Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: Volume VI, Supplemental of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi

Part 10 No expense should be spared when orienting our soldiers to a combat area of operations. In the case of Iraq, a critical part of our effort is to get inside the cultural context of both Iraqi partners, as well as adversaries. Only by putting aside our prejudices, suspending disbelief, and examining Iraqi history and culture from the inside, including the pervasive influence of Islam, can we begin to empower soldiers — Iraqi and American alike — in their efforts to stabilize the country and erode the appeal of militant Islamists. One way to accomplish this is to become familiar with what Iraqis know about their own history, as well as the writings of Iraqi scholars, who have influenced that knowledge. Although histories of Iraq, written in English by well-respected American authors are insightful, historical narratives in Arabic reflect the most authentically Iraqi perspective. Fortunately, through the linguistic and literary talents of Commander Aboul-Enein, we now have access, in English, to historical narratives written by Dr. Ali al-Wardi. Commander Aboul-Enein, besides being a regular guest lecturer in my graduate and undergraduate Middle East courses at National Defense Intelligence College, brings rare expertise that has helped us shape the understanding of anew generation of America’s defense intelligence professionals. Foreword Departure of Mehmed VI, the last Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, 1922.

Iraq’s Social, Political, and Military History: of the Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali al-Wardi Dr. Ali al-Wardi is widely read by Iraq’s intelligentsia and his works can be found not only on the book shelves of academics, but in Iraqi government offices, as well as in prison libraries. We cannot afford for American units to deploy to Iraq without being exposed to his ideas. Commander Aboul-Enein and ARMOR have provided a great service by highlighting Wardi’s work in this series of review essays. The current essay focuses on Wardi’s treatment of the delicate stage of Iraq’s founding — an unwieldy unitary state created to serve imperial British interests and composed of three distinct former Ottoman administrative districts. Readers will discover interesting historical details that shed light on current problems such as a 1922 fatwa (religious edict) endorsed by Iraq’s Sunni and Shiite clerics to address the threat from Wahabi renegades attacking southern Iraq. It is an example of Iraq’s Shiites and Sunnis agreeing that the Wahabis were not acting out of religious conviction, but simply using evangelism as an excuse to loot, pillage, and murder. Perhaps it is a template for Iraqi cooperation in dealing with today’s Islamic extremists. It is my hope that this series will be used to educate units deploying to Iraq, and more importantly, stimulate discussion among our soldiers. I also see the series as a valuable resource for my students at the National Defense Intelligence College and look forward to the fresh insights these articles will stimulate. Colonel John A. Wahlquist, USAF (Retired) Faculty Member, Middle East and Islamic Studies, National Defense Intelligence College The 1920 Revolt was the first nationalist movement inspired by Iraqis and unified many disparate elements toward the concept of an independent Iraq. British officials came to the realization that they could no longer ignore public sentiment and at least shape events toward transitioning Iraqi independence. This essay of the ARMOR series discusses the sixth volume of Ali al-Wardi’s seminal, “Social Aspects of Iraqi Modern History.” It is important to study this work as it delves into the mechanics and intricacies of creating modern Iraq in 1922 and its path to complete independence 10 years later. Aside from Arabic sources, Wardi spent part of 1973 reviewing original documents at the British Archives in London, which relies on the two volumes published in 1961 from the correspondence of Ms. Gertrude Bell. Wardi, as a sociology professor, used students at the University of Baghdad, who were pursuing Masters-level and Doctoral degrees in sociology and history, to supplement the research of his sixth volume. The author obtains diaries from Arab, Ottoman, and British officials, local newspapers of the period, and finally oral histories to capture the events of Iraq’s independence through the lens of tribal elders. The current high commissioner, A. T. Wilson, left in September 1920, and Sir Percy Cox arrived in Basra within the week. Cox was met by Said (an honorific title connoting descent from Prophet Muhammad) Sheikh Taleb Naqib and Sheikh Khazzal, both major leaders in southern Iraq. Sheikh Taleb was a prominent figure who played off the Wahabis, Hashemites, Ottomans, and the British in a single-minded quest to increase and maintain his power. He was among those vying for kingship of Iraq, and led a movement called “Iraq for Iraqis,” attempting to thwart British designs to install Hashemite rule in Iraq. Volume six describes Ta-leb’s final act in Iraqi politics before disappearing into obscurity. Sir Percy Cox and the Creation of the Iraqi Mandate Wardi discusses the dynamism of Cox’s tenure. Landing in Basra, he spent a few days in southern Iraq, traveling by plane to Nasiriyah, Amarah, Kurna and Qal’aa Saleh, making himself available to consult with tribal elders, religious notables, and officials. He took a riverboat, and then a train, from Basra to Baghdad, arriving in mid-October 1920 to a reception of Baghdad’s notables and General Haldane, commander-in-chief of British forces in Iraq. The reception included a military salute and playing “God Save the King.” These ceremonies were designed to showcase the military might and government control of England, while simultaneously drawing closer those Iraqi revolutionaries who wanted a smooth transition toward independence and divorcing them from reactionaries who wanted a violent overthrow of the British mandate. Cox immediately got to business, assigning Ms. Gertrude Bell as his oriental secretary, and entering into discussions on the prospects of establishing a provisional government. Sir Percy Cox Gertrude Bell 27

In London and Baghdad, there developed an anti-Cox coalition, which sought to undermine his plans for gradual independence of Iraq. This group believed in the theories of social Darwinism, the white man’s burden, and the civ-ilizing mission of England toward her subject peoples. This faction argued that it would take generations to expunge tribalism from Iraqi society. In 1923, Thomas Lyell published, “The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia,” whose central thesis insisted that Iraqis, specifically, and Muslims, in general, were incapable of self-rule. Lyell argued that the Islamic faith was not progressive and it would wreck any attempt at instilling national loyalty impulses. When reading this, think of regrettable statements made in the 21st century by so-called experts in the United States and Middle East who believe that Iraq can only be ruled by dictatorship and that Iraqis are incapable of democratic rule. This anti-Cox faction within the British bureaucracy and military was outraged at the pardon of political agitators, such as Yousef al-Suwaidi, and the Cox policy of reducing taxation in Iraq. Cox pressed ahead with plans to form a temporary council of ministers and there was discussion of Sheikh Taleb as provisional prime minister. Among Baghdad’s most premier families, they settled on Abdel-Rahman al-Gaylani as prime minister. The temporary ministry included Jafar al-Askari as defense minister; Sheikh Taleb as interior