Task Force Diehard: Lessons in Engineer-Armor Task Organization

Breaching operations are complicated operations that depend on a considerable amount of effort, coordination, and synchronization to be successful. They are not strictly engineer operations but require a combined arms effort to achieve success. At the brigade level, this requires specific task organization and gives the limited maneuver assets under Division XXI nontraditional task organization. During National Training Center (NTC) Rotation 02-06 during March 2002, the 1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT), 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), planned and executed two deliberate attacks that included brigade breaches. During both of these breaches, 1BCT used the 1st Engineer Battalion (1EN) along with an operational control (OPCON) armor company team, C Company, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (C/2-34 AR), as the brigade breach force — a maneuver task force not typically seen in brigade operations. In the preparation, planning, and execution of these missions, 1BCT and 1EN thoroughly reviewed obstacle breaching doctrine as outlined in U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-34.2, Combined-Arms Breaching Operations, and developed the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for executing and controlling brigade combined arms breaching operations.1 Preparation The 1BCT began to prepare for combined arms breaching operations in late August 2001 with a series of officer professional development sessions focused on breaching operations. During this time, the brigade commander proposed attaching an armor company team to the engineer battalion to create the breach force, with the armor company team providing both the tank plows for the reduction element and the direct fire for the breach force internal security element. An armor or infantry task force traditionally performs these roles with engineers attached as the reduction element. The list of tasks and tools necessary for an engineer battalion to function as the nucleus of a task force was created during subsequent professional development sessions. Topics included direct fire planning and safe distance zones, maneuver, and synchronization. Early in the preparation phase, 1BCT designated C/2-34 AR, as the armor company providing the direct fire and tank plows to the breach force. C/2-34 AR contributed maneuver TTPs to the preparation and planning process, as did the 2-34 AR staff. The first test for Task Force (TF) Diehard (named for 1EN Diehard Battalion) occurred during a platoon simulated training exercise (STX) in October 2001. Tank plows from C/2-34 participated in Engineer Qualification Tables (EQT) X and XI conducted by 1EN A and C Companies. While these tables focus on the tasks performed by the reduction element, it gave the engineers valuable experience in the command and control of an attached element. Following four very successful platoon runs at EQT, the task force assembled on the northern edge of Fort Riley for its first run as TF Diehard– Breachex, which was executed with two engineer companies and a platoon of tanks from C/2-34. The resultant lessons on timing, logistics, maneuvering, and communications were gathered and put back into the planning in preparation for the next run during 1BCT’s NTC train-up in 2002. Task Force Diehard: Lessons in Engineer-Armor Task Organization by Lieutenant Colonel Dale Cleland and Colonel Miroslav Kurka — 13

Planning and Rehearsal Full-fledged planning and rehearsing at apace more closely resembling the NTC battle rhythm began on 3 January 2002. 1EN moved to the field with 1BCT for 2 weeks of company team training lanes, followed by Gauntlet (a 1-week TF vs. TF training exercise) and a combined arms live fire exercise (CALFEX). During Gauntlet and CALFEX, a total of three brigade breaches were programmed, two under live-fire conditions. During company STX, the engineer companies worked closely with C/2-34 on various company team missions in more conventional command and control relationships, further strengthening the teamwork required for breach force operations. To fully support an engineer battalion based task force, in addition to C/2-34, 1BCT attached a fire support team (FIST), a fire support officer (FSO), a medical treatment team with M113 ambulances, and a Bradley-Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV) section. TF Diehard gave its FSO a radio and battle position in the battalion commander’s M113 to facilitate responsive fire support. A major training objective for Gauntlet was the formation and training of the engineer battalion task force and its employment as the breach force. This allowed the remaining two maneuver task forces to serve as the support force and the assault force, roles where the direct fire capabilities of the M1 and M2 were used to best effect. Tactical planning for employing the engineer battalion as a maneuver force was enhanced by the collocation of the engineer battalion TOC with the BCT main command post (CP). This allowed the engineers to draw on the expertise of numerous elements located in the BCT main CP, including the brigade reconnaissance troop liaison officer, the brigade fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), the brigade chemical officer, the air defense coordinator, and the brigade S4 planner. The scenario for the force-on-force deliberate attack had 1BCT supporting the division’s main effort in the west by conducting a deliberate attack. 