Destroying the Enemy Ambush in Iraq

Destroying the Enemy Ambush in Iraq by Captain Morris K. Estep Throughout recorded history, ambushes have been used as an effective tactic to counter larger, more sophisticated enemy armies.1 Likewise, the majority of attacks by subversive elements in Iraq used small dismount ambushes against reconnaissance patrols and convoys. Many leaders argued that more armor protection was needed to reduce injuries to soldiers. Yet, others argued that a stricter adherence to tried training principles was needed — more emphasis on doctrine, doctrine, and doctrine. However, speed, violent execution of counterattack battle drills, and rapidly adapting to enemy tactics through the use of after-action reviews were key to destroying the enemy’s ambush. Background During our unit’s deployment to Iraq, ambushes by the enemy occurred in areas where our platoon’s technological advantages were negligible. Specifically, weapons standoff of crew-served weapons, such as the M240B, M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), or the M2 .50-caliber machine gun, was drastically reduced because the enemy took advantage of crowded city streets where civilians, especially children, were within a few feet of our vehicles. Just as our platoon positively identified the enemy, the enemy identified us, recognizing that our line-of-sight bursts would have injured or killed any of those civilians. Any collateral injury to civilians meant negative media coverage for the unit. Moreover, the terrain in many of the cities, especially in the eastern portion of Baghdad, did not allow adequate standoff to use crew-served weapons. For example, the majority of direct-fire engagements were within 50 to 75 meters from the enemy and were usually fought within the close confines of a house or narrow street. The villages or towns that we patrolled consisted of tightly packed homes, crowded streets or berms, garbage and scrap metal dumps, and large open sewer ditches that denied an opportunity for bypass. Such terrain was ideal for ambushes conducted by groups of three- to four-man enemy dismount teams, which hid among the population before attacking, and blended back into alleys and homes with the local populace after each attack. This type of hit-and-run attack seemed almost impossible to anticipate. My platoon realized that defeating such an elusive enemy required speed and a violently executed counterattack to deny the enemy initiative on the battlefield. The Enemy’s Strategy Each time my platoon encountered an ambush, it was at night. Many of the cities and towns had intermittent electrical power, which meant we could operate HMMWVs in blackout conditions using night vision goggles (NVGs). This worked well in areas where we could see great distances with an unobstructed view. In cities and towns where local people were on the streets until midnight or later, an ambush pattern began to emerge. The enemy dismount teams would use a spotter within the cities or towns; in some cases, this would be a child or group of children or young males sympathetic to the enemy’s subversive behavior. In the beginning of our deployment, our platoon observed young males with cell phones placing phone calls and watching us as we entered the ambush area. On other occasions, young males used car horns to signal our platoon’s approach, and later in the deployment, the spotters were children with whistles that signaled our approach to the ambush area. A final technique used by the enemy was a variety of colored signal flares fired from rooftops as we approached the ambush areas. This particular spotting technique was used almost exclusively by the enemy in the final months of our deployment. Once the spotters signaled our presence, the dismount teams (usually hidden in alleyways, on rooftops, inside two- or three-storied homes, behind walls surrounding homes, or concealed behind scrap metal or cars along the street) initiated the ambush in one of three scenarios. The first was the improvised explosive device (IED); the second was the rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) attack with multiple positioned small-arms fire from AK- 47s; and the third was a combination of the two attacks — IED followed by multiple RPGs and small-arms fire. During our reconnaissance patrols or convoy security missions, the enemy would attempt to ambush by using a combination of IED, RPG, and small-arms fire, targeting the lead vehicle to stop our platoon within the ambush kill zone. The enemy was not attempting to inflict large numbers of casualties by using the initial IED against just one of our vehicles; he used the IED to stop the vehicles in his area where he attempted to use RPGs and small-arms fire. The Platoon’s Strategy The key to success in surviving the initial moments of an ambush is speed. The instinctive reaction for any soldier when attacked by an IED or RPG is to stop or slow the speed of the vehicle, which is due to initial shock, confusion, and disorientation caused by the ambush. Therefore, our