DRAGOONS IN IRAQ: COMBINED CENSUS OPERATIONS

, First Lieutenant Nicholas Rinaldi, and First Lieutenant Brian Murdock “Know your turf. Know the people, the topography, economy, history, religion and culture. Know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance. Your task is to become the world expert on your district… Develop a mental model of your area — a framework in which to fit every piece of knowledge you acquire.” — D. J. Kilcullen, Twenty-Eight Articles of Counterinsurgency In December 2008, D Troop, 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry (Dragoons), 3d Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, deployed to the city of Mosul in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. A tank company by configuration, we had the distinct advantage of well-versed, experienced noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who had returned from counterinsurgency operations in Samarra just 12 months prior to arriving in Mosul. Another benefit was learning several months prior to deployment that we would be operating in the west Mosul area of operations (AO), which allowed us to tailor our research and cultural awareness training to a very Mosul-specific program. We believed this training would be vital to our success in Mosul, which was largely regarded as the last stronghold of al-Qaeda in Iraq. On arrival in theater, the Dragoons received a first-class battle handover from elements of the 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment. Three Iraqi Security Force (ISF) battalions secured ten densely-populated neighborhoods in our assigned AO, which were focused exclusively along the major routes through a system of mutually supporting checkpoints. However, our company leaders realized almost immediately that the ISF battalions did not know their turf — there was no human intelligence (HUMINT) network whatsoever. Worse still, the ISF had not identified local leaders or economic centers of gravity in their assigned neighborhoods. The reasons for this dearth of information were twofold: the ISF was heavily indoctrinated in a checkpoint-centric mentality, which prevented adequate forces from getting to the neighborhoods; and many of the ISF battalions had just recently rotated into the Mosul AO from other parts of Iraq. Therefore, during trans fer of authority (TOA), the Dragoons determined that mission success over the course of the deployment would be directly tied not only to our own ability to rapidly understand the AO, but also enabling ISF understanding of that same AO. To meet this requirement, the company developed a plan to immediately conduct sample combined cordon, search, and census operations throughout the AO with its — 41

ISF brethren. A sample cordon, search, and census was designed to be completed during a scheduled 4-hour patrol and typically encompassed an objective area of 6 to 10 residences. The company intelligence synchronization team (COIST) worked with the ISF to develop an initial list of information requirements that each search team would gather from heads of household in the objective area. Our initial census forms included general information requirements such as numbers of occupants living at the residence, tribal affiliation, associated vehicles, and occupation of head of household. The cordon, search, and census operations quickly evolved into a more in-depth process. After the first few iterations, the COIST and ISF added additional detailed information requirements, to be completed by combined search teams, which included occupant e-mail addresses, cell phone numbers, hours of electricity per day, and local-leader affiliations. These first few cordon, search, and census missions allowed the Dragoons and ISF to rapidly gain a picture of the people within their AO, making it much easier to effectively spread information operation (IO) messages and develop nonlethal projects to help the community. Shortly after TOA, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) was implemented and unilateral targeting of insurgents by coalition forces became much more problematic. The Iraqi criminal courts implemented rule of law across the country, a necessary step in the growth of democracy in Iraq. Obtaining a warrant prior to detaining an insurgent became essential. It quickly became apparent that Iraqi judges were more apt to issue warrants if ISF could provide an exact location or address of the suspected insurgent. Although cordon, search, and census operations were used as a means for ISF and anew-to-theater coalition force company to learn the intricate dynamics of the AO, it rapidly became the cornerstone of our enduring campaign plan. It greatly enabled targeting within the existing capabilities of the ISF, thereby supporting the higher headquarter’s goal of ISF units capable of securing their AOs with Dragoons ultimately in tactical overwatch. Application of Cordon, Search, and Census to Warrant-based Targeting Our first step in conducting a combined cordon, search, and census operation was to “sell” the importance of census to our ISF partners. ISF conceptual buy-in was the point of initial friction; in addition to static checkpoint operations, the only time our partners desired to penetrate neighborhoods was during a middle-of-the-night raid. Compounding the ISF buy-in quagmire was the fact that our first few combined