Operation Baton Rouge: Perspectives from an Iraqi Security Forces Advisor

“A combat advisor influences his ally by force of personal example. You coach, you teach, and you accompany in action. Finally, an advisor provides the connection and expertise to bring to bear fires, service support, and other combat multipliers. All accolades go to the leader you support.”1 In the dawning of October 2004, 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 1st Infantry Division, led a group of approximately 5,000 soldiers, comprised of 3,000 Americans and 2,000 Iraqis, on a major offensive against insurgents in Samarra, Iraq. The mission of Operation Baton Rouge was “to kill or capture anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) and return the city to competent civilian control.”2 Intelligence suggested that the AIF numbered 200 to 500 and was made up of local Baathists and former military officers fighting for the return of a Sunni-dominated government. The rest were foreign “jihadis” and hardcore Iraqi Islamists, heeding the call of terrorist leaders such as Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi. The coalition forces’ offensive operations lasted three days and concluded on 4 October. Operation Baton Rouge was touted as a resounding coalition success. During the three days, “over 125 AIF were killed, 60 wounded, and 128 detained.”3 This article focuses on the challenges of a very specific group of 1st Infantry Division soldiers, who were serving as Iraqi Security Force (ISF) advisors during the search and attack phase (phase three) of Operation Baton Rouge. Introducing ISF into the operation increased the size of the attacking/stabilizing force to prevent a power vacuum and demonstrate a credible ISF.4 Especially significant was the integration of the 1st Ministry of Interior (MOI) Special Police Commando Battalion (commandos), which proved to be a successful Iraqi solution to the Samarra problem. Initial Planning A key component of Operation Baton Rouge was introducing ISF into the city to enable civilian control of a deteriorated security environment. Initial plans for Baton Rouge called for implementing the “police-in-a-box” concept, which was based on police substations built in transportable shipping containers (with ancillary equipment of weapons and radios) complemented with newly trained Iraqi police officers. Each task force element was to clear their sector of AIF and establish control. During phase four (stabilizing), task force ISF advisors would escort police-in-a-box elements from nearby staging areas to conduct a link-up and establish Iraqi-led policing operations. Our task force mission analysis of phase four assigned our civilian international police advisors (IPA) to each of the task force’s company teams to be liaisons to the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). Our task force operations cell coordinated the ISF efforts for the task force commander. The IPAs were American police officers contracted by the U. S. State Department, strategically placed across Iraq to oversee the training and mentoring of the IPS. Overall, they were well-intentioned Americans looking to shoulder some of the burden in reconstructing Iraq. Despite some small-scale successes, they appear to have been recruited for a U. S. interagency solution rather than job competency — they had no area expertise and little or no knowledge of Iraqi security and police force missions. Most IPAs migrated from recent service under the United Nations’ mission in Kosovo. Generally, the IPAs struggled with conflicting priorities, a lack of integrated communications, and nonstandard equipment.