platoon meticulously rehearsed standard operating procedures (SOP) focused on controlling human reactions within the 10-second initial-reaction time immediately following an ambush. Drivers learned to immediately increase vehicle speeds; tank commanders (TCs), gunners, and scouts learned to immediately react to contact within their areas of security, and accurately fire at the enemy while mounted and at a high rate of speed. At our forward operating base (FOB), we constantly rehearsed scenarios that involved a vehicle in a mobility kill and sustained casualties, as well as evasive maneuvers in built-up areas. At every opportunity, the platoon rehearsed short-range marksmanship (SRM) skills and fired each weapon mounted while on the move. It is very important for soldiers to be comfortable with firing weapons on the move; it is critical for soldiers to have the ability to create a stable platform for firing at targets from the left, right, front, and rear of HMMWVs. During all our rehearsals and scenarios, time was of the essence and we strove to reduce time in the kill zone, especially when rehearsing the casualty and disabled vehicle scenarios. Rehearsals also involved maintaining distances between vehicles and each section. The platoon used four HMMWVs, with two sections, while on patrol or convoy missions. Our SOP for distance and security depended on terrain, mission, and overall guidance from higher. Generally, our vehicles maintained a distance between each HMMWV and section based on the potential of encountering an IED, while maintaining a distance small enough to provide accurate security from each HMMWV’s sector of fire. At times, it was difficult to maintain those distances — the soldiers were tired from the heat, dealing with crowds, and time spent on the streets. However, as a leader, it is important to maintain a level of discipline to ensure the platoon does not sustain casualties. Prior to every mission, the platoon rehearsed its unit SOP for every imaginable scenario during an ambush. This was not a 30-minute affair for the senior scout to speak the entire time, but rather a time for platoon members to interact with each other, rehearse individual areas of responsibility, and react to an injured vehicle commander. Each time, new contingencies were added to the scenario; for example, the platoon sergeant and senior scout become casualties during an ambush — you are now the patrol leader, what do you do? These types of rehearsals served to make soldiers aware of very real dangers facing the platoon, as well as provided leaders with feedback of how well each soldier understood SOP. Counterattacks Our unit strategy worked well during both dismounted and mounted counterattacks. Usually, our direct fire engagements were always a combination of dismounted and mounted counterattacks.2 After a few ambushes, we realized that the subversives were poorly trained and undisciplined dismount teams that chased after us only after we had moved away from the kill zone. The unit always gained the initiative from the enemy when he came out of cover and concealment to attempt to kill us. We always first targeted the RPG dismounts to eliminate the immediate threat to our vehicles since the platoon was a stationary target at the short halt. Once the RPG dismount teams were eliminated, we began the successive bounding toward the remaining enemy. Section A would bound forward a distance, while section B fixed the enemy with smallarms and crew-served fires. Once section A stopped and set, they fixed the enemy while section B bounded forward to section A’s location. It goes without saying that distance, security, and avoiding fratricide were always basic to our platoon’s movements and were perfected during rehearsals. During missions that involved convoy escorts, our strategy was slightly modified. After counterattacking, we disengaged from the fight, and when the con- “...weapons standoff of crew-served weapons, such as the M240B, M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW), or the M2 .50-caliber machine gun, was drastically reduced because the enemy took advantage of crowded city streets where civilians, especially children, were within a few feet of our vehicles.” 12 — November-December 2006 voy was at a safe distance, we returned to the convoy. In this way, we could regain contact with the convoy that was already speeding away from the ambush and continuing its mission. Thus, we were again prepared to provide security and react to any potential ambushes further down the road. Through the course of our unit engagements, we always maintained contact with higher, sending reports on developing situations, including enemy battle damage assessments (BDAs). For instance, when the enemy withdrew from the fight, we pursued and maintained contact, immediately reporting the composition and disposition of the enemy as it was developing. Sometimes, a small number of dismounts ran to hide in the local mosque. We did not pursue the enemy into the mosque; our platoon, if not the enemy, did