The Role of the HHC/HHT Commander in the Counterinsurgency Fight

In the ever-evolving counterinsurgency (COIN) environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the biggest challenges faced by company/troop commanders remains resource management. Company-level commanders are overwhelmed with the immense size and complexity of their areas of operations, which are too large for their organic capabilities. This is exacerbated as these commanders are expected to conduct intelligence analysis using company intelligence support teams at a level consistent with a battalion S2 section. In addition, multiple enablers, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, are available but not resourced unless requested at the company/ troop level. Additional combat power or enablers for these commanders are not efficient answers as most commanders struggle to effectively use currently available assets. There are no two ways about it — current operations require more commanders on the battlefield who can conduct the levels of analysis and execution necessary for success. One option, which has been overlooked, is headquarters and headquarters company/troop-level (HHC/HHT) commanders. Both at the National Training Center (NTC) and in theater, battalion/squadron commanders have employed HHC/HHT commanders in various ways during COIN operations. This article provides several examples, conducts a simple analysis of the HHC/HHT commander’s effectiveness, and provides recommendations for improving the usefulness of an underutilized asset. The role of an HHC/HHT commander is unique as he has very few soldiers he directly controls, especially during combat operations. The HHC/HHT commander must work in concert with various staff sections of the organization to provide support and leadership. He is also responsible for developing junior officers, most notably, mortar and scout platoon leaders in the combined arms battalion, the support platoon leader in the cavalry squadron, and the executive officer. In a COIN environment, his role often becomes even more nebulous, with battalion/squadron operations usually being conducted from a forward operating base (FOB) while maintaining a nonlinear area of operations. Many of the normal support functions of the HHC/HHT, including Class I, maintenance, and managing the battalion trains, are negated due to contractor support on the FOB. This leaves the commander with available time to assume additional roles, as designated by the battalion/squadron commander. The four examples below depict how different commanders have used HHC/ HHT commanders and provides a basic analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each method. The HHC Commander as the FOB Mayor and OIC of Base Defense Operations One battalion at the National Training Center used its HHC commander as FOB mayor and base defense operations cell (BDOC) officer in charge (OIC). The HHC was given an area of operations that included the FOB and an area outside the defensive perimeter, which was approximately 3 kilometers in all directions. The commander oversaw all FOB contracts and was responsible for the security of the base, including the entry control point (ECP). The company commander developed a base defense standard operating procedure (SOP) and issued all orders pertaining to base defense and FOB standards. Security manning of the FOB ECP was provided by the maneuver companies by way of a battalion tasking, and personnel were rotated daily. The mortar platoon was provided as a maneuver element, but was also tasked with providing one ‘hot’ gun at all times, limiting its availability. The scout platoon was unavailable as it was tasked as the brigade aerial reaction force (ARF). All Raven unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) within the battalion were consolidated within the HHC to provide ISR capabilities in vicinity of the FOB. In addition, 46 a rapid aerostat initial deployment (RAID) camera was provided to observe historical and potential indirect fire point-of-origin sites. The HHC commander was effective as the FOB mayor with no contractual issues during the rotation. He developed a solid BDOC SOP, which included a plan for mass casualties. Operations at the FOB ECP were a challenge, as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) developed each day were not always carried on by the next group of soldiers on duty. Also, the mortar platoon was continually tasked for last-second missions, including resupply missions to the retrans site and battlefield circulation of the battalion command sergeant major. This prevented them from being available to conduct patrols in the HHC’s battlespace, thus providing enemy forces freedom of movement. The Raven UAVs were minimally used due to a lack of trained operators (only one operator available) and difficulties with planning and requesting restricted operating zones. Ultimately, base defense, in the form of increased indirect fire, suffered due to insufficient assets. In addition, the commander’s duties as FOB mayor and BDOC OIC prevented him from observing his mortar and scout platoon leaders during troop leading procedures, thereby missing multiple opportunities to develop junior leaders in his charge. The HHC Commander in a Base Defense-only Role A second battalion at the NTC tasked its HHC commander with only the responsibility of base defense. He had no responsibility for AOs outside the FOB, although his area of interest included the main supply route, which ran along the western edge of the base and served as a historical location for indirect fire. The battalion staff tasked the company with providing