Our contingent of ISF advisors and IPAs arrived prior to our task force line of departure at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Brassfield-Mora to stage and link up with IPS counterparts.5 We were advised by the lead ISF advisor from another task force that phase four was still being ironed out at brigade headquarters. Lack of contact with the brigade S5/ISF cell prevented us from gaining insight into the developing plan. Contact with our task force (which was located south of Samarra) went through Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) to our attacking elements, or bounced via mobile subscriber equipment back to our location at FOB Paliwoda then via FM radio to the task force because of urban communications limitations, which added another layer of friction. Unfortunately, “Murphy” decided to show up and assist the planning cell for phase-four development. That evening, we discovered what was holding up phase-four planning — coalition forces had not yet secured compliance with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. There would be no IPS available to implement the police-in-a-box concept. The newly independent Iraqi bureaucracy would allot ISF to the division only days prior to execution. Due to the delayed introduction to the fight, commandos from the Special Police Commando Battalion became more of an exploitation-versus-policing force. Negotiations between commander, 2d BCT; commander, Task Force (TF) 1st Battalion, 14th (1-14) Infantry; the Salah Ad Din Deputy Governor; and the commandos’ commanding general and battalion commander, ended with an agreement that the commandos would work with autonomy in cooperation with TF 1-14 Infantry. See Figure 1 for task organization. They would enter operations during phase three (search and attack), conduct raids, snatch and grabs, and deliberate clearance of zones in the city. The commandos would follow TF 1-14 Infantry after they crossed the Tigris River Bridge west of Samarra and completed a forward passage of lines (FPOL) with TF 1st Battalion, 26th (1-26) Infantry, then conduct cordon and search operations to the south in vicinity of Objective Pierce, see Figure 2. The Commandos Together only a few weeks, the commandos moved to support Operation Baton Rouge with only 48-hours notice. The commandos were focused on urban raid operations and counterterrorist missions against hijackers and kidnappers. A rough, paramilitary looking unit, their uniforms consisted of a woodland camouflage pattern with black leather gloves, jackets, and balaclavas. They used American-supplied pickups with camouflage paint and machine guns mounted in a “field expedient” fashion. “From this regiment we have police who have previous experience fighting terrorism and also people who received special training under the former regime — people who used to be in the army.” — Police Commando Commanding General MG Adon Thabit6 The commandos would be effective in Samarra because of their predominantly Sunni background. Sunnis historically were in high-security roles under Saddam Hussein and therefore the most experienced. They have deep family ties with the Sunni Triangle and relied on those ties as an ad hoc intelligence network. They were very skilled in identifying civilians who represented a threat. Mission and Link-up A contingent of Task Force Steel Tigers, Blue Spaders ISF advisors, and IPAs would coordinate between the commandos and higher/adjacent units, overseeing movement and resolving coalition force/ISF issues. We would drive out im-Task Organization (Ground)

1 14 1 4 1 26 1 18 1 77 1

Commandos 7 IA

MOI: Ministry of Interior ING: Iraqi National Guard IA: Iraqi Army IPS: International Police Advisors ISF: Iraqi Security Forces Figure 1 Phase III (Search and Attack) sketch not to scale 95 82 83 84 85 86 87 00 99 98 97 96

1 14 1 26 1 18 1 4 1 77

IA 1 4 1 4 1 14 A Figure 2 — 35 mediately to link-up with the commandos who were staged at a nearby annex of FOB Brassfield-Mora. On arrival at the FOB, we quickly broke into teams to work with the commandos. We went about preparing for combat and integrated with our assigned company leaders. Our first priority was to find English-speaking commandos. Out of our team of six, now split between three companies, we had only one translator, a senior lieutenant who spoke broken English and had a common understanding of military phrases from training with U. S. Special Forces. As with all Iraqi paramilitary types, there is always a lack of equipment, which makes “areed,” which loosely translates to “I need,” the most important Arabic word to learn. In working with the ISF, I let them present their dissertation on how areed would solve their problems; my mission was to give them what I had and get them to execute, adapt, and overcome. The next morning, the commandos made a huge convoy — the likely target of an ambush — and departed the moonscape of the FOB en route to Patrol Base Razor to begin the FPOL into Samarra. We staged at the patrol base for what seemed like an eternity. Each commando company seemed to know exactly where we were going and sped off into the city. As I suspected, the convoy attracted contact as we entered the city. Again, we sweated out another eternity on the bridge entering Samarra waiting for the lead elements to sort out actions on contact. Soon after, we arrived at our chosen assault position. Unfortunately for the children of Samarra, a local school was chosen. It had a large courtyard for staging vehicles, a completely walled compound that proved to be relative protection from small-arms fire, and a rooftop view of the sector. Our defensive positions overlooked a cemetery leading to a jumbled mess of a casino, hotels, and apartment buildings. Traffic from the adjacent units was relatively regular. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.7 — T. E. Lawrence Establishing security is the only area I found conflict with T. E. Lawrence’s advice to “let them do it.” An IPA on loan from his regional headquarters did not like our stern interaction with the commandos. It seems the established priorities of work (establish security; and nothing else happens until security is established) is in contrast to the IPAs “diplomatic agenda.” We were in the middle of a firefight and he was still trying to establish bonds with his company. Diplomatic cigarette breaks were getting in the way of completing the mission. Since our positions were not as commanders, we struggled to lead by “force of example.” After much coaching and refinement, security was established. With security finally established, the companies broke to establish patrols and traffic control points in their assigned sectors. Our company closed ranks to fill in the gaps left by the patrolling company. We shared our night-observation devices with the commando snipers. In a play on “diplomacy,” we asked to see one of the friendlier sniper’s Dragonov. As we passed off this as show and tell, we used the scope to clear his fields of fire. Patrols The traffic around our assault position attracted the insurgents’ attention. An improvised explosive device (IED) erupted about 200 meters from our position in the vicinity of a passing American patrol. The patrol spotted our rooftop security positions and reacted to what it believed to be the point of origin and peppered our position with machine gun fire. What follows is not a recommended example of how to conduct military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). We could not raise the patrol because we had no way of identifying which unit, let alone patrol element, it was. As our TF 1-26 Infantry counterparts called higher, the patrol halted its firing. Tiger 37 moved to the schoolhouse rooftop to gain a better vantage point, and our unit left the sanctuary of the schoolhouse walls to establish recognition as a coalition forces position. With Tiger 37 on the roof and our unit at the entrance, we waited. The patrol’s turrets swiveled north and away, and after what seemed like another eternity passed, they resumed their patrol. Either higher headquarters got the call or the patrol unit realized we were U. S. soldiers. Over the course of the night, AIF probed our schoolhouse assault position. A commando patrol was sent to follow the egress route of the AIF. The commando patrol followed the AIF through a cemetery and up to a hotel, which turned out to be an AIF hideout. The commandos captured the AIF by surprise and rounded up 25 members; based on their obvious physical characteristics, they were foreign fighters. The commandos pointed out the non-Iraqi Arabs, but the African-born fighters were easy to recognize. It was such a big haul that Patrol Base Razor sent a patrol of five-ton trucks to conduct a detainee transfer. The commandos received instant credibility for their performance during this operation. Objective Pierce After consulting with the TF 1-14 Infantry com mander, the commandos were tasked to conduct combined operations with Team Reaper (A Company, 1-14 Infantry) to conduct a cordon and search, referred to as “Objective Pierce,” to clear the southwest portion of Samarra, which is located in a heavy industrial area. The automotive garages, ice factories, warehouses, and even a pharmacy were being “Our contingent of ISF advisors and IPAs arrived prior to our task force line of departure at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Brassfield-Mora to stage and link up with IPS counterparts. We were advised by the lead ISF advisor from another task force that phase four was still being ironed out at brigade headquarters. Lack of contact with the brigade S5/ISF cell prevented us from gaining insight into the developing plan.” 36 — exploited by the AIF. The industrial nature made it a prime hiding spot for IED-making caches and workshops. The cordon was established by a tank platoon to the west, Bradley platoon to the north, and Apache/Kiowa helicopters to the south. The search was conducted from the west-to-east direction in the north with Team Reaper. In the south, my assigned commando company would be the lead element of the commandos. Well versed in urban combat, the commandos executed with fervor. Their snipers quickly secured observation posts on the highest structures to provide overwatch. Often, since they lacked integrated communications, the snipers would reveal themselves for hazard identification and to direct their counterparts to movement. We followed the commando company through our sector dismounted. With the initial sweep not drawing contact with AIF, we maneuvered to the north online with Team Reaper. Now, with an attachment of three sappers from the 65th Engineers, we conducted a deliberate clear ing of Objective