Lessons from the 1941 Anglo-Iraqi Revolt: An Analysis of the Writings of Iraqi Army Officer and Military Historian, Mahmood Al-Durrah

Among the problems of the Saddam Hussein regime was the downfall of Iraqi scholarly thought and publications. Many Iraqi historians, political scientists, and writers within Iraq were reduced to publishing works that did not contain true analysis and discussions of the problems facing Iraq’s modern history; instead, the focus was on slogans of Baathism and praising the regime. As a reader of Arabic books on military and political history, it is my earnest hope that among the fruits of Operation Iraqi Freedom is the reawakening of the true scholarly potential of Iraqi intellectuals. This article discusses the writings of the late Iraqi officer, Mahmood Al-Durrah, who served as an army lieutenant during World War II. Al-Durrah, an Iraqi military historian, shares his views on the 1941 Anglo-Iraqi conflict in his book, Al-Harb Al-Iraqiyah Al-Britaniah (the Iraqi-British War, 1941). I have a passion for Arabic works of military significance and wish to share my analysis of Al-Durrah’s works with ARMOR readers. When an American soldier or sailor hears “1941,” they remember Pearl Harbor; for Iraqis, it is the invasion of Iraq by British forces to suppress the pro-Axis government of Prime Minister Rashid Ali, who was installed as prime minister in a military coup that swept aside the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy. Al-Harb Al-Iraqiyah Al-Britaniah offers a comprehensive study of the strategy and tactics of British and Iraqi forces, and discusses how the British secured the port at Basra and fought their way to Baghdad.1 Although in Arabic, Al-Durrah provides perspectives on operational and tactical decisions made by Iraqi senior officers in confronting new British combined armor, infantry, and air tactics. It also offers lessons on how the Iraqi military entered Arab political life. As U. S. forces become involved in the positive evolution of Iraq, as well as battling the Iraqi extremist insurgency, it is vital to study Arabic works written by Iraqis. These works not only should be read by American students of warfare, but need to be — 5 rediscovered by Iraqi security forces, who have sadly endured 2 decades of devolution in Iraqi military thought. The chief cause of the 1941 Anglo-Iraqi conflict lay in the very structure by which modern Iraq was created. After World War I, during the 1921 Cairo Conference, British officials, such as Winston Churchill, T. E. Lawrence, and the Hashemite family of the Hijaz (western Arabia) that led the Arab revolt, gathered to stitch together modern Iraq from the Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. After Prince Faisal was ejected by the French in 1920 and denied kingship of Syria, it was in Iraq that the British would find a convenient monarchy to install Faisal. It also provided the British with a method of giving their mandate in Iraq the veneer of Arab governance. The installation of Faisal as King of Iraq represented many negative images to average Iraqis, which included a Sunni ruling over a Shiite majority nation, a British-inspired monarch, and a western Arabian (Hijazi) with no connection to Iraq. The Iraqi monarchy and constitution was created from 1921 to 1923 with British oversight. This was a time when many Arab officers demobilized or simply defected from the Ottoman armies and were experimenting with ideas of nationalism, self-determination, and even fascism. The Iraqi constitutional monarchy was created to primarily preserve British basing and oil interests in Iraq, which was further cemented by the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty that ensured favorable terms for the British and control of strategic military bases, primarily the Habbaniya air base, and valued oil fields. The terms of the 1930 treaty led to the suicide of Iraq’s Prime Minister Abdel-Mohsen Saddoun, who could not endure the humiliation of the terms dictated by the British. The 1930 treaty led to mass demonstrations, including an infamous riot orchestrated by General Yassin Hashimi, who would become Prime Minister in 1935. In this climate, Iraqi officers dreamed of being the next Kemal Attaturk or Reza Shah, both military officers; Attaturk founded modern Turkey and Shah found ed the Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran. Other Arab officers in Iraq also saw solutions in the militant fascism of Hitler and Musso- “After Prince Faisal was ejected by the French in 1920 and denied kingship of Syria, it was in Iraq that the British would find a convenient monarchy to install Faisal. It also provided the British with a method of giving their mandate in Iraq the veneer of Arab governance. The installation of Faisal as King of Iraq represented many negative images to the average Iraqis, which included a Sunni ruling over a Shiite majority nation, a British-inspired monarch, and a western Arabian (Hijazi) with no connection to Iraq.” 6 — lini, who created a facade of order and industry using hidden violence and suppression of civil and political life. Among the most influential military officers that infused the army into Iraqi