9 as 1: Small Unit Leader Development - A Paradigim Shift

9 as 1: Small-Unit Leader Development –a Paradigm Shift by MG Robert B. Brown “A squad is an organizational idea jointly held by its members. It does not exist physically – you can’t see a squad – you can only see the individuals who man it.” –COL William E. DePuy, ARMY magazine, March 1958 complexity.”1 Leaders at all levels must be prepared to face those enemies across the spectrum of operations by lethal and non-lethal means. According to GEN Dempsey, “The development of adaptive leaders who are comfortable operating in ambiguity and complexity will increasingly be our competitive advantage against future threats to our nation.”2 Overmatch is essential to achieving success on the battlefield. The infantry’s mission – to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture him, or to repel his assault by fire, close combat and counterattack – depends on overmatch. Overmatch is the successful ability to execute critical tasks against projected threat forces in all operational environments, 1) concluding with decisive operations that drive the adversary to culmination and 2) achieving the operational objective while retaining the capability to continue with subsequent missions.3 As a military, where we have overmatch, we win. We enjoy overmatch in the air, sea and ground at higher echelons. “We don’t want to send a soldier into harm’s way who doesn’t overmatch his potential enemies. It is at the squad level where it Situational Understanding Small unit common operating picture Collaborative situational awareness “Unblinking Eye” Networked lethality Embedded training Mobile comms with voice, text and data Mission planning tool ...Operating under mission command. Tactically and technically proficient, fully trained and empowered Leader development Army values warrior spirit Builds a cohesive team Digital comfort Cultural, civil, language External enablers Training and education Advanced situational awareness Comprehensive soldier fitness Social, family Figure 1. The Army leader. becomes too much of a fair fight,” GEN Dempsey emphasized in a speech given in May 2011.4 It is at the small-unit level, on the ground, that it becomes too fair a fight. The enemy has adapted their methods due to this overmatch. Those who wish to do us harm avoid our strengths and look to “bleed us by a thousand cuts” at the small-unit level. We do not have a crystal ball to determine the future, but we can be certain that the future will remain one full of uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. There may be those who look to attack our strengths, but we can be certain that our enemies will continue to attempt to exploit our weaknesses.

Human dimension Taking a bottom-up approach, we can thoroughly assess our gaps and weaknesses at the squad level and then fix them. We must work to get overmatch at the tip of the spear – where we need it most. We must analyze gaps across the formation, both material requirements and the human dimension, and then correct those gaps across the entire doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities spectrum. We can gain overmatch at the squad from an effective combination of some new capabilities (network, load, mobility, power) and, most importantly, from a thorough review of small-unit leader development, training, education and empowerment. We will get to overmatch by looking at the measures of effectiveness for the squad formation. Those areas that offer the greatest impact on the formation will receive the priority to fix. The result will be overmatch at the lowest level – where it matters most. This will only be effective by training small-unit leaders to take advantage of the overmatch and empower them to make decisions in an environment of trust through mission command. Given the incredible performance of our junior leaders over the past 10 years of conflict, how could we not provide overmatch and enable our squads to be dominant on the battlefield?

The human dimension is a priority because we know there are significant training and leader-development challenges ahead of us. Our small-unit leaders must become more familiar with resources that deployed units will have available to them. Our squad leaders must have a greater understanding of supporting weapon-system capabilities, vulnerabilities and employment considerations. They will have to make the most efficient and effective use of training time and facilities, and they must become familiar with 21st Century soldier competencies: cognitive, physical, social-cultural and moral-ethical. A case for change At the forefront of our nation’s forces is the infantry squad. The basics of shoot, move and communicate continue to provide the necessary foundation to the squad, but due to the environment, we must move away from the rote-repetition approach of settling an engagement. We should be able to integrate all capabilities within the squad’s fight, thus once again creating overmatch. To ensure this happens, before deployment the Army must institute a method to develop cognitive skills, values, critical thinking and decision-making skills across all levels of command, including the squad. These additional leader skills will prepare leaders at all levels to support the squad to operate in any environment across the spectrum of operations. The squad as foundation of the decisive force must have internal knowledge, skills and abilities in its leaders and soldiers for it to remain dominant on the battlefield. At leadership levels above the squad, leaders must have the right means to understand the situation, evaluate it quickly and introduce accurately the enablers needed to provide that overmatch capability needed in a squad fight. Leader development is a critical component in developing cognitive skills and decision-making ability to identify threats, collect intelligence and collect evidence through effective sensitive-site exploitation. Leader development is also a critical component in the psychological effects of trust, cohesion, teamwork and empowerment under mission command.