minister; Sassoon Hasqiel as finance minister; Mustafa Aloussi as minister of religious affairs; and Hassan Babji as justice minister. This provisional ministry lasted from October 1920 to January 1921; they created eight functional ministries, and 14 posts of ministers without portfolio, who provided major Baghdad families and tribal elders with a voice in the central government. The ministers met twice a week at the home of Sheikh Taleb, who played a major role in the formation of this temporary government and assigned a British aide or advisor to each minister. The integration of Shiites into the temporary council of ministers was a challenge for Cox. This was due to anti-Shiite sentiment among Sunnis, as well as Shiite clergy dissuading Shiites from participating in the government, in any form, by decreeing that anyone who joined this government would be collaborating with nonbelievers. After much negotiation, Cox and Sheikh Taleb brought Bahr al-Uloom Tabatai in as the minister of education and health. The Kurds were represented by Ezzat Kirkukli as the minister of labor and transport. Creation of Iraqi Institutions Hashemite Prince Feisal Ibn Hussein of the Arab Revolt began a political campaign, lobbying to be named King of Iraq. He ran the newspaper al-Istiqlal (The Independence) and many of his Iraqi officers began returning to Iraq from Syria. Among those close to Prince Feisal was Provisional Defense Minister Jafar al-Askari. Between 1920 and 1921, 111 Iraqis in Syria were demobilized from the Ottoman army and returned to Iraq. Among the first appropriations of the temporary government were 75,000 silver rupees to repatriate Iraqis and their families. Cox invited many of the senior officers, such as Nuri Said, to lunch as a means of reintegrating them into Iraq’s emerging political and bureaucratic structures. Iraqis in Turkey began to return, including students, merchants, military officers, professionals, and bureaucrats. There began a slow transition from British and Indian bureaucrats to Iraqis and, on January 1921, the Iraqi army command was established with ten officers. This bureaucracy absorbed thousands of Iraqis as battalions of inspectors and logisticians formed. Cox, Lieutenant Colonel Jafar al-Askari, Lieutenant Colonel Nuri Said, and Sheikh Taleb oversaw the process of reinte-grating Iraqis into the civil service, bureaucracy, and emerging government. Shiite reluctance to collaborate with the British meant the army became overwhelmingly Sunni. The view of Grand Ayatollah Meh di Khalsi was that an oppressive Muslim was better than a just infidel. During this period, pro-independent Grand Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi died in August 1920, and was replaced as leader of the Shiites in Iraq by Grand Ayatollah Fathallah Isfah-ani. Isfahani died 5 months later, passing the mantle to Grand Ayatollah Shirazi, who was avidly anti-British and wanted an immediate break with England. The new Grand Ayatollah refused to meet with Cox, much like Grand Ayatollah Sistani refusing to meet face to face with Ambassador Paul Bremer, and worked through intermediaries to communicate with American officials. Of note, Grand Ayatollah Khalsi, the leading Shiite cleric during Iraq’s formation as a nation-state, was an Iraqi who accepted Persian citizenship to avoid Ottoman military conscription. This nuance is significant in the struggle for leadership within the Najaf hawza (clerical hierarchy). Today, Muqtada al-Sadr is playing on his urubah (Arabness) in speeches to distinguish himself from Grand Ayatollah Sistani, who is Persian, but spent his life in Iraq. The British Recruit a King: Prince Feisal and the Creation of an Iraqi Monarchy After Cox completed the formation of a temporary ministry, he strove to undertake the difficult job of lo- “In August 1920, British foreign minister, Lord Curzon, began making overtures to the French government, eliciting their views on the British making Feisal king of Iraq. The French had an extremely low opinion of Feisal; however, the British argued that a cadre of Iraqi leaders had expressed their desire for Feisal, and at the end, London could redeploy 70,000 troops currently used to keep the peace in Iraq.” “Prince Feisal’s father, who was the king of the Hejaz and Sherief of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali, demanded Feisal refuse the throne of Iraq in favor of his other brother, Prince Abdullah, who was camped in Amman, Jordan. The father wrote Feisal that his acceptance of Iraq would be construed as selfishness on his part and overt collusion with the British.” 28 cating an appropriate king for Iraq. The candidate would have to be acceptable to both the Iraqis and his superiors in London. Jafar al-Askari, who was a member of Prince Feisal’s entourage, worked diligently to lobby for Feisal to be named king of Iraq; he was aided in his effort by Nuri al-Said and Gertrude Bell, Cox’s oriental secretary. Wardi notes from his archival research read that A. T. Wilson, Cox’s predecessor, was the first to propose Prince Feisal as king of Iraq in a cable to London. Wilson argued this would be a decent consolation after Feisal had been forcibly removed as king of Syria by French Forces in 1920. In August 1920, British foreign minister, Lord Curzon, began making overtures to the French government, eliciting their views on the British making Feisal king of Iraq. The French had an extremely low opinion of Feisal; however, the British argued that a cadre of Iraqi leaders had expressed their desire for Feisal, and at the end, London could redeploy 70,000 troops currently used to keep the peace in Iraq. In November 1920, Lord Curzon wrote to Feisal, who was exiled from Syria to Northern Italy after his defeat at the Battle of Maysalun, and invited him to come to London for talks. Wardi recounts the meeting between Curzon and Feisal; the British foreign minister greeted Feisal and asked why he was not wearing his traditional Arab robes and headdress. Feisal responded that “they (the French) stripped me of my country (Syria), and I have stripped myself of these robes.” Curzon responded, “You will don better Arab robes than the ones lost.” Feisal understood the offer immediately; with his dethronement as king of Syria, he would become king of Iraq. By the end of the month, Curzon dispatched Major Kinahan Cornwallis as Feisal’s personal aide. His mission was to not only advise Feisal, but ensure that he accepted the concept of gradual independence for the Iraqi mandate, dissuade him from conducting any raids or retribution against French forces in Syria, and finally ensure the perception that he was not a pawn in British hands. In addition to French pressures against Feisal, the prince’sown family added its own pressures. Prince Feisal’s father, who was the king of the Hejaz and Sherief of Mecca, Hussein Ibn Ali, demanded Feisal refuse the throne of Iraq in favor of his other brother, Prince Abdullah, who was camped in Amman, Jordan. The father wrote Feisal that his acceptance of Iraq would be construed as selfishness on his part and overt collusion with the British. Major Cornwallis kept Lord Curzon informed of the father’s correspondence to Prince Feisal and proposed that either Sir Cox hold an informal plebiscite to give voice to Iraqi desires for Feisal or Prince Abdullah depart Amman and assume the throne of Iraq. He recommended the second course of action, saying that organizing a plebiscite would be difficult in the short-run, but acknowledged that Feisal assuming the throne of Iraq would be in Britain’s long-term interests. Feisal, however, refused to assume the throne of Iraq, unless his brother Abdullah publicly surrendered his claims to Iraq to him. Winston Churchill, the 1921 Cairo Conference, and