politics was not afield commander, but an instructor in Iraq’s military academy. Colonel Tawfik Hussein taught military history and injected ideas that inspired not only Al-Durrah, but a string of Iraqi military leaders who would orchestrate a series of military coups. Hussein laced his history lesson with images of King Faisal betraying the aspirations of Iraqi, Syrian, and Palestinian officers who left the Ottoman service to fight against the Turks in the Arab Revolt in the hope of establishing an independent Arab state. He argued that the Iraqi army has a duty to undertake political action to realign the direction of the nation. In 1929, Hussein began teaching and, by 1934, he had influenced over 70 key officers and attracted the attention of the Muslim youth group, who yearned to reestablish the Caliphate in Iraq. Two of the four generals in charge of the army and who understood they held the key to maintaining internal order for King Faisal, were followers of Hussein’s rationale. In addition, Lebanon became a haven for Iraqi officers who published pamphlets, as well as anti-monarchy and anti-British articles in the Lebanese press. More importantly, Lebanon offered a location to hold meetings with Islamists, communists, and nationalists, all committed on ridding Iraq of British influence. The 1936 Bakr Sidqui Military Coup It is important that all Arabs study what would become the first incidence in modern Arab political history where army officers staged a successful military coup in October 1936. The climate to create the perfect conditions for this military coup included the bulk of the Iraqi army being deployed on annual summer maneuvers, the army chief of staff being out of the country in London for military talks, and the cooperation of a flight commander who controlled five bombers, all under the leadership of General Bakr Sidqui. Events, which unfolded around the night of 26 October 1936, began with a shock and awe of bombers, under the command of Ali Jawad, screaming over Baghdad at 11:30 p.m. They dropped four bombs in front of the council of ministers’ building, the central post office, parliament, and the Dakhla River, leading to seven casualties, but more importantly, this was the first time aerial bombardments were used in a military coup. The officers in revolt swore fealty to King Ghazi and sent a proclamation to the king indicating they were purging the corrupt ministers around him. Communists, led by lawyers in and around Baghdad, asked the people to rise up against the government. During the ensuing chaos, the war minister, Jafar Al-Aksary, was murdered by several officers sent by Sidqui. General Sidqui imposed Prime Minister Hikmat Sulayman on King Ghazi and Iraq would be ruled by unconstitutional means for a year. Al-Harb Al-Iraqiyah Al-Britaniah laments the decision to execute Jafar Al-Askary, who dedicated his life to Arab nationalist causes and was a competent warrior having distinguished himself fighting the Ottomans in the Arab Revolt; he also fought the French in Syria. General Sidqui’s dictatorship would last less than a year and he would be killed in an assassination plot hatched by military officers.2 Iraqi politics after Sidqui would see the return of Prime Minister Nuri as-Said, for his fourth time as prime minister. Prime Minister as-Said attempted to remove Iraq’s chief of staff, General Amari. Instead of having General Amari capitulate to the wishes of civilian authority, it was Amari and 30 senior officers who removed Nuri as-Said from power and imposed Rashid Ali al-Gaylani as prime minister. For added measure, the 30 senior officers, all yearning to return to the Sidqui dictatorship, deposed the war minister, Taha Hashemi. Only one encampment, the Wishash Barracks, remained loyal to civil authority. The dic-tatorships of Generals Fawzy and Amari, along with Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, began in 1940 and would last until the end of the Anglo-Iraqi War in late May 1941. World War II Iraq During World War II, Iraqi officers and cadets saw a Britain that was on its last legs of empire. Many senior Iraqi generals and Arab nationalists assessed the situation and found that Britain stood alone; the Wehrmacht rolled over France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; Hitler signed a nonaggression pact with Stalin; Iran’s Reza Shah was pro-Axis; Turkey’s Kemal Attaturk remained neutral; Haj Amin Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, allied himself fully with the Nazis and was offering religious sanction for Arab officers to throw off their governments that enabled British colonization; and London requested Baghdad abide by the provisions of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and declare war on Italy and Germany. Iraqi officers questioned why Iraq should continue its pro-British policies and have British oversight in policy matters when it was losing to the Germans. In a compact with Prime Minister al-Gaylani and the senior generals, it was decided that Iraq’s policy was to gain full independence for itself, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine to form a Greater Arab State. These five countries also formed a government