Blitzkrieg: Revolution or Evolution?

Blitzkrieg: Revolution or Evolution? by Major James T. Bushong The blanket statement that the German Blitzkrieg tactics were a radical new form of warfare is widely held as truth. It is also incorrect. Blitzkrieg was a happy marriage of new technology (mechanized forces) and time-tested cavalry tactics. This evolutionary combination deserves the credit for the German’s success at the onset of World War II, rather than a revolutionary new approach to warfare. This article examines Blitzkrieg tactics and compares them to tactics that cavalry soldiers have used throughout history to outmaneuver and destroy their opponents. It demonstrates that theorists, such as J.F.C. Fuller, found solutions to the problems of the World War I stalemate through history books and advances in technology, rather than actually creating a new form of warfare. This article includes an analysis of how modern theorists approach the problems of modern warfare, and poses the question: “Do we really have revolutionary new tactics or just revolutions in technology?” The end of World War I found the Germans and the British badly bloodied from four years of trench warfare. Technological advances in machine guns and artillery had caused such a stalemate on the battlefield that all parties involved were looking for ways to break the deadlock. The logical solution was to fight against these technological advances by seeking newer technology. The answer appeared to be the tank, a slow moving behemoth of the battlefield that could crush wire obstacles, roll through bomb craters and over trenches, and provide reasonable crew protection to the men inside. It was meant as a support vehicle for infantry in the assault, but was never really considered for any other mission. On 20 November 1917, the British successfully used over 300 tanks at the Battle of Cambrai in support of their infantry. The British advanced over five miles using this new weapon. This was an astonishing rate of advance compared to the previous battles, but no real thought had been given to how tanks could be employed after initial advances. This left the British the same tactics with which they had started the war and the German counterattack regained virtually all the ground that had been lost. The use of tanks at Cambrai proved that new technology could be used, but required new doctrine to make armored forces a truly effective part of the combat team. Major J.F.C. Fuller, Chief of Staff of the British Armoured Corps, began to address these issues. “Plan 1919” was Fuller’s solution to the problem of what to do with the tanks. While Plan 1919 was technically a plan and not doctrine, it was the first attempt at a design for future warfare. Fuller summarizes his plan by saying, “Instead of launching frontal attacks against an enemy’s front, it was decided to launch it against his rear — his command and supply system — by suddenly and without warning passing powerful tank forces, covered by aircraft, through his front. Next, direct paralyzation [sic] of his rear had disorganized his front, to launch a strong tank and infantry attack of the Cambrai pattern against that front.”1 The war ended in November 1918 and Fuller never implemented this “dramatically different” approach to warfare. Because armor and aircraft technology was in its infancy and problems with logistical support arose, the merits of the plan were questionable at best. It did pro-November-December 2005 — 23 vide a basis for continued innovation during the interwar period with the British conducting armored maneuvers in 1927, 1928, and 1931. Ironically, and perhaps tragically, the British “displayed scant interest in pursuing armor’s potential, but rather tied its development entirely to the infantry and cavalry establishments” with “the cavalry display(ing) the most resistance to new ideas and technology.”2 This resistance continued despite the fact that ten years earlier, in April 1917, two cavalry brigades had been sent forward to exploit a gap created by three tanks at the battle of Arras. An officer in the Highland Light Infantry commented, “an excited shout was raised that our cavalry was coming up. It may have been a fine sight, but it was a wicked waste of men and horses, for the enemy immediately opened on them a hurricane of every kind of missile he had. The horses seem to have suffered the most.”3 Given the British penchant for preserving tradition, it is perhaps predictable that the cavalry soldiers would display such resistance to the new technology, which clearly had potential in the arena of maneuver warfare. British cavalry leaders had made their successes with horse cavalry and had become so fettered to their horses that the thought of replacing the animals with machinery was abhorrent. The Germans were not so reluctant to change. The Germans developed the stormtrooper tactics in the last two years of World War I as an answer to the stalemate that had evolved in the trenches.4 While these tactics were innovative and would be used as a basis for the advancement of future doctrine, they failed to take new technology into account. Failure to sustain manpower losses created by these tactics effectively nullified the tactical victories won and ultimately led to Germany’s defeat in 1918. The Germans learned from their losses and established committees to review the lessons of World War I. They created a model for training and development that was based on the “principles of initiative, exploitation, and maneuver that lay at the heart of the army’s basic doctrine.”5 It was here that the Germans learned and incorporated the lessons of the British army. During World War I, the Germans learned to cope with tanks rather than use them. They only produced 20 tanks to the more than 5,000 that the British and French produced. However, after the British maneuvers of the 1920s, a Reichswehr report stated, “with existing models, one can now clarify what will happen with tanks behind the enemy’s main line of resistance after a successful breakthrough. We recommend that, in exercises, armored fighting vehicles be allowed to break through repeatedly in order to portray this method of fighting and thus to collect added experience.”6 