“Boots on the Ground:” Breaking the Small Unit Reaction Cycle Through the Use of Dismounted Operations

Two company commanders pour over maps, imagery, overlays, and targeting packets. The senior commander briefs the junior commander as the two units prepare to conduct a relief in place (RIP) while maintaining continuous stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) during counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Routes that are likely sites for improvised explosive device (IED) emplacement have been identified; complex ambushes and how they relate to discovered cache sites and historical points of origin for indirect fire have been templated. The outgoing commander discusses his conduct of operations — a reliance on dis mounted patrols, observation posts (OPs), and ambushes, and a general disregard for “presence patrols.” Mounted patrols are restricted from certain routes due to constant IED threats, and the commander discusses how he worked to indirectly secure the route without forcing patrols into obvious kill zones. Obviously disturbed by something, the incoming commander listens while studying the map, then points to an especially dangerous route, which is pockmarked by numerous large IED craters, and asks, “So, you have conceded this terrain to the enemy by not moving patrols on it.” The task facing most U. S. Army units in the current operating environment (COE) is to secure a designated piece of terrain, prevent insurgents from gaining a foothold, and simultaneously establish conditions that will allow local authority to resume governance. Under such conditions, many current COIN and SRO practices are terrain-oriented, focused on an overt presence in relation to geographic space. The trend in thinking for many Army leaders is that securing or controlling terrain can only be accomplished through the direct presence of units on apiece of terrain; that securing a route, for example, can only be man- “Boots on the Ground:” Breaking the Small-Unit Reaction Cycle Through the Use of Dismounted Operations by Captain Andrew Forney 16 — aged through a patrol timeline that maximizes the amount of personnel on a given piece of terrain throughout a 24-hour patrol cycle. “Boots on the ground” becomes the mantra in which security becomes equated with the number of soldiers per square foot. An extension of this concept is the vague task of conducting a “presence patrol.” A presence patrol is a patrol, mounted or dismounted, “that wants to be seen, both as a show of force and to lend confidence and stability to the local population of the host nation.”1 Presence patrols have become a rudimentary and daily task for small units, the idea being that an overt presence in any location directly relates to security in the area. Current experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan seem to illustrate a contradictory trend — the overt presence of U. S. forces in any one area may not directly correlate to increased security, but instead relate to direct attacks against those same forces as the enemy identifies patterns and the simple density of possible targets. During an insurgency, insurgent forces do not need to routinely hold geographic space as key terrain. The enemy is not terrain-oriented, but focuses attacks on engaging U. S. forces and attempting to create catastrophic damage as part of an information operations (IO) campaign. Key terrain for the insurgent is the opinion of the local population, followed by national and international perceptions — insurgents are not necessarily concerned with holding terrain. With this in mind, small units tasked to conduct presence patrols find themselves in a sequence of events, termed “reaction cycle.” (See Figure 1) Small units are tied directly to a higher unit intent that equates security to overt presence. A patrol is tasked to conduct a presence patrol with the purpose of occupying a perceived portion of key terrain. The patrol unwittingly makes itself a target to insurgent forces in this way. Forced to react, the small unit executes actions on contact, and if lucky, may even destroy enemy forces. The patrol continues their mission, having done little to change the security situation on their patrol route. In actuality, the patrol has weakened their relationship with the local population, leading them to equate the presence of U. S. patrols with continued attacks. Ultimately, the trend toward reaction filters upward, leaving battalion, squadrons, and brigade combat teams (BCTs) wondering how to improve security in respective areas of operations (AO) with the same amount of troops. One of the most frustrating challenges for leaders in current COIN operations is to break the reaction cycle. To achieve this, it is first necessary for leaders to identify the common foundation for enemy activity in their AOs, be it ideological, political, or economical. There may be several or a combination of these triggers that lead to enemy activity. Several well-written articles concerning lower-level human intelligence (HUMINT) have been written and are a good source of reference.2 Once the foundation has been identified, units must operate across the full lines of operation to counteract the foundation by identifying the commander’s intent, most notably, his endstate. The issue is one of meeting quantitative goals through qualitative actions. Improving the security environment of any AO requires several different lines of operation that, ultimately, mirror several root causes identified earlier as triggers for enemy activity — ideological, political, and economical. It is the commander’s responsibility to identify these triggers during the first step and then identify quantitative means to counteract these triggers. At the small-unit level (company and below), these high-minded phrases have little to no true impact. The reality is that small-unit leaders are required to improve security in their AO while maintaining practical levels of force protection. It is important to remember that to secure apiece of terrain, it is not necessary to place units on it. Rather, to secure, one must, “prevent a unit, facility, or geographic location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action.”3 This can be accomplished several ways and will allow leaders to break the small-unit reaction cycle. Leaders first must make the decision to willfully go forward and destroy the enemy in an innovative manner — to create an action cycle that forces the enemy to react to his actions (see Figure 2). In the small-unit action cycle, leaders have identified the foundation for insurgent activity in their AO by gathering intelligence from