the Objection of Prince Abdullah Winston Churchill became British colonial secretary in February 1921. The Middle East portfolio became his to solve and his first act was to create a Middle East bureau and bring in T. E. Lawrence to advise him. Churchill expressed his wish for a conference to be convened in Cairo that year to solve the remaining problems of World War I, which was the Middle East, in general, and Iraq, specifically. The Cairo Conference convened in March 1921; delegates from Iraq included Cox, Gertrude Bell, General Haldane, Jafar al-Askari, and Sassoon Hasqiel. Churchill and T. E. Lawrence attended and it was agreed that Prince Feisal would make the optimal monarch for Iraq, which was acceptable to most Iraqis and the British. T. E. Lawrence, according to Wardi’s book, proposed that the British Royal Air Force be the main arm used to subdue tribes and bring order, allowing British expeditionary troops to depart. Soon after the Cairo Conference, Churchill and Lawrence met Prince Abdullah and he was told of the decision to make his brother king of Iraq. The prince, encamped in Amman of present-day Jordan, took the news badly. It took weeks of negotiations, and the British used the carrot-and-stick approach with Abdullah. First, they cleaved the territory in mandated Palestine, known as Transjordan, and created a kingdom for Abdullah to rule. Palestine proper would remain a British mandate until their withdrawal in 1948. They also affirmed that if Abdullah were able to successfully bring about a revolt against the French in Syria, London would not stand in his way, should he name himself king of Transjordan and Syria. They also threatened that without British military help, Ibn Saud, in Central Arabia, could arrive in Mecca and evict his father, who was king of the Hejaz. Prince Abdullah relented to the demands of the British for his brother to become king of Iraq, although he never was warm to the idea. Said Taleb Agitates and Challenges Plans for Feisal to be Named King Said Taleb felt his political marginalization when he was not among the Iraqis invited to the Cairo Conference. He used the absence of Sir Percy Cox to agitate and stimulate his “Iraq for Iraqis’ movement.” Taleb traveled around Iraq, lobbying that he “Winston Churchill became British colonial secretary in February 1921. The Middle East portfolio became his to solve and his first act was to create a Middle East bureau and bring in T. E. Lawrence to advise him. Churchill expressed his wish for a conference to be convened in Cairo that year to solve the remaining problems of World War I, which was the Middle East, in general, and Iraq, specifically.” 29 be a candidate for king of Iraq, and promised, if selected, he would release political prisoners; newspapers denouncing Prince Feisal began appearing even before the return of the Iraqi delegation from Cairo. When Cox returned in April 1921, he found Iraq divided into the Sherifian faction (those wanting Prince Feisal or Abdullah as king) and the ‘Iraq for Iraqis’ faction under Said Taleb. Cox held off announcing the main decision of the Cairo Conference, the selection of Prince Feisal as king, and addressed issues resolved in Cairo, which included military compensation of Iraqis, internal security of Iraq, border control, and general amnesty for political prisoners. He used his predecessor’s (A. T. Wilson) informal plebiscite, conducted in 1919, and revealed a desire for Hashemite rule with the understanding that it would remove the British from Iraq, to argue that the imposition of Prince Feisal was the will of the Iraqi people. However, this did not please the Said Taleb faction. Said Taleb met with the British editor of the London Daily Telegraph on tour in Iraq and threatened that the imposition of Feisal would lead to tribal insurrection, and that he would take his complaints to Paris, Cairo, and Istanbul. Assassination threats began to circulate against Prince Feisal and British officials in Baghdad and Basra. The pressures in Baghdad and Basra did not subside until the British arrested Said Taleb and exiled him to Ceylon (modern day Sri Lanka) off the Indian coast, providing him a stipend of 2,500 rupees. He returned to Iraq in 1925, and died while seeking medical treatment in Munich in 1929. He is buried in Basra. The chief of the Muhammara tribal confederation, Sheikh Khazzal, was another challenger to Feisal and the British plans to make him king of Iraq. The British granted general amnesty to all Iraqi political prisoners held in Cairo, the Hejaz, and Palestine, orchestrating their return alongside Prince Feisal in a public display of him claiming the throne of Iraq. All the political prisoners and escaped revolutionaries, who were in exiled, boarded the Northbrook, a British destroyer bound for Basra. In that same week, Churchill announced the support of Feisal as heir-designate to Iraq in the British House of Commons. Feisal arrived in Iraq in June 1921 and spent several days visiting both Shiite and Sunni tribal and clerical leaders. Feisal Crowned King Feisal I of Iraq In late June 1921, Feisal received an endorsement from Grand Ayatollah Khalsi, and the British felt confident enough to hold a formal plebiscite in Iraq’s major cities, such as Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla, Karbala, and Diyala, garnering a 96-percent approval rating for Feisal as king. The 21st day of August was specifically chosen by Feisal as his coronation date. It corresponded to Eid al-Ghadir, a holy day in Shiism in which Prophet Muhammad allegedly designated Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, successor. This was calculated to remind the Shiites of Feisal’s descent from Ali, despite his clearly Sunni upbringing in Mecca and Constantinople. Feisal’s first order of business as king was the employment of as many Iraqis as possible into the bureaucracy; he opened schools and universities and formed anew council of ministers. Among his chief advisers, which was assigned by Cox, was the British oriental secretary, Gertrude Bell. Feisal also met Grand Ayatollah Khalsi halfway in appointing certain persons, such as the mayor of Samara, who was a Shiite. Perhaps fortuitously, a crisis stemming from central Arabia drew the Shiites closer to King Feisal, and offered a chance to unify both Shiites and Sunnis against a common threat. It also, however, altered the careful balance of British policy toward what would be the future states of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Spring 1922: Wahabi Incursions into Iraq In August 1921, King Feisal was installed by the British as king of Iraq. As a member of the Hashemite clan, a Sunni and descendant of Prophet Muhammad, he made overtures to the Iraqi Shiites. King Feisal had to balance his Sunni origins with governing a Shiite majority and his position was by no means secure; he imported many Arab Sunni military officers, who had served in the Ottoman army, to help him maintain order and government in Iraq. On 11 March 1922, the new Iraqi monarch faced his first real external threat when a large raiding party of Ikhwan (brethren), led by Faisal al-Dawish, left the territory of Ibn Saud and, under the pretext of bringing a purer form of Islam, destroyed 781 homes, stole 130 horses, and hauled off thousands of camels, sheep, and donkeys south of Nasiriyah. Reports that they had butchered people like “goats,” destroyed holy sites, and enslaved women and children arrived in Baghdad and Basra. The Ikhwan were a fanatical group whose mission was to spread the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab by force. Both Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud and his ancestor, Muhammad Ibn Saud, used the Ikhwan as shock troops in their efforts to create what eventually became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. King Feisal was angered by this assault; not only was it an affront to Iraq, but it reopened the ongoing rivalry between Ibn Saud and the Hashemites. It is important to realize that in 1924, Ibn Saud’s forces would evict King Feisal’s father, Sherief of Mecca Hussein Ibn Ali, then installed as king of the Hejaz (the region in which Mecca is located). From Ibn Saud’s view, the Brit- “The 21st day of August was specifically chosen by Feisal as his coronation date. It corresponded to Eid al-Ghadir, a holy day in Shiism in which Prophet Muhammad allegedly designated Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, successor. This was calculated to remind the Shiites of Feisal’s descent from Ali, despite his clearly Sunni upbringing in Mecca and Constantinople.” 