A Potential Achilles’ Heel: Integrity in Asymmetrical Warfare

22 — November-December 2003 A Potential Achilles’ Heel: Integrity in Asymmetrical Warfare by Captain Sean M. Scott “I have just been offered two hundred fifty thousand dollars and the most beautiful woman I have ever seen to betray my trust. I am depositing the money with the Treasury Department of the United States and request immediate relief from this command. They are getting close to my price.”1 — Arthur MacArthur Integrity is a key component of leadership, which is the most essential element of combat power. According to U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, Army Leadership, “Leadership is influencing people — by providing purpose, direction, and motivation — while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organization.” In fact, our Army recognizes integrity as an imperative of leadership as encompassed within “competence and character.”2 While no American military professional would be likely to argue the paramount importance of integrity, how often do we pay lip service to this crucial facet of leadership? In the daily routine of military life, we are constantly confronted with numerous ethical and moral dilemmas of varying degrees. While we would like to believe that military professionals would always do what is right, the media has highlighted numerous examples of misconduct involving soldiers from junior enlisted to general officers. These cases involve some of the more egregious and scandalous affairs that attract media attention; however, most soldiers could easily name instances of unethical behavior that fall below the noise level of the media. The majority of incidents are dealt with appropriately by the chain of command; yet, how often do such breaches of integrity remain undetected or overlooked? A key element of ensuring a soldier remains true to Army values lies in education. In his Republic, Plato outlines his conception of the guardian class as performing an essential function within a society.3 By protecting the polis from external threats, guardians not only ensure a state’s existence but set the conditions for it to prosper. Considering their function so vital to the society’s future, Plato asserted it was critical to select only the most qualified citizens for extensive education and training. Rather than being solely a warrior, a guardian “is both warrior and philosopher.”4 The guardian is not only competent enough to fight and win on the battlefield, he also has the character to serve the ideals of his society. This key distinction extends the oft-cited formula of tactical and technical competence as indicative of being a successful military professional, to include ethical competence. Marcus Tullius Cicero expanded on the guardian concept by noting that “the wisest and bravest still guarded their State by arms and counsel, and their influence continued to be supreme because, while they surpassed the masses in preferment, they had a smaller share of the pleasures of life, and in property were not, as a rule, better off than their fellows.”5 Cicero not only warns against the establishment of a Praetorian Guard mentality among guardians, but also reminds them of the hardships inherent to their duty. While not all soldiers have read Plato or Cicero, necessity charges them with living up to the ideals of the guardian class. In the current national military strategy, transnational threats are of prime importance. International criminal organizations, many with links to terrorist factions and insurgents, are growing in power and influence across the globe. In the coming years, America’s military must face the prospect of direct confrontation with such transnational organizations. In future operational environments, potential adversaries of the United States with extreme fiscal resources will attempt to exploit the integrity of the U.S. Armed Forces as a means of asymmetric warfare. Are major criminal organizations, including drug cartels, a new form of society that is competing with a set of societal norms and fiscal resources of unparalleled magnitude? Drug Cartels — A Transnational Threat for the 21st Century International drug cartels constitute their own society in numerous ways. Relative to most modern societies, cartels have a nontraditional set of societal norms. It is perilous to offer any standardized set of societal norms capable of encompassing the diversity of groups involved in drug trafficking; however, most are driven solely by the motive of profit while an increasing number have ideological agendas supported by the drug trade. By their nature, most of these organizations present an amorphous threat that involves a convoluted network of production, distribution, security, and financing that spans multiple continents. Sun Tzu’s axiom of formlessness presents one of the most significant challenges to undermining the drug cartels.6 Using elaborate means to provide operational security makes it difficult to identify and strike at the cartel’s center of gravity. With seemingly unlimited fiscal resources, cartels buy political influence and judicial leniency. This contributes to their ability to remain formless by extensive use of bribery, kickbacks, extortion, and intimidation to secure their networks against political, judicial, law enforcement, military, and media threats. Viewing the cartel as a society, the role of the guardian class is fulfilled by mercenaries. In recent years, many of these hired guns have taken over the networks