that favored militarism; however, they stalled on declaring war on the Axis because it recognized Arab self-determination; it declared no colonial ambitions in Egypt and Sudan and recognized their independence; it recognized the need for Arabs to be linguistically and culturally linked; and it was vehemently anti-Zionist. There was a selective memory about Axis efforts to colonize Arab and African nations; for instance, the Italians colonized Libya in 1911 and began an invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. From 1940 to the start of hostilities between British and Iraqi forces, a series of negotiations were undertaken to get Baghdad to first declare war on the Axis, then allow access through Iraq for British forces, and lastly, react to London’s request for extra Iraqi security in and around two strategic British air bases at Habbaniyah and Baghdad. Al-Harb Al-Iraqiyah Al-Britaniah addresses American diplomatic urgings for Iraq to cooperate with Britain as a means of asserting its right to full independence. This was the same line “The 1930 treaty led to mass demonstrations, including an infamous riot orchestrated by General Yassin Hashimi, who would become Prime Minister in 1935. In this climate, Iraqi officers dreamed of being the next Kemal Attaturk [at left] or Reza Shah [at right], both military officers; Attaturk founded modern Turkey and Shah found ed the Pahlavi Dynasty in Iran.” — 7 of reasoning the United States urged with Morocco: that allied forces would, after World War II, work toward self-determination and independence of protectorates, mandates, and colonies.3 The Iraqis, in turn, wanted Britain to assert the independence of Syria and Lebanon once it was liberated from the Vichy French, and demanded a just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian problem (then, as it is now, the Palestinian question was an agenda item of Arab governments). The British were in no mood for negotiations and expected the Iraqis to abide by the provisions of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. Finer points of disagreement between the Iraqi and British governments dealt with unimpeded access to Iraqi facilities versus the landing of British forces only with the consent of Baghdad. Such Iraqi indeci-siveness in times of war would lead to the May 1941 British invasion of Iraq. What gave Britain’s Iraq policy a sense of urgency was the successful invasion of Greece by Nazi forces in April 1941, which made German bombers and transports within easy range of the Middle East. It is important to pause and understand the state of the Iraqi monarchy during 1940-1941. King Ghazi had died in a car crash in 1938, and in the world of conspiracies, the Iraqi street blamed his death on a British plot. In his place, the young King Faisal II was too young to assume the throne and regency under his uncle, Prince Abdal-Illah, was declared. Prince Abdal-Illah saw the controversy between Prime Minister al-Gaylani and the army, versus the British, as a means of wrestling more power for the monarchy with British support. British and Iraqi negotiations became crucial when Nazi forces solidified their hold on Greece and were moving on strategic islands such as Rhoades and Crete. The government of Prime Minister al-Gaylani agreed to allow British forces to land in Basra, but attached many conditions as to the size and use of roads by these and follow-on forces. The issue of follow-on British forces would be the spark that ignited conflict in May 1941. In the last week of April, British air, land, and naval forces were making their way to Iraq from Bahrain, India, and Palestine. The bulk of these ground forces would land in Basra, regardless of what Iraqi generals and ministers thought about follow-on forces. The stage was set for conflict. The Rashid Ali (al-Gaylani) Revolt or Anglo-Iraqi Conflict Before delving into the tactics and operational aspects of this conflict, it is important to reflect on the choices that Iraqi leaders made versus how Morocco attained independence as a result of World War II. Iraq saw in British weakness, in the early years of the war (1939-1941), an opportunity to defy London and assert its sovereignty. Morocco, a French protectorate, and its monarch, King Mohammed V, chose to side with the allied cause, contributing troops in the hopes that the removal of its status as a French protectorate would be the natural outcome after the liberation of France and the victory of the free French. The outcome for Iraq would be a chaotic government after World War II, leading to the demise of the monarchy in 1958; for Morocco, it would lead to independence in 1956, with small skirmishes with French forces and a relatively easier removal of its protectorate status. In Iraqi memory, the 1941 British landing would signify the second time English troops occupied Iraq, the first being 1914 to 1918. Little attention is paid to the reasons and geostrategic issues that drove London to send troops both times for the Iraqis, which is enough to say the British occupied Iraq twice during the 20th century without a real comprehension of the historic or millennial geostrategic background of Mesopotamia. The