1BCT planned for a brigade breach using an armor task force (2-34 AR) as the support force, an infantry task force (1st Battalion, 16th Infantry) as the assault force and the newly created TF Diehard as the breach force. During 1BCT’s deliberate attack, the armor company team for breach force consisted of an armor platoon and an infantry platoon. After attaching three plow-mounted tanks to the reduction element (engineer platoons), two tanks remained in the security element. This provided sufficient firepower against a point of breach defended by OPFOR infantry, but not enough firepower in the event OPFOR had armor to range the point of breach. Using this task organization, 1BCT successfully breached two lanes through enemy defenses and passed 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry onto the objective. The final stage of preparation was a CALFEX in which the entire 1BCT participated in two deliberate attacks, each maneuver task force rotated as the support force, while the engineer task force served as the breach force during both iterations. Live artillery, main gun rounds, small arms, and demolitions were used against remote-control targets and actual obstacles. During the CALFEX, the security element of the breach force consisted of an armor company team of two armor platoons. Both missions were a success, each providing the task force with “The 1BCT began to prepare for combined arms breaching operations in late August 2001 with a series of officer professional development sessions focused on breaching operations. During this time, the brigade commander proposed attaching an armor company team to the engineer battalion to create the breach force, with the armor company team providing both the tank plows for the reduction element and the direct fire for the breach force internal security element.” 14 — valuable lessons in direct fire control and maneuver. Execution On 15 March 2002, 1BCT deployed to the NTC and trained against the Krasnovian OPFOR. The training objectives for the 1BCT were to shoot, move, and communicate using all the brigade’s assets; shape the battlefield to mass at the decisive time and place; and to kill Krasnovians whenever the opportunity was present. The engineer task force objectives for breaching operations were to operate effectively as a maneuver element to establish the point of breach at the time and place that supported the brigade plan. Two of the brigade’s eight missions were deliberate attacks: the third force-on-force mission was a deliberate attack with a brigade breach in the central corridor east of the Iron Triangle; and the sixth mission was alive-fire deliberate attack through the Arrowhead and Alpha/Bravo Pass obstacle complexes into Echo Valley. The brigade employed the five planning tenets of the breaching portion of the deliberate attack: intelligence, breaching fundamentals, breaching organization, mass, and synchronization. These were applied in the preparation phase, but examined anew with each mission. Intelligence. For combined arms breaching, obstacle intelligence is critical to both the maneuver elements and the breaching force. It determines the point of breach, the point of penetration on the objective, and the location and orientation of the support force. It feeds the first key steps of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and comes from all available sources. The majority of 1BCT’s ground intelligence came from the brigade reconnaissance troop and the maneuver task force scouts, and focused primarily on OPFOR disposition, strength, and movement. The obstacle intelligence was further developed by the engineer task force’s engineer reconnaissance platoon, consisting of three four-man engineer reconnaissance teams (ERT), whose mission was to pinpoint the obstacle location and composition, and refine the point of breach or identify a bypass. MDMP intelligence considerations for the engineer task force go beyond the engineer’s traditional focus on the obstacle. During intelligence preparation of the battlefield and mission analysis, as well as focusing on the obstacle reduction or enemy engineer effort, TF Diehard planners had to account for templated opposition firepower in terms of requirements to destroy or neutralize the enemy — an aspect traditionally left to the support force or security element. Equally important was to determine terrain suitability for the armor security element to support the breach, and decide what additional reconnaissance information was required by the attached armor. It is critical to call on the attached armor company team’s planning expert early. This requires early communication of the expected task organization from the brigade staff. Keep in mind that the engineer planning time begins with the assistant brigade engineer typically 12 hours before the brigade OPORD is issued. During mission analysis, the armor planner brings a different perspective to the task force on how the situation template will effect operations, as well as an understanding of his unit’s capabilities. This information produces a set of implied tasks that engineer planners do not necessarily derive from the same information. Additionally, the armor planner provides critical information on constraints and assumptions unique to the heavy force. With practice, task force planners began to incorporate these factors, but initially, it took a tanker to ensure the critical elements were included. “A major training ob jective for Gauntlet was the formation and training of the engineer battalion task force and its employment as the breach force. This allowed the remaining two maneuver task forces to serve as the support force and the assault force, roles where the direct fire capabilities of the M1 and M2 were used to best effect.” — 15