Pierce by going door-to-door/hole-to-hole. During the clearing mission, the discipline of the commandos broke down — the uneventful initial clearing lulled them out of their game. Security devolved as they were more interested in the breaching, which was being done by the sappers. With the help of my translator, we snaked through our assigned sector. Accustomed to working with American soldiers, even my translator lost his temper, often cursing the commandos into action like a crusty NCO of yesteryear. Once the excitement of the sapper’s work wore off, the commandos’ focus increased and a rhythm of searching developed. Occasionally, a commando would find a resident still at home/work willing to open doors/gates to allow our searches rather than test our sappers’ entry techniques. The combined clearing mission of Objective Pierce was a distinct element of Baton Rouge. Immediately, the “good news drum” began beating. Commando leaders were quickly paraded in front of CNN cameras to tout a successful Iraqi solution to the Samarra problem. Transition to Phase Four After we passed the reins of control of Objective Pierce to TF 1-14 Infantry, we regrouped and refitted at the Samarra mayor’s office, the makeshift headquarters of the commando senior leaders. Based on their recent successes, coalition force leaders offered the commandos the opportunity to continue operations from their own internal intelligence. These guys were from Samarra; they had a score to settle. The following 24 hours was filled with raids/snatch and grabs — each more successful than the previous. One captive, rumored to be involved in one of the al-Zarqawi beheadings, confessed under interrogation. Since phase four was not conducted in accordance with the original plan, we returned to FOB Brassfield-Mora to link up with a platoon from Task Force 1st Battalion, 77th (1-77) Armor that was resting and refitting for an extended stay in support of TF 1-26. A “doctrinal” FPOL occurred the next day as we rode shotgun with the 1-77 platoon on return to its task force sector. After a brief stay with one of our companies’ interim patrol bases, we caught a patrol to the task force trains outside Samarra just in time to start the road march back to FOB Paliwoda. After-Action Review Clearly, any lens of history is speckled with the mud of reality; however, in light of the ongoing combined operations between coalition and indigenous security forces (whether in Iraq or Afghanistan), it is important to reflect on Operation Baton Rouge from the ISF advisor perspective: The delay in task organization complicated “multinational integration.” The task forces did not receive the commandos until just hours before execution. Experiences with ISF revealed rehearsals helped better integrate their capabilities into the operation. Moreover, the ad hoc task organization of advisors to ISF complicated operations initially. While the commandos executed with surprising success, we did not fully maximize their capabilities during the initial fight. The commandos are trained almost exclusively to conduct offensive operations and expect to conduct only these types of operations. The commandos’ training program prior to Baton Rouge was primarily focused on raids and sensitive-site exploitation. Establishing a patrol base and conducting traffic control points taxed their relatively small organization (nearly half the size of Iraqi army battalions) during this operation. Indigenous security forces already possessed valuable intelligence networks. Many of the commandos (notably their commanding general) were displaced from Samarra under the former regime. Their knowledge of local families, criminals, and neighborhoods allowed them to instinctively identify outsiders (specifically foreign fighters and al-Zarqawi’s operatives). Much of their exploitation success is directly tied to their homegrown intelligence networks. ISF lack cultural initiative, specifically as it relates to priorities of work. Reflecting on T. E. Lawrence’s advice, decisions are created by committee after lengthy discussions. The commandos would not execute work priorities unless their American counterparts had a significant “influence of personality,” or unless they were directed by higher headquarters. A lot of this is accounted for by the slow and deliberate Arab culture — desert life forces a methodical pace on Arab armies. As Army leaders, we relied on our own initiative to direct willing ISF NCOs “Together only a few weeks, the commandos moved to support Operation Baton Rouge with only 48-hours notice. The commandos were focused on urban raid operations and counterterrorist missions against hijackers and kidnappers. A rough, paramilitary looking unit, their uniforms consisted of a woodland camouflage pattern with black leather gloves, jackets, and balaclavas.” — 37 to establish work priorities and then have them follow up with impromptu officer professional developments with their company commanders and lieutenants. A focal point of ISF weak leadership was junior officer leadership (lieutenants). During Saddam’s reign, all hints of initiative or charisma were smothered.8 Our company was “blessed” with a “Mu-lazim Awal” (first lieutenant) who was respected and well liked (and to my advantage, spoke broken English). His function in the company was much like that of a company executive officer; he helped