Integrating Host-Nation Security Forces in Civil-Military Operations: Achieving Unity of Effort

• Host-nation security forces;

• Essential services;

• Governance; and

• Economic development.

Current COIN doctrine advises that operations must occur along multiple LLOs in a synchronized manner to achieve some measure of unity of effort. This concept is not difficult – it is a non-lethal extension of the combined-arms approach – but operating in joint, multi-agency or host-nation channels makes synchronization and unity of effort extremely difficult. Operation Charge of the Knights Although difficult, operating in host-nation channels is necessary, as integrating host-nation security forces into civil-military operations allows multiple synergies between LLOs to achieve true unity of effort. For example, in Basra, integrating ISF in civil-military operations during Operation Charge of the Knights achieved unity of effort and synchronized progress along multiple LLOs.

The Iraqi government initiated Operation Charge of the Knights in Spring 2008 to re-establish legitimate government control over Basra. The entire military history of the operation is outside this article’s scope, but several facts deserve mention:

• First, Iraqis led and executed the operation with coalition assistance in combat aviation, logistics and civil-military support.

• Second, the units tasked with conducting most of the combat operations were not originally from Basra. Neighboring provinces sent units when the Basra-raised and British-trained units proved ineffective in the conflict’s early days. As a result, the Iraqi-army units in Basra did not know the city or the inhabitants and were only slightly Integrating Host-Nation Security Forces in Civil-Military Operations: Achieving Unity of Effort by CPT Walter A. Reed IV more aware of the human terrain than the coalition forces operating in many parts of Iraq were.

• Lastly, the units that arrived in Basra were some of the most highly competent and well-trained units in the Iraqi army, with several units staying together through four or more sets of coalition adviser teams.

After the initial fighting to remove militia elements, the Iraqi army settled into steady-state operations and the coalition advisers began requesting civil-military operations support for post-conflict-effects mitigation activities. Several teams from 360th Civil Affairs Brigade came from Baghdad to form a civil-military operations center and a civil-affairs team to support the Iraqi army. After two days of initial assessments, the team chose to focus efforts on the neighborhood of Hyanniyah, an overcrowded slum on the outskirts of the city. Hyanniyah, like many other slums in Iraq, is an area initially built to house 50,000 that now contains almost 200,000 people. A decades-long migration trend from the countryside into the cities had strained already unreliable and underfunded city services.

Hyanniyah also served as a primary recruiting zone for militia elements that formerly controlled the city. Hyanniyah project The militia made significant gains in the area based on the local government’s historical inability or unwillingness to provide regular essential services to the population of Hyanniyah. Tribal sheiks held some power in the neighborhood; however, the urban poor in Hyanniyah stayed there primarily because they had no tribal structure to rely on. There was no potable water in the neighborhood. The area received less than two hours of government power per day. The sewage system consisted of a series of ditches that ran down the sides of the roads into gutters, which ran the waste to large stagnant ponds on the outskirts of the neighborhood. There were no police stations or substations inside the neighborhood.

In short, the neighborhood lacked any semblance of consistent essential services and would likely remain so for years, if not decades. Attempting to solve all the problems in Hyanniyah was out of the question, but identifying several areas for high-impact and low-cost improvements showed the Iraqi government’s and coalition forces’ resolve to improve citizens’ lives. Several immediate issues were identified that could be resolved within the scope of guidance for the Commanders Emergency Response Program funds allocated to the task force. The most important issue facing the people of Hyanniyah was the tremendous amount of garbage and debris that had accumulated due to militia control of the city streets and the heavy fighting to remove them. Municipal trash crews and road cleanup teams, already barely keeping up with the amount of debris and trash on the streets, were incapable of clearing the streets in a reasonable amount of time.

The civil-affairs team identified the trash piles and sewage back-ups as a significant public-health threat, as well as a significant obstacle to economic recovery in the area. Importantly, the project concept did not replace the municipal government or city services for any length of time, but rather it supplemented the city work crews with men from areas affected by the fighting. The intent for the project was threefold:

• First, assisting the municipal government with debris and trash removal, Iraqi and coalition forces would avert a potential public-health disaster and enemy information-operations victory.

• Second, the project showed the public that the Iraqi army and their coalition partners would improve the neighborhood conditions now that militia control had ended.

• Last, hiring men from the neighborhood to serve on the work crews, the project injected some economic benefit directly into the community.

Based on this intent, the team identified several measures of performance that included removing all large piles of trash from the major thoroughfares; completing the project within three days of starting it; and injecting $25,000 into the local economy. MoP ensured performance of the task to the required standard. Identifying measures of effectiveness ensured the project achieved its desired impact. For example, to measure whether the project was successful in averting a public-health disaster, the team surveyed the health clinics to identify and record any changes in the baseline number of sanitation-based public-health issues such as cholera, dysentery, viral diarrhea, etc. The second MoE posited that the trash and debris removal would be sufficient so that within three days of completion the municipal sanitation services could resume. Lastly, to measure the economic benefit, the team counted the number of local market stands and surveyed shop owners to identify the level of spending in the neighborhood markets.