adhere to the rules of engagement, as well as the cultural sensitivities of Islam. When the enemy did seek concealment in the mosque, we simply cordoned the mosque, called in a situation report, and requested either Iraqi Civil Defense Corps or Iraqi Police to search the mosque.3 Our After-Action Reviews (AARs) Upon return to the FOB, we always conducted an after-action review (AAR) to review the enemy’s methods and develop a learning environment within the platoon. Each soldier in the platoon reviewed how we defeated the enemy’s tactics and what worked well and what did not work well for us. Each soldier in the platoon talked about his experiences and perspectives during the ambush. This not only relieved the anxiety and apprehension of being shot at, but it also revealed key details of the fight that could be determining factors in the platoon’s success. The platoon AARs allowed us to adapt our strategy to the constantly changing battlefield. In short, the speed and violent execution of our counterattack battle drills were worthless if we did not adapt quickly to the enemy methods. The Fedaliyah Mile: An Example Our platoon was involved in a battle in Fedaliyah that serves as an example of defeating an enemy ambush. On the morning of 4 April 2004, our platoon began recovery efforts on FOB War Eagle following a 12-hour mission to secure the Al-Rashaad police station from Mahdi militia. We were notified that within 48- hours, the platoon would conduct a tactical road march to Kuwait for eventual redeployment. Our platoon began the process of turning in ammo, cleaning individual body armor, and loading military vehicles for shipment to the states. Patrols conducted by our sister platoon on the morning of 4 April 2004, focused on left-seat rides to ensure the smooth transition of the follow-on unit in our squadron’s area of operation. One of those patrols was informed by a local Iraqi citizen of a possible night ambush in the town of Fedaliyah, which was within our squadron’s area of responsibility. This town was a poor agricultural area that consisted of mud-brick houses, a handful of warehouses, a school, a medical clinic, and a Shia mosque. The main avenue of approach into and out of the village was a mile-long, single hard-ball road that ran west to east, known to our unit as the “Fedaliyah mile.” It joined Highway 5 from west to the east at the berm road, which hand-railed the Diyalah River. The terrain of Fedaliyah was flat, arid, and “The villages or towns that we patrolled consisted of tightly packed homes, crowded streets or berms, garbage and scrap metal dumps, and large open sewer ditches that denied an opportunity for bypass. Such terrain was ideal for ambushes conducted by groups of three- to four-man enemy dismount teams, which hid among the population before attacking, and blended back into alleys and homes with the local populace after each attack.” “Each time my platoon encountered an ambush, it was at night. Many of the cities and towns had intermittent electrical power, which meant we could operate HMMWVs in blackout conditions using night vision goggles (NVGs). This worked well in areas where we could see great distances with an unobstructed view.” November-December 2006 — 13 restricted by large irrigation and sewage ditches that canalized dismounted and mounted movement to key intersections. Moreover, the town’s primary means of income was focused on water buffalo herds. This added to overall restrictions on movement because the herds were kept in large pens near houses located adjacent to key intersections, which allowed easy access to the Diyalah River for watering purposes. Overall, this road was excellent for ambushes because the enemy used the homes and warehouses for cover and concealment. Our platoon was given the task of conducting a dismounted reconnaissance patrol in Fedaliyah to identify the insurgents who were planning the ambush. At dusk, we conducted a mounted infiltration of the village from south to north, through the town of Amin. As we entered Fedaliyah, the streets were eerily deserted, which was odd because usually, at that time of night, children were playing, vendors were selling their wares, and everyone waved as we passed. We staged our vehicles near the berm road with a security element, and then initiated our dismounted patrol. We noticed that the Shia mosque was completely dark and had no electricity, which was extremely unusual. In fact, according to our Shia interpreter, this had never happened in any Shia mosque throughout the Muslim world. We contacted two Iraqi males and discussed the mosque issue and lack of people on the streets; neither could explain, but both indicated that they were late for a family reunion and wanted to leave immediately. Based on these circumstances, we contacted the tactical operations center (TOC) and reported the suspicious lack of electricity in the mosque. We continued our patrol and moved toward the local sheik’s house to discuss the mosque issue. We attempted to contact the sheik without results; the