Task Force 1-77 Armor — Back in the Saddle

Approximately six months prior to deploying to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II, 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment (1-77AR), 1st Infantry Division, was told it would be deploying without all its M1A1 tanks. As the battalion’s master gunner, this decision posed quite a challenge — not to mention the task of developing a gunnery training program that not only supported qualifying 15 tank crews, but also ensured everyone in the battalion was trained on mission-focused tasks. The majority of these tasks were geared toward the infantry, and for most of our tankers, these tasks, such as close quarters marksmanship, M240 machine gun qualification, squad live fire exercises, and convoy live fire, were new. After an intense training period, our tankers were well trained in these new tasks and had finally accepted the fact that most of them were not going to be on a tank the entire deployment. Our task force deployed to the Iraqi theater of operations on 4 March 2004 to conduct combat operations. Going to war without tanks was tough for an armored battalion to accept. Most tankers have been in the Army for years, training for this exact moment — testing our abilities as armor crewmen in a combat environment. But we essentially traded in our tanks for rucksacks and became light cavalrymen for the deployment. You can only imagine the excitement and sigh of relief when three months into the deployment, the task force received another company of tanks. Since we were the only armor battalion in the brigade, we knew that tank crews would come from Task Force 1-77AR. The first issue we encountered was the lack of qualified tank crews. During the last gunnery, the only crews that qualified were the ones who would man the original 15 tanks. The previous gunnery was conducted eight months prior, and because tank crews are required to qualify once a year, all our tank com mander/gunner combinations were now out of tolerance. After the task force commander decided which platoons would receive the additional tanks, a gunnery qualification was necessary to validate the new crews. As the task force master gunner, I was charged with this task, which required developing a training plan to ensure the crews were retrained on many of the armor crewman tasks. Crews were trained and evaluated by their platoon leaders, and the company commander submitted a memorandum to the task force commander stating all crews had completed the required training prior to the live fire. Training was divided into five areas: Safety training. Safety training included depleted uranium hazards, which were conducted during the live-fire portion of training. Crews fired at T-55s that were destroyed during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) I. Safety training also included limited visibility operations – driving a tank with a driver’s night sight is an extremely perishable skill. Ground guide procedures were included in safety training, as well as thermal vehicle identification and crew drills. Crew drills covered ammunition fire in the crew compartment, fire in the engine compartment, removing injured crewman through loader’s hatch, removing injured crewman through driver’s hatch, immediate action for engine failure, abandon tank, tank rollover, loss of brakes, loss of steering, and turret traversing procedures. Tank crew gunnery skills test. Tank crew gunnery skills test must be completed prior to any live-fire event and this was no exception. Company master gunners and company leaders ensured the test was done to standard. Crew stabilization. Commanders were advised that they should fill tank commander/gunner positions with soldiers experienced in those positions. A combat environment is not the place to train new crews unless absolutely necessary. Tabletop trainer. When we deployed, we took the tabletop trainer with us, which paid big dividends. We used it because we did not have a unit con duct of fire trainer (UCOFT) in the division. Crews had to obtain the same standards with the tabletop trainer as they would have if they were firing in a UCOFT. Live fire. It was extremely important to know that our crews could put “steel on target.” A master gunner’s dream is to design and build a tank range that supports all types of ammunition up to 120mm high-explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds. The area was called “Objective Hawaii,” an old Fedayeen communications center that had been abandoned and destroyed during OIF I. It provided almost 20 square kilometers of rolling desert land that was perfect for a range. Just a few weeks prior, the range establishment pack et was approved for firing, and the process of placing targets and marking firing positions began. The first issue we encountered was the surface danger area, which encompassed some Iraqi farmland outside the actual range area. Prior coordination was made with the local city counsel, area sheikh, and Iraqi police, which enabled us to notify the local farmers when we would be firing. Farmers were also paid a dislocation allowance for leaving the area for the three days we fired and would receive compensation for any damages the firing may cause. I spent the five days leading up to the live fire on the range with the combat patrol. The M88 pulled one T-55 700 meters from the firing position and the other T-55 1,150 meters away. The rolling terrain did not allow for any targets further than 1,150 meters. Tankers are accustomed to firing at targets well beyond that range during gunnery, but this was anew type of mission, one with which tankers were not familiar. The scaled-down ST-5 panels were also placed at 700 meters, instead of the normal 1,500 meters. The tank crews arrived at the range eager and ready to shoot. Day one was live fire accuracy screening test (LFAST) and machine gun zeroing, and we conducted driver’straining at night. With the exception of having to LFAST one tank, day two was all machine gun firing or a Tank Table V (modified), which included four daytime engagements and three night. Two of the day engagements allowed the loader to fire his M240. It was amazing how many loaders were hitting troop targets, primarily because they were not using the standard “butterfly” trigger, but using the dismount kit’s buttstock and pistol grip. This allowed the loader to have better control over the weapon and lay more accurate fires. Adding the dismount kit to the loader’s M240 limits him to firing at ground targets only. He is the primary “air” guard on the tank, but having air superiority allows commanders the ability to exercise this option. During a normal gunnery rotation, the loader only fires his M240 during one engagement for the entire gunnery. Lack of training or focus on the loader firing his M240 is a concern. We are no longer fighting an enemy that is tank heavy, but rather an enemy that fights on foot or from the back of a pickup truck. It is more imperative to have a loader who is machine gun proficient, rather than one who can 24 — “The newly validated tank crews have now moved on to their new sectors with a sense of pride and accomplishment. Crews fire the main gun seldomly, usually at buildings or structures, and fire machine guns more often. This machine gun focused gunnery has better prepared our tankers for their mission at hand. With an enemy that is elusive and sometimes difficult to identify, it is important that our tankers are well trained on tank-mounted machine guns.”