First try The first attempt at the project used the tribal sheiks in the neighborhood to gather the work crews for the cleanup. The team used this approach to facilitate a rapid start as well as to reinforce the tribal power structures utilizable by ISF or coalition forces in the future. The sheiks raised the required labor crews and set to work clearing the trash and debris piles from the major thoroughfares throughout the neighborhood. Having removed the largest trash piles, the project was complete in five days. It met all MoP the civil-affairs team had identified and paid $25,000 to employ almost 300 Iraqis temporarily.

The team also analyzed the results by evaluating the project against MoE. The team identified no significant increase in the number of public-health issues, meeting the first MoE. However, the second and third MoEs (municipal crews running, economic impact) went unmet.

Several factors led to the inability of the municipal crews to resume work. First, the level of work throughout the neighborhood was inconsistent and poorly supervised at the crew level. The tribal sheiks had no real interest in cleaning the neighborhood; they knew which of the largest piles to clean up and left the interior of the neighborhood untouched. Their interest was in strengthening the patronage networks that had suffered during militia control.

Second, lack of time and resources limited the project, so the interior section of the neighborhood was untouched and still presented a problem. After clearing the large trash and debris piles, more trash and debris from the interior of the neighborhood quickly replaced them on major roads.

Market surveys and the types of workers on the crews deemed the project’s economic impact insufficient. The tribal sheiks used their patronage to reward members of their tribe, some of whom did not live in Hyanniyah and some who were as young as 12 years old. The lack of working-age men with families to support, illustrated by no appreciable impact on the local markets, was a major impediment to the project’s economic impact in the community.

Analysis of the initial project’s effectiveness convinced the team that more control was necessary to ensure the project met MoEs. Since the Iraqi-army battalion in Hyanniyah had, at this time, established areas of operation at company level that divided the neighborhood, the U.S. civil-affairs team approached the Iraqi battalion commander with the idea to use the Iraqi company commanders to generate work crews and ensure that work met standards within their AOs for three reasons:

• The team figured that the company commanders wanted the side streets and interior alleys in their AOs cleared since they would operate among them.

• By generating the work crews from inside their AO, the company commanders could better connect with the citizens in their neighborhood and further enforce the Iraqi government information-operations campaign that painted a brighter future for Iraq free of militia control.

• The Iraqi-army units had the required manpower and interest to effectively supervise the crews and foreman. The second project launched less than three days after the first at five times the original scale.

Second try The second run of the trash and debris removal project yielded tremendous results, with all MoP and MoE met:

• The crews completed the work to a uniform standard, and the Iraqi-army commanders vouched for them on payday. They ensured that only legitimate workers were paid.

• Families from within the respective neighborhoods provided the work crews.

• All males paid out on the second project (almost 2,000) were in the target-age range with families to support.

• With the interior of the neighborhoods cleared, the municipal trash crews began collecting manageable amounts of trash and debris.

• Business in neighborhood markets picked up appreciably, and the amount of business conducted in U.S. dollars (the method of payment for workers in the project) increased substantially.

The project was a success in that it met the commander’s intent within the time and resources allocated. However, the project’s real success was just becoming apparent in COIN operations in progress in the neighborhood.

When the decision was made to use the Iraqi army to assist in the Hyanniyah CERP project, there was very little thought of the direct military benefit to the Iraqi-army battalion on the ground. Leaders did not foresee that involving the Iraqi army in civil-military operations would pay dividends along one of the COIN LLOs as well as improve essential services. The first inclination of this occurred when the first cleanup crew arrived for payment. Due to strict money-handling and contracting procedures, the U.S. Army contracting officer and pay agents were the only ones authorized to accept work and disburse pay. However, even though the Iraqi army never touched any of the money, they organized the work crews in preparation for payment; required names, addresses, tribes and some form of identification before workers reported for payment; and could verify whether the individual actually worked.

The Iraqi army battalion S-2 was present during the payment operation and talked to each individual about conditions in the neighborhood and the current level of militia activity. On several occasions during the payment operation, individuals with fake or altered identification cards were refused payment until they could provide an acceptable form of identification. These actions provided a tremendous amount of information that the Iraqi army used to enable operations along the civil-security LLO. By understanding the human terrain at the street and neighborhood level, they began to separate the insurgents from the population, a key element of COIN operations. Another advancement occurred simply by using the Iraqi army to assist in supervising the work crews. This fought the Iraqi army’s tendency to conduct operations solely using static traffic-control points scattered around the city. By supervising the street-cleanup project, the company commanders and platoon leaders engaged the population of the neighborhood daily. This presented several opportunities where better intelligence and more reliable information was gained by being among the people and accessible to the citizens.