bridge the gap between the commanders and soldiers. However, the majority of the other “Mulazims” (lieutenants) lacked any initiative to execute or learn. The commandos displayed a distinctly high level of morale and courage. It would be remiss to disregard the combat performance of these brave men. When line of departure time came, the commandos were all business and they knew their business. American advisors developed tactics, techniques, and procedures to overcome communications difficulties with the commandos, such as language barriers and incompatible communications. I personally recruited an Iraqi translator from our home FOB knowing that our mission was to liaise with ISF.9 “Omar,” despite his role, displayed immense courage during Baton Rouge. I often had to force myself to remember he was a civilian on the battlefield. At task organization, my first task was to find the best English-speaking commandos and link them up with my IPA counterparts. Unfortunately, FM crosstalk was nonexistent — the commandos, the IPA, and U. S. soldiers each had separate radio systems. You can imagine the command and control nightmare between the three groups during the cordon and search operation of Objective Pierce. We relied on the tried-and-true “command voice” and hand-and-arm signals to direct operations. ISF did not own the night. Communications was not the only equipment shortfall in Baton Rouge. In our short task organization with the commandos, we recognized that certain aspects of operations are outside the scope of their equipment. The commandos were not equipped with appropriate night-vision devices to conduct operations during hours of darkness. The commandos relied on instinct and bare knuckles instead of laminated maps with global positioning systems, encrypted radios, and night-vision optics. Inadequate U. S. interagency coordination. Perhaps an insignificant reflection on Operation Baton Rouge was the lack of formal interagency coordination between U. S. military and supporting civilian agencies, specifically the Department of State-contracted International Police Advisors. Despite the recognized directive that military commanders were the senior U. S. representatives in each sector of Iraq, there was no single place, agency, or force that directed interagency cooperation. Cooperation was based on ad hoc personal relationships. Seams in interagency cooperation were strained as each commando company was split to conduct individual missions. The IPAs seemed more focused on along-term strategic goal of rebuilding Iraqi police units that leaned more toward “community police patrols.” This was in contrast to the 2d BCT commander’s intent of using the commandos as a short-term exploitation force in raids and sensitive site exploitation. To their credit, the commandos ceded operational control to U. S. military officers when given direct tasks from higher headquarters. Notes 1“So you want to be an Advisor,” BG Daniel P. Bolger, Military Review, March-April 2006, p. 3. 2“The Fight for Samarra: Full-Spectrum Operations in Modern Warfare,” MG John R. S. Batiste and LTC Paul R. Daniels, Military Review, May-June 2005, pp. 13-21. 3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 18. 5FOB Brassfield-Mora overlooked nearby Samarra and was the home of our sister task force, the Blue Spaders, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry. 6“Iraq Interior Ministry Forms Police Commando Battalions,” SGT Jared Zabaldo, Armed Forces Information Services: News Articles, 20 October 2004, online at http://www.defenselink. mil/news/Oct2004. 7“Twenty-seven Articles,” T. E. Lawrence, Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917, online at http://telawrence.net/telawrencenet/ contents_lists/years/1917_1918.htm, pp. 126-133. 8Bolger, p. 7. 9I had to strong-arm a friendly neighborhood field ordering officer to offer a bonus above his normal salary. I will not name names or positions, in case he is ever audited. John P. J. DeRosa is an operations officer, Directorate of Operations, Raven Rock Mountain Complex, Adams County, PA. He received a B. A. and an M. A. from California State University-San Bernardino. His military education includes Armor Officer Basic Course, Battalion Maintenance Officer Course, Maintenance Leader Course, Unit Movement Officer Course, Signal Support Systems Specialist Course, Basic Combat Training, and Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, including assistant operations officer, Iraqi Security Forces, Task Force 1st Battalion, 77th (1-77) Armor, Balad, Iraq; executive officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1-77 Armor, 1st Infantry Division (ID), LSA Anaconda, Balad; assistant operations officer, 1-77 Armor, 1st ID, Schweinfurt, Germany; battalion maintenance officer, 1-77 Armor, Camp Monteith, Kosovo; and tank platoon leader and tank company executive officer, 1st Battalion, 185th Armor Battalion, 81st Separate Infantry Brigade (E), San Bernardino, California. “The commandos would be effective in Samarra because of their predominantly Sunni background. Sunnis historically were in high-security roles under Saddam Hussein and therefore the most experienced. They have deep family ties with the Sunni Triangle and relied on those ties as an ad hoc intelligence network. They were very skilled in identifying civilians who represented a threat.” 38 —