructuring model to apply. As noted, any future changes pertain ing to capabilities and platforms for the mounted forces within the IBCT should progress with caution to not lose focus of the “light” aspect of the light IBCT while ensuring that changes do not unintentionally worsen the current capability gap the cavalry squad ron faces in achieving its intended purpose. This discussion is relevant across the operations field as it presents exciting opportunities for both infantry men and Armor officers alike to better integrate our skillsets and capabilities to produce a more lethal and effective

IBCT.

MAJ Joshua Taylor is the brigade executive officer, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI. Previous assignments include squadron S-3, 3-4 Cavalry, 3-25 Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks; squadron executive officer, 3-4 Cav, 3-25 Infantry Division; troop commander, B/1-73 Cav, 2-82 Airborne Battalion, Fort Bragg, NC (deployed with 2-82); assistant BCT S-3 (Training), Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2-82 Airborne, Fort Bragg; assistant S-3/observer and controller, Livefire Division, Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC); aide-de-camp for the commanding general of Fort Polk, LA, and JRTC; and scout platoon leader, 1-509 Airborne Infantry (opposing force). His military schooling includes the Armor Officer Basic Course (honor graduate); Maneuver Captain’s Career Course; Command and General Staff College (Southwest Border Security Program scholar); Defense Language Institute; University of

Foreign Military and Cultural Studies Red Team Member’s Course; Joint F i r e p o w e r C o n t r o l C o u r s e (distinguished honor graduate); Cavalry Leader’s Course; Maintenance Leader’s Course; and Jumpmaster, platoon leader, Ranger and Airborne courses. MAJ Taylor holds a bachelor’s of business administration degree from the University of North Alabama in finance and a master’s of arts degree as an Olmsted scholar from the Universidad de Belgrano in international relations. He is the recipient of the Bronze Star and Meritorious Service medals, and a Bronze Medallion recipient of the Order of St. George. Notes 1 Quintas, Lee BG, “From the Chief of Armor’s Turret,” Thunderbolt Blast, December 2013-January 2014 edition, Vol. 2, Is sue 9. 2 “M551 Sheridan,” retrieved March 1, 2014, from Military Today, http://www. military-today.com/tanks/m551_sheri dan.htm, no date. 3 McHugh, John M., and Odierno, Raymond T. GEN, Army Posture Statement, Washington, DC: Committee on Armed Services, March 2014. 4 Ibid. 5 Erwin, S. I., “U. S. Army in the Market for ‘Light’ Tanks,” National Defense maga zine, Oct. 7, 2013; retrieved March 13, 2014, http://www.nationaldefensemaga zine.org/blog/lists/posts/post. aspx? ID=1294. 6 Coffey, Doug, “United Defense Unveils Thunderbolt 120mm Demonstrator; Thun derbolt Illustrates Rapid Integration of Devastating Firepower and Transforma tional Technologies into Existing Plat forms,” Business Wire, Oct. 6, 2003; retrieved March 2014, http://www. businesswire.com/news/ home/20031006005086/en/United-Defense-Unveils-Thunderbolt-120mm-Demonstrator-Thunderbolt. Acronym Quick-Scan AGS – Armored Gun System AT – anti-tank BCT – brigade combat team CoA – course of action COLT – Combat Observation Lasing Team IBCT – infantry brigade combat team IFV – Infantry Fighting Vehicle JRTC – Joint Readiness Training Center MGS – Mobile Gun System MICO – military-intelligence company U. S. Army 2LT Russel Finegan, a fire-support officer assigned to Charlie Troop, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, looks through a Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder system at Fort Hood, TX, Feb. 25, 2013. A strong COLT capability provides a BCT commander a highly mobile/more lethal long-range ground-reconnaissance force capable of answering priority intelligence requirements while delivering more effective fires and providing timely battle-damage assessments for the deep fight. (U. S. Army photo by SGT John Couffer)