Tip-line activity increased tenfold once Iraqi-army personnel began supervising the crews. This led to better targeting and more effective operations. With no functioning police force in Hyanniyah or anywhere else in Basra, the Iraqi army had the task of securing the populace. By supervising work crews and gathering individuals for teams, the Iraqi-army companies conducted several combat patrols daily, identifying and stopping many instances of petty crime and providing a sense of renewed security following militia control. Based on the increased human-terrain awareness, better intelligence and their ability to secure the population, the ISF conducted more effective COIN operations, due in part to the project’s requirements. Synergy and future challenges It is important to note that these developments, occurring along three COIN LLOs, were simultaneous and synchronized, as FM 3-24 requires. The ISF were conducting civil-security operations while concurrently assisting in economically developing the area at the same time they were assisting in restoring essential services. Each activity was conducted along a separate LLO, but the Iraqi army was the critical link to bring all three together and move along several at once. The first iteration of the project essentially worked along one or two of the COIN LLOs (economic development and restoration of essential services); however, Iraqi-army participation evinced progress along all three LLOs at once.

Not only were operations conducted along several LLOs at once, the actions each became more effective by the presence of the other, creating a synergistic effect. One example occurred when the Iraqi-army units gathered work crews from the neighborhoods in their AOs. Iraqi-army units ensured a more substantial economic-development impact of the project by selecting working-age males with families to support. They also gathered information (names, addresses, tribal affiliation) that could be used to separate insurgents from the population, thus making their civil-security operations more effective. Furthermore, by providing economic assistance to the militia’s prime recruiting age group, the ISF further attacked the militia’s base of support. Therefore, both the economic-development piece and civil-security operations were more effective than they would have been if done in isolation either by coalition forces or by ISF. The coalition-force elements and ISF executed this project under circumstances that are unlikely to be replicated in the future. A look at several potential challenges to involving the Iraqi army in civil-military operations is in order. The first challenge is that the role of the ISF (specifically the Iraqi army) changes, resulting in the loss of the key link between the multiple LLOs. If the role of the Iraqi army changes and the government of Iraq deems the army’s primary mission to be external defense rather than the protection of its citizens from internal or insurgent threats, the emphasis on Iraqi partners for civil-military operations would then of necessity shift to the police. Currently all but a very-select-few police units are incapable of conducting the type of disciplined operation that is required for success, but if they are entrusted with the security of the local population, they could be useful partners. The most important quality of the ISF partner is not the color of their uniform but their ability to take advantage of the opportunities to improve security and economic development created by civil-military projects.

Another potential challenge might come from the changing U.S. force structure in Iraq. The Status of Forces Agreement mandates that all “combat troops” be out of Iraq by August 2011. This does not present a significant challenge because progress can take place along multiple LLOs simply by integrating enablers like the civil-affairs teams and military-training teams. No U.S. “combat units” participated in the projects in the Hyanniyah neighborhood. Coalition adviser teams and civil-affairs personnel were the only coalition troops involved.

The most significant future challenge to attaining simultaneous progress along multiple COIN LLOs as described in this article will be access to appropriate resources. Without coalition control of the resources used to conduct the projects, the Iraqi-army units in Basra would have been unable to conduct civil-military operations to the required standards of responsiveness and completeness. Based on the speed and responsiveness of the money allocated by the government of Iraq to Basra province for reconstruction, resources would not have been responsive enough to progress the COIN fight in Hyanniyah.

There is no CERP-like program for the ISF to use to respond to immediate and critical reconstruction needs. The Iraqi government has set aside money for this purpose, but the major threat is that CERP’s rapid responsiveness will be lost once money is channeled through the cumbersome bureaucracy and endemic corruption, eroding the true benefit. If the government of Iraq is serious about conducting COIN operations (and there are doctrinal and force-structure indications they are: establishment of the Iraqi COIN school in Taji and creation of the battalion-level civil-affairs officer position, to name two), military control of small-scale rapid-reconstruction funds is essential.

Summary

In conclusion, by integrating host-nation security forces into civil-military operations (in this case, Iraqi-army units in Basra in 2008), simultaneous progress along multiple COIN LLOs can result in unity of effort. Furthermore, the synergistic effects of integration make both civil-military operations as well as combat and civil-security operations more effective. Civil-military operations gain effectiveness by using cultural experience, additional supervision and additional Iraqi stakeholders. On a larger scale, participation by host-nation security forces in civil-military projects contributed to the legitimacy of the government’s actions. Understanding the human terrain and the requirement to engage the population are just a few benefits the ISF gained that assisted their combat and civil-security operations because of their significant participation in civil-military operations.

In Hyanniyah, the supervision requirement for the project forced the counterinsurgents to operate among the people and made significant security gains in terms of a lower crime rate, intelligence gained and, most importantly, the prevention of militia resurgence in the neighborhood. Although this approach is not a panacea for achieving unity of effort along multiple LLOs, the integration improved the effectiveness of the projects and the counter-insurgents’ ability to conduct operations. Integration also ultimately contributed to the legitimacy of the Iraqi government’s operations in Basra.

CPT Walt Reed is an Armor Branch officer assigned to Fort Carson, CO.

Acronym Quick-Scan AO – area of operation CERP – Commanders Emergency Response Program COIN – counterinsurgency FM – field manual ISF – Iraqi Security Forces LLO – logical lines of operation MoE – measure of effectiveness MoP – measure of performance