30 ish had surrounded him with Hashemites (King Feisal’s brother Abdullah had been installed as king of Transjordan), yet Ibn Saud had to maintain his relations with the British. Sir Percy Cox managed this tangled web of intrigues as British high commissioner of Baghdad. The British Royal Air Force Responds The British Royal Air Force (RAF) dispatched a reconnaissance plane to gather intelligence on the size of the Ikhwan force, which was shot down as it made a low-level pass over the encampments south of the rail lines linking Nasiriyah and al-Samawah. British military leaders in Iraq responded to the shoot-down by sending four planes to strafe and bomb the Ikhwan encampments. One of those four planes was shot down and the RAF sent another wing of four planes to continue its air raid of the Wahabi Ikhwan. Although the strikes contained the Ikhwan, it did not deter them. King Feisal expressed his outrage when he learned that Sir Cox had attempted to stop the RAF raids; the Iraqi monarch expressed a desire for stronger measures to push the Ikhwan back into central Arabia. British Commissioner in Baghdad Balances Hashemites and Ibn Saud Sir Percy Cox balanced British relations with Ibn Saud. He feared being drawn into the dynastic squabbles between the Hashemites and Ibn Saud, and wanted to calm tensions by sending a letter to Ibn Saud, asking for an explanation for the raids by the Ikhwan. Cox received an answer from the sultan of Nejd (then Ibn Saud’s title before becoming sultan of Nejd and king of the Hejaz in 1925 and finally king of Saudi Arabia in 1932), saying that Faisal al-Dawish acted on his own and would be punished; no mention of reparations appeared in the letter, which only outraged Iraqi public opinion. Ibn Saud indicated that he had no issue with the RAF attacking this renegade group and more strenuous means should be taken to subdue Faisal al-Dawish. The street began spreading conspiracy theories that the British had engineered the entire incident and Shiite clergy attempted to gain popular support by seizing on Iraq’s outrage. King Feisal responded by sending a delegation made up of representatives from the defense, interior, and justice ministries to investigate the raid in late March. They filed a report at the end of the month with a damage assessment and determined that the Iraqi government was unresponsive, despite not only advanced warnings of the raid, but pleas from the citizens of Nasiriyah. This further outraged the Iraqi population as the report was published in several newspapers, including al-Istiqlal (the Independent) and al-Iraq. King Feisal used the report to remove five ministers from office. Sir Cox expressed outrage at not being consulted and discussed the loss of control over King Feisal with British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill. An Iraqi Sunni Fatwa Sanctioning War with the Militant Sunni Ikhwan In early April 1922, a meeting of Sunni leaders and clerics, led by Sheikh Abdul-Wahab (no relation to the founder of Wahabism, Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahab) and Ahmed Sheikh Daud, was held to decide several matters, which included determining if the Iraqi Sunnis had the right to bear arms against the Wahabis, fellow Sunni co-religionists; if so, was cooperation with Shiites in common defense acceptable; and if a coordinated Sunni-Shia effort was acceptable, who should represent the Sunnis at a meeting in Karbala to declare jihad against the Wahabi Ikhwan? The text of the unique fatwa, drafted as a result of the meeting, is found on page 145 of Wardi’s book and is a single paragraph long. It outlines the questions asked and then issues a positive ruling on two of the three questions posed. This enabled attending Sunnis to discuss who would comprise and represent their delegation. On the two questions, it was ruled that since the Wahabis used the excuse of evangelism to sow destruction on fellow Muslims and giving no quarter, pillaging, murdering, and attacking the honor of families by enslaving women and children, then they are Khawarij (a fringe group outside the faith) on which war must be waged. The term “Khawarij” (anglicized to Kharijites) has not only literal, but religious, historical significance. The Kharijites insisted on the right to revolt against any ruler who deviated from the example of the Prophet Muhammad. The Kharijites originated after Muhammad’s death and advocated for the succession of Ali before turning against him in 658 CE. From this essentially political position, the Kharijites developed a variety of theological and legal doctrines that further set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shiite Muslims. In modern times, Muslim scholars and governments referred to terrorist groups and brigands, who emphasized the practice of takfir (declaration of apostasy) to justify killing innocent people, as the “new Kharijites.” The text of the fatwa was published in newspapers — the author references al-Istiqlal, dated 6 April 1922 — and was signed by 12 Sunni clerics, including Sheikh Abdul-Wahab, Bahauddin al-Naqshabanbi, and Abdul-Malik al-Shawaf. The group settled on a delegation of four, under the leadership of Ahmed Sheikh Daud, to travel to Karbala and endorse the declaration of jihad against the Ikhwan before a representative of King Feisal and other attending sects such as the Shiite hawza (clerical hierarchy) of Najaf. “The Ikhwan were a fanatical group whose mission was to spread the teachings of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab by force. Both Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud and his ancestor, Muhammad Ibn Saud, used the Ikhwan as shock troops in their efforts to create what eventually became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. King Feisal was angered by this assault; not only was it an affront to Iraq, but it reopened the ongoing rivalry between Ibn Saud and the Hashemites.” 31