As the environment in which we as a nation and Army operate changes and evolves, our response as a profession in developing leaders must change and evolve. A culture of adaptation and chaos-management must emerge as we shift the paradigm to a model of decentralization and empowerment for soldier and leader development across our force. But I’m confident we can do this successfully; not since Vietnam has our Army had a force with such rich operation experience to draw knowledge from to “grow” and adapt leadership development – and the Army as a whole – as a learning organization. Dialogue for change The Maneuver Center of Excellence, along with the Armor and Infantry schools, are developing a series of three articles to open a dialogue for change in growth in small-unit leader development. This article addresses the challenges we face in leader selection and developmental changes for team leader and squad leaders; agile and adaptive leader training; and training management for the small-unit leader. The following two articles will address developing mission command and trust through immersive training, team building and cognitive-skills development through the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness-Performance and Resilience Enhancement Program. These subsequent articles will detail examples from the experimental and operational forces, which have worked in improving leader development in both the institutional and operational force. As always, feedback from the force will create a dialogue for future changes and ensure that the operational force is receiving a quality product from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command force, and that we team up as we re-energize home-station training and leader development to complement the professional military education the soldier receives. We share a common goal through structured self-development at home station and PME to develop the best leaders possible for the growing and intense demands of future conflicts.

Team and squad leader training Over the last 10 years, training and leader development has reduced, yet requirements and responsibilities for our noncommissioned offers have increased. Pre-9/11, the Primary Leadership Development Course / Warrior Leader Course was 30 days long; post-9/11, the course reduced to 17 days long. Pre-9/11, the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course / Advanced Leader Course was eight weeks long; post-9/11, BNCOC / ALC was reduced to five weeks. Pre-9/11, the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course / Senior Leader Course was 11 weeks long; post-9/11, ANCOC / SLC became seven weeks long. The changes in course length reflect the Army’s operational needs and tempo, especially during the surges of Iraq and Afghanistan, and although this doesn’t necessarily represent decline in quality, it’s time for the Army to look at the courses’ structure. As dwell time increases across the force, we have a unique opportunity to relook the courses and professional development holistically to buy back what we’ve sacrificed over the last 10 years. This also allows the Army to review the KSAs required at all levels of leadership, identify where they are taught and reduce redundancies across the institutional, operational and SSD domains. Operational requirements to train leaders in a timely manner for the operational force also created a shift in the domains to put the onus on the institutional Army for leader development; now is the opportune time to equally weight all three domains and capitalize on technological advances, allowing SSD and operational development to increase in developing our Army’s junior leaders.

Programs of instruction will be required to make this model work. This must be a collaborative effort among Department of the Army, U.S. Army Forces Command and TRADOC. The PoIs will operate as the backbone to formalize the training across the force and aid the operational units to focus on leader development as opposed to course development. The PoIs provided will allow operational units to provide a structure to their leader courses and NCO development programs. They will also provide a model that provides the operational Army with the selection of building-block events that lead to capstone training; when a squad leader or platoon sergeant selects capstone training, the building blocks become available: resources, terrain needed, training ammunition and lesson plans. The goal is to provide the requisite training and development at the appropriate time along the NCO’s career to better enable the NCO to meet the demands of the current and future operating environments and to maximize 21st Century training capabilities. For example, this would include training on 360-degree assessment; instruction on how to teach, coach and mentor; focus on how to properly counsel and build teams; prepare leaders to lead from the front; and ensure leaders have the requisite technical and tactical skills to lead. Junior leaders will learn the most in their units from their leadership as they follow the two-down model – with first sergeants developing squad leaders and platoon sergeants developing team leaders. This will also allow unit leaders to adjust PoIs and implement unit-specific training requirements for their post requirements and specialty skills required in light, airborne, Stryker and mechanized units.

