The Battlefi eld Surveillance Brigade The Future of Division-Level Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

sion is to “conduct ISR operations to enable the division commander to precisely focus joint elements of combat power and simultaneously execute current operations while preparing for future operations.”1 It is the primary organization in the division for conducting ISR. The BFSB does this by executing the ISR tasks assigned by the division headquarters, which answer the commander’s priority intelligence requirements (PIR). This allows the commander to make informed and timely decisions to shape operations in the area of operations (AO). Unlike previous division- or corps-level military intelligence (MI) units, the BFSB’s primary task is collection, not analysis. The structure to conduct analysis has been built into the division and corps intelligence (G2) sections. The focus of the BFSB is intelligence that lies outside the brigade combat teams’ (BCT) AO or supports the higher level commander in shaping the entire AO. Organization of the BFSB The newly published U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, lays out an operational environment that characterizes the future as an era of persistent conflict. Not only must the U. S. military be On 17 March 2008, General William S. Wallace signed a directive transferring the proponency for the battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) from the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth to the U. S. Army Armor Center at Fort Knox. This transfer represents an important next step in continuing the development of the BFSB into a fully operational support brigade designed to conduct multidisci-plined intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). As armor and cavalry officers and soldiers occupy key positions in this brigade, there is a pressing need to understand this organization and how it functions. It is also critical that lessons learned from the deployment to Iraq of the first interim-designed BFSB, the 525th BFSB, be debated and, as necessary, incorporated into other BFSBs as they are activated. This article briefly discusses the mission, organization, and operational concept of the BFSB and the important role it plays in the modular Army, and makes recommendations to encourage debate on its future development. Mission of the BFSB As outlined in the BFSB Operational and Organization concept, the BFSB’s mis-capable of defeating traditional militaries of nation states, such as North Korea or Iran, but also nonstate actors, such as terrorist groups and international drug cartels, that threaten U. S. interests. FM 3-0 calls for a military capable of executing full-spectrum operations that include offense, defense, and stability operations.2 The BFSB was designed to operate across the spectrum of conflict and provide ISR in support of these operations. From 2004 to 2006, the CAC experimented with various designs for the BFSB, which were tested and refined through multiple simulations, studies, exercises, and reviews supported by the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center, the Army’s battle labs, U. S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), and RAND Corporation. This led to the current design approved by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on 11 August 2006. The BFSB was designed to be a responsive, adaptable, and multidisciplined ISR organization. Through the combination of traditional reconnaissance missions performed by scout/cavalry units, and the technical and human intelligence (HUMINT) operations performed by MI units, the BFSB was designed to provide the mix of ISR capabilities necessary to op- 34 — The Battlefield Surveillance Brigade The Future of Division-Level Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance by Major Jaren K. Price erate in any contingency. The BFSB’s organic organization consists of a brigade headquarters, an MI collection battalion, a reconnaissance squadron, a network support company, and a brigade support company. It was also designed to be tailored during Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) for its specific mission or contingency by adding a variety of capabilities (see Figure 1).3 BFSB Headquarters The BFSB headquarters’ mission is planning, executing, and supporting ISR operations. It was designed with three command elements: a mobile command group, tactical command post (TACCP), and a main command post (MAIN). The MAIN is organized by warfighting functions with enablers and includes: an air defense and airspace management/brigade aviation element (ADAM/BAE); an Air Force tactical air control party (TACP); and a robust sustainment section designed to provide sustainment planning and coordination, due to the lack of a brigade support battalion (BSB). The BFSB is commanded by an armor, infantry, MI, or aviation officer with the XO and S3 from a different branch than the commander (see Figure 2). MI Battalion The MI battalion is composed of six companies (See Figure 3). The unmanned aircraft system (UAS) company provides organic aerial reconnaissance and surveillance with the Shadow UAS system and links to the future Army extended-range multipurpose UAS. The technical collection company conducts signal intelligence (SIGINT) and contains six Prophet collection systems. The collection and exploitation (C&E) company and the counterintelligence (CI)/HUMINT company are designed to provide CI and HUMINT collection for the higher headquarters, as well as augment, or provide, HUMINT support to BCTs or support brigades. Figure 1. Battlefield Surveillance Brigade Organization Figure 2. Battlefield Surveillance Brigade Headquarters — 35

2/0/4// 6 Intel 4/3/28// 35 Plans 2/0/1// 3 Fires 1/1/3// 5 Protection* Sustainment 10/4/31// 40 C4 Ops 1/0/4// 5

6/1/13// 20

2/0/6// 8

1/0/3// 4 ISR Fusion 0/1/12// 13

4/2/6// 12

0/0/6// 6

0/0/4// 4

1/0/1// 2

0/0/3// 3

1/2/2// 5

1/0/1// 2

2/0/1// 3

0/0/4// 4

38/12/124//174 *The Protection cell is only a working group in the BFSB unless augmented. The Protection function falls under the S3.