they were initially contracted to protect. The most foreboding of these trends involves insurgent and terrorist groups who fund their ideological agendas with drug money. Unlike other major international criminal organizations whose revenues are not all tied to the production and distribution of drugs, cartels need land to grow their products. The need for land places them in direct confrontation with governments trying to controls their territories. This unfortunate relationship leads cartels to maintain standing armies to control their drug fields; thus, the seeds of insurgency are sown. With or without a political agenda, governments force cartels to fight a war for land not far removed from an insurgency; however, for those cartels composed of insurgents with a well-defined ideological agenda, the drug trade is an attractive means to nest financial needs with political goals. We are predisposed to underestimate the abilities of these mercenaries and insurgents due to our own professional bias. Much like the Russians underestimated the Chechens by referring to them as “criminals and bandits” rather than “fighters.”7 This indication of the Russian mindset led to military misadventures that cost an inordinate amount of blood and national treasure. Today’s guardians of the drug trade have access to the latest military weapons and equipment, as well as sophisticated intelligence networks. Of greater importance, they possess the will to win without respect for the law of war. Given this situation, it is clear that cartels possess the ability to conduct revolutionary warfare in a low-intensity environment to achieve limited theater political-military objectives. If our allies are unable to meet the challenges posed by such groups, the potential exists for friendly nations to call for more direct U.S. military assistance in maintaining the legitimacy of their governments. If the weight of the American military comes into direct confrontation with cartels, they will certainly attempt to fight asymmetrically to maintain their drug networks. Integrity in Asymmetrical Warfare The chief question regarding potential conflicts between the American military and drug cartels revolves around whether or not U.S. military personnel are vulnerable to exploitation due to the vast fiscal resources available to the cartels. The simple answer to this question is a resounding “yes.” A sophisticated opponent would not be hard pressed to use in- “In the current national military strategy, transnational threats are of prime importance. International criminal organizations, many with links to terrorist factions and insurgents, are growing in power and influence across the globe. In the coming years, America’s military must face the prospect of direct confrontation with such transnational organizations. In future operational environments, potential adversaries of the United States with extreme fiscal resources will attempt to exploit the integrity of the U.S. Armed Forces as a means of asymmetric warfare.”

formation warfare to obtain personal financial information and addresses of dependents as targeting information. Anyone who has been to a personnel services battalion (PSB) recently can attest to the ease with which information may be obtained. Junior enlisted soldiers in unsecured areas have access to reams of information that would allow cartels to build an impressive targeting list. Routinely, soldiers within PSBs are pressured to pro vide favorable personnel actions or speedier service by friends and significant others. Anyone on the payroll of a cartel could walk into a PSB and attempt to gain access to information on soldiers deployed on a counternarcotics mission. If soldiers cannot resist the temptation to help their friends on a daily basis, how can they be expected to resist an offer of five times their annual pay for simply providing some social security numbers, birthdates, and mailing addresses? What if the friend happens to be the one on the payroll? The possibilities are frightening. When their existence is threatened by massive, direct military intervention or more limited assistance, drug cartels will seek to pit their advantage against the frailties of human nature. This could lead to bribery and kickbacks directed against key U.S. military leaders and soldiers. How much would it cost to entice an E-5 to take his patrol 500 meters off of its route and fail to interdict a drug shipment? This is an interesting question, especially taking into account he will ETS from the military at the conclusion of his deployment and is not being asked to directly hurt any of his comrades in arms. How would a company commander react if he were informed that the life of his daughter depends on whether or not his unit continues to successfully interdict the flow of drugs from his area of operations? Of course, there are no easy answers to these questions. Once a soldier begins to accept any form of compensation, he may be blackmailed in addition to the other weight leveraged by the cartels. Given the potential for this type of warfare, it is critical to examine the force protection measures available and what resources exist to emplace them. First and foremost, we must recognize that the Department of Defense (DOD) could not hope to compete fiscally with the drug cartels. DOD does not have the resources to put thousands of dependents into protective custody when they are threatened. For the most part, force protection measures will be procedural in nature. Army personnel commands