The Karbala Conference: A Meeting of Iraq’s Sunnis and Shiites The Karbala Conference convened on 9 April 1922, amidst 100,000 visitors to Karbala; more than 500 troops had to be dispatched to maintain crowd control. Sir Cox pressured King Feisal not to attend, a difficult choice, so the king, who endorsed these proceedings and saw this as an opportunity to unite Sunni and Shiite, sent his close advisor, Nuri Said. The Ulema (clergy) present, at what would be called the 10th of Shaaban Karbala Conference, witnessed both Iraqi Shiite and Sunni Ulema sanction war against the Sunni Wahabi Ikhwan, if reparations were not paid and those involved went unpunished by Ibn Saud. Cox and King Feisal disagreed over the Karbala Conference. The British commissioner not only had to balance British interests between Ibn Saud and the Hashemites, but Cox was concerned the findings of the Karbala Conference would be used to arm the tribes under the pretext of fighting the Ikhwan — the same arms that could easily be turned against the British in Iraq. Cox was well aware that among the participants of the Karbala Conference were leaders and clerics who incited and participated in the 1920 Revolt, which took weeks to suppress with hundreds of British troop casualties. Cox worked to let the steam out of the Karbala Conference and engineered a series of talks between representatives of Ibn Saud and King Feisal. The Muhammara Truce revived discussions over the borders between Ibn Saud’s Nejd and al-Hasa regions of central and eastern Arabia and Iraq. It eventually led to the late November 1922 Uqair Conference, which, in effect, took territory from the Saudis and gave it to Iraq, and then took territory from Kuwait and gave it to the Saudis. The modern borders between Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia began to take form, beginning with discussions by Sir Cox. End of the Wahabi Incursions Twenty-first century American military leaders can learn much from this undiscovered history. Wardi’s section on the Karbala Conference shows a precedent in which Iraqi Sunni and Shiites collaborated on opposing a militant Sunni presence represented by the Wahabi Ikhwan. It is an earlier version of the cooperation seen today with the Iraqi Sunnis of the Anbar Awakening, fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq. Had Sir Cox not intervened, and Iraqis had resorted to arms or extracted reparations from the Wahabi Ikhwan, the fatwa could have fused Iraqi Shiites and Sunnis into a common national effort that could have led to creating a true nation-state. However, without British help, it is doubtful the Iraqis could have defeated the forces of Ibn Saud. From 1926 to 1929, the Ikhwan became uncontrollable and Ibn Saud dispatched modern forces to defeat this fanatical Islamic Sunni sect, crushing them in the plain al-Sabila near al-Artawiyah. Faisal al-Dawish, the man who led the Ikhwan raid against Southern Iraq in 1922, and his forces were massacred by Ibn Saud in 1929. The descendants of those killed at al-Sabila masterminded the takeover of the 1979 Grand Mosque in Mecca; the leader, Juhayman al-Utaybah, grew up indoctrinated with stories of this massacre. King Feisal’s Credibility Erodes with British Insistence on the Iraqi Mandate King Feisal spent his entire tenure as king attempting to change the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to designate Iraq as an ally and not a country mandated by Great Britain. The problem of maintaining the mandate led to intertribal fighting between tribes who were pro-mandated, and those who wanted outright independence from Britain. This took its worse form in the Zhu Qar region of Iraq. From this lack of timetable toward independence, Iraq formed political parties, three of which had the eviction of the British as their main effort — they were the freedom, nationalist, and renaissance parties. Some ministers resigned, others were asked to resign, and Iraq’s early government was in chaos. When Kemal Ataturk defeated combined Greek, French, and British forces in 1922, consolidating what would be the Republic of Turkey, he stationed four divisions along the Iraqi border. Iraq’s Sunni clerics issued a fatwa prohibiting the fighting of co-religionists and declaring the British colonial infidels. Ataturk’s forces were posturing and dealing with consolidating their hold in the Kurdish regions of modern Turkey. The British insistence on maintaining the mandate led to the erosion of King Feisal’s authority and credibility; he lost the support of the Shiite clerical hierarchy in 1923. Feisal imposed a compulsory military draft that was unpopular, but also developed the first highways linking Iraq’s major cities and providing a means for the development of Iraq’soil infrastructure. In 1930, Wardi discusses how Feisal attempted to redefine Iraq’s status vis-à-vis the British, seeking a change to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty by incorporating an end date to the British Mandate. This caused instability, which led to the British granting independence for Iraq in 1932, but Britain retained its military bases, rights for military transit, and oil concessions. King Feisal died in 1933 while visiting Switzerland. This historical narrative by Dr. Wardi is important for America’s military planners as every negotiation with Iraqis is influenced by the events of the British mandate. Wardi’s books also contain helpful surprises, such as the cooperation of Iraq’s Shiites and Sunnis to push back a renegade violent Sunni group radiating from Arabia. This history can be applied to bolster the stature of Iraq’s Sunni militant groups that have turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq. It is vital that we educate America’s combat forces using direct Arabic materials, starting with the volumes of al-Wardi to gain a better perspective of Iraq’s human terrain. Author’s Note: I wish to thank Lieutenant Jeffrey Pastore, U. S. Navy Reserve, for his edits and valuable comments that enhanced this essay. “Wardi’s section on the Karbala Conference shows a precedent in which Iraqi Sunni and Shiites collaborated on opposing a militant Sunni presence represented by the Wahabi Ikhwan. It is an earlier version of the cooperation seen today with the Iraqi Sunnis of the Anbar Awakening, fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq.” “Wardi’s section on the Karbala Conference shows a precedent in which Iraqi Sunni and Shiites collaborated on opposing a militant Sunni presence represented by the Wahabi Ikhwan. It is an earlier version of the cooperation seen today with the Iraqi Sunnis of the Anbar Awakening, fighting al-Qaeda in Iraq.” 32

Dr. Ali al-Wardi, known as the father of Iraqi Sociology, devotes this final volume to a discussion on external characters, movements, and personalities that have shaped Iraq. Of his eight books, two full books comprise volume 5 on Iraq’s 1920 Nationalist Revolt, and two full books represent volume 6 on the establishment of Iraq’s monarchy and the contents of this review essay, events in what is now Saudi Arabia. This final review essay focuses on Wardi’s historical chapters on Abdul-Aziz Ibn Saud (referred to as Ibn Saud) of the Nejd (Central Arabia), and his archrival Ali ibn Hussein of Mecca and the Hejaz (Red Sea Coastal Region of Arabia). Events, such as the rise of Ibn Saud and the fall of the Hashemites in Arabia, would have an impact not only in Iraq, which remained under Hashemite rule until 1958, but in the historical outlook of Jordan as well. The Jordanian is the only remaining Hashemite monarchy set up after World War I, with the current monarch, King Abdullah II. Studying this history from Wardi’s Arab perspective delivers you directly into the mind of the region. Our allies, as well as our adversaries in the Middle East, can use such recognition and appreciation of this vantage point in history to weave a mutual narrative. This will serve to cultivate a clear understanding of the human terrain of the region. The Development of Ibn Saud The chapter on Ibn Saud opens with his exile in the Empty Quarter of Arabia, under the protection of the Murrah tribe, and his exile later during childhood in Kuwait, under the protection of Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah, the emir. The Ibn Sauds lost their ancestral lands in central Arabia to the Ibn Rasheeds and their tribal confederation; this loss included the capture of Ibn Saud’s capital, Riyadh. Al-Sabah, who considered the Ibn Rasheeds his rival, cultivated the Ibn Sauds in a Machiavellian plan to throw the family back into central Arabia to keep the region unstable and thereby keep Kuwait free of central Arabian marauders. In late 1901, in a story told and retold by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud and thus part of Saudi Arabia’s collective history, Abdul-Aziz would lead 40 horsemen to recapture Riyadh and defeat his archrival, Ibn Rasheed. On 15 January 1902, Ibn Saud and 40 horsemen, aided by tribes bearing animosity toward Ibn Rasheed and motivated by the opportunity for plunder, took Riyadh. In 30 years, through conquest, tribal alliances, and religious fanaticism, Abdul-Aziz not only captured his ancestral homeland of Nejd, but also became the undisputed leader of Arabia, creating the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In Wardi’swords, Ibn Saud was successful because:  He learned and was a patient student of tribal politics; for example, he gladly accepted the mentorship of the sheikh of Kuwait, Mubarak al-Sabah.  