Breaching Fundamentals. Breaching fundamentals are to suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSR-A). These fundamentals apply whether a unit is breaching a minefield or crossing a river and require a combined arms approach to be successful. Much like the preparation phase, each breaching operation was approached as a brigade operation, involving armor, infantry, artillery, air defense artillery, and engineers. They each play critical roles in SOSR-A and are task organized to best fill these roles. In 1BCT, suppression resulted from a combined effort of direct fire from the support force and indirect fire from the artillery and organic mortars. Obscuration was planned for both indirect smoke and mechanical smoke. Mechanical smoke was planned for both breaching operations but weather conditions prevented it from being effective for the point of breach. The support force initiated the indirect smoke, which came under the breach force control once the objective had been suppressed. The FSO and FIST attached to the engineer task force, with the assistance of the brigade FSCOORD, planned and controlled both indirect smoke and indirect destructive fires. Collocating the engineer battalion’s TOC and the FSCOORD’s cell with the BCT’s main command post (CP) facilitated fire support planning for TF Diehard. The armor company team was critical in providing the security fundamental for the point of breach. This presented one of the greater challenges for task force planners, especially as the dramatically different weapons ranges and vehicle capabilities were considered. The legacy force engineer company, equipped with M113A3s and armed with M2.50-caliber machine guns and Dragons, were employed dramatically different from the 3,750-meter TOW standoff and 2,500- meter M1 main gun effective ranges. In some situations, all weapons systems were effectively employed after careful planning and further refinement on the ground. In other situations, such as a breach along the north wall of the central corridor, the shorter ranges of engineer weapons prevented them from playing a major role in providing security until the reduction elements moved forward to the point of breach. These missions demonstrate the importance of including the armor commander in the course of action (COA) development. While the basic battlefield calculus can be done by any Combined Arms and Service Staff School graduate, the nuances of exactly how to array the maneuver element for best effect, placement of support by fire positions and deconfliction of the safe distance zones proved the benefits of having a tanker involved in COA development by producing a solid COA on the first attempt, rather than one developed in a vacuum by engineer planners. Reduction of the obstacle is the bread and butter of the engineer battalion, but even here, the armor company provided invaluable assistance. The tank-mounted mine plow is the ideal tool for proofing the lane through the obstacle — as long as the point of breach is on suitable ground. Our well-rehearsed teams of sappers with a tank plow reduced Krasnovian mine-wire obstacles in 5 to 10 minutes, versus 30 minutes or more when a lane had to be proofed by hand or with an armored combat earthmover. These minutes were critical to the survival of both the breach force elements and the assault force. The final fundamental is the assault, which applies to the breach force and the assault force. The breach force must have sufficient firepower remaining after the reduction to secure the far side of the breach until the assault force passes through the lane and assaults the objective at the point of penetration. Breaching Organization. The organization of the friendly forces for the breach has been alluded to throughout this article. To reiterate, there is a support force whose role is suppressing the objective; a breach force for securing the point of breach and reducing the obstacle; and the assault force whose mission is to seize the far-side objective. 1BCT organized along doctrinal lines, with the exception of creating the breach force around the engineer task force. By task organizing an armor company team, the breach force had both a reduction element and a security element with sufficient assets to accomplish each of the SOSR-A tasks. Consistent with lessons learned during the Gauntlet train-up, the breach force was also task organized with the following slice elements: a FIST, an FSO, a medical treatment team with M113 ambulances, and a Stinger section. Additionally, a smoke platoon and two military police sections were OPCON to the TF. The command and control of these elements changed as the battle progressed. Mass. By executing a brigade breach, the brigade commander was able to mass reduction assets (engineers) at the point of breach. The concept of mass also applies to all three elements in a breaching operation. As in all operations, the objective of mass is to bring the maximum effects of the different combat systems to bear at the right place. For the engineer task force (breach force) this was also accomplished by coordinating in advance the placement of the tank plows so that they could provide additional direct fire when they were not proofing the lane. Correct task organization within the support force placed firepower under the control of the commander who could most execute suppression and allow the conduct of the breach. Synchronization. The most important element in a brigade breach is the synchronization of all the elements so that they play their role at precisely the correct time and in the correct sequence. Critical to synchronization is reverse planning and rehearsals. As mentioned above, bringing the maneuver company commander into the planning process early allows engineer task force planners to understand and incorporate aspects of