The institutional Army will assist by providing tools/applications, bite-size digital leader training and immersive squad trainers. The institutional Army will also develop assessments to measure programs and implement feedback as those courses develop.

Also, an individual training avatar will develop during initial military training – possibly earlier, during the accessions process – to help soldiers better recognize their personal strengths and weaknesses, and then provide them with instructional and training tools that will facilitate self-improvement. The avatar will also serve as the critical link between virtual and live. As the soldier performs, the avatar will follow in simulations. The Commanders employ mission command in training as well as actual operations. They tell subordinates their intent, and the subordinates determine how to achieve that intent. (U.S. Army photo) manders with a better solution for developing the attributes associated with 21st Century soldier competencies, Warrior Ethos and Army Values. One of the eight leader-development imperatives stated in the “Army Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army” information paper6 is to “[p]repare leaders for hybrid threats and full-spectrum operations through outcomes-based training and education.”7 With an outcomes focus, leaders have the flexibility to adapt training to meet the developmental needs of subordinate leaders and soldiers. Field Manual 7-0 tells us “using the principle of ‘train as you will fight,’ commanders employ mission command in training as well as actual operations. They tell subordinates their intent, and the subordinates determine how to achieve that intent.”8 When the commander includes developmental outcomes within his intent, soldier development becomes a dynamic and integral aspect of training. In the context of training, commanders should consider that the outcome includes not only the training objective, which describes the intended outcome (task, condition, standard) but the total impact of the training on the soldier or unit, intended or unintended.

With respect to the strategic squad, the squad leader would necessarily be empowered to execute the commander’s intent. He would likely be responsible and accountable for developing and conducting training to achieve his commander’s intent; however, he would need resources, especially time, to accomplish his task. To develop the necessary attributes associated with decentralized operations – such as initiative, discipline, accountability or adaptability – it follows that training should demand and develop those very same attributes. Mission command requires trust, and we trust the squad leader in combat. So why can’t we simulations / virtual link will allow more repetitions and hence a greater learning and trust-building environment for the soldier and leader.

The training avatar will also allow unit-leader access for the soldier’s digital leader book upon his arrival in a unit. The avatar will be accessible in the NCO evaluation system as well allow an immersive experience focusing on the fundamentals of leadership at the team- through company-level NCO leadership. The avatar will provide the digital link to the Digital Training Management System for that soldier, allowing the soldier to carry forward successfully completed development in the SSD and operational domains to new units and NCOES. Outcomes-based training In training for full-spectrum operations, with the intent of developing the moral-ethical, cognitive and physical components of the human dimension, leaders may find it helpful to consider developing values-based standards derived from concepts such as the Army Learning Concept, Warrior Ethos and Army Values. These concepts explicitly state what is important to our Army; however, the desired attributes and competencies are harder to measure than specific tasks or actions.5 Consequently, training and education often focuses on menus of specific tasks, individual and collective, that somehow will develop the desired attributes. This task-focused approach to training may not be the best solution in developing attributes such as adaptability, confidence, initiative, judgment or accountability. While task accomplishment is important and Army standards must be met, an outcomes focus on training may provide com-In training for full-spectrum operations, with the intent of developing the moral-ethical, cognitive and physical components of the human dimension, leaders may find it helpful to consider developing values-based standards derived from concepts such as the Army Learning Concept, Warrior Ethos and Army Values. (U.S. Army photo) trust, and we trust the squad leader in combat. So why can’t we trust him to train his squad?