With the lessons of World War I being reviewed by experienced soldiers unopposed to change, the German army was preparing for a radical change in the way they conducted warfare. They drew everything they needed from their history books and after action reports. The Blitzkrieg was hailed as a revolutionary new approach to warfare. The Germans “created” it and put it into practice in 1939 in the Polish offensive. The British felt that they needed to adopt the principles of this breakthrough in doctrine and put it into practice in such offensives as Goodwood and Market Garden. Blitz- “The end of World War I found the Germans and the British badly bloodied from four years of trench warfare. Technological advances in machine guns and artillery had caused such a stalemate on the battlefield that all parties involved were looking for ways to break the deadlock. The logical solution was to fight against these technological advances by seeking newer technology. The answer appeared to be the tank, a slow moving behemoth of the battlefield that could crush wire obstacles, roll through bomb craters and over trenches, and provide reasonable crew protection to the men inside.” 24 — November-December 2005 krieg focused on the principles of speed, maneuver, versatility, and overwhelming force at a decisive point. These are the same principles that have defined and guided tactics, particularly as they relate to the use of cavalry, for centuries. Cavalry forces evolved into four categories throughout the ages: the cuirassier or heavy cavalryman, the lancer, the dragoon or mounted infantryman, and the light cavalry.7 The Germans employed all four categories while creating blitzkrieg tactics: tanks were the heavy cavalry; lancers were close-air support or dive bombers; the dragoons were mechanized infantry; and the light cavalry were lightly armored reconnaissance elements. All of these elements must conduct operations together, and in conjunction with infantry, to create success on the battlefield. The Germans realized this and created a doctrine that unified this lethal team. The infantry is the basis for any military. Cavalry can seize, but cannot hold ground, and the Germans realized this. “On 10 May 1940, Germany had 136 divisions in the West, of which 10 were armoured, seven motorized, one cavalry, and one airborne.”8 This left 117 infantry divisions to be supported by the 19 other divisions. It is unclear whether there were many more infantry units because they were the meat of the German army or there simply were not enough resources to outfit more divisions as motorized. Either way, the de cisive arm of the German military was made up of the Panzer divisions that in two weeks time had completely cut French lines of communications and forced the British Expeditionary Forces into full retreat across the Channel.9 The tactics used dated as far back as Alexander, whose “battles comprised a concerted infantry push in the centre to create the opportunity for a decisive cavalry charge on the right.”10 While the Germans did not have the resources, or perhaps the desire, to outfit their entire army as cavalry, they certainly took a lesson from the Romans who “began a trend by which the army became a force of cavalry regiments, as opposed to infantry legions, as a premium was placed on mobility.”11 Clearly, the Germans used history from the times of Alexander through World War I in developing their blitzkrieg tactics, but their work was not revolutionary. Rather, they had analyzed their weaknesses from the previous war and developed new technology, not new tactics, to overcome those weaknesses. The U.S. Army is using the same process today with the advent of modularity. The modular army being analyzed in the Pentagon today maintains the same principles that the Germans focused on using blitzkrieg tactics: speed, maneuver, versatility, and overwhelming force at a decisive point. The modular brigade depends on the ability to arrive anywhere November-December 2005 — 25 “‘On 10 May 1940, Germany had 136 divisions in the West, of which 10 were armoured, seven motorized, one cavalry, and one airborne.’This left 117 infantry divisions to be supported by the 19 other divisions. It is unclear whether there were many more infantry units because they were the meat of the German army or there simply were not enough resources to outfit more divisions as motorized. Either way, the decisive arm of the German military was made up of the Panzer divisions that in two weeks time had completely cut French lines of communications and forced the British Expeditionary Forces into full retreat across the Channel.” Continued on Page 50

Blitzkrieg continued from Page 25 2Williamson Murray. “Armored Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences,” Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1996, p. 28. 3John Ellis, Cavalry: The History of Mounted Warfare, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, NY, 1978, p.176. 4Murray, pp. 34-35. 5Ibid., p. 38. 6Ibid., pp. 39-40. 7James Lawford. The Cavalry, Roxby Press Limited, London, UK, 1976, pp. 18-27. 8Brian Bond, “Battle of France,” H100, Transformation in the Shadow of Global Conflict, U.S Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 2004, p. H108RC- 211. 9Ibid., p. H108RC-214. 10Ellis, p. 11. 11Stanley Sandler, Ground Warfare: An International Encyclopedia, Volume One A-G, ABC-CLIO, Inc., Santa Barbara, CA, 2002, p. 162. Major James T. Bushong is currently an Army space support team leader, First Space Brigade, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, CO. He received a B.S. from Texas A&M University. His military education includes U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Armor Officer Advanced Course, and Armor Officer Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include aide de camp, U.S. Army Armor Center and Fort Knox, Fort Knox, KY; commander, I Troop, 3d Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (3/3 ACR), Fort Carson, CO; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3/3 ACR, Fort Carson; commander, L Troop, 2d Squadron, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY; and platoon leader, 2d Platoon, A Company, 2d Bat talion, 72d Armor, Camp Casey, Korea.