The Support Platoon in Baghdad

The Support Platoon in Baghdad by First Lieutentant Jeffrey M. Kaldahl While training for deployment to Iraq, our platoon spent hours drilling on nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) procedures and reacting to contact, ambushes, and sniper attacks. As major combat operations drew to a close, it became clear that running multiple logistics packages (LOGPACs) throughout a 500-kilometer attack would be unlikely, and instead, we would be executing missions out of some type of forward operating base similar to how things are done during deployments to gunnery or the Combat Maneuver Training Center. However, when we arrived in Baghdad on 29 May, we quickly realized it would not be business as usual. We have yet to run a large LOGPAC containing class III and V: no linkup with supply sergeants; and no synchronized plan to merge with first sergeants at a logistics release point (LRP). Instead, the support platoon is dispersed throughout the battalion sector to the companies — instead of constantly running class III and V resupply, our platoon’s primary responsibility is to help Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) guard the ministry of oil. While this may sound like a problem, in reality it combines the strengths of the support platoon as well as the fundamentals of Army operations to create an efficient system that turns the support platoon into a force multiplier for the battalion. By using the flexibility of the platoon, it can perform a variety of tasks that provide the support needed for the rest of the battalion to accomplish its mission. Organization To understand this process, it is important to grasp how the platoon is organized throughout the battalion sector. First, over half the platoon is consolidated with HHC at the ministry of oil. Our primary mission is to guard its facilities and allow Iraqi nationals to work at rebuilding Iraq’s oil program. In addition to most of the platoon’s soldiers, its senior leaders are located at this centralized location as well. This allows for quick dissemination and collection of necessary information, and gives squad leaders the opportunity to take charge of more than just the soldiers in their squads. Throughout the rest of the battalion sector, each company has a specifically assigned number of fuel and cargo heavy expanded mobile tactical trucks (HEMTTs) for support. For example, one company has one fueler and one fuel handler assigned, and the other companies have two fuelers and one cargo HEMTT assigned. We base these requirements on the company’s anticipated fuel consumption and how many cargo HEMTTs are needed to move heavy objects to and from base camps to improve security structures, as well as quality of life. Companies that have more than one vehicle also have at least one 77F20 team leader in each respective squad. He not only provides leadership for the support platoon soldiers, but he also has an opportunity to develop his own leadership style in a real world environment. This organization works for several reasons. First, companies do not use their tanks everyday and fuel consumption is dramatically reduced. For example, during a normal gunnery rotation, the battalion consumes an average of 6,000 gallons per day. While in Baghdad, that has been reduced to less than 1,000 gallons per day, which means companies can go days without refueling tanks. Fuel HEMTTs are only required to refuel every two or three days, reducing the number of fuelers and support personnel at each company. The junior noncommissioned officer’s (NCOs) ability to run a squad is critical to make this work. We are fortunate to have at least two junior NCOs (corporals and sergeants) in each squad, and every NCO is capable of running a squad. Additionally, team-leader preparation prior to deployment not only gave them confidence, but also gave the rest of the platoon the confidence to operate on their own, independent of squad leaders. If this element seeks to exist, this plan will fail. Another key is that the team leaders are all 77Fs. By providing the companies with fuel specialists, as opposed to transporters, they benefit from the working relationship the fuel handlers already have with our forward support battalion’s fuel section to get the fuel they need when they need it. While separating the platoon provides great advantages, there are also disadvantages. The first one is the inability for direct communication within the platoon. There have been several instances where we required information about soldiers or equipment that we could not obtain. To get the information meant convoying to the company or going through the company to get the information. Also, if we have to discuss MOS-related items, passing information through the company is more difficult because the basic technical knowledge is not always available. Next, separation hampers the accountability of both personnel and equipment. While companies handle the green-two status of sensitive items, there have been 10 — November-December 2003 plenty of times when platoon level visual inspections of designated items were necessary, usually during specific monthly inventories and change of command inventories. Besides that, there is a constant challenge of dispatching vehicles, as well as keeping track of equipment inspections and maintenance worksheets (5988Es) each week. The squads are assigned to companies that cannot print out 5988E forms or dispatch vehicles, so vehicles are brought to the ministry to be processed. There are several things that can be done to mitigate these problems. First, when vehicle operators pick up 5988E forms or re-dispatch their vehicles, we ensure they checked in. This allows us to not only know they are re-dispatching their vehicles, but we also get a quick update on what is going on and if they have any issues. Second, we visit them at their locations once or twice a week. Finally, we address any problems that require higher-level help at the first sergeant’s LOGPAC meeting held daily at our location. Movement from Kuwait The most difficult movement was from our base camp in Kuwait to Baghdad. It was a 28-hour road march with two rest stops no longer than one hour each. In addition to normal problems, such as security, food, and rest, the battalion had to contend with the fact that we would lose vehicles to mechanical failure, while only having two designated recovery assets. Furthermore, once everything was off the boats and we transformed into our tactical load