The NCOs at the squad level, both squad and team leaders, are relying on experience and baptism by fire in combat to develop and refine cognitive skills. It is time we elevate their training to the level required for a truly decisive force.

Training management Leader development is now taking on a lifelong-learning concept with SSD and PME combined to continue developing the leader at squad level.

Unit commanders also share responsibility in maximizing assets to narrow the training and education scope during the Army Forces Generation cycle. This includes specific regions/areas of responsibility, languages, cultures, enemy tactics, techniques and procedures, and leveraging technological assets to bring training-support packages and hip-pocket training to the next level. The next level includes interactive modules to increase cognitive skills through repetition with tactical-decision exercises at squad, platoon and company level. Also, the squad-level leader must develop cognitive skills through training to assist his commander in developing lethal and non-lethal targets, answering the commander’s priority intelligence requirements – and collecting through reconnaissance those requirements. Training will address personality targeting, tactical questioning, negotiation techniques, SSE and non-lethal – as well as lethal – targeting techniques. An example of a source currently available is advanced situational-awareness training, referred to in the U.S. Marine Corps as “combat hunter.” This training stresses the value of combat-observation techniques, combat tracking, human profiling and behavior-pattern analysis techniques. The course’s goal is how to train soldiers to be true sensors and subsequently to apply predictive analysis to all situations.

Once the squad leader has mastered these skills through leader development, he is ready to actively participate in collaborative training management of his squad, nested with the platoon’s training goals and the company’s and battalion’s full-spectrum operations mission-essential task list. Individual- and collective-task training management is essential in not only developing cognitive fusion and teamwork across the squad, but it will inherently build trust, teamwork, cohesion and empowerment to psychologically prepare the squad for the rigors of combat in any environment against any enemy.

Conclusion

In almost all our Army’s past conflicts, the squad has always operated as part of a larger force: platoons and companies in Vietnam, battalions and regiments in Korea, and division-level and larger attacks during World War II. However, for today and the near future, the operating environment has changed. The squad continues to operate as part of a larger force; however, the environment has demanded that these forces assume risk and spread out across the battlefield, which in some cases prevents quick reaction, mutually supporting efforts and clear knowledge of where all forces are at in times of crisis. This has proven to be even more difficult when these forces are operating in rugged terrain in a dismounted role – where we have the least connectivity to our supporting assets and the least situational awareness and understanding.

In parallel with the Army Learning Concept 2015, it is time to take a serious look at our leadership-development courses for junior leaders. Before moving to live training and trust-building, we must determine what material is outdated and where the training focus needs to be for the future fight. Ultimately we will adapt new, emerging technologies through the virtual, constructive and gaming constructs to enhance team- and squad-leader development before moving to live training and trust-building, enhancing mission command across the force. Empowerment across the force will allow timely feedback, tapping into our most valuable resource – combat-tested and -proven junior leaders – to adapt the courses to their needs, enhancing their strengths and structuring the courses to bridge current knowledge gaps in training management and home-station unit training.

In this article, we laid the foundation and case for change, addressing the challenges we face in leader selection and developmental changes for team and squad leaders; agile and adaptive leader training; and training management for the small-unit leader. Subsequent articles will address developing mission command and trust through immersive training, team-building and cognitive skills development through CSF-PREP. We plan to detail examples from the experimental and operational forces that have worked in improving leader development in both the institutional and operational force. Feedback from the operational force will facilitate both a bottom-up and collaborative effort, driving timely changes in our courses and cross-pollinat-ing effective practices across various units as we continue to better ourselves as an Army.