Reconnaissance Squadron The reconnaissance squadron is composed of a headquarters troop, two HMMWV-based ground troops and along-range surveillance (LRS) company composed of 15, six-man teams (See Figure 4). The squadron includes fire support personnel and an Air Force TACP. Unlike previous cavalry squadrons, it is not intended to fight for intelligence against a robust conventional enemy; rather, it is designed to integrate the advantages of a scout on the ground, with all the technical and HUMINT capabilities of the MI battalion, to avoid decisive engagement and shape the battlefield by superior knowledge of the enemy. Network Support Company The network support company provides the communications structure for the brigade. It is based primarily on the satellite communications structure provided by the joint network node (JNN) system. The company is designed to provide both digital, voice, and video teleconference connectivity, along with automation support. Brigade Support Company (BSC) The BSC is designed to support the organic structure of the BFSB with field feeding, distribution, and maintenance support. It is designed to task organize into teams to support each battalion or can be organized as necessary to support the BFSB. TOE versus MTOE As in most cases with Army units, the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) differs from the design document in the table of organization and equipment (TOE). As currently fielded, the 525th BFSB includes a smaller headquarters, two smaller MI battalions, a LRS company, a network support company, and a brigade support company. The 525th has not been fielded key equipment such as the Shadow UAS and Trojan Spirit. Current plans are to first field Active Component BFSBs based on the MTOE and then transition them to full design following redeployment. Most Army National Guard (NG) BFSBs will be activated with the full design. Operations The BFSB is the primary organization tasked to collect PIR for the division or assigned headquarters. Its organic structure was primarily designed to meet the needs of a modular division, but it may be force tailored to support a corps, joint task force, or multinational force. Force tailoring is the assignment of additional capabilities to the organic brigade organization, based on the mission, during Figure 3. Military Intelligence Battalion Figure 5. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Process 36 — Figure 4. Reconnaissance Squadron

ARFORGEN. The higher headquarters conducts its mission analysis and determines PIR. Based on PIR, it assigns ISR tasks to subordinate units according to location and capabilities. The higher headquarters uses mission orders with a task and purpose and provides necessary resources. It is then up to the subordinate commander to determine how he will accomplish the mission. Once the required information is collected, it is analyzed and fused with other information to form intelligence. This intelligence is evaluated against the original requirement to ensure compliance. If the task is fulfilled, the higher headquarters begins the process again, which is focused on the next priority; if the task is not fulfilled, then it is adjusted to meet the original requirement. (See Figure 5). The BFSB primarily operates for the higher headquarters in areas not assigned to other brigades or in an assigned AO for ISR operations. Its tasks should focus on allowing the higher headquarters to shape the AO for subordinate units. Additionally, the BFSB reinforces the ISR capability of BCTs or can provide this capability to other brigades. This is primarily done with the CI/HUMINT companies in the MI battalion. Once the BFSB receives its task from higher headquarters, it conducts mission analysis and plans the best way to accomplish the mission. The BFSB commander task organizes the reconnaissance squadron and MI battalion as required. This allows for the use of cueing, mix, and redundancy. Task organizing company-sized elements of ground recon, UAS, SIGINT, and HUMINT capabilities has proved effective in developing intelligence of insurgent infiltration routes, training camps, and sustainment capabilities, particularly in the western areas of Iraq. This intelligence allows maneuver commanders to quickly and precisely target and destroy these insurgent capabilities. Figure 6 depicts a division AO with both contiguous and noncontiguous AO focused on urban areas. The BFSB has been assigned an AO along the western border of the country, concentrating on a templated threat, and will use a mix of MI and reconnaissance assets. BFSB HUMINT and SIGINT assets have been task organized to some brigades to provide, or augment, their ISR capabilities. A LRS team and UAS are also tasked to find a sniper operating along a main supply route in the division control area. Armor/Cavalry Officers in the BFSB The BFSB provides a variety of opportunities for cavalry officers and soldiers. Currently, the Army plans to activate four Active Component BFSBs and six in the National Guard. The requirement for two additional Active Component BFSBs is currently under review. The BFSBs contain positions from private to sergeant major, and lieutenant to colonel, designated for scout and cavalry specialties. Soldiers or officers could actually spend their entire careers in a BFSB. The BFSB commander’s position is coded as an O2B, which means it could be filled by an armor, infantry, MI, or aviation officer. Commanders of BCT recon squadrons, in addition to BFSB MI battalions and recon squadrons, should be the primary candidates for this command. The key is developing commanders and staff officers that understand the various ISR disciplines and how to execute ISR operations and effectively integrate both joint and Army assets to provide timely Figure 6. Battlefield Surveillance Brigade Operations — 37 Note: HUMINT and counterintelligence/HUMINT companies and platoons are represented by the generic MI unit symbol. Since a symbol does not currently exist to represent HUMINT units.