maneuver, command and control, and logistics with which they were unfamiliar. Detailed reverse breach planning and wargaming took on new importance as the armor company commander introduced new aspects of planning with which the engineers had not previously had to contend. These include the logistics of arming and fueling a heavy force on the battlefield (M1s consume fuel three times faster than engineer equipment), and maintaining weapons platforms for which the task force was not resourced. Working with C/2-34 AR and their parent task force early in the preparation phase produced several TTPs that served the engineer task force well during subsequent fights. Lessons Learned Recap As mentioned earlier, to fully operate as a maneuver task force, in addition to tanks and plows, an engineer battalion must have a FIST, a medical treatment team, air defense artillery assets and additional combat service support assets. Experts for employing these attachments came from the attachments and from the expertise of numerous elements collocated with the engineer battalion TOC in the BCT main CP. The armor company team OPCON to an engineer task force must come with a slice from the parent armor task force’s support element. This slice should include maintenance capability or support arrangements, recovery assets, class V, and unique class III resupply capability, depending on the duration of the task organization, and ideally, one-third of the 16 — support platoon’s bulk fuel and haul assets. The engineer battalion S4 developed a set of standard planning factors for supporting the engineer task force. These factors included support from the engineer battalion’s organic assets. These include class I, bulk class III, inclusion into the logistics resupply breakouts, and casualty evacuation — especially when few or none of these assets came with the armor company. Rehearsals are absolutely critical to success. For a task force that does not habitually fight together, the rehearsal provided the perfect opportunity for the engineer task force commander to ensure all elements of the breach force understood their roles and timing in the operation. It also afforded the armor commander the opportunity to educate the engineers on maneuver, as well as ensure maneuver schemes fit the engineer mission. A full mounted rehearsal ensured that coordination issues, such as movement and fire controls, were fully understood. TF Diehard was created around an engineer battalion to serve as the breach force for brigade breaching operations. With the addition of an armor company to provide direct fire capability, the engineer task force accomplished each mission, which gave the brigade commander flexibility with his two maneuver task forces. With the help of C/2-34 AR, TF Diehard learned many lessons each time the TF assembled. While a success from the beginning, by the final live fire deliberate attack, TF Diehard pulled all these elements together for the final attack mission. As the brigade breach force with a balanced company team as support and assault elements, TF Diehard breached the Arrowhead obstacle complex and Alpha Pass just 3 hours after the BCT crossed the line of departure, and passed the entire assault force and part of the support force into Echo Valley to defeat the Krasnovians once and for all. Our thanks to the armor officers and noncommissioned officers who taught us what it means to be a maneuver task force. Notes 1U. S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-34.2, Combined-Arms Breaching Operations, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 31 August 2000, Change 3, 23 February 2001. LTC Dale Cleland is a staff leader, Combined Arms and Service Staff School (CAS3), Fort Leavenworth, KS. He received a B. A. from the U. S. Military Academy and an M. A. from the University of Kansas. His military education includes CAS3, Engineer Officer Advanced Course, and the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include engineer advisor, Office of the Project Manager-Saudi Arabia National Guard, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; operations officer, 1st Engineer Battalion (Combat), Fort Riley, KS; plans officer, 3d Brigade, 75th Division (Training Support), Fort Riley, KS; and assistant professor, Geography and Environmental Engineering, U. S. Military Academy, West Point, NY. COL Miroslav Kurka, currently a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, recently served as the chief of staff, Objective Force Task Force, Arlington, VA. He holds a B. S. from the U. S. Military Academy and an M. S. from Central Michigan University. His military education includes U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, CAS3, Engineer Officer Advanced Course, Engineer Officer Basic Course, and U. S. Army Airborne School. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include commander, 1st Engineer Battalion (Combat), Fort Riley, KS; deputy commander, 937th Engineer Battalion (Combat), Fort Riley, KS; commander, 565th Engineer Battalion (Provisional), Hanau, GE; and chief, U. S. Army Europe Force Protection Branch, Heidelberg, GE. “During mission analysis, the armor planner brings a different perspective to the task force on how the situation template will effect operations, as well as an understanding of his unit’s capabilities. This information produces a set of implied tasks that engineer planners do not necessarily derive from the same information. Additionally, the armor planner provides critical information on constraints and assumptions unique to the heavy force. With practice, task force planners began to incorporate these factors, but initially, it took a tanker to ensure the critical elements were included.” — 17