MG Robert Brown commands the U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, GA. Previous assignments include chief of staff, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army; deputy commanding general for support, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq; director, exercises and training, J-7, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI; Joint Ground Maneuver Program analyst in force structure, Resource and Assessment Directorate, J-8, Washington, DC; and G-3 (training) and chief of operations, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. His other command experience includes D Company, 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO; 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX, and Operation Joint Forge, Bosnia-Herzegovina; and 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, WA, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq. MG Brown’s military education includes the Infantry Basic Course, Armor Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College and National War College. He holds a master’s degree in national security and strategic studies from National Defense Univer-When the commander includes developmental outcomes within his intent, soldier development becomes a dynamic and integral aspect of training. (U.S. Army photo) Notes 1GEN Martin E. Dempsey, ARMY magazine, November 2010. 2GEN Martin E. Dempsey, ARMY magazine, February 2011. 3Joint Publication 3-0, Page IV-29, accessed Aug. 15, 2011, at http:// www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf. 4GEN Martin E. Dempsey, speech May 5, 2011, at Association for United States Army meeting.

5“An Initiative in Outcomes-Based Training and Education: Implications for an Integrated Approach to Values- Based Requirements,” Asymmetric Warfare Group paper, March 2010. 6(Editor’s note: an information paper derived from the 2010 Army Posture Statement. For more information, see https://secureweb2. hqda.pentagon.mil/vdas_armyposturestatement/2010/information_ papers/ Army_Leader_Development_Strategy_for_a_21st_Century_Army_(ALDS).asp.)

7“Army Leader Development Strategy for a 21st Century Army,” Nov. 25, 2009.

8FM 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full-Spectrum Operations, February 2011.

Acronym Quick-Scan ALC – Advanced Leader Course ANCOC – Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course BNCOC – Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course CSF-PREP – Comprehensive Soldier Fitness-Performance and Resilience Enhancement Program FM – field manual KSA – knowledge, skills and abilities NCO – noncommissioned officer NCOES – Noncommissioned Officer Education System PME – professional military education PoI – program of instruction SLC – Senior Leader Course SSD – structured self-development SSE – sensitive-site exploitation TRADOC – (U.S. Army) Training and Doctrine Command Although we announced in the September-October 2011 edition that the theme of ARMOR’s first writing competition would be “BCT 2020,” the competition’s focus has been changed to “enabling operational adaptability through reconnaissance.” Writers should refer to the foreword of the Army Capstone Concept, accessible at http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm (especially the fourth paragraph) and discuss questions such as:

• Does the Armor Branch need different capabilities to do what is outlined in the foreword?

• Are we configured correctly to accomplish the mission? Entries are due no later than Jan. 12, 2012. Winners will be published in the March-April 2012 edition of ARMOR and recognized at the 2012 Reconnaissance Summit March 6-8, 2012. How do I enter?

Submit an unclassified article examining “enabling operational adaptability through reconnaissance.” Articles should be no more than 5,000 words, not counting endnotes. Concepts must address:

• Suggested configurations must be capable of full-spectrum operations; cannot cost the Army more money; and must be designed within the framework of existing resources.

• The training and professional-development implications of any suggested redesign.

Previously published articles, or articles being considered elsewhere for publication, are ineligible. Articles submitted to other competitions are also ineligible.

What do winning writers receive?

First place: recognition at the Reconnaissance Summit/publication in ARMOR.

Second place: recognition at the Reconnaissance Summit/ publication in ARMOR.

Third place: certificate of achievement signed by commandant/consideration for publication in ARMOR. Fourth place: certificate of achievement signed by commandant/consideration for publication in ARMOR. Honorable mention: certificate of recognition signed by commandant/possible publication in ARMOR. How do I submit an article?

• Complete the entry form and submit it with your manuscript via email to benn.armormagazine@conus.army.mil no later than Jan. 12, 2012. Include a biographical worksheet and filled-out operations-security certification form as part of your entry. The entry form, bio worksheet and OPSEC certification form are available on our Website at https://www. benning.army.mil/armor/ArmorMagazine/index.htm. How will the articles be evaluated and judged?

• The entry form, biographical worksheet and OPSEC certification are part of the submission; these forms must be with the manuscript for the entry to be considered.

• ARMOR’s editorial board will recommend to the Armor School commandant the winners using specific evaluation criteria.

If you have questions, contact benn.armormagazine@conus.army. mil.

Change in theme for ARMOR’s 1st writing competition