sample census operations did not result in the “golden” cache find or immediately lead to the capture of a high-value target; these two types of significant activities (SIGACTs) tend to be the two most frequently used tangible metrics in gauging a successful mission. During daily interactions with our counterpart ISF company commanders and platoon leaders, Dragoon platoon leaders stuck to the company talking points — developing a information database of residents in the AO will ultimately allow more successful lethal and nonlethal targeting. We continually reinforced the value of this offensive operation. However, for true ISF buy-in, a tangible benefit from a cordon, search, and census operation was needed as “proof of principle.” The first demonstration of the utility of the cordon, search, and census method occurred in March, which was about 90 days post-TOA. We received intelligence derived from signal intelligence (SIGINT), which stated that a man named Mohammed, who lived in the Hay al-Tinek neighborhood and worked as a butcher, was constructing a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at his home. Prior to cordon, search, and census operations, an unspecific tip such as this would have led the ISF to either disregard it completely or conduct an operation to detain all middle-aged males in the neighborhood. Our first step was to share the intelligence with the ISF battalion that operated in that particular neighborhood. Transparent targeting has become in vogue as the ISF actually move in as the security lead in its country. The method by which we obtained intelligence was irrelevant, but sharing it was vital. The ISF were just happy for any help it could get in defeating insurgency in its neighborhoods. As luck would have it, the ISF identified one census information requirements datasheet derived from a previous cordon, search, and census operation, which matched the key characteristics of our target, Mohammed/Hay al-Tinek/ butcher, who lived in house number A123. The ISF then referenced its AO geographical reference grid (GRG) system and determined exactly where Mohammed the butcher lived. After an abbreviated troop leading procedure (TLP) process, the ISF were ready to action the target immediately. However, we strongly encouraged them to obtain a warrant for the target’s arrest first; holding suspected insurgents more than 48 hours for questioning has become extremely difficult as Iraq moves toward rule of law. The ISF battalion received intelligence from its brigade headquarters the very next day concerning a VBIED under construction in the vicinity of house A123. The ISF battalion S3 went to visit with an Iraq criminal courts judge in Mosul and obtained a warrant for the arrest of Mohammed the butcher. With warrant in hand, the ISF actioned the target unilater- “Transparent targeting has become in vogue as the ISF actually move in as the security lead in its country. The method by which we obtained intelligence was irrelevant, but sharing it was vital. The ISF were just happy for any help they could get in defeating insurgency in its neighborhoods. As luck would have it, the ISF identified one census information requirements datasheet derived from a previous cordon, search, and census operation, which matched the key characteristics of our target…” 42 — ally and found large amounts of homemade explosives, as well as a white van being reconfigured for VBIED employment at the residence of the target. The target was arrested, and during tactical questioning, he shared valuable information with the ISF on the VBIED network in west Mosul. The ISF quickly realized that it would not have captured this target or prevented the VBIED attack if it had not conducted the sample cordon, search, and census operations, which had provided it with a partial database of who lived in the AO. As the ISF battalion recon platoon leader responsible for Mohammed’s capture put it, “It was like we were in a dark room and you all turned on the light … now we will know every shop, mosque, sheik, imam, and school teacher in our neighborhoods.” Word rapidly spread throughout ISF units in west Mosul and our ISF partners asked us to support them in several more sample cordon and search operations; however, the ISF chain-ofcommand had something much larger in mind. As part of Operation New Dawn, the 3d National Police Division Commander, responsible for security of west Mosul, ordered several battalion-sized cordon, search, and census operations of entire neighborhoods throughout the city. This created anew set of challenges in the evolving nature of the cordon, search, and census operation; while sample cordon, search, and census permitted up to 45 minutes per household due to the small objective size, the Iraqi chain of command now desired to complete a census of up to 3,000 residences in just a few days time. We would have only about 15 minutes per household, so we had to develop a more efficient process to conduct cordon, search, and census operations. During combined TLP with various ISF battalions, we decided on the “census light” method. Key tasks for the ISF included interviewing each head of household, completing census dataforms, and searching the residences. We decided on these tasks because they allowed an “Iraqi face” to be at the tip of the spear of the operation while gaining the added benefit of their