Military Balance of Forces and Disposition In 1941, Iraq commanded approximately 46,000 active and 280,000 reserve ar my officers and troops and had 13,000 policemen. The Iraqis possessed a mixed number of Italian, British, and American warplanes and transports, and one armored group composed of a mixture of antiquated tanks and armored personnel carriers. Unique to Iraqi forces is a riverine force of four armored patrol craft of 70 tons, armed with machine guns. Iraqi forces were divided into three security regions: the 1st and 2d Army Groups, headquartered in Baghdad with garrisons in Fallujah, Baquba, Ramadi, and Habbaniya air base (one of two in the country); the 3d Army Group, headquartered in Mosul; and the 4th Army Group, headquartered in Basra with garrisons in Nasiriya, Diwaniyah, Amarah, and Al-Shuayba air base (second of two in the country). Why Iraq’s Military Fate was Sealed Despite the British landing, a superior force both technologically and militarily, the main reason Al-Durrah attributes to the total defeat of Iraq is what he calls “the governance of five” (the four military generals and Prime Minister al-Gaylani). The four senior officers, General Salah-al-din Sabbagh, Colonel Fahmy Said, Colonel Mahmood Suleiman, and Colonel Kamel Shabeeb, were each in command of an army group and had their own political ambitions and tribal groups to protect. As overall command and control of Iraqi forces was nonexistent, their military fate was sealed. An example highlighted in Al-Durrah’s book is the Iraqi general staff drawing up contingencies for the defense of Basra, which was completely ignored by field commanders who took their orders from General Salah-al-Din Sabbagh, the military governor of Basra. The first wave of British forces were granted access into Basra by Prime Minister al-Gaylani and arrived on 18 April 1941. They were composed of the 20th Infantry Brigade, an artillery regiment, an antitank battery, an engineer company, and a civil affairs/humanitarian group. Their mission was to secure the port at Basra for follow-on forces that were to arrive 27 April. It was this second British contingent to which Prime Minister al-Gaylani refused to grant access, adding that British forces could not exceed one brigade in Iraq. On 29 April 1941, the British considered this refusal an abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and tantamount to war. London refused to tie in any political concessions on issues, such as Palestine and its manda- “It is important to pause and understand the state of the Iraqi monarchy during 1940-1941. King Ghazi had died in a car crash in 1938, and in the world of conspiracies, the Iraqi street blamed his death on a British plot. In his place, the young King Faisal II was too young to assume the throne and regency under his uncle, Prince Abdal-Illah, was declared.” 8 — tory status over Iraq, to the landing of British troops on Iraqi soil during a time of war and national survival against Axis powers. General Sabbagh of the Basra military district remarked that by allowing this initial force unopposed into Basra, the battle for this strategic port city had been lost. Another problem of the Iraqis was the only objective given to army group commanders was to be prepared to defend their regions. The British had clear objectives, which included first securing Basra and then the airfield at Habbaniya. The Strategic Importance of Habbaniya Air Base To demonstrate the importance of the Habbaniya airfield and its airport, Sin Al-Zuban, a secret communiqué from Berlin, was dispatched by Mufti Kamal Haddad to guarantee Axis support to Iraqi Prime Minister al-Gaylani should war break out with the British. It also stated that an air bridge of resupply from the island of Rhoades would be provided, but pressed for the Iraqis to occupy Sin Al-Zuban airport and Habbaniya airfield, as well as secure sources of highly refined airplane fuel for German transports and fighter escorts. This Axis air bridge offered an important supply option for Iraqi forces since they had no access to Basra. Colonel Haqi Abdel-Karim commanded elements of the Third Army Group and took the initiative to lay plans for moving his group to secure Habbaniya air base. His forces would take positions around the base and attack once hostilities began with the British. Colonel Abdel-Karim worried about British air superiority in strafing his ground forces and breaking a siege of Habbaniya air base. His plan included a strategy to amass several artillery pieces across the Euphrates River overlooking Habbaniya air base and begin bombarding the base while conducting an infantry assault. On 30 April, the British base commander of Habbaniya awoke to find a massing of Iraqi troops around the perimeter and occupying the strategic heights of Talul, overlooking the entire base. Immediately, the base was placed on alert and mobile armored vehicles, with mounted Vickers machine guns, began taking positions along the perimeter. The Iraqis pushed forward tank, armored, machine gun, and mechanized infantry companies that were supporting the 4th Infantry Brigade that arrived from Kirkuk. They also reinforced this assault force with anti-air and engineering