and accurate intelligence. While it is beneficial to understand and gain experience in various types of units; specialization of officers who “grow up” in BFSBs and recon squadrons should be encouraged. Recommendations for Consideration As with any new organization, many strengths and weaknesses are not evident until the unit is deployed to perform its actual mission. The 525th BFSB, in conjunction with the U. S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, has begun to identify some of these shortfalls. However, if a unit is not resourced or employed as it was designed, the unit and concept cannot clearly be evaluated. Currently, the 525th BFSB is neither resourced nor being deployed as designed. However, based on lessons learned from the deployment of various BCTs, the deployment of the 525th BFSB, and simulations and exercises involving the BFSB, I recommend several items for immediate consideration. Deploy a Fully Resourced BFSB The first recommendation is to fully resource the TOE design and deploy a BFSB as soon as possible. In particular, the Armor Center must ensure that the reconnaissance squadron is fully manned, equipped, and trained, and also correct the shortages that exist in the BFSB headquarters between the MTOE and TOE. The BFSB should then be assigned to a headquarters and employed as a brigade to fully test its operational concept. The next available BFSB could be deployed to Afghanistan to work for the combined joint task force (CJTF)/U. S. division headquarters as Afghanistan provides a variety of terrain to test BFSB capabilities, as well as the need for ISR capabilities for the commander. As more BFSBs are activated, one should be assigned to each deployed division headquarters. The National Guard BFSBs should be included in this plan. Reevaluate the MI Battalion Structure The second recommendation is for the MI school, based on feedback from the 525th, to reexamine how the MI battalion should be structured; should it have two smaller MI battalions, as in the current MTOE, or one large battalion as approved in the TOE. The concept currently being tested, with smaller deployed MI battalions, is to combine the HUMINT and SIGINT into multifunctional teams, instead of discipline-specific companies. The 525th has documented numerous advantages to this concept such as the teams’ ability to develop intelligence and support BCTs. The MI school must look closely at the requirements for the MI battalion in full-spectrum operations and determine which design makes the most sense. If the school determines that two small battalions, with multifunctional teams are better, changes must be made to the support company for the BFSB. Add a Brigade Special Troops Battalion The third recommendation is to resource a unique brigade special troops battalion (BSTB) for the BFSB. In the original design, the BFSB had a BSTB, but was later removed to reduce personnel numbers. Based on observations from the 525th BFSB and the Stryker BCT (which does not have a BSTB or a BSB), and the other BCTs, BSTBs are critical to effectively employing the brigade’s separate and support companies. These headquarters reduce the requirement for small unit- “The LRS company does not have a vehicle to support its teams and the recon troop vehicle would not meet the needs of the LRS company, which establishes the need for another type of light recon vehicle. The LRS company requires alight, all-terrain vehicle that would extend the range and speed of the LRS teams. Ideally, a six-man LRS team and its vehicles could be internally loaded in a CH-47 for insertion missions.” 38 — level planning by the brigade staff and allow for better planning of operations and care of soldiers. Based on personnel and equipment numbers and the sustainment operations in the BFSB, adding a BSTB and BSB is likely excessive. A BSTB with an added support operations (SPO) section could meet the needs of the BFSB and provide command and control for the network support company, the sustainment company, and any additional company-sized units attached to the

BFSB.

