Transferring and Cultivating ‘Deep Smarts’ — A Force Multiplier in Modern Warfare

The current military paradigm requires commanders to embrace full spectrum operations, high tempo operational execution, rapidly developing technologies, and confront an evolving new generation of warfare.1 To embrace this reality and address the increasing knowledge gaps among units and commanders, the U. S. Army needs a robust plan to cultivate and transfer essential military wisdom.2 In distilling an actionable message to business managers, Dorothy Leonard and Walter Swap, in their book Deep Smarts, present a model on building, recreating, and cultivating “deep smarts” within an organization.3 The term describes “a special form of experience-based expertise that is critical for managers to understand and appreciate.”4 Leonard and Swap note that “throughout an organization are people whose intuition, judgment, and knowledge, both explicit and tacit, are stored in their heads.”5 With the rapidly evolving nature of warfare and increased demands for proficiency of operations throughout the spectrum, we cannot leave the accumulation of deep smarts to chance and random experience. This presents the need for developing deep smarts, the benefits of understanding how it applies to current military conflicts, and the deliberate process of cultivating it as a force multiplier for the Army. Recognizing the Need for Deep Smarts Leonard and Swap define “deep smarts” as “a form of expertise based on firsthand life experiences, providing insights drawn from tacit knowledge. Deep smarts are as close as we get to wisdom. They are based on know-how more than know-what — the ability to comprehend complex, interactive relationships and make swift, expert decisions based on that system level comprehension, as well as the ability, when necessary, to dive into component parts of that system and understand the details.”6 Clearly, these nodes of wisdom are apparent in the Army by commanders embroiled in a variety of current and past operations. However, current management practices, as espoused by Leonard and Swap in transferring these deep smarts, are ineffective as we “fail to differentiate between the kinds of knowledge that can be transmitted as brain food and those that need marinating and slow cooking.”7 People learn, create, and recreate knowledge through experience. In making decisions, many commanders rely on intuition of the battlefield situation. However, what we think of as intuition is really swift-pattern recognition, based on experiences. The ability to see patterns in a sea of information is a hallmark of deep smarts. Leonard and Swap note that “deep smarts like these not only enable those who possess them to act with conviction, but are also better able to convince others to follow their lead.”8 Why then are the current learning ap-paratuses within the Army not sufficient to address this? For a commander to capture complex experience-based knowledge, the person’s brain has to contain receptors.9 Information does not become knowledge until it connects with something we already know. The Army builds these receptors in commanders through simulations and other direct methods of learning, largely passive reception. However, there is a limit to these methods. In 2003, Lieutenant General William Wallace noted that “the enemy we’re fighting is a bit different than the one we wargamed against, because of these paramilitary forces. We knew they were here, but we did not know how they would fight.”10 In bridging the knowledge gap, the Army — 35 has also used mentorship as a tool. However, mentors are not expected, with some competency, to transfer skills or knowhow. In February 2006, General George Casey Jr. started a counterinsurgency (COIN) academy to stress the need for U. S. forces to shift from a conventional warfare mindset to one that understands how to win in a guerrilla-style conflict, and made its attendance mandatory for all commanders serving in Iraq. The purpose of the school, which was located north of Baghdad, was to prevent the same outcome that occurred in 2003-04 when Army commanders committed mistakes typical of a conventional military facing an insurgency. However, as a direct method of knowledge transfer, its advantages might be limited because of the large amounts of tacit elements involved. Much of the experience in counterinsurgency cannot be readily articulated. The knowledge might also be too primitive to be well structured. Leonard and Swap note that “PowerPoint presentations, the publishing of best practices, checklists, and guidelines can create receptors where none existed, but none of these methods, useful as they are, will suffice to create deep smarts.”11 In winning the next battle decisively as an organization, we would want to deliberately transfer the experience-based knowledge of today’s battles to the commanders and junior leaders who will determine tomorrow’s outcome. Understanding the Context for Deep Smarts As noted by Leonard and Swap, “deep smarts are based on firsthand life experiences, providing insights drawn from the tacit knowledge that has built up over time.”12 A good example would be lessons learned from the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment’s (ACR) involvement in Tal Afar, Iraq, from 2004 -2005. There were several techniques and methods that the regimental commander employed during counterinsurgency operations. For example, following the suggestion of his Iraqi allies, he ringed the city with dirt berms 9 feet high and 12 miles long, leaving checkpoints from which all movement could be observed. This was effective and allowed U. S. forces to control and follow the movement of the population. The regimental commander and his staff, with input from U. S. intelligence sources, also traced the kinship lines of different tribes, enabling the unit to track fighters traveling to likely destinations just outside the city. About 120 fighters were then rounded up from among those fleeing the impending attack. Before launching an attack into the city, the unit pressed civilians to leave the city for a camp prepared for them just to the south. In September, after 4 months of preparatory moves, the regiment launched its attack. By that point, there were remarkably few insurgents left in the city. Many had fled