companies. British reconnaissance patrols revealed that the 1st Infantry Brigade moved from Baghdad to Ramadi to cut British reinforcements from Jordan. The Iraqis also moved their 11th Infantry Regiment from Baghdad to Fallujah by train to act as a reserve force that could respond using the village’s central location with its rail and river connections. The Iraqi generals and colonels then debated whether to make the first move and attack Habbaniya air base or wait for the British to strike first. The British continued their reconnaissance flights in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Habbaniya sectors. Capitalizing on Airpower: A New British Realization The Anglo-Iraqi War of 1941 saw maximum use of airpower by British forces and their Iraqi counterparts, as well as their Axis allies. At 0500 hours on 2 May, British bombers took off from the Al-Shuayba air base near Basra and the surrounded Habbaniya air base in the center of Iraq. Their target was Iraqi units surrounding Habbaniya air base that were not within artillery range. The British had prioritized their target list in the following order: artillery, tanks, armored carriers, trucks, and infantry formations. The Iraqis responded by shelling Habbaniya air base, beginning at 0550 hours, and sent up anti-air Flak directed at British warplanes. The British aerial attack lasted 19 hours and targets were drawn against Iraqi military assets in Baghdad, as well as Iraqi planes at the Rashid Ali airstrip and troop barracks in Qur-na. Four Wellington bombers decimated Iraqi warplanes on the ground at the Rashid Ali airstrip. Sensing an imminent attack, and by observing the mass take offs of British warplanes, the Iraqis sent up their own fighters and bombers, which downed one Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter at Salman Pak and attacked British-held Sin Zuban airport at Habbaniya before making an emergency landing at Fallujah. After the attack on the Rashid Ali airstrip, the Iraqis dispersed their planes to airstrips at Baquba, Khan Bani Saad, Dilli Abbas, and Mikdadiyah. However, good reconnaissance alerted the British to these other four airstrips and they attacked with aerial sorties, one of which scored a direct hit on the precious airplane fuel storage facility in Baquba. By 4 May, only 7 out of 69 Iraqi warplanes remained and the only time the Iraqis would enjoy any air support was when Nazi Messerschmitt fighters and Henkel bombers flew to Iraq from bases in Rhoades and Syria (then controlled by the Vichy French). Iraqis and Germans could not coordinate Axis airpower with Iraqi ground operations against British forces. Instead, Axis warplanes stumbled on RAF fighters over Iraq. The British employed anew tactic of keeping Iraqi units pinned in location using continuous aerial bombardment. Iraqis were unable to maneuver and support forces surrounding the British air base at Habbaniya. RAF planes located an infantry group traveling from Baghdad to Fallujah and strafed it. After almost 2 days of relentless RAF aerial bombardment against the Iraqis surrounding Habbaniya, a combined air and land force went to Talul Heights with infantry and armored Vickers machine gun regiments to mop up the concentration of Iraqi artillery and infantry forces surrounding the air base. Large British transports disgorged heavy artillery pieces at Habbaniya, which began shelling Iraqi artillery positions across the Euphrates River overlooking Habbaniya air base. On 6 and 7 May, a combined British and Indian expeditionary force, which made up two infantry brigades, landed in Basra; these forc- “Iraq saw in British weakness, in the early years of the war (1939-1941), an opportunity to defy London and assert its sovereignty. Morocco, a French protectorate, and its monarch, King Mohammed V, chose to side with the allied cause, contributing troops in the hopes that the removal of its status as a French protectorate would be the natural outcome after the liberation of France and the victory of the free French.” — 9 es would be critical in bringing civil order in Basra. The Axis Enters the Fray One of the most important lessons to be learned from the 1941 Anglo-Iraqi conflict is the impact that outside powers have on the potential outcome of warfare in Iraq, whether Vichy French Syria, Germany, and Palestinian guerrillas in 1941 or Syria, Iran, and non-Iraqi Islamist extremist terrorist groups today. The Germans used Vichy French Syria to shuttle supplies and conduct air attacks in support of the Iraqis. These groups also used bases in Mosul, which offered the added benefit of access to fuel supplies. On 14 and 15 May, the British had had enough and launched air attacks on Mosul and Irbil in Northern Iraq, and struck at airstrips and air bases in Damascus, Halab, and Rayan, Syria. The British also maintained two remote fuel depots labeled H3 and H4 along the Jordan, Rabta, and Baghdad roads, which would aid General Glubb Pasha’s Arab legions and British forces in Palestine to quickly access Iraq during this crisis in support of British units. Another item eerily similar to the 2003 war in Iraq was the use of guerrillas to harass regular forces. In this case, the guerrillas