comparatively better cultural awareness and language abilities. Conversely, key tasks for coalition forces included stenciling an address on each residence in accordance with our GRG system and taking digital pictures of each head of household and associated vehicles of each residence. These tasks allowed coalition forces to maintain situational awareness of the operation while using our comparatively better map-reading skills and technological capabilities. After several rehearsals, we found that 15 minutes was a sufficient length of time at each residence to complete these tasks. Tasking four coalition platoons to follow and support three Iraqi search/census companies, we found it was feasible to census up to 500 residences in one day, accomplishing the ISF leaders’ intent of completing a 100-percent census of a large neighborhood in just a few days. By May, about 50 percent of the residences in our company area of operations — upward of 7,000 structures — had been entered into a combined census database, to include head of household interviews with associated digital media and each residence marked with a GRG address. At this point, the benefit of the cordon, search, and census operation began to expand exponentially. In the month of May alone, the ISF conducted precision raids on five insurgents with warrants in hand; identified and reduced several IEDs; and discovered multiple insurgent weapons caches with the help of human intelligence (HUMINT) tippers using the GRG address system. For the first time since the TOA, the ISF felt it had the initiative in its battlespace. Transition to Unilateral ISF Cordon, Search, and Census Operations Both Dragoon and ISF leaders now believed large-scale cordon, search, and census operations to be the most efficient method to rapidly survey the remaining “…key tasks for coalition forces included stenciling an address on each residence in accordance with our GRG system and taking digital pictures of each head of household and associated vehicles of each residence. These tasks allowed coalition forces to maintain situational awareness of the operation while using our comparatively better map-reading skills and technological capabilities.” “Both Dragoon and ISF leaders now believed large-scale cordon, search, and census operations to be the most efficient method to rapidly survey the remaining residences and increase security gains. However, in early June, Dragoon received orders to change its level of partnership with the ISF from full-spectrum operations to ‘advise and assist.’ This change was due to Prime Minister Maliki’s request for all coalition combat forces to be ‘outside the cities’ no later than 30 June…” — 43 residences and increase security gains. However, in early June, Dragoon received orders to change its level of partnership with the ISF from full-spectrum operations to “advise and assist.” This change was due to Prime Minister Maliki’s request for all coalition combat forces to be “outside the cities” no later than 30 June; therefore, our priority for the month of June was to enable the ISF to conduct cordon, search, and census operations with little or no coalition oversight. To rapidly expand the ISF’s capabilities required a great deal of teaching, coaching, and mentoring from our leaders and soldiers. The transition to unilateral operations occurred in several phases with varying results by ISF units. The first point of friction in achieving independent ISF census operations, with little coalition forces oversight, was in its TLP process. We struggled to overcome the mental hurdle of planning an operation “our way,” then place ourselves in an advisory role. We first visited our partnered unit’s headquarters to plan the location of the operation. Once an objective area was selected, we helped them plan, covering everything from troops available to vehicle configuration and Class I for their jundi. Typically, we found that 2-hour key leader engagements, conducted at least twice, were necessary for an ISF battalion to completely plan a cordon, search, and census operation. While this is a heavy price to pay, since it sub-tracts from time otherwise available for a combined patrol, it paid great dividends in moving toward the ISF’s ability to conduct a unilateral cordon, search, and census of its AO. Next, we advised during mission execution, with each operation achieving decreased involvement from our company. There were bumps in the road. The ISF’s two greatest obstacles included its difficulty with battletracking an operation from a forward tactical command post (leader-level); and using terrain association from imagery maps to complete census on an entire objective (soldier-level). To address the former issue, our leaders collocated with the ISF command and control (C2) node during operations to train them on systems that worked for us; the ISF inevitably adjusted these systems to work within its culture and capabilities. To address the latter issue, our platoons gave map-reading classes and even conducted practical exercises, usually prior to and during evening patrols. While striving to advise-only during actual mission execution, we never allowed a mission to get so far away from the ISF that we could not recover. By the end of June, each of our partnered ISF battalions conducted a completely independent cordon, search, and census operation with