manpower for the FOB ECP. The mortar platoon was unavailable because it was tasked as the battalion commander’s personal security detachment; the scouts were unavailable because they were tasked as the brigade’s ARF. Ultimately, the commander was forced to task members of the battalion staff sections to provide FOB ECP security. Because the commander was not overtasked, he was able to observe his specialty platoon leaders, as well as take advantage of several opportunities to sit down and counsel them based on his observations. On the other hand, security at the FOB ECP was problematic. While the commander developed a solid plan for base defense, the security element at the ECP had no training prior to assuming its mission and struggled with several basic responsibilities such as guard mount. Often, shifts fell short of qualified soldiers to man crew-served weapons. On multiple occasions, local nationals approached the ECP requesting a tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) team (THT) provide intelligence on enemy force activities. Due to the inexperience of the soldiers and noncommissioned officers at the ECP, coordination through the BDOC to send the THT was slow, resulting in one potential source leaving the ECP without providing information. Functionality of the battalion staff sections was also noticeably degraded. The HHC Commander as the ISR Manager A third battalion at the NTC made its HHC commander the battalion ISR manager responsible for planning and tasking all ISR elements based on targeting orders produced by the battalion. While this commander attended all targeting working groups and briefs, he also conducted his own meetings, ultimately re-hashing the information already discussed at other meetings. While available ISR assets were used more effectively, this senior “The HHC/HHT commander must work in concert with various staff sections of the organization to provide support and leadership. He is also responsible for developing junior officers, most notably, mortar and scout platoon leaders in the combined arms battalion, the support platoon leader in the cavalry squadron, and the executive officer.” “The HHC was given an area of operations that included the FOB and an area outside the defensive perimeter, which was approximately 3 kilometers in all directions. The commander oversaw all FOB contracts and was responsible for the security of the base, including the entry control point (ECP).” 47 commander was unable to lead soldiers or develop mission orders. He also was unable to observe and mentor his subordinate platoon leaders due to other obligations. The HHC Commander as the FOB Mayor in a Counterinsurgency Mission This example uses the HHC/HHT commander as the FOB mayor in an actual counterinsurgency mission role. The 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, deployed to Diyala Province, Iraq, in November 2007. The squadron established operations on FOB Caldwell near the Iranian border, and was responsible for a very large operating environment (OE). The HHT commander was appointed as FOB mayor, responsible for planning and executing all support missions, and given responsibility for the battalion quick reaction force (QRF). Unlike the combined-arms battalion HHC, the HHT of a ground cavalry squadron in an armored cavalry regiment has a support platoon, but does not have a scout platoon or mortar platoon. Security for the FOB was provided by Iraqi army units, as well as contracted Ugandans, who manned the FOB ECP. To adequately fill the QRF, the commander took cooks and mechanics and spent countless hours training them for potential contingencies. On occasion, he led the QRF, which provided another commander on the battlefield. During the deployment, he also served as the S3 when field-grade officers took leave. The FOB mayor’s responsibilities were time-consuming for the first 4 months, but decreased over the length of the deployment. The HHT commander spent a great deal of time developing his executive officer and support platoon leaders, enabling them to execute with minimal supervision. The QRF developed slowly at first, but soon became a capable maneuver element. The result of these events was that the HHT commander had a great deal of time and was underused on a day-to-day basis later in the deployment. Ultimately, there is no ‘right’ way to use the HHC/HHT commander. A battalion/squadron commander must weigh the mission, his battalion’s strengths and weaknesses, resources available, and experiences of his HHC/HHT commander to determine where maximum effect can be achieved. However, regardless of the type of role in which the battalion commander elects to use his HHC/HHT commander, he must provide him with the proper tools to succeed. The battalion S3 must task subordinate elements to support, but avoid overburdening, specialty platoons organic to an HHC. ISR assets must be made available and then properly used to support the battalion’s targeting plan. In conclusion, the HHC/HHT commander may take on a whole host of roles; however, he is still responsible for training and developing junior officers in his company. Time must be set aside for this duty, as it cannot be delegated or overlooked. Captain Harvey C. Smith III is currently enrolled as a graduate student at George Mason University, seeking an M. S. degree in operations research. He received a B. S. and an M. B. A. from the University of Delaware. His military education includes Armor Captain Career Course, Cavalry Leader Course, and Air Defense Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include mechanized infantry company trainer, Scorpion Team, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA; troop commander, F Troop, 2d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Foot Hood, TX, and Diyala and Ninewah Provinces, Iraq; assistant S3 (regiment), 3d ACR, Fort Hood; S4 (regiment), 3d ACR, Fort Hood; executive officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO; and platoon leader, C Battery, 1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery, Fort Carson, CO, and Tikrit, Iraq. “To adequately fill the QRF, the commander took cooks and mechanics and spent countless hours training them for potential contingencies. On occasion, he led the QRF, which provided another commander on the battlefield. During the deployment, he also served as the S3 when field-grade officers took leave.” 