and so-called “mujahideen” from Syria, Iraq, and Palestine joined the irregular force led by Palestinian leader Al-Kaukji. From 19 to 22 May, British generals in Basra focused their efforts on Fallujah because the village offered a crossroads, as well as rail and river links, to Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. The British staged a diversionary attack on Ramadi to deceive Iraqis in committing forces in that sector while the main thrust on Fallujah began at 0500 hours on 19 May with bombardment from 57 fighter bombers. The Iraqis failed to stop an advance of combined artillery, infantry, and mobile armored vehicles mounted with Vickers machine guns, and Fallujah fell. An Iraqi truck, laden with dynamite to destroy the iron bridge linking Fallujah and Baghdad, was strafed by sheer luck by a RAF fighter. Hitler realized the importance of unfolding events in Iraq and signed a directive on 23 May authorizing military aid, advisors, weapons, intelligence sharing, and communications with Iraqi resistance forces to bog the British in Iraq. Hitler’s preoccupation with Operation Barbarossa and his eventual invasion of Russia sapped the effectiveness of Axis assistance to Iraq. The Fall of Baghdad Al-Durrah’s book ends with a criticism of the way Baghdad fell. Iraqi generals and colonels did not overcome and adapt to British tactics in using combined air, ground, and artillery forces, along with the effective armored machine gun vehicles. Instead, Iraqi regular forces fought predictably a defensive action. Al-Durrah compares the plan for the defense of Baghdad as almost identical to the defense of Fallujah. The book describes how the defensive plans of Baghdad collapsed as soon as it came into contact with British regiments and aerial bombers. Generals and colonels, who were confident of British defeat and support of the Axis almost a year earlier, were now fleeing toward Mosul. Britain returned the regency of Prince Abdal-Illah and many of these generals and colonels were rounded up and subjected to an Iraqi military tribunal, thus ending the reign of Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Gaylani and his four generals that ran Iraqi affairs for a little more than a year. These generals were replaced by Prime Minister Nuri as-Said, who would become prime minister for a fifth time. The war would assert the Iraqi monarchy’s executive authority until the revolution of 1958 that violently ended Hashemite rule in Iraq and brought Colonel Abdel-Karim Qassem into power. Al-Harb Al-Iraqiyah Al-Britaniah offers American military planners an understanding of why Iraqis mistrust foreign intervention; in particular, Iraqi leaders are highly sensitive to foreign basing rights, which is why routine agreements governing status of forces protections that enable a military exercise today are resisted and sometimes viewed with suspicion by many Arab governments.4 The challenge is to understand the history and keep reassuring Arab friends that such agreements are not designed to impinge on sovereignty. Unlike European colonial, mandatory, and protectorate experiences that crafted documents to subjugate a region, current civilized nations and global powers in the 21st century are working together to empower Arab countries in dealing with security challenges that impact us all. Just as America’s military students spent much time studying Russian works during the cold war, today’s conflict demands a comprehensive study of Arabic works like Al-Harb Al-Iraqiyah Al-Britaniah. Notes 1Al-Durrah, Al-Harb Al-Iraqiyah Al-Britaniah, Dar-Al-Taleeah Printers, Beirut, Lebanon, 478 pp. 2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, U. S. Navy, is currently serving as a counterterrorism analyst, Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Washington DC. He received a BBA from the University of Mississippi, an MBA and Masters from the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, and a Masters from the Joint Military Intelligence College. His military education includes the Naval War Command and Staff College, the Army War College Defense Strategy Course, and Amphibious Warfare School. He has served in various duty assignments, to include special advisor and Middle East country director, Islamic Military, Office of the Secretary of Defense. His assessment of Al-Harb Al-Iraqiyah Al-Britaniah represents his understanding of the material; any errors or omissions are his own. He wishes to thank the Pentagon and Georgetown University librarians for making the book available for analysis. Finally, he would like to express his appreciation to the SOUTHCOM Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, U. S. Navy, for his constant support of efforts to bring Arabic works of military significance to U. S. military professional journals. “Colonel Haqi Abdel-Karim commanded elements of the Third Army Group and took the initiative to lay plans for moving his group to secure Habbaniya air base. His forces would take positions around the base and attack once hostilities began with the British. Colonel Abdel-Karim worried about British air superiority in strafing his ground forces and breaking a siege of Habbaniya air base.” 10 —