load a HEAT round in less than four seconds. The first day on the range was scheduled as follows:

• Engagement 1 — (defense) personnel carrier (PC) (710m) (T-55) and two sets of troops (5-700m) (loader’s 240, coax, and.50 cal).

• Engagement 2 — (defense) PC (710m) and troops (500m) (coax and.50 cal).

• Engagement 3 — (defense) repeat engagement 1.

• Engagement 4 — (offense) two sets of troops (coax) (5-700m). Night training included:

• Engagement 1 — (defense) truck (710 m) (T-55) and troops (500m) (coax).

• Engagement 2 — (defense) two sets of troops (5-700m) (coax).

• Engagement 3 — (offense) truck (700 m) and two sets of troops (5-700m) (coax). At first, crews were attacking the range as if they were at home station. “Stoppage, on the way, stoppage,” was followed by a request to elevate and work the machine gun problem. Back at home station that would be the right thing to do, but in a combat situation the enemy has a vote. The first few crews had to be reminded that this was not a Tank Table VIII and they had other machine guns to service targets. Tank commanders also did not use “defilade” time. On personnel carrier and troop engagements, they pulled out and fired at both tar gets simultaneously, just as they would in a real situation. The tank crews on the ready line observed this and caught on quickly. The crews had to be reminded that the enemy was not going to stop attacking because the tank had a machine gun problem. Home station gunnery does not fully prepare tank crews for this type of situation. Crews are trained for “break-time” and fighting against a clock, not a true hostile target. Tank crews must be prepared to fire at a target with another weapons system if one fails to fire. The only way to prepare crews for this is to train at home station. We should not cut crews for engaging targets with the wrong weapons system. The last day at the range included six engagements. The task force commander wanted to emphasize machine gun fir ing and only a few main gun engagements. Crews attacked the range with excitement, knowing that they were going to fire service HEAT rounds at real T-55s. The throughput on the range was amaz-

• Engagement 3 — (defense) PC and troops (coax and.50 cal).

• Engagement 4 — (offense) tank and troops (main gun and coax). Night training included:

• Engagement 1 — (defense) tank and troops (main gun, gunner’s power control handle failure, and coax).

• Engagement 2 — (offense) truck and troops (coax). Twenty-one night runs were completed in less than three hours. The reason for the high throughput is that crews were fighting through the engagements. They were using other weapons systems to service targets and work through problems simultaneously. The newly validated tank crews have now moved on to their new sectors with only drives home the fact that machine gun training should be a top priority of all tank units deploying to Iraq. The days of the main gun being the primary weapons system on a tank are diminishing. Staff Sergeant James L. Gibson is currently task force master gunner, Task Force 1st Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment (1-77AR), 1st Infantry Division (1ID), Operation Iraqi Freedom II. His military education includes M1A1 Master Gunner Academy, Primary Leadership Development Course, and Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course. He has served in various positions to include company master gunner, C Company, 1-77 AR, 1ID, Schwein furt, Germany; tank commander, C Company, 1-77AR, 1ID, Schweinfurt; and platoon sergeant, C Company, 1-77AR, 1ID, Schweinfurt. ing! We completed 21 day runs in less than four hours. Crews were no longer worrying about stop page time — “stoppage, on the way, stoppage,” was immediately followed by “caliber 50” or “loader 240, troops, 10 o’clock.” The engagements for the Tank Table VIII (modified) day firing were:

• Engagement 1 — (defense) 2 sets of troops (coax).

• Engagement 2 — (defense) PC and 2 sets of troops (loader 240, coax,.50- cal). a sense of pride and accomplishment. Crews fire the main gun seldomly, usually at buildings or structures, and fire machine guns more often. This machine gun focused gunnery has better prepared our tankers for their mission at hand. With an enemy that is elusive and sometimes difficult to identify, it is important that our tankers are well trained on tank-mounted machine guns. We have now passed the 100-day deployed mark. With the limited number of main gun rounds our tanks have fired, it — 25