48 than 200 years in the U. S. Army: “Sergeants operate where the action is, in direct control of men who get the job done. That is why they need that rawhide toughness they are famous for, and why they have human understanding.”5 There are critical components to mission accomplishment; however too much supervision can also be harmful. First consider this definition: “An Army leader is anyone who, by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.”6 Now, consider this definition: Supervising means “to watch over an activity or task being carried out by somebody and ensure that it is performed correctly.”7 The first portion of the definition includes motivation, inspiration, encouragement, and positive influence; however, the second portion could easily imply ‘micromanagement.’ Another and a very disturbing reason for the lack of mid- and lower-level leadership can be found in ‘officer-centric’ organizations. This might be due to a lack of leadership as opposed to a reason, but it is definitely something apparent in certain units. Many organizations exist where officers and NCOs work very well together to accomplish unit missions. The NCO Corps was established on the very idea that commissioned officers cannot keep a handle on everything; therefore, NCOs are key to the Army’s success as a whole. “Nothing happens in our Army unless a sergeant is involved.”8 Over the past 6 years, I have observed varying degrees of ‘officer-centric’ organizations, which vary in degree from single officers to entire formations being run by very busy officers. “Don’t bypass your noncommissioned officer to demonstrate how busy you are doing his job.”9 Formations that over-supervise NCOs tend to be very dysfunctional organizations in many areas. They arrived at this point either led by superiors, who may have been slighted or experienced a disservice by an NCO (thereby teaching his junior officers this type of leadership) or who felt the need to take a stronger stance due to perceived NCO failures. In either case, sooner or later, many will do it simply because ‘they can,’ sometimes becoming downright abusive. NCOs can also be abusive due to a lack of training or stress, but it is not as common; this is not anew concept, as some patterns occur in cycles throughout our Army. Lieutenant General John M. Schofield addressed the U. S. Corps of Cadets in 1879, “The discipline which makes the soldier of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than make an Army. It is possible to impart instruction and give commands in such a manner and in such atone of voice as to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey. The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he “Much has been written about the supposed demise of discipline in the latter stages of the Vietnam War. Cause of the deterioration has been placed largely at the feet of a permissive society. The feet do the walking — the head does the talking. Deterioration of discipline has one root cause — lack of leadership.” Echoes from the Past from Page 25 49 who feels, and hence manifests disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.”10 Following the Korean conflict General Bruce C. Clarke stated, “If you diminish an NCO in public, you’re cutting off your own legs.”11 In Army Digest in 1967, Sergeant Major John Stepanek sheds light on why an NCO might fail to provide his best in situations: “Remember one thing. Very few noncommissioned officers were awarded their stripes without showing somebody something, sometime, somewhere. If your platoon sergeant is mediocre, if he is slow to assume responsibility, if he shies away from you, maybe sometime not too long ago someone refused to trust him, someone failed to support his decisions, someone shot him down when he was right. Internal wounds heal slowly; internal scars fade more slowly.”12 Even Marshal Zhukov of the Soviet Union recognized the rifts between the officer and NCO Corps. In 1974, he said, “My many years in the Army have demonstrated that whenever confidence in NCOs is lacking and wherever they are continuously bossed by officers, you have no real NCOs and no really combat worthy units.”13 Are we at this point yet? Of course not; however, leaders must take action to fix what is broken in our formations to avoid dark periods such as post-Vietnam. That means NCOs must enforce and reinforce standards and discipline as set by officers, which means officers must include NCOs as part of the team and allow them to do their job. In Military Intelligence Magazine, Major General Julius Parker stated, “The success of the U. S. Army is directly related to the quality of the professional relationships between its officers and noncommissioned officers.”14 Throughout military history, specifically directly after the Spanish-American War, during the Pacification Campaign of Cuba, to relatively present times, there exists an undeniable