The Commander’s Role in Receipt of Mission: ‘Frame the Problem’ and ‘Issue a Proposed Problem Statement’

proposed problem statement. To be clear, this article is not another critique or analysis of the worthiness of design. However, a look at the doctrinal basis for The Commander’s Role in Receipt of Mission: ‘Frame the Problem’ and ‘Issue an Initial Proposed Problem Statement’ by LTC Harold Douglas Baker Jr. and retired LTC Kevin E. Brown our proposal brings design into the equation. As previously mentioned, the commander’s initial guidance includes a decision to initiate design or go straight into the MDMP.3 In our opinion, this means that the commander attempted to frame the problem and, based on his or her understanding (or lack thereof), chose to proceed in a certain direction. Design: how much?

To bring another supporting perspective, a recent Command and General Staff College classroom discussion on the commander’s role in the MDMP prompted one of the students to state, “What do you mean that the commander decides in his initial guidance whether or not to design? It’s really how much to design.” The student went on to explain that his point came not because he believed that the overall design procedure applied to every situation but that design’s second element, framing the problem,4 should be considered part of the MDMP. He went on to say it should occur sooner rather than later in the process.

Taken in that context, a commander and staff should not wait until mission analysis to frame any problem type and should definitely not delay the task develop a proposed problem statement until just before moving into COA development. Ultimately, in accordance with FM 3-0, the commander must frame the problem and produce an initial proposed problem statement much earlier in the MDMP.5 If commanders view these tasks as part of receipt of mission, the problem-statement task for the staff during mission analysis becomes refine the proposed problem statement as it encapsulates any new information. This revision, in turn, leads to a final problem statement for approval or modification during the mission-analysis brief. Doctrinal tasks CGSC’s Department of Army Tactics has taught students for several years that to gain situational understanding, the commander and staff conduct a tactical problem analysis upon receipt of mission using mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available – time available and civilians, or METT-TC) and applicable operational variables (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment and time, or PMESII-PT). This method draws upon a loosely defined tactical problem in FM 3-90,Tactics, which “accounts for the factors of [METT-TC], the variables whose infinite mutations always combine to form a new tactical pattern. They never produce exactly the same situation; thus there can be no checklist that adequately addresses each unique situation.”6 Logically there’s no checklist, but accounting for the factors of mission variables with the addition of applicable operational variables provides a framework to the process. Hence, a coherent analysis using mission and operational variables meets the standard for frame the problem.

Doctrinal support for using the mission and operational variables to frame the problem, and conducting this analysis within receipt of mission, is available throughout FM 5-0. “Upon receipt of a mission, commanders filter information categorized by the operational variables into relevant information with respect to the mission,” states FM 5-0. Also, commanders “use the mission variables, in combination with the operational variables, to refine their understanding of the situation.”7 In addition, update running estimates, the third task under the MDMP’s receipt of mission section, supports inserting frame the problem. This task states that commanders should “immediately begin updating their running estimates upon receipt of the mission”8 that includes a summary of the problem, the operational approach and all variables that affect the mission. Commander’s role Commanders integrate personal knowledge of the situation, analysis of the operational and mission variables, assessments by subordinate commanders and other organizations, and relevant details gained from running estimates.9 Thus, frame the problem reasonably fits as a subtask of the receipt of mission’s conduct initial assessment. If a commander follows the MDMP’s doctrinal tasks, he or she has the requirements and relevant information needed to frame the problem and, in turn, issue an initial proposed problem statement as part of issue the commander’s initial guidance.