He perceived tribal politics not simply as a vehicle to amass power, but as the art of the possible.  He learned much in the court of al-Sabah; sitting for countless hours with rosary in hand, he absorbed lessons on compromise, justice, providing for tribal elders, dividing the spoils, dispersing benefits, and arbitrating disputes.  He surrounded himself with advisors not only from Arabia’s different regions, but also from the wider Arab world.  He selected advisors based on what they could teach him, soliciting direct and candid opinions from those advisors, yet retaining the final decision; other Arab leaders, by contrast, routinely surrounded themselves with courtiers and supplicants. Ibn Saud was given advice based on the reality of his world; today, we call this the practice of “realpolitik.”  He spent much of his wealth for strategic advantage; court poets for Ibn Saud and his rival Hussein best explain this This is the eleventh and final essay in the al-Wardi series, which introduces U. S. military leaders to the writings and teachings of the father of Iraqi sociology, Dr. Ali al-Wardi. The first essay was published in ARMOR’s March-April 2009 edition; essays two through 11 were published in succession. In these essays, Dr. Wardi does an excellent job of introducing Iraq’s warriors, leaders, customs, traditions, and battles not regularly studied in western military schools. In previous articles, the landscape of Iraq’s history from before the 16th century was drawn with precision and detail. Of particular historical relevance were the wars between the Safavid Persia and the Ottoman Empire; the Ottoman Empire and Iraq’s Shiites and Sunni tribes; the Ottomans and the British Empires; and raids from central Arabia and into Iraq by the Wahabis that began in 1802 and ended in 1927. Iraqis have also watched from the sidelines as events in Syria, Arabia, and World War I significantly changed and influenced their lives directly. America’s military leaders are lifelong and consummate students of history, culture, and warfare; the art of cultivating empathy for areas of terrain in which the U. S. Army operates will make the difference in engaging insurgents and cultivating the population. Commander Aboul-Enein has brought to life an Arabic multivolume work of military significance to our forces deployed or deploying to Iraq. ARMOR is not just a professional journal, but also a forum for ideas, which presents us a clear opportunity to use essays, such as this one, as valuable teaching tools for our forces. I would like to close this series by extending my sincere gratitude to Commander Aboul-Enein for taking the time to put “pen to paper” and bring to life this important work, and to our readers both at home and overseas, “Forge the Thunderbolt and Strike First!” Christy Bourgeois, Editor in Chief, ARMOR Part 11 Volume VI, Supplemental: The Rise of Ibn Saud and Decline of Hashemites in Arabia: Final Review Essay in the ARMOR Series Foreword 33 strength, “as for Ibn Saud, money attracts men, for Hussein, money corrupts men.” This different outlook favored Ibn Saud in his world of tribal politics.  He possessed physical and moral charisma; he exuded a presence of a confident, powerful, and magnanimous Arab tribal chieftain.  He viewed politics as theater and was reputed to be a master actor, appearing weak before adversaries when he was strong, or befriending an adversary before turning on him. Wardi reports that Ibn Saud produced tears on command, such as reuniting with a friend who turned against him, or expressing tears of joy to see an old political ally.  Tribes believed he brought them luck, which is difficult to explain, but he cultivated a perception that a tribe becomes lucky if associated with him. Ibn Saud Transforms Bedouin Fighting Units: Cultivation of the Ikhwan (The Brotherhood) Ibn Saud’s army was composed of Bedouins, whose loyalty was exclusive to looting opportunities and spoils. Their military worth was not reliable and based largely on material gain. Ibn Saud initiated and led a revolution in tribal warfare for central Arabia. He understood that Arab leaders had increasingly cultivated regularly trained forces in addition to tribal levies. Ibn Saud studied the early Islamic period of Prophet Muhammad for inspiration. In Muhammad’s time, people were divided in two groups: al-Ahraab (wandering Bedouins) and al-Muhajiroon (émigrés whose commitment to Islam and Muhammad led them to settle in Medina with him). Using an interpretation of the Quran, al-Tauba, verse 98, Ibn Saud’s Wahabi clerics argued this verse meant those who wanted to be true practicing Muslims should abandon the custom of the wandering Bedouin and organize into settled enclaves, much like Muhammad did in Medina, known as “the act of hijrah” (Muhammad’s migration to Medina). This changed the personality of the Bedouin, settling them in an environment created by and steeped in Islam, which allowed them to abandon the old pre-Islamic tribal values and embrace Islamic values. Ibn Saud hoped to create a fixed core of settled Bedouins in central Arabia, allowing them to demonstrate their commitment to Ibn Saud by moving into these settlements, called “hejeiras” (settlements, but playing on the Arabic word for hijrah, giving it a religious symbolism). The first one created was in 1911 and called “Artawiyah,” between Kuwait and Qassim in Eastern Arabia. By 1921, Ibn Saud would have 122 settlements with more than 77,000 families settled. Each hejeira would have Wahabi morals police, al-Mutawain, which enforced morality and acted as agents for Ibn Saud. These settlements would receive subsidies from Ibn Saud to make them viable agricultural settlements. They called one another “Ikhwan” (the brotherhood) and were steeped in Wahabi ideology, a form of salafi (fundamentalist) Sunni Islam, which is considered among the most intolerant Islamist belief systems. Ibn Saud would draw a fanatical group of fighters, committed to propagating Wahabism, by force from these hejeiras. They would be the frontline shock troops and skirmishers for Ibn Saud’s tribal army, raised on Wahabi zeal, and believing Ibn Saud’s commitment to propagate Wahabism as the only form of Islamic expression in Arabia. Ibn Saud revived and reinterpreted the bargain his ancestors made in 1744 with the founder of Wahabism that created the first Saudi state, which lasted until