pattern that reappears several years at the beginning of a war, at its completion, or within a few years of its completion. Here is how General Carl Vuono sees it: “Noncommissioned officers are the heart and soul of our force. They are the heart because they determine the pulse. …If you look at the history of our Army and you look at the peaks and valleys of the efficiency of our force, look at the status of the NCO Corps at that particular time.”15 In my opinion, we are in a draw, which leads down to one of the valleys that General Vuono spoke of in his collected works. In the following quote, General Creighton Abrams speaks on the improper use of the chain of command, which can be directly equated to over-supervision and lack of trust: “The Army’s readiness depends upon the effectiveness of its leaders and their ‘ready’ spirit. Our leaders function best when the chain of command is used properly. Thus, we must concentrate efforts on making it work; used properly, the chain of command is a lifeline; used improperly, it becomes a choker, snuffing out initiative; it will also throttle the Army’s effectiveness as a fighting force. To be fully ready, the Army must maintain a chain of command, which provides freedom for junior leaders, commissioned and noncommissioned, to make decisions, lead their units, and care for their men in their own way, consistent with professional standards. They must be granted a chance to operate without a senior looking over their shoulders, making decisions for them or second guessing them. …It has been my observation that senior commanders are often surprised at how well their juniors operate when given appropriate freedom. When it frees junior leaders, the chain of command multiplies and enriches their effectiveness. Our readiness to fight depends on the professional ability, experience, and self-confidence of all of our leaders, but especially our junior commissioned and noncommissioned leader, and the strong and responsive bonds of support and encouragement in the chain of command.”16 This passage was written toward the end of the Vietnam War, proving that micromanagement was a fact of life even then, which creates a basic mistrust and undue friction. In 1921, Major B. G. Chynoweth stated, “During World War I, we lost our old noncommissioned officer group. They have become officers or they are gone. Did we appreciate them fully? We must surely do so now. It was they who helped make our tasks so easy before the war. It is their absence that so complicates matters now. …Now is the time to commence the building of the noncommissioned officers for the next war.”17 This statement was made between World War I and II. We currently have much of our NCO Corps intact, but are bleeding them daily. We have some course corrections to make before we lose the old generation of NCOs and the new one takes over. In 1954, at the end of the Korean War, U. S. Army Regulation (AR) 615-15, Enlisted Personnel, published this quote: “The position of respect and leadership accorded the noncommissioned officer in the chain of command depends directly on the degree of authority that he is allowed to exercise.”18 Senior NCOs are responsible for ensuring junior soldiers are held accountable for their mistakes so that we may continue forging that po- “The lack of pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections (PCCs/PCIs) is another frequent problem among units. This can be a single point of failure for an organization and can lead to serious predicaments such as running out of fuel before the mission is complete or running out of ammunition in the middle of a firefight. As leaders, we have all seen deployed units become complacent in conducting PCCs/PCIs; however, to reinforce productivity, leaders should spot check these things from time to time to reinforce the notion of ‘honest broker.’ ” U. S. Army Sergeant Drudge inspects his troop’s dog tags, weapons, and equipment during a precombat check, Kirkuk, Iraq. 50 sition of respect and leadership, which will be continued far into the future, no matter when we leave this old organization. After World War II, the Infantry Journal had this to share: “Putting stripes on a man’s sleeve doesn’tin itself make him a leader with assurance. The promoted private may have given signs of having the stuff a NONCOM needs. But you, as the leader from whom he has received his authority, are still the man he must look to for his backing and specific instances of the way to lead men. And some company or platoon commanders never seem to learn their own faults of leadership are usually reflected in those of their assistants, though many NONCOMs do rise above ineffectual or uncertain leadership. …Anew NONCOM needs some words of encouragement and advice from you — and he should not have to seek them. As his leader, it’s your job to keep an extra close eye on him for awhile after he is made — and more for the purpose of finding things to explain and praise than to blame. …The way to help him most is by praise within the hearing of his men. …Nothing helps an uncertain leader more than a clearly spoken expression of appreciation.”19 If a leader encourages junior leaders and instructs them, disciplines in private, and praises in public, he can shape a diamond in the rough into a jewel to be admired and emulated by the enlisted men following him. If not, the following quote may ring true within the halls of your organization: “The normal desire of the veteran who has won his stripes by hard service is to support his officers and reduce the friction down below. Whatever is done to lessen his dignity and prestige, damages morale and creates new