sheik, normally friendly and hospitable, now refused us entry, sending the message through his wife that he was ill. It was at this moment we realized the information of an ambush occurring was probably very credible. We moved to the trucks staged near the berm road and notified the TOC of the situation. After we were mounted, we moved in blackout drive, using NVGs, from east to west on the Fedaliyah mile toward Highway 5. The First Ambush After moving a mere 100 meters on the road, we received contact from three volleys of RPGs against the senior scout’s truck and my truck. As rehearsed and performed several times before in contact, within seconds, the platoon identified the locations of the RPG teams and returned a heavy volume of fire, using M4s and crew-served weapons, eliminating the RPG teams. At the same time, there were enemy teams along the north and south of the road that engaged our platoon with small-arms fire. As we moved along the road, our trucks sped toward Highway 5 to exit the enemy’s kill zone. As we approached the intersection near Highway 5, the platoon was placed in a hasty defense position to provide a situation report to the TOC, and to confirm any casualties. Fortunately, the platoon did not sustain a single casualty; however, two of our trucks were damaged. Our commander and headquarters section, also on patrol to the north in the city of Kamaliyah, observed enemy fires and arrived at our location. After a few moments of discussing the situation, the decision was made that two tanks would be sent from the FOB to reinforce our platoon as we attempted to regain contact with the enemy. The platoon moved east toward the berm road — using successive bounds to provide maximum security. Section A bounded first and set on the southern side of the road; section B followed suit on the northern side of the road. With a damaged antenna, communications to the platoon and TOC were sporadic at best, and I was forced to use the integrated communications (ICOM) radios. As section A was set and scanned, awaiting section B to bound, my senior scout identified a technical vehicle and six dismounts with rifles approximately 200 meters from my location. The enemy also identified my vehicle and simultaneously engaged our section — our fires were more accurate and we easily killed the enemy. We continued bounding for the remainder of the mile, but received no further contact. The tank section and our headquarters section moved to a hasty defensive position near the berm road where I updated our enemy BDA and provided a situation report. While continuing to scan for the enemy, the platoon cross-leveled our ammo and prepared to counterattack since it was likely that the enemy had retrograded north into the city of Kamaliyah to blend with the population and initiate another ambush on the highway. From the initial RPG contact to our hasty defensive position at berm road, nearly 30 minutes had elapsed. The Second Ambush From our position, we waited another five minutes before moving with the tank and headquarters section to Highway 5. We did not receive additional contact while in Fedaliyah. As we turned north onto Highway 5, I informed the platoon, as well as the commander and headquarters section, that it was possible that the enemy had retrograded into ambush positions on Highway 5 to continue the attack. After moving 200 meters on the highway toward the FOB, we received sustained RPK and AK-47 fire from two ambush positions on the southwest edge of Kamaliyah. Again, our platoon returned accurate and overwhelming fire on the identified positions, easily killing the insurgents. The platoon continued movement north while I relayed our BDA and SITREP through the ICOM to the commander. The platoon moved north in a box formation, allowing it to maximize security and scan for the enemy. As we moved to- “The key to success in surviving the initial moments of an ambush is speed. The instinctive reaction for any soldier when attacked by an IED or RPG is to stop or slow the speed of the vehicle, which is due to initial shock, confusion, and disorientation caused by the ambush. Therefore, our platoon meticulously rehearsed standard operating procedures (SOP) focused on controlling human reactions within the 10-second initial-reaction time immediately following an ambush.” 