great results. Developing IR Sheets/Materials/GRGs As mentioned previously, the census information requirements datasheets changed for virtually every mission, depending on the type of neighborhood. However, the purpose of the datasheets was always to gain the most information, as quickly as possible, from each home. Our first census information requirements datasheet simply listed every question presented on the handheld interagency identity detection equipment (HIIDE). The datasheet began to evolve, to include relatives, make and models of vehicles, and even blank areas for photos. Digital media was the most important element of data collection, along with actual interviews of heads of household. Once all these information requirements were gathered and compiled on one census sheet, it took about an hour to conduct census in one household. In the beginning, this process served well as a sample census — each patrol’s objective area would encompass just a few houses and the ISF could interact at great length with each family. At the end of the census, the local population felt more confident of the ISF’s ability to protect their neighborhoods and families. Initially, all heads of household were entered into the HIIDE system, although subsequent large-scale operations did not include this task due to time constraints. The census information requirements datasheet evolved to fit the mission based on size of objective and time available. There was one issue that continually hindered our cordon, search, and census operations — the GRG created by our COIST, using tactical ground reporting network (TiGRNET) imagery, did not always match up with the current landscape of Mosul, which, with a population exceeding two-million people, was consistently changing, especially along the western periphery due to squatter villages. This led to difficultly during census operations as each ground commander had to reference digital media to determine which house was specified on the GRG. Another identified hindrance was the familiar “fat-finger finder,” the method by which a HUMINT source attempts to show coalition forces or ISF where a lethal target is located using imagery. Typically, every fat-finger-based combined raid would encompass an entire block of houses, or a neighborhood, just to locate one target. The faster we could identify the target house, the less confusion, and the more likely we detained the right target. We first implemented putting the GRG address physically on the house during a cordon, search, and census mission in an extremely poor neighborhood in west Mosul with a seemingly infinite number of squatter homes, which were not reflected on our most recent imagery. While the ISF searched each residence and interviewed heads of household, coalition forces observed the operation, recorded critical digital media, and stenciled GRG numbers on the houses. The census information requirements datasheet was marked with a corresponding GRG number and filed at the end of each day, along with the digital media, in our COIST database and ultimately into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet maintained by the ISF. On each house a number was stenciled (not free-handed), which made a huge difference when it came to credibility in future operations (insurgents have yet to figure out how to duplicate this numbering system without coalition forces being able to identify counterfeits). All houses were photographed with the owner of the house and any licensed vehicles. The cordon, search, and census operation enabled several second- and third-order effects; the most effective being the operations forced ISF away from static “Several building-marking methods evolved over time; brick walls outside the courtyard were the preferred location for marking, but anywhere that the GRG address was visible from the street was sufficient. The stencils were professional, neat, and clean (a combination of letters and numbers) and some homeowners were actually proud of the address on their house. Stenciling addresses on each house forced the GRG to be updated, which was a tremendous benefit in planning future operations.” 44 — checkpoints and into open dialogue with the local community. The census information requirements datasheets were in Arabic and included questions about essential services in the neighborhood. We experimented with bringing humanitarian aid (HA) packets along during one cordon, search, and census operation; the reception by the ISF and local populace was phenomenal. The ISF distributed the HA packets based on level of poverty and cooperation during the census — the packets became a staple for subsequent missions. Over time, several building-marking methods evolved; brick walls outside the courtyard were the preferred location for marking, but anywhere that the GRG address was visible from the street was sufficient. The stencils were professional, neat, and clean (a combination of letters and numbers) and some homeowners were actually proud of the address on their house. Stenciling addresses on each house forced the GRG to be updated, which was a tremendous benefit in planning future operations. The residents developed a sense of security, which came along with the whole-neighborhood concept and addresses on each house — our sources inside the neighborhood told us that local residents spread the idea that