or been caught. U. S. forces and their Iraqi allies then moved slowly, clearing each block of the city and calling in artillery strikes as they spotted enemy fighters or explosives. When establishing security, the first step was to establish 29 patrol bases across the city. That, along with steady patrolling, gave the U. S. military and its Iraqi allies a view of every major stretch of road in the compact city. This level of observation made it extremely difficult for insurgents to plant bombs. During an interview with the Washington Post, Colonel H. R. McMaster, commander, 3d ACR, noted that the success was “fragile.”13 The city’s mayor however was unhappy that the unit was leaving. He said other American units had been there before, but they did not coordinate with Iraqi forces like McMaster. “When you leave, I will leave, too,” the mayor threatened.14 Much of the lessons learned and processes for implementation will remain largely tacit knowledge within Colonel McMaster and his staff. Leonard and Swap observes that to calibrate such a gap in knowledge within the organization “the usual approach is to arrange a series of workshops that cover topics assumed to be important and fielding questions. This kind of exercise is valuable, of course, but is unlikely to cover more than the most common events, situations and technical problems. Moreover, the tacit dimensions of knowledge are not elicited.”15 As a learning organization, the Army would need to facilitate the development and transfer of these deep smarts in aspects of counterinsurgency from the “expert” to the novice or protégé preparing for an impending counterinsurgency mission.16 Transferring and Cultivating Deep Smarts Within the Army As military operations become more complex and encompass the full spectrum of missions, the cultivation of deep smarts becomes increasingly necessary. How then can we transfer deep smarts within the Army? Leonard and Swap propose that deep smarts within an organization can be best transferred through “guided experience” of knowledge coaches to protégé.17 This involves guided observation, observing expertise in practice; guided problemsolving, working on a problem jointly; and guided experimentation, the mindset of thinking in terms of hypotheses and tests.18 “Deep smarts are as close as we get to wisdom. They are based on know-how more than know-what — the ability to comprehend complex, interactive relationships and make swift, expert decisions based on that system level comprehension, as well as the ability, when necessary, to dive into component parts of that system and understand the details.” Clearly, these nodes of wisdom are apparent in the Army by commanders embroiled in a variety of current and past operations.” 36 —

Guided observation is a powerful way of initiating novices into the practices of someone with deep smarts. Leonard and Swap note that “guided observation can be a more effective way of developing deep smarts than observation alone, if the knowledge coach selects the subjects for observation and focuses the protégé’s attention on salient behavior.”19 This has much application to unit commanders executing relief in place (RIP) missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Guided observation would allow for deliberate reflection, and paired with brainstorming would improve observation and questioning. Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, describes the many lessons that Task Force (TF) 1st Battalion, 34th (1-34) Armor, learned during its deployment in Iraq. One such example reflects the new paradigm faced by the unit’s staff during counterinsurgency operations. Nagl notes that “the enemy we faced could only be defeated if we knew his name and address — and, often, the addresses of his extended family. Understanding tribal loyalties, political motivations, and family relationships were essential to defeating the enemy we faced, a task more akin to breaking up a Mafia crime ring than dismantling a conventional enemy battalion or brigade. ‘Link diagrams’ depicting who talked with who became a daily chore for a small intelligence staff more used to analyzing the ranges of enemy artillery systems.”20 Such innovative tools, when presented, mask many of the tacit elements of reorganizing unit staffs to be employed in new tasks, and how many revisions were made to the link diagrams to make the process optimally effective for the unit. In transferring this knowledge to subsequent follow-on units and units in training (proté- gés), knowledge coaches, through guided observation, can transfer the tacit elements of such innovation. Guided problemsolving allows the pro- tégé to work on a problem jointly, and by doing so, learn how to approach the problem. During counterinsurgency and peace support operations, incoming commanders would be able to learn much from an in-country knowledge coach when solving problems jointly.21 This could also apply to inexperienced military advisors. Guided problemsolving allows the learner to actively develop his deep smarts and contribute to an experience repertoire. As an example, Nagl again notes that based on his experiences with TF 1-34 Armor, native local forces have inherent advantages over outsiders in a counterinsurgency campaign: “They can gain intelligence through the public support that naturally adheres to a nation’sown armed forces. They don’t need to allocate translators to combat patrols. They understand the tribal loyalties and family relationships that play such an important role in the politics and economies of many developing nations. They have an innate understanding of local patterns of behavior that is simply unattainable by foreigners. All these advantages make local forces enormously effective counterinsurgents.”22 Task Force 1-34 Armor worked diligently to mentor the local police force and two battalions of the Iraqi National Guard during its year in Khalidiyah, Iraq. Nagl also adds that “recruiting, organizing, training, equipping, and employing these forces often appeared to be an uphill fight, as the Iraqi leadership both wanted and resented American leadership and logistical and financial support. Building trust through joint operations and shared risks ultimately resulted in some intelligence sharing, but the task of creating reliable forces that could