14 — November-December 2006 ward the center of Kamaliyah, we observed contact from all towns within the squadron’s area of operation — Kamaliyah, Amin, and Sadr City. I saw green tracers coming from all directions, heard RPG explosions, and saw mortar impacts within residential areas. The TOC notified us that nearly all of Baghdad was under attack from Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia in an attempt to wrestle political power from the interim Iraqi government; thus we were ordered to return to the FOB. The Third Ambush A total of two hours elapsed since our initial contact in Fedaliyah. We were less than four miles from our FOB when we made contact with two additional ambush positions from the southeastern side of Sadr City. The dismounts at the first ambush position were easily killed since they “charged” at our platoon, sporadically firing rifles as they left their positions. The second dismount team attacked our section with small-arms fire, but after a few short bursts, displaced to a hide position behind rubble near a large house. My senior scout was first to identify these dismounts and immediately returned fire with his M4. The tank section moved to a support-by-fire position and suppressed the enemy with coax. Simultaneously, our dismount team moved to assault and clear enemy positions. My senior scout identified an RPG team at the position. I called for the tanks to lift fires as our team cleared the position using successive bounds. After killing the enemy, my senior scout placed seized weapons into a pile and destroyed the cache with a fragmentation grenade to prevent the enemy from using them again. Thereafter, my team returned to the HMMWVs and continued north on the highway. Section B informed us over the ICOMs that 200 meters to our south, a hasty obstacle had been emplaced by insurgents. At that point, it was clear that the enemy was attempting to block us to the south and ambush us with several IEDs from the north near the army canal, where we would be forced to cross at a chokepoint. The tanks moved south into an attack-by-fire position and identified a squad of enemy dismounts that had set fire to a tire and wire obstacle. The tanks killed the enemy with coax, and dismounts from section B removed the obstacle from the highway. We continued the move north to the FOB, but did not receive enemy contact; in fact, we did not observe any IEDs nor dismount teams. We arrived at FOB War Eagle and reported to the TOC. A total of five hours had elapsed during the course of three ambushes. Due to our rehearsals, improved training, and AARs, our platoon did not receive a single casualty. Instead, within five hours, the platoon inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and captured intelligence on insurgents in the form of passports, money, and documents related to the Mahdi militia. Each soldier in the platoon performed incredibly well, which reflected individual discipline and intelligence, resulting in their ability to overcome a treacherous and adaptive enemy. Lessons Learned The asymmetrical battlefields in Iraq require a focus on combat with an enemy who does not use doctrine to fight. The enemy was defeated by means of our will to win using basic soldiering skills — rifle marksmanship, vigilance, intelligence, and persistence in the face of a violent and brutal enemy. Every AAR immediately following contact provided us with invaluable information in understanding and ultimately defeating the insurgents. The most effective tools to save the lives of soldiers and destroy the enemy during ambushes are tactics and procedures derived from AARs where every platoon member is required to participate in discussions. As soldiers, we must recognize that just as we adapt to the enemy’s tactics in Iraq, the enemy adapts and changes his tactics to counter our adaptations — it is a cycle that never ends. The enemy cannot be defeated using technology alone; instead, he must be defeated by our rapid synthesis of intelligence. We must then use this information to develop new tactics derived from our observations, and rapidly apply those tactics to the operating environment, instead of our relying on a catchall doctrine that attempts to provide guidance for all generic situations. Notes 1Godfrey Hutchinson, Xenophon and the Art of Command, Greenhill Books, London, UK, 2000, p. 201; and U.S. Army Field Manual, Tactics, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., chapter 5, section 5-123, 4 July 2001. 2Although we operated primarily mounted in the early part of our deployment, we were subsequently dismounted on all reconnaissance patrols, except for infiltration and exfiltration using HMMWVs. When we received enemy contact, our HMMWVs were maneuvered toward our dismounts to provide crew-served fires. 3CPT Dale Murray, “Company-Level Cordon and Search Operations in Iraq,” ARMOR, September-October 2004, pp. 27-31. CPT Morris K. Estep is currently an operations officer, Military Transition Team, 1st Infantry Division, Afghanistan. He received a B.A. from the University of Washington and a J.D. from Seattle University School of Law. His military education includes Officer Candidate School, Armor Officer Basic Course, Scout Platoon Leaders Course, and Armor Captains Career Course. He has served in various positions, to include XO, C Company, 2d Battalion, 81st Armor Regiment, Fort Knox, KY; XO, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), Fort Polk, LA; and scout platoon leader, 1st Squadron, 2d ACR, Fort Polk. “Generally, our vehicles maintained a distance between each HMMWV and section based on the potential of encountering an IED, while maintaining a distance small enough to provide accurate security from each HMMWV’s sector of fire.” November-December 2006 — 15