coalition forces and ISF now knew exactly who lived in each house, making insurgents afraid to move into the neighborhood or conduct operations there. Plentiful in Mosul was the evidence of multiple combined clearing missions conducted over the span of the past 6 years. The evidence was clearly obvious as each house had multiple markings on the door or wall, each representing that the structure was cleared at some time in the past. Circles, dots, lines, or a single tagged letter — it was apparent in every neighborhood. Once the GRG address was stenciled and professionally placed on each house, the ISF finally took ownership of an operation, which worked to produce a neighborhood that had a sense of security and the ability to point out a specific house if there was someone in the vicinity conducting nefarious activities. It means something to the residents when they repaint their houses, but leave the stenciled address undisturbed, painting over every other marking. One time-tested fact of forward deployed units is that the lowest-ranking American soldiers often develop the most ingenious tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). During a few of the “census en masse” operations, we learned that stenciling addresses was actually the limiting factor in the size of the objective we could census with the ISF. Changing stencils was a time-consuming task. PFC Ma-loney developed a “uni-stencil,” which is a single stencil that can be used to make any letter or number. Maloney’s innovation immediately became a company TTP that allowed us to maintain pace with our ISF census teams, making it possible to census larger objectives each time. While our census information requirements datasheets were perfect for the residential neighborhoods, we faced anew challenge in Sinaa South. All structures in this neighborhood were businesses, primarily automotive chop shops frequently reported to be involved in VBIED production. Our leaders created a business information requirements census sheet, in conjunction with its partnered Iraqi army (IA) S3 shop, with specific information requirements such as hours of business, types of merchandise sold, and names of employees. The IA were so excited about the warrant-based targeting effects from the first sample business census that they were extremely receptive to completing a 100-percent business census of Sinaa South. Lasting Benefits and Conclusions On 30 June, coalition forces turned over security of the cities, including Mosul, to the ISF — a major step forward. General Odierno said, “This is the right time to transition security of the cities to the ISF, who are ready for this task.” The full census of our company’s AO has not yet been “On 30 June, coalition forces turned over security of the cities, including Mosul, to the ISF — a major step forward. General Odierno said, “This is the right time to transition security of the cities to the ISF, who are ready for this task.” The full census of our company’s AO has not yet been completed, but the ISF have repeatedly demonstrated both the desire and ability to complete this task in the next few months.”

underestimating the religious factors that breathed life into parts of the insurrection demoralized by superior British weapons. Wardi writes the tribes were defeated because they joined and left the revolt as they pleased; money from spoils dried up quickly and could not sustain the revolt; spies and informants in the pay of the British permeated every level of Iraqi society; they waited until 8,450 were killed before they realized it was time to consider the prospect of some form of negotiation with the British; and many joined the revolt based on face and honor, and when the public wavered in its support, their face and honor wavered as well, leading to some abandoning the revolt. Spread of Rebellion and Conclusion In Samawah, tribes and nationalist forces attacked British armed riverboats HMS Stonefly and Greenfly. Within urban areas, such as Karbala, the city was divided into pro-and anti-British factions. Neighborhoods established provisional governments that were suppressed by the British. In retaliation, General Haldane cut water to Karbala, much to the objection of Wilson, who understood this would only unify the people of Karbala as they would endure common suffering. In Najaf, the British allowed some self-government, and even an election of market officials occurred on 25 August 1920. An aerial bombardment of Kufa led to damage of the mosque that was capitalized on by anti-British agitators. Wilson finally realized the only means of quelling this insurrection was not by force alone and began to consider discussing plans to transition Iraq into an independent entity. By August 1920, a stalemate developed whereby tribes controlled villages and the British controlled major urban areas. However, it would be along road to the 1921 Cairo Conference that would develop the details of transitioning Britain’s Iraqi Mandate to independence by 1932. Many more casualties would occur on both sides, but the next phase of the 1920 revolt would see increasing violence, as British and Iraqi revolutionaries postured for strategic advantage in world opinion and negotiations. Wardi’s Part 2 of Volume 5 takes us from July 1920 to the conclusion of the revolt when it became clear that King Faisal would ascend to the throne of a newly created nation-state of Iraq in late August 1921. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a U. S. Navy Medical Service Corps Officer and Middle East foreign area officer. He currently serves as a senior counterterrorism advisor, warning officer, and instructor on militant Islamist ideology, Joint Task Force for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC. He received a B. B. A. from the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss), an M. B. A. and M. A. from the University of Arkansas, and an M. S. from the National Defense Intelligence College. His military education includes the U. S. Naval War College, the U. S. Army War College Defense Strategy Course, the Marine Corps University Amphibious Warfare School, and advanced analytic courses at the Joint Military Intelligence College. His most recent assignments include country director for North Africa and Egypt, assistant country director for the Arabian Gulf, and special advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, DC. This work would not have been possible without the help of YN1 Gavin Irby for his edits and valuable comments and the help of the John T. Hughes Library and Library of Congress for making Wardi’s works available for study. A special thanks to the National Defense University Librarians, who devoted part of their lunch hour to help me. Works of Dr. Ali al-Wardi from Page 34 46 — completed, but the ISF have repeatedly demonstrated both the desire and ability to complete this task in the next few months. This desire is directly attributable to the ISF’s ability to obtain warrants using information obtained during cordon, search, and census operations. Additionally, their relationship with the local community has been significantly enhanced as a result of these operations as they are more adequately able to identify and work with local leaders. During a recent planning session with west Mosul ISF leaders, they proudly showed us revised census information requirements datasheets currently being used in Mosul, which were derived from the original products we used during our combined operations prior to 30 June. More importantly, the west Mosul ISF has demonstrated its ability to unilaterally secure local neighborhoods following the 30 June handover — the most common type of mission remains a cordon, search, and census. Although a census of each neighborhood has been completed at one time or another, the ISF continues to update its resident database, which allows them to obtain warrants and target insurgents more successfully. While the time for fully partnered cordon, search, and census operations in Mosul appears to have passed, this type of operation could be applied to a number of other areas where coalition forces are closely partnered with indigenous forces who lack sophisticated intelligence collection means and knowledge of their AO. We have not yet discovered an operation that gains intelligence so rapidly while simultaneously endearing indigenous forces to the community. By enabling the ISF to “know its AO” through cordon, search, and census operations, its timeline for assuming security responsibility of Mosul was greatly expedited. Captain Bryan Frizzelle is currently serving as company commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Squadron, 8th Cavalry (3-8 CAV), 3d Brigade Combat Team (3BCT), 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), Mosul, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Armor Captain Career Course, Cavalry Leader Course, Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leader Course, and M1A2SEP Tank Commander Certification Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, D Company, and S4, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Iraq, and Fort Hood;; task force mortar platoon leader, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Baghdad, Iraq; and tank platoon leader, B Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Fort Hood and Baghdad. Lieutenant Jeffrey Gagliano is currently serving as executive officer, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B. S. from Texas Christian University. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Basic Officer Leader Course, Anti-Terrorism Level II, and Anti-Terrorism Level II Instructor Course. He has served in various leader and staff positions, to include platoon leader, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq; instructor, Anti-Terrorism Level II, Sembach, Germany; instructor, Ground Combat Skills, Sembach; and noncommissioned officer in charge, Crime Prevention, San Antonio, Randolph Air Force Base, TX. Lieutenant Brian Murdock is currently serving as a platoon leader, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Officer Candidate School, and Basic Officer Leader Course. Lieutenant Nicholas Rinaldi is currently serving as a platoon leader, 2d Platoon, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Airborne School, Ranger School, Scout Leader Course, and Basic Officer Leader Courses II and III. Lieutenant Daniel Wagner is currently serving as a platoon leader, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Mosul, Iraq. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy. His military education includes Maneuver Officer Basic Course. He has also served as executive officer, D Company, 3-8 CAV, 3BCT, 1CD, Iraq, and Fort Hood.