Evolution of the Knight: Where Armor is Headed

“The mission of armor is to close with and destroy the enemy by means of fire, maneuver, and shock effect.”1 Armor soldiers fight effectively while dismounted — this is a fact. The old adage of “death before dismount” no longer exits in the armor community. Our soldiers and leaders now train with the latest in dismounted equipment, understand dismounted patrolling tactics, and are well versed in skills formerly associated only with our infantry brethren. Two years after a call for the right equipment, soldiers now deploy with the latest in protective gear, are well trained in advanced optics, and are comfortable with the lethal employment of small arms. These skills must always remain within the armor community. Ensuring our soldiers maintain a lethal edge, both mounted and dismounted, ensures our future success, regardless of the battlespace in which we fight. Today, our armored warriors perform the role once associated mainly with Special Forces — training the independent army of a sovereign nation. Our military transition teams (MiTT) pave the way for the future success of Iraq and its guarantee of security. Two years ago, the concept of an advisor support team (AST) struggled to survive. The situation even pulled the dreaded observer/controllers away from the relative safety of “god guns” and multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES) to train Iraqi army battalions. With a highly austere support structure and no training prior to deployment, the early AST worked hard to produce capable and effective battalions. Today’s MiTT members receive nearly two months of training prior to deployment, something the old AST members did not receive. Today’s advisor training involves everything from calling for artillery to familiarization with Iraqi weapons systems. The latter (for our AST) occurred in the searing desert heat while trying to decipher a technical manual written in Czech or Russian, accompanied by the occasional indirect attack. Clearly, the training allocated for MiTTs is a direct result of current mission success. Additionally, the importance of culture, echoed nearly a century ago by T. E. Lawrence, is understood by the current crop of advisors. Lawrence immersed himself in the Arab culture during the desert fighting of World War I. His writings and “The 27 Articles of T. E. Lawrence,” provide invaluable guidance to future MiTT members regarding Arab culture and the advisor’s role. Some pertinent examples for today’s advisor include: “Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore. Never give orders to anyone at all, and reserve your directions or advice for the CO, however great the temptation (for efficiency’s sake) of dealing with his underlings. Your place is advisory, and your advice is due to the commander alone. Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward, but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you.”2 Perhaps, as a necessity of the expanded Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), armor — 39 soldiers traditionally did not serve as advisors. As part of this current operating environment, the armor community must capture lessons learned by advisors and continue to improve on the early training needed to bring forth success for future battalions. Starting with U. S. involvement in Bosnia, armored soldiers consistently excel in what Retired General Krulak termed, “The Three-Block War.”3 Our soldiers today understand the complex battlefield. Many of our junior officers are well versed in combat operations, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian assistance operations — sometimes all within a 24-hour period. Again, the armor community must capture these lessons learned for future operations, where the three-block war is the norm, not the exception, as many of us once thought. The current fight in Iraq will not last forever. While the “Long War” on Islamic extremism may last for decades, other threats with conventional forces still exist and continue to develop. Thomas Friedman, “The First Law of Petropoli-tics,” claims as oil prices continue to rise, the amount of democratic practices in nations with questionable governments declines proportionally.4 Higher oil prices provide more free capital for countries to pour into military armaments and new weapons systems. The day of the tank is no where near over — it is simply expanding its realm. Today’s armor leaders must look back to doctrine, especially doctrine related to fighting and sustaining the mounted force. Not too many of today’s junior officers have experienced logistics, refueling, rearming, and operations that do not involve a forward operating base. When was the last time a combat training center witnessed a battalion breaching operation against prepared defenses? How much platoon training focuses on maneuvering four Abrams tanks across open terrain? Do any tank commanders remember the days of fighting through the defile drill? These vital skills must not disappear from the armored force’s playbook. Although training skills needed to win the current fight are vitally important, so are the basic blocking and tackling of armored forces — tanking. Leaders must continue to integrate mounted operations as part of a training plan while integrating lessons learned from today’s complex battlefield. Failure to maintain the bread and butter of our armored forces today may lead to a shocking wakeup call at the hands of another armored force in the future. Our forces are the best today thanks to training, doctrine, and lessons learned. Let us not forget pre-GWOT lessons while fighting the current war — the days of “gunner-sabot-tank” are not gone, merely on hold. Training management is the next important task that the armor community must continue to maintain. Since the start of the GWOT, funding, equipment, training facilities, and repair parts seem nearly limitless. As the war continues to strain our economy and budget, those days shall end. What some of my peers call “GWOT-FORGEN” or “IRAQ-FORGEN” (instead of ARFORGEN) continues to drive training. Getting your unit reset, retrained, and ready for the next Iraqi Freedom deployment limits both the amount and types of training conducted. Many of today’s young officers are not familiar with training management techniques of the pre-GWOT army. The science and art of training management must not escape our consciousness. The days of “IRAQ-FORGEN” driving every aspect of a training cycle are numbered, and not soon enough for many of us. As the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) prepares a rewrite of U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-0, keep the basic training principles in mind.5 Forecasting ammunition, land, and facilities in the days of a tightly controlled budget slowly creeps back into the force. Techniques and procedures learned on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, while important to today’s current fight, may not apply on every future battlefield. Today’s armored warrior receives better training and is far more combat seasoned than his many preceding generations. We must continue to expand on and share lessons learned on the battlefields of the GWOT. Integrating these lessons with traditional mounted maneuver training ensures an armored force ready for any threat on the battlefield, whether symmetric or asymmetric. Our enemies are thinking enemies; they too take away key lessons from our successes on the current battlefield. To ensure our continued lethality and dominance on the battlefield of tomorrow, today’s armored warriors must remember the basics of armored warfare while incorporating the valuable lessons of the past four years of combat. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual, (FM)) Tank Platoon, U. S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D. C., 3 April 1996. 2T. E. Lawrence, “The 27 Articles of T. E. Lawrence,” The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917. 3Charles C. Krulak. “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War.” Leatherneck, 31 January 1999, pp. 14- 17. 4Thomas L. Friedman, “The First Law of Petropolitics: Why the price of oil and the pace of freedom always move in opposite directions,” Foreign Policy, May/June 2006, pp. 28-36. 5FM 7-0, Training the Force, GPO, Washington, D. C., 22 October 2002. Major Mike Sullivan is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College. He received a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and a M. A. from American Military University. His military education includes Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Armor Officer Advanced Course, Tank Commanders Course, Airborne School, Air Assault School, Infantry Officer Basic Course and Jungle Operations Training Course. He has served in various command and staff positions to include airborne anti-tank platoon leader, airborne antitank company XO and airborne rifle platoon leader, 3d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC; primary maneuver instructor, Warrior Preparation Center, Kaiserslautern, Germany; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Company and A Company, 1st Battalion, 63d Armor Regiment, 1st Infantry Division, Vilseck, Germany; S3 air, 1st Battalion, 63d Armor Regiment, company/team primary observer controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany; and as an Iraqi Army advisor, 6th Iraqi Army Battalion, Kirkush, Iraq. 40 — “Today, our armored warriors perform the role once associated mainly with Special Forces — training the independent army of a sovereign nation. Our military transition teams (MiTT) pave the way for the future success of Iraq and its guarantee of security. Two years ago, the concept of an advisor support team struggled to survive.”