1818. Balancing strict Wahabi values with the reality of the Saudi state in the 20th and 21st centuries would be a major component for Saudi Arabia’s rulers to govern the country even to this day. Wardi writes that unlike Muhammad’s Medina, which had the rational and commonsense personality of the Prophet, these settlements wallowed in what Wardi calls “tataruf” (extremism); for example, condemning all Muslims not living among them as being outside the faith. They ran around with scissors cutting long robes as a show of excessive consumption and believed fighting to uphold Wahabism would mean a just reward in paradise. Inventing new Islamic doctrines such as giving your back to the enemy and fleeing battle is apostasy, a complete abandonment of one’s religion. In 1919, the Wahabi Ikhwan would exert its might in raids against Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, and the Hejaz; its reputation for savage brutality and giving no quarter would strike fear among the population centers of Arabia. Ibn Saud Assesses the Right Time to Strike the Hejaz Ibn Saud’s forces took Turbah and Khurmah in 1924, and a standoff ensued between the Hashemites of Mecca and himself. It was Hussein ibn Ali (leader of the Hashemites), sherief of Mecca, and king of the Hejaz (adding the title of caliph to his resume) that gave Ibn Saud the chance to pounce. Hussein’s decision to declare himself caliph of all Muslims alienated leaders in Egypt, angered the British, and alarmed leaders in Persia. The British dramatically reduced Ibn Saud’s subsidy, which further fueled his motivation to take the Hejaz. Ibn Saud gambled that the British reaction would be limited to verbal objections. He also sought to capitalize on the opportunity to increase the zeal of his warriors with the Hashemite’s banning Wahabis from making the pilgrimage to Mecca, a required pillar in Islam. Ibn Saud organized a primary attack force to invade the Hejaz along the Red Sea Coast and a diversionary force that would drive toward Jordan. Tribes approaching Jordan and urban dwellers began fleeing the city of Amman, fearing Wahabi massacres. The British organized a rapid reaction force of armored cars and planes, which responded to the Wahabis with concentrated strafing and bombing — leading to a massacre of the Wahabis, resulting in Ibn Saud’s forces with 500 dead and 600 captured. The Saudi leader was concerned that he may have underestimated the British and their reaction. It is estimated that 3,000 Wahabi forces were amassing in Turbah for an invasion of the city of Taif, held by Hussein. Tribal forces and the Ikhwan were not regular forces that could have been called back. Their leaders, Sultan ibn Bijad and Khalid ibn Luai, ordered the attack that ultimately led to a collapse “Ibn Saud’s army was composed of Bedouins, whose loyalty was exclusive to looting opportunities and spoils. Their military worth was not reliable and based largely on material gain. Ibn Saud initiated and led a revolution in tribal warfare for central Arabia. He understood that Arab leaders had increasingly cultivated regularly trained forces in addition to tribal levies.” 34 of Hashemite forces. They underestimated the power of the Ikhwan and waited for a British aerial strafing that never came, thinking they would expect the same treatment as in Jordan. Hussein and his son, Prince Ali, never comprehended the alienation they had received among British officials and that Jordan was strategically different than the Hejaz for British interests. The Ikhwan executed a brutal massacre in Taif, killing hundreds of those deemed not to be Wahabi. It is here that Hussein, after weeks of discussions, agreed to abdicate as king of the Hejaz to his son, Prince Ali, thinking this would placate Ibn Saud. King Ali ibn Hussein of the Hejaz would remain on his throne for only 15 months before succumbing to the momentum of the Ikhwan and Ibn Saud. Only a few weeks into his coronation, the holy city of Mecca fell to the Wahabis. Hussein, Ali, and the Hashemites beseeched the British for help. The British position was clear: noninterference in disputes over Islamic holy sites. The Wahabis entered Mecca, demolishing the tombs of Muhammad’s wife, Khadija, which was located atop her home. The Wa-habi’s iron rule included an immediate ban on smoking and visiting cemeteries and forced “five times daily” prayer. Those found lingering in the tombs of Prophet Muhammad’s companions were arrested, and in the case of Indian subjects, the British had to pay a fine for their release. Ibn Saud closely monitored British newspapers, and although these papers arrived late via steamboat, he noted that the British labor government had fallen to a conservative government. He was gauging the British attitude toward his continuance of conquering the Hejaz. He amassed his forces and decided to invade the seaport city of Jeddah, where King Ali ibn Hussein would make his last stand. However, unlike Mecca giving up easily, Jeddah would provide solid resistance against Ibn Saud. The Battle of Jeddah (1925) Wardi is not renowned for laying out tactical details of battles in his multivolume history of Iraq; however, his description of the Battle of Jeddah in 1925 is an exception. King Ali ibn Hussein had drawn up an entrenched defensive line, made possible by Ibn Saud’s hesitation to capitalize on the momentum of taking Taif and Mecca. Had he pressed onto Jeddah, he would have easily taken the city without resorting to a siege. Ibn Saud was concerned that his uncontrollable Ikhwan would perpetrate massacres in Jeddah, as in Taif, leading to international intervention as many of the world’s powers maintained legations in Jeddah. King Ali’s war minister was Tahseen Faqir Pasha, a man with combat experience in the Ottoman army, who was sent by King Abdullah to reinforce his brother, King Ali, in retaining Jeddah. King Ali’s forces built a defensive line based on Ali’s experiences in defending Istanbul during the Balkan wars of 1912 to

1913. An Ottoman military engineer of Turkish origin, Narwas Bey, aided him in his efforts. The line, as mentioned above, extended 6 miles, with 20 artillery pieces, reinforced with 30 heavy machine guns, and further reinforced by barbed wire, mines, and searchlights, as the Ikhwan attacked at night and predawn. The army of the Hashemites collected to meet Ibn Saud; they were a diverse group of 1,650 men from Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, to include criminals, street thugs, and even slaves, all to defend the line. Ibn Saud’s army was 6,000 deep, armed with captured artillery; in particular, the cannons captured at the Mecca arsenal that had a longer range than those fielded by the Hashemites in Jeddah. The battle began in January 1925, both sides exchanged artillery and the Ikhwan taunted tribes that allied with King Ali to defect and join Ibn, while firing artillery into trenches. Aside from the different soldiers imported from the Levant to fight Ibn Saud, several commanders undermined the Hashemite unity of effort. The commanders included Iraqi Jameel Rawi Pasha, Tah-seen Pasha, King Ali, and a Syrian general. From an armament perspective, King Ali’s forces should have easily defeated the Wahabis — he had planes and armored cars. However, of his six Italian planes, he had two functioning aircraft and a Russian pilot, who had to be coerced to return to Jeddah and fly. Although they had two planes, and now one pilot, along with four Russian mechanics, they lacked proper ordnance, so modified artillery shells were devised. The pilot refused the idea of throwing hand grenades and a young Syrian, who sneaked onboard, detonated a grenade that blew up one plane in the air, killing the Russian pilot. Having the plane crash near the tent of Ibn Saud bolstered his reputation for being extremely lucky. A disagreement over promised pay led to Ibn Saud’s war spoil claim of King Ali’s coveted possession of four German aircraft (to include the pilots), equipped with machine guns and proper ordnance. King Ali’s armored forces were antiquated and in a state of disrepair, ultimately leading to Ibn Saud’s victory on the battlefield. “The British dramatically reduced Ibn Saud’s subsidy, which further fueled his motivation to take the Hejaz. Ibn Saud gambled that the British reaction would be limited to verbal objections. He also sought to capitalize on the opportunity to increase the zeal of his warriors with the Hashemite’s banning Wahabis from making the pilgrimage to Mecca, a required pillar in Islam.” “The Ikhwan executed a brutal massacre in Taif, killing hundreds of those deemed not to be Wahabi. It is here that Hussein, after weeks of discussions, agreed to abdicate as king of the Hejaz to his son, Prince Ali, thinking this would placate Ibn Saud. King Ali ibn Hussein of the Hejaz would remain on his throne for only 15 months before succumbing to the momentum of the Ikhwan and Ibn Saud.” 35