independently guarantee local security was incomplete when the task force passed responsibility for these units to its follow-on force, Task Force 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry.”23 Much of the development of the cooperation and working procedures between TF 1-34 Armor and local forces were inherently tacit to the commander and staff. Guided problemsolving allows the incoming commander or units in training (pro- tégé) to understand the tacit elements, or deep smarts, from the knowledge coach, such as the basis for established working procedures and historical context of the cooperation. Guided experimentation is needed when there is a lack of information. David Gar- “For a commander to capture complex experience-based knowledge, the person’s brain has to contain receptors. Information does not become knowledge until it connects with something we already know. The Army builds these receptors in commanders through simulations and other direct methods of learning, largely passive reception.” — 37 vin, Learning in Action: A Guide to Putting the Learning Organization to Work, notes that two types of experiments can occur: hypothesis testing and exploration.24 Hypothesis testing is used to determine the superior, while exploration is more open-minded with a goal to generate options. In both cases, coaches can add value by helping identify the types of experiments and their extent. Leonard and Swap note that this extreme form of planned “learning by doing” creates receptors and promotes the development of deep smarts.25 An example of guided experimentation can be seen in the use of “eagle check-ward, away from their vehicles with their hands on their heads, and were searched when they reached the checkpoint. The eagle checkpoints were launched to avoid fixed, ground-based checkpoints, which had attracted suicide attacks on British troops. This technique was successful for the battle group because of its uncertainty — the local populace had no idea where the Royal Marines would establish checkpoints — and effectively denied insurgents freedom of movement. In understanding the basis for such a technique, it was noted that the use of the eagle checkpoint had been frequently used during ard and Swap rightly observe that in training and development “we want to believe that we can make leaders out of managers (or commanders) if we send them to a course on leadership. We want to believe that smart people taking over new positions can learn what they need to know with little or no overlapping service with their predecessors. We spend millions of dollars on reports, analyses, and databases so people who need to learn can plow through them and become knowledgeable. And we no longer have time for ap-prenticeships. The practice of having a novice shadow an expert for an extended period is prevalent only in some isolated parts of our society, such as medical training.”27 To address the full spectrum of operations that commanders would be expected to plan for and execute with a high degree of proficiency at both tactical and operational levels, we need to design guided experience for our organizational practices. All commanders should think of themselves as knowledge coaches. These commanders have a responsibility to identify junior leaders who have deep smarts and are indispensable to current and future operations, and plan programs of knowledge transfer. The Army, as a learning organization, needs to raise the general organizational level of sophistication about how deep smarts are developed. One of the perceived limitations of creating deep smarts is that of the lengthy timeframe needed to create guided experience. Simple and profound receptors can be built through lectures and simulations, but the transfer of deep smarts, “grown organically, through experience, and like any organic process takes time.”28 Technology through various applications can aid in the transfer; however, in delivering complex, experience-based knowledge in simple form, we need to “appreciate the limits of oversimplification and fast delivery.”29 In confronting tomorrow’s battles, the Army would greatly benefit from knowledge coaches. As Leonard and Swap put it, “knowledge coaches help their proté- gés recreate through guided experience — the deep smarts, including tacit knowledge. Why recreate rather than just transfer knowledge? Because today is not exactly like yesterday, and the current situation is inevitably a bit different from the one the coach experienced. Some of the coach’s deep smarts apply directly; some need to be adapted. In the act of recreation, protégés sift through these options and figure out for themselves what ap-points,” employed by the British army’s Black Watch battle group during its deployment to Camp Dogwood, Iraq, located 20 miles south of Baghdad, in November 2004. The method involved surprise air raids to search for suspects on desert roads around the base. Arriving in helicopters, Royal Marines attached to the battle group were on the ground, stopping and searching vehicles, no longer than 20 minutes. As soon as they reached the ground, the Royal Marines took position along the route. Approaching vehicles were ordered to stop 100 yards out and the occupants were ordered to walk forthe British troubles in Northern Ireland. Hence, the deep smarts of the experiences in Northern Ireland allowed for the hypothesis testing by knowledge coaches in Iraq.26 Thus, guided experience, observation, problemsolving, and experimentation under the guidance of a knowledge coach, facilitates the development and transfer of deep smarts from the expert to the protégé. In cultivating deep smarts as part of the management and learning culture within the Army, we need to identify and include a key role for knowledge coaches. Leon- “In February 2006, General George Casey Jr. started a counterinsurgency (COIN) academy to stress the need for U. S. forces to shift from a conventional warfare mindset to one that understands how to win in a guerrilla-style conflict, and made its attendance mandatory for all commanders serving in Iraq. The purpose of the school, which was located north of Baghdad, was to prevent the same outcome that occurred in 2003-04 when Army commanders committed mistakes typical of a conventional military facing an insurgency.” 38 —