should definitely consider stricter control of personal financial information. The Army has already revised its websites to remove potential data of interest to terrorists for targeting senior leaders. The Army’s subversion and espionage directed against the Army program must be revised in light of the increased threat posed by drug cartels. While there are no “silver bullets” available for force protection, it is evident that further measures could reduce the vulnerability of U.S. personnel. We must address another essential question: how do we detect breaches of integrity? If the enemy remains formless, he may be subverting the mission without our knowledge. Yet again, there are no easy answers to this problem. At a systemic level, it would be extremely difficult to detect small bribes and other relatively minor infractions; however, the net effects of dozens of such incidents could have crippling results. Grand Strategic Perspective The U.S. military must understand that it is only one policy instrument incapable of bringing potential conflicts with drug cartels to resolution without a shrewd combination of political and economic instruments orchestrated in a manner that shapes peace. Liddell Hart accentuated the need to keep the endstate of conflict at the forefront of developing policy, “While the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of the peace — for its security and prosperity.”8 The nature of U.S. involvement in a future confrontation with drug cartels must remain beholden to this principle. In addition to this, it is critical to understand the nature of the war in which we are involved and refrain, as Clausewitz advises, from “trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”9 While this seems elementary, the potential for the U.S. to become embroiled in a vicious counterinsurgency could easily evolve from a more limited initial objective. The deteriorating situation in Colombia has the greatest potential to involve direct confrontation between the U.S. military and drug cartels. According to the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Medellin and Cali controlled trade in the 1980s and early 1990s has devolved into hundreds of smaller decentralized operations across all aspects of the drug trade. According to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates, several billion flows into Colombia each year from cocaine traffic alone.10 While the problems in Colombia are foreboding, the U.S. has had remarkable success in Bolivia and Thailand. In Thailand during Operation Trap Tiger, the DEA working in concert with the Thai law enforcement and military disrupted the Shan United Army, the largest trafficker of heroine in Southeast Asia, with a combination of high-tech equipment, training, and interagency cooperation.11 These experiences demonstrate a potential model for dealing with the transnational threat presented by drug cartels. The U.S. has many economic policy instruments at its disposal. While the U.S. routinely freezes the financial assets of criminals and those who support their infrastructure by laundering the cash flow generated from the drug trade, it also has the ability to influence nations by impos- “When their existence is threatened by massive, direct military intervention or more limited assistance, drug cartels will seek to pit their advantage against the frailties of human nature. This could lead to bribery and kickbacks directed against key U.S. military leaders and soldiers.” 24 — November-December 2003 ing sanctions on countries that support drug cartels. Despite U.S. efforts to stem both the demand for drugs and inhibiting the ability of drug cartels to market their products, the sources of production remain under their firm control. The Colombian government’s $7.5 billion, 6-year counternarcotics plan, issued in October 1999, pledges $4 billion to support the plan and calls on the international community to provide the remaining $3.5 billion. The U.S. recognizes the need to support its allies in their efforts to eradicate drugs within their borders; therefore, in July 2000, the U.S. Congress appropriated over $860 million for fiscal years 2000 and 2001, including $519 million for equipment and training.12 It is difficult to gauge the effects of this commitment of U.S. resources since the Colombian government has continually mismanaged its allocated money.13 The political options available to the U.S. involve both domestic and foreign policy. Obviously, the U.S. retains the right to censure countries that choose to aid drug cartels. The U.S. has found many cost effective ways to leverage the expertise of its federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with its allies. Government and nongovernment agencies continue building infrastructure for allies to aid in establishing and maintaining legitimacy. Johnnie Marshall, Administrator of the DEA, states extradition of suspects connected to drug cartels is one of the “absolute most valuable tools we’ve used.”14 While often referred to as a “drug war,” retired U.S. Army general and former “drug czar” Barry McCaffery has compared America’s drug problem to “a cancer that must be treated.”15 The statistics, which lend credence to his perspective, are appalling. In the year 2000, 16,000 U.S. citizens died of overdoses and total drug-related deaths exceeded 50,000.16 Under his leadership, the Nation’s policy toward the “drug war” began to transform into treating the “drug disease” that was plaguing the American people. While his emphasis on reducing the demand for drugs led to a 55 percent spending increase for prevention and 34 percent increase for treatment, most of the $19.2 billion budget continues to be allocated toward interdiction and law enforcement.17 Strict law enforcement, coupled with tougher drug laws and sentencing by the U.S. judicial system, has the potential to serve as a catalyst in reducing the demand for drugs. The net sum of these policy instruments leverages the United States’ ability to combat drug cartels. In its most extreme form, U.S. military policy could manifest in direct intervention to help establish or maintain the legitimacy of an allied nation. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Congress has authorized vast resources for training and equipping counternarcotics forces in Colombia. In addition to this financing, the United States offered military expertise from the U.S. Southern Command. Federal agencies continue to provide intelligence from national assets to allies. The Coast Guard, coupled with its sister services, continues to interdict the flow of drugs into the Continental United States and increase the cost of distribution for drug cartels. The options available for employing the U.S. military range the full spectrum of conflict. Given the current state of affairs, how can the U.S. military adequately address the potential for its enemies to exploit integrity asymmetrically? The answer is simple, yet profound: internalization of leadership values and understanding the primacy of the guardian’s role within our society. Leaders must heed Clausewitz’s guidance to take advantage of every opportunity to “rekindle the flame of purpose in all others; his inward fire must revive their hope.”18 Two other military minds offered their guidance regarding the need for patriotism to be the guiding purpose within the guardian class, Pericles and Giuseppe Garibaldi. Thucydides quoted Pericles, “This empire has been acquired by men who knew their duty and had the courage to do it, who in the hour of conflict had the fear of dishonor always present in them, and who, if ever they failed in an enterprise, would not allow their virtues to be lost to their country, but freely gave their lives to her as the fairest offering at her feast.”19 Garibaldi proclaimed, “I offer neither pay, nor quarters, nor provisions; I offer hunger, thirst, forced marches, battles, and death. Let him who loves his country in his heart and not with his lips only, follow me.”20 To protect our forces, we must become formless and win the information war. The Nation’s leaders must demand that the military further restrict access to potential targeting data to protect our guardians and allow them to focus on their mission. Furthermore, we must emplace further measures to detect breaches of integrity. When we discover those unable to demonstrate tactical, technical, and ethical competence as leaders, it is our duty to police the ranks of our profession. While that may involve taking an unpopular stand, it is our duty to the People that have granted us the privilege of serving our Nation. As General Douglas MacArthur so eloquently stated, “No nation can safely trust its martial honor to leaders who do not maintain the universal code which distinguishes between those things that are right and those things that are wrong.”21 Notes 1Peter Tsouras, The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, London, Greenhill Books, 2000, p. 248. 2U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999, p.1-4. 3Ibid., pp. 2-2, 2-24. 4Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato, New York, Basic Books, 1968, p. 376c. 5Cicero, The Republic, ed. and trans. by C.W. Keyes, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1928, p. 171. 6Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. by Thomas Cleary, Boston, Shambhala, 1988, 49-51, p. 55. 7Vincent J. Goulding, “Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare,” Parameters, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 21-24. 8B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, New York, Penguin Books, 1954, p. 322. 9Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 88. 10U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, 17 October 2000, p. 7. 11Micool Brooke, “The Golden Triangle’s Bounty,” Armed Forces Journal, March 2000, pp. 48-50. 12U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Plan Columbia, 2 March 2001, p. 3. 13Ibid., p. 11. 14U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, p. 15. 15Christopher Wren, “A Drug Warrior Who Would Rather Treat than Fight,” The New York Times, January 8, 2001, p. A12. 16U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, p. 7. 17Wren, p. A12. 18Clausewitz, p. 32. 19Tsouras. 20Ibid., p. 148. 21Ibid., p. 163. CPT Sean M. Scott is currently commander, C Company, 46th Adjutant General (Reception) Battalion, Fort Knox, KY. He is assigned to the 1st Armor Training Brigade at Fort Knox, KY. He received a B.S. from the United States Military Academy. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include scout platoon leader, 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Fort Hood, Texas; troop XO, 4th Squadron, 7th Cavalry, Camp Garry Owen, Korea; and assistant S3 (Mobilization) for 3d Squadron, 16th Cavalry, Fort Knox, KY. The author would like to thank Retired BG Charles Brower, IV, COL Anthony Ierardi, and CPT Curtis Taylor for reviewing this article. The responsibility for errors lies solely with the author. November-December 2003 — 25