FM 5-0 states that commanders are the “most important participant in the MDMP” and are much more than “simple decision-makers in this process.” They “use their experience, knowledge and judgment to guide staff planning efforts.”10 Although the commander’s initial proposed problem statement may be incomplete or portions of it incorrect, it provides guidance to a staff that allows it to conduct mission analysis within a greater context of the situation as currently known. In a manner, the commander’s initial proposed problem statement is a direct part of mission command that enables him to take a more active and earlier role in driving the operations process.11 In general, the effort shows the staff that the commander has dedicated time to “identifying the right problem to solve.” This will lead to greater dialogue between the staff and commander as they move into mission analysis.12 Essential commander task Given the logic of placing frame the problem and issue initial proposed problem statement in receipt of mission, the 12th task of mission analysis is better suited to refine the problem statement. Placing the problem-statement task in its current location may have intended to direct the commander and staff to conduct a full mission analysis before drafting a problem statement. However, the commander and staff need to have already addressed, reviewed and refined the problem statement much earlier than just prior to moving into the next step of COA development. A commander cannot give an adequate initial commander’s intent and planning guidance if he or she has not framed the problem and analyzed the proposed problem statement well before the mission-analysis brief.

In all, this article’s intent is to propose that frame the problem and issue an initial proposed problem statement are essential commander tasks in the operations process for implementation prior to mission analysis. These tasks are not just elements of design that occur only when facing a complex, ill-structured problem. As a recent article in Military Review stated, “Once one moves from an abstract, theoretical problem (such as ‘seize an airfield’) to a real-world version of the same problem (‘seize this airfield in this real location to create these conditions’), complexity immediately rears its head.”13 Frame the problem and issue an initial proposed problem statement apply to every problem set. What may at first glance seem to be a medium-structured problem, or even a well-structured one, could be quite complicated and complex once one considers and analyzes the varying factors. As stated earlier, even clearly complex and ill-structured problems warrant an effort by the commander to frame the problem and draft an initial proposed problem statement. Otherwise, November-December 2011 13 without that type of analysis, how can he or she make a decision to initiate design?

In conclusion, the amount of work required by a commander to frame the problem and write an initial proposed problem statement in many cases may be minimal. Yet that effort provides a means for a commander to influence, guide and direct a staff early in the MDMP through a display of his or her understanding of the situation and a presentation of information gaps that need to be filled. If commanders are truly the most important participant in the MDMP, the inclusion of frame the problem and issue an initial proposed problem statement within the MDMP’s first step provides a doctrinal impetus for the execution of mission command.

LTC Doug Baker Jr. is an instructor with the Department of Army Tactics, CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He served multiple tours in Iraq as a Stryker battalion S-3 and executive officer and, most recently, as a centralized-selection-list security-force assistance adviser. He is recipient of three Bronze Stars and an Army Commendation Medal for valor. His military schooling includes Airborne School, the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Ranger School, Jumpmaster School, Combined Arms and Services Staff School and CGSC. He received a bachelor’s of science degree in international and strategic studies from the U.S. Military Academy and a master’s of arts in military history from Louisiana State University.

Retired LTC Kevin Brown is an assistant professor with the Department of Army Tactics, CGSC. During his military career, he served with 1st Armored Division, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. He also served as an assistant professor of military science at the University of Texas at Arlington and as an instructor at CAS3. His military schooling includes CGSC, CAS3, Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Airborne School, Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle Course and Air Assault School. He received a bachelor’s of science degree in marketing from the University of South Alabama and a master’s of science in adult and continuing education from Kansas State University. CAS3 – Combined Arms and Services Staff School CGSC – Command and General Staff College COA – course of action FM – field manual MDMP – military decision-making process METT-TC – mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available – time available, civilians PMESII-PT – political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment and time Acronym Quick-Scan Notes 1FM 5-0, The Operations Process, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 2010. Paragraph B-65.

2 FM 5-0, Change 1, The Operations Process, Washington, DC:

Government Printing Office, March 2011. Paragraph B-57. 3Ibid. Paragraph B-23.

4Ibid. Paragraph 3-52.

5FM 3-0, Change 1, Operations, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 2011. Paragraph 5-15. 6FM 3-90, Tactics, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 2001. Paragraph 1-15.

7FM 5-0, Change 1. Paragraph 1-43.

8Ibid. Paragraph G-7.

9Ibid. Paragraph 1-37.

10Ibid. Paragraph B-8.

11FM 3-0, Change 1. Paragraph 5-13. 12FM 5-0, Change 1. Paragraph B-58. 13Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., et al, “Integrated Planning: The Operations Process, Design and the Military Decision-Making Process,” Military Review 91 (January-February 2011). Page 29.