Final Confrontation in the Battle of Jeddah: King Ali ibn Hussein Departs The largest confrontation in the Battle for Jeddah would occur on 14 March 1925; the Hashemites brought along-range cannon from Medina and sent four regiments of troops on a front extending 2 miles, reinforced by five armored cars to push the Wahabi lines. The Wahabi lines held as they fought tenaciously; however, it was revealed during this fight with the Saudis that King Ali’s forces retreated after 5 hours of fighting, making their way back to their own lines. In the holy month of Ramadan, Ibn Saud and King Ali agreed to a truce. While Ibn Saud’s Ikhwan were more disciplined, King Ali’s forces complained for lack of funds, support, and seemed to want more and more goods in exchange for loyalty. King Ali’s forces finally refused to obey orders after the king did not pay their regular salaries. Egyptians complaining about nonpayment were allowed to return to their country. No provisions were made for the civilian populous, which starved before the eyes of King Ali’s forces. This led Jeddah’s notable families to negotiate on behalf of the starving population, which began to drain their army’s resources. When it became impossible for King Ali to maintain control of Jeddah, the British consul in the city brokered a surrender and the Wahabis cut off access into Jeddah, except by sea. The British maintained their position of not interfering in the rivalry between King Ali and Ibn Saud. King Ali’s forces collapsed internally and Jeddah’s mercantile leaders wanted an end to the siege. On 22 December 1925, King Ali, through negotiations with the British consul, sailed away from Jeddah onboard four ships, which carried his entourage and personal belongings, to include Arabian stallions, his personal care, carpets, cash, and jewels. He agreed to leave Ibn Saud all weapons, planes, armored cars, rifles, and artillery. Of note, 21 of King Ali’s slaves were emancipated, turned over to the British consul and repatriated back to Africa. King Ali departed for Aden, then Bombay, and finally settled in Basra. Ibn Saud and his Wahabi Zealots Offend a Wider Muslim World Wardi discusses how Ibn Saud was now between the horns of a dilemma, balancing the management of the Islamic holy places and the interest regional powers, to include Egypt, British India, French North Africa, Iraq, Jordan, French Syria, the Persian Gulf states, and the wider Muslim world, had in his control of Mecca and Medina. Wahabis and the Ikhwan living in isolation in central Arabia was one point of contention, but was tolerable; however, now the Ikhwan would be exposed to various Islamic practices that greatly angered them, which quickly lead to an international crisis. One early reported incident involved a group of Afghans praying near and in the cave of Hira (where Muhammad received the first revelations) who were shot by the Ikhwan. Their imposition of Wahabism was angering regional powers. When Ibn Saud took over the Prophet’s city of Medina, they destroyed all tombs of the Prophet’s companions, Muhammad’s wives, Muhammad’s uncle Abbas, and Caliph Uthman’s tomb. Four Shiite Imams were also buried in Medina and their tombs were destroyed by the Wahabis, which led to objections from Iraq and Persia. In 1926, Ibn Saud moved against the Ikhwan when they began attacking and assaulting pilgrims such as the Egyptian consul, Dutch deputy consul (representing Muslims from their colony in Indonesia), and British Indian deputy consul. The Egyptian mahmal, carrying the annual cloth covering of the Kaaba (to Muslims a house of worship built by Prophet Abraham), was attacked and Egyptian troops, which staffed the guard contingent of this cloth, fired into the attacking Ikhwan, killing more than two dozen. This event led to a break in relations between Egypt and Ibn Saud, which lasted from 1926 to 1936. In 1928, Ikhwan raiders assaulted Iraq and British planes, strafing them once again; it would be the final year in which Ibn Saud’s fanatical Ikhwan attacked Iraq. Eventually, this fanatical group turned against Ibn Saud in 1929. In that year, Ibn Saud sent his forces to pacify the renegade Ikhwan, led by Faisal al-Dawish and the old warrior, Sultan ibn Bijad, who had led Ibn Saud to victory in the Hejaz. Both would be killed and victims’ families of the massacre at Sabila would grow up with stories of Ibn Saud’s betrayal to uphold and spread Wahabism. Some of these descendants would lead the 1979 takeover of the grand mosque in Mecca. Wardi’s final pages end with wars to contain Ibn Saud’s forces in Iraq, the Arab Gulf States, and Yemen. Khalid ibn Luai, the relative assaulted by Prince Abdullah ibn Hussein, who then joined Ibn Saud, became Ibn Saud’s governor of Mecca. However, Ibn Saud had become leader of most of the Arabian Peninsula and, in 1932, declared the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In less than 6 years, American engineers would discover the largest oil deposits in the known world, starting with Dammam Dome Number 7; Saudi Arabia would enter anew phase in its history and would now have the money to spread its distinct brand of Islamist beliefs. My primary objective of this multipart expose of the father of Iraqi Sociology, Dr. Ali al-Wardi, is to enhance the reader’s perspective of Iraq and its neighboring countries. We can all agree that the best books and writings on any subject leave the reader wanting more and I certainly hope this series has accomplished its goal. If interested in furthering your understanding of Iraq, Phebe Marr’s Modern History of Iraq, Westview Press, 2003, is a good start. After getting a general idea of Iraq’s history, read Patrick Cockburn’s excellent biography, Muqtada, Scribners, 2008, on the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sadrist movement he inherited from his father. There are a few excellent books on Shiism, most notably Vali Nasr’s very well written The Shia Revival, W. W. Norton, 2006. In addition, if you encounter variants of stories recounted in Wardi’s volumes while serving in the field, do not hesitate to contact ARMOR and join the debate by submitting your story. A good essay or book stimulates robust debate, which then enhances the overall learning experience for all who participate. Finally, these essays are part of my advocacy to have Arabic works of military significance highlighted and made available for debate, discussion, and teaching among our combat forces and America’s military leaders. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U. S. Navy Medical Service Corps Officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B. B. A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M. B. A. and M. A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M. S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U. S. Naval War College, the U. S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC. Author’s Note: I wish to thank Commander Scott Olivolo, Medical Service Corps, U. S. Navy, for his edits and comments that enhanced this essay. This work would not have been possible without the help of the John

T. Hughes Library in Washington DC and the Library of Congress Middle East Reading Room. 36