stresses in the relations between the officer corps and the ranks, and the military machine loses its cushion and becomes subject to increasing shock.”20 So whether it be by micromanagement, stifling initiative, laziness by not enforcing standards, not affording NCOs appropriate degrees of authority and responsibility, not training junior leaders how to lead, not giving NCOs proper resources, or simply not forcing junior NCOs to do the right thing, it all boils down to a lack of leadership on the leader’s part. This problem is nothing new; it has weathered decades of peaks and valleys for more than 235 years. Our NCO Corps is not functioning properly in some areas and many others are at risk; our junior NCOs need guidance and training. They deserve nothing less than what we had as we grew up in the Army. By putting in place a dynamic NCOPD program, paying attention to detail, or simply holding these young soldiers accountable, we can quickly overcome our shortfalls. It will take commitment from our senior NCOs and officers: Lieutenant General Paul E. Funk is quoted as saying, “More than any other group, NCOs ‘made me,’ and I’ll never forget that.”21 Let it always be so; let us heed these “echoes from the past” before the problem gets so out of control that we have to spend years to fix it. “Take a look at your unit and assess its leadership. Are you moving into a valley, sitting in the draw, or on top of the peak? What will you do to start the climb to the high ground to ensure the professional and quality leadership of the NCO Corps that has given us, the United States Army, the ability to make it happen?”22 Notes 1Sergeant First Class Paul E. Thompson Jr., “Light/Heavy Integration at the Joint Readiness Training Center,” ARMOR, July-August 1998, p. 12. 2Command Sergeant Major Kenneth O. Preston, “Uniform Discipline: A Good Indicator of a Unit’s Deeper Problems?” ARMOR, July-August 2000, p. 57. 3Headquarters, Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-2, The Armed Forces Officer, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, DC, 1 February 1988, para 15-6a. 4Major Herald F. Stout, “The NCO Meets His Junior Officer,” The Officer/NCO Relationship: Words of Wisdom and Tips for Success from Senior Officers and NCOs, The Information Management Support Center, Pentagon, Washington, DC, 12 September 1997, p. 2. 5Major General Aubrey S. Newman, “Follow Me,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 1. 6Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership, GPO, Washington, DC, 12 October 2006. 7Encarta Dictionary, English, North America. 8General Crosbie E. Saint and CSM George

L. Horvath, “Sergeants Time Paces Readiness in USAREUR,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 27. 9General Bruce C. Clarke, “Clarke of St. Vith,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 24. 10Lieutenant General John M. Schofield, Address to the United States Corps of Cadets, 1879, “Manual for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates of Infantry in the Army of the United States,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 36. 11General Bruce C. Clarke, “Clarke of St. Vith,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 36. 12Sergeant Major John G. Stepanek, “As a Senior NCO Sees It,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 3. 13Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov, “Reminiscences and Reflections,” The Officer/ NCO Relationship,” p. 24. 14Major General Julius Parker, “Vantage Point,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 39. 15General Carl E. Vuono, “Collected Works,” The Officer/ NCO Relationship, p. 26. 16General Creighton W. Abrams, “Readiness: To Fight A War, To Keep The Peace,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 28. 17Major B. G. Chynoweth, “The Enlisted Apprentice,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 28. 18U. S. Army Regulation (AR) 615-15, Enlisted Personnel, GPO, Washington, DC, 1954, is quoted by General Matthew

B. Ridgway in The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 28. 19“The Noncom,” Infantry Journal, September 1945, is quoted in The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 29. 20Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, “The Armed Forces Officer,” The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 36. 21Lieutenant General Paul E. Funk, Letter, dated 8 September 1997, The Officer/NCO Relationship, p. 38. 22Colonel Michael F. Pappal, senior brigade observer controller-trainer, Joint Multinational Readiness Center. Command Sergeant Major Paul E. Thompson Jr. is currently serving as the command sergeant major (CSM), Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Mustang Team, Hohenfels, Germany. He received a B. S. from Excelsior College and his military education includes the U. S. Army Sergeants Major Academy. He has served in various leader and staff positions, to include interim CSM, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX; CSM, 6th Squadron, 9th U. S. Cavalry, Fort Hood; operations sergeant major, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor, Schweinfurt, Germany; and first sergeant, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 63d Armor, Vilseck, Germany. “Following the Korean conflict General Bruce C. Clarke stated, ‘If you diminish an NCO in public, you’re cutting off your own legs.’ In Army Digest in 1967, Sergeant Major John Stepanek sheds light on why an NCO might fail to provide his best in situations, ‘Remember one thing. Very few noncommissioned officers were awarded their stripes without showing somebody something, sometime, somewhere.’ ” 51