both higher headquarters and subordinate elements. Next, they take direct and focused action to counteract this foundation, either through kinetic or nonkinetic means. Finally, they exploit gains for follow-on operations and solidify successes in their AO’s security environment. To translate this cycle to kinetic operations, it becomes necessary to go back to the basics. U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, identifies two types of patrols, the reconnaissance patrol and the combat patrol.4 To gain the initiative in current COIN operations, it is recommended that planning and priority for these operations is conducive to conducting dismounted operations. Few, if any, vehicle pa-Small Unit Action Cycle ID foundation/ triggers Directed Military Action Counteract Enemy Triggers Exploitation Figure 2 Enemy Action The “Presence Patrol” Reaction Cycle Presence Patrol Military Response Cordon and Search • Direct Fire • Perceived Security Control of Terrain • Visible Presence • Figure 1 — 17 trols have the ability to infiltrate AOs, something that dismounted sections can accomplish, especially during limited visibility. Reconnaissance patrols “provide timely and accurate information on the enemy and terrain.”5 During COIN operations, both overt and covert reconnaissance patrols can be executed. Overt reconnaissance patrols are a good means for HUM INT gathering from local nationals and can be used as a tool for cooperation with indigenous security forces (ISF) for future IO exploitation. Covert reconnaissance patrols are an outstanding means to gather information on enemy activity and should be the first step toward the execution of combat patrols. Covert reconnaissance is optimally performed dismounted, and clear intent, tempo, focus, and engagement criteria must be specifically explained prior to execution. Unlike the presence patrol, no reconnaissance patrol should be executed without commanders providing subordinates with clear and specific information requirements. Combat patrols, are conducted to destroy or capture enemy soldiers or equipment.”6 This is the small-unit leader’s primary kinetic action to force the enemy to react to his intent. Dismounted combat patrols during current COIN operations should focus on ambushes and sniper emplacement as a means to engage enemy forces prior to coming under direct action. Such tasks are an outstanding means to kill or capture IED emplacement teams and provide local route security.7 U. S. forces can engage enemy elements as they attempt to counteract IO following the rapid insertion of large amounts of U. S. combat forces. Several planning factors should be taken into account prior to the execution of either type of patrol. In the current operating environment, with armor and cavalry units assuming a large amount of dismounted tasks, it becomes necessary for these tasks to be at the company or troop level due to the small size of armor and cavalry platoons. During a typical operation, one platoon may provide vehicular transport to a dismount point for a second platoon, and then remain in a patrol base or quick reaction force (QRF) status to provide support or extraction for the dismounted platoon. Commanders must deconflict any issues with direct-fire control, especially if armor elements are conducting patrols in the vicinity and may react to the identification of armed dismounted elements to their flanks. Fires, always dependent on the current rules of engagement, should be pre-planned to allow for assistance in displacement and extraction. If available, air assets can be used to help clear or secure infiltration and exfiltration routes or engage identified enemy elements. However, the most important task for commanders as they send subordinates forward to conduct reconnaissance and combat patrols is to provide a clear task and purpose with an achievable endstate. One of the fatal flaws of the presence patrol concept is the lack of guidance subordinate leaders are given when saddled with such a mission. Planning for such operations is not offensive in nature, does not attempt to gain initiative over enemy forces, and assumes that the mere presence of U. S. forces in any area improves security, which is not necessarily the case. The planning and execution of dismounted patrols by typically mounted elements will obviously seem foreign, at first, as units come out of their operational comfort zone. However, to change the current operational reaction cycle and improve the security environment of AOs in current COIN operations, it is imperative to change the presence patrol mindset. Forcing the enemy to react to our actions will prevent casualties and alter the security environment with more of a covert, rather than overt, presence. It is time that the adage “boots on the ground,” became more than just a cliché. Notes 1U. S Army Field Manual (FM) 3-21.9, SBCT Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, U. S Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D. C., December 2002, pp. 10-17. 2Major Bill Benson and Captain Sean Nowlan, “Tactical Intelligence Shortcomings in Iraq,” ARMOR, March April 2005, pp. 18-22; and Captain Timothy J. Morrow, “The Human Intelligence Game for Armored/ Mechanized Units,” ARMOR, MayJune 2005, pp. 39-44. 3FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, GPO, Washington, D. C., September 2004, p. 1-167. 4FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, GPO, Washington, D. C., 22 April 1992, pp. 3-11. 5Ibid. 6Ibid, pp. 3-19. 7Sergeant First Class Matthew Donofrio, “Contemporary Sniper and Observation Post Operations,” ARMOR, May-June 2006, pp. 44-48. Captain Andrew Forney is currently an operations/intelligence trainer, Military Transition Team, Afghanistan. He received a B. A. from Western Maryland University. His military education includes the Armor Officer Basic Course, Air Assault Course, Airborne School, and Armor Captains Career Course. He has served in various positions, to include XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Squadron, 8th Cavalry Regiment (1-8 CAV), Fort Hood, TX; XO, A Company, 1-8 CAV, Iraq and Fort Hood; and tank platoon leader, A Company, 1-8 CAV, Fort Hood and Iraq. “The trend in thinking for many Army leaders is that securing or controlling terrain can only be accomplished through the direct presence of units on apiece of terrain; that securing a route, for example, can only be managed through a patrol timeline that maximizes the amount of personnel on a given piece of terrain throughout a 24-hour patrol cycle. “Boots on the ground” becomes the mantra in which security becomes equated with the number of soldiers per square foot.” 18 —