Develop Light Reconnaissance Vehicles A fourth recommendation is for the Armor Center to reevaluate the needs of the Army for light reconnaissance vehicles and design and procure new vehicles. One critique that has resurfaced repeatedly in the BFSB design is using the HMMWV as a reconnaissance vehicle in both the recon troops and LRS companies. For the recon troops, critics point out that the HMMWV lacks the protection, firepower, and the essential suite of cameras, sensors, and lasers required of a reconnaissance vehicle. While the standard 1025/26 HMMWV has advantages, such as off-road mobility and could be sling loaded by Army helicopters, the needed change to up-armored vehicles negates these advantages. The ideal vehicle for the BFSB and the infantry BCT (IBCT) recon troops would include the following options: be sling loadable by helicopter (also internally loaded on a CH-47); provide armor protection from small arms, up to 12.7mm and mines/IEDs; have an organic suite of sensors that could be used on the move; have a mast antenna for employment while stationary; be capable of mounting a variety of weapons (M2, Mk- 19, M240); have high off-road mobility; carry a minimum of six soldiers (crew of two and four dismounts) and equipment; have a range of 350+ miles; and have the ability to run various electronic equipment from an internal power source. The LRS company does not have a vehicle to support its teams and the recon troop vehicle would not meet the needs of the LRS company, which establishes the need for another type of light recon vehicle. The LRS company requires alight, all-terrain vehicle that would extend the range and speed of the LRS teams. Ideally, a six-man LRS team and its vehicles could be internally loaded in a CH-47 for insertion missions. At a minimum, it must be lightweight and small, sling loadable, and able to carry LRS soldiers and their equipment without resupply for 5 to 7 days. The vehicle must be highly mobile and nearly silent, and would serve primarily as transportation to increase the LRS teams’ mobility and not as a fighting or reconnaissance platform. The vehicle would carry between 1 to 3 people; the key is that the entire LRS team and vehicles are CH-47 transportable. They must also be transportable by medium tactical vehicles, either internally or on standard Army trailers. Resource BFSB Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) The fifth recommendation concerns one of the most critical shortages currently in the BFSB — the unresourced requirement for TACPs in the brigade and recon squadron. The BFSB has no organic indirect or joint fires capability and must rely on outside resources. Due to the distances the BFSB was designed to operate, the support of Army indirect fires assets is likely to be limited. This provides a reliance on joint fires, especially for LRS teams. The lack of TACPs severely limits the BFSB’s ability to plan and employ joint fires, especially close air support (CAS) in a timely manner. This capability is critical to protect BFSB soldiers and allow the BFSB to execute targeting. The Armor Center should ensure that the current Army/Air Force memorandum of agreement is modified to resource the required TACPs for the BFSB. Explore Feasibility of a Single Scout MOS Finally, the recon troops in the BFSB are currently composed primarily of 19D cavalry scouts, while the LRS company is composed of 11B infantrymen. All “scouts” in the BFSB recon squadrons, as well as the IBCT recon squadrons, should be 19Ds, as opposed to a mix of 11Bs and 19Ds; using 11Bs as scouts is inefficient and their training does not provide necessary entry-level skills for soldiers primarily focused on ISR. While many basic scout and infantry tasks overlap, there is a big difference between training focused on obtaining information while avoiding contact with the enemy and training focused primarily on killing the enemy and holding terrain. An 11B receives limited training on ISR and must be trained as a scout after arriving at his unit. Training for 19Ds is focused on ISR and soldiers arrive prepared to operate as both mounted and dismounted ISR soldiers. Training for 19Ds leads to a different mind set focused on ISR, not offensive operations; 19Ds stay primarily in ISR units, while 11Bs are currently assigned between infantry and ISR units, degrading their effectiveness to perform either task. As the Armor and Infantry Centers consolidate into the Maneuver Center of Excellence, a single scout MOS makes sense. The BFSB was designed to improve the commander’s ability to understand the enemy and operational environment and make well-informed decisions. As the Armor Center continues the development of this organization, armor and cavalry officers need to understand how the BFSB is organized and operates. As lessons learned are developed from the deployment of the 525th BFSB, it only makes sense to examine the design and make necessary changes, just as the Army has done with the BCTs. While armor and cavalry officers and soldiers are key components of this organization, it is the development of “ISR” soldiers and leaders who understand both the muddy boots and technical aspects of ISR that will shape the battlefields of today and the future. Notes 1U. S. Army Combined Arms Center, “Operational and Organizational Concept for the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade,” Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1 May 2007. 2Headquarters, Department of the Army, U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, February 2008. 3“Operational and Organization Concept for the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade,” Figures 1 through 6, 1 May 2007. Major Jaren K. Price is currently the S2, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, Korea. He received a B. A. from Webber State University and an M. A. from American Military University. His military education includes the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Military Intelligence Captains Career Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include chief, Special Doctrine and Doctrine Author, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD), Fort Leavenworth, KS; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Support Company, 311th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, 101st Airborne (ABN) Division (DIV), Fort Campbell, KY; assistant S3, 311th MI Battalion, 101st ABN DIV, Fort Campbell; S2, 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, 101st ABN DIV, Fort Campbell, and Kosovo; and tank platoon leader and company XO, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Battalion, Schweinfurt, Germany, and Bosnia. — 39