plans, it became clear the battalion wanted to move a lot more equipment than originally planned. Who do you call in a situation such as this? You guessed it — the support platoon. As any support platoon leader, HHC commander, and battalion XO knows, the space on the back of cargo HEMTTs is precious. This became clear almost immediately as we prepared for our move north. The best thing the battalion did was prioritizing its needs. It was class I because the initial class I shortage was still an issue. Over here, class I not only means meals ready to eat (MREs), but also cases and cases of water. Before anything else was planned, class I took up the space of five full cargo HEMTTs. Fortunately, we did not have to carry class V. The companies received munitions and transported it on tanks, personnel carriers, or whatever other vehicles they could use. This saved an immeasurable amount of space because we did not have to carry any additional ammo basic load (ABL). This made space available for other priority items. Some ideas included refrigerators, air conditioners, class IX, supply room items, NBC equipment, as well as items needed to support the support platoon. The bottom line is: someone must prioritize what goes on the HEMTTs, and it cannot be the support platoon leader because anyone else seeking space outranks him. The support platoon leader should seek assistance from the HHC commander and battalion XO. However, the support platoon leader must make clear what he can and cannot take. Eventually, someone is going to ask for more space than is available, and the platoon leader must make the priorities clear. The battalion also used HEMTTs for recovery support. As mentioned earlier, there are only two recovery trucks in the battalion. With a 500-kilometer road march ahead, it would have been foolish not to anticipate more than two vehicle breakdowns. Cargo HEMTTs were a solution and the battalion distributed them throughout the four serials and used them to recover any medium (5-ton) or heavy (HEMTT) vehicle that broke down. We had to borrow tow bars from the line companies because we did not own any. Light tow bars were best because we did not have to modify them to make them work. They are also significantly lighter, which makes it a lot easier for two or three people to lift. Since light tow bars were also used by high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to recover broken down HMMWVs, we were required to put medium and light feet at the end of the heavy tow bar. We received these interchangeable feet from the maintenance section and put them on as many heavy tow bars as we needed. Besides preparing the two bars, it was imperative that we trained and rehearsed the recovery plan with the platoon. Security along the main supply route was still a concern, so learning how to recover a vehicle on the route was a bad idea. We spent two days practicing hooking and unhooking HEMTTs until each person knew what to do, if necessary. In addition to the cargo HEMTTs, we also used three M931 lowboys as recovery assets. We placed them in the last serial, and they were used as a last resort for recovering light vehicles. However, just prior to start point, one of the 5-tons with a build-up went down, so we had to “While training for deployment to Iraq, our platoon spent hours drilling on nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) procedures and reacting to contact, ambushes, and sniper attacks. As major com bat operations drew to a close, it became clear that running multiple logistics packages (LOGPACs) throughout a 500-kilometer attack would be unlikely, and instead, we would be executing missions out of some type of forward operating base similar to how things are done during deployments to gunnery or the Combat Maneuver Training Center.” November-December 2003 — 11 use one lowboy to put the buildup on because it had most of the maintenance tools — another use for the lowboys. Keep some type of lift asset available to help load vehicles onto the low boy. We had an M88 available to lift the build-up onto the low boy, but used cranes from cargo HEMTTs to put trailers on the lowboy. Trailers proved to be a chronic problem for the battalion. It is worth mentioning that besides putting broken trailers on lowboys, they also fit in cargo HEMTT beds. However, the decision to leave a cargo empty should be made at a higher level, but it is something worth considering, since trailers seemed to provide the biggest headache for recovery. Finally, it is important to consider the possibility of having to tow a fueler. We left two fuel trucks empty, also in the final serial. In the event a fuel truck broke down, one of the empty fuel trucks could transfer the fuel, and a HEMTT or a 10-ton wrecker could then recover the broken fueler. While we were fortunate enough not to have to use this, it is another planning consideration that saves a lot of problems, if needed. Daily Missions Once we arrived in Baghdad and settled into a routine, certain missions began occurring daily. Although they are not part of our normal function, ask any soldier in the battalion and they will tell you they are grateful for what we provide. First, because of the increased class I draw by the dining facility, we assist them by providing larger hauling capabilities. This is primarily for the bottled water. Additionally, we still draw MREs, and depending on the ration cycle, we receive either T-rations or the occasional A-rations. Our second daily mission is more for the soldiers — the daily mail run. The longer we are here, the better the mail system gets. That means more packages as well as hundreds of letters. Each day we fill at least one cargo HEMTT full of mail, and this is one mission that soldiers know must get done! The last mission is much like our normal tasks — refilling the main generator at our battalion tactical operations center. The generator powers several buildings, including the battalion headquarters, billeting, and the battalion headquarters and billets for 3d Battalion, 7th (3-7) Infantry. Currently, we rotate days with the 3-7 Infantry platoon, but when they are gone we fill it everyday. These missions are all fairly routine, and are not manpower intensive. Since they regularly occur, these missions are easy to plan for and work into our guard schedule. Also, since the missions support other sections, we do not provide escorts, which further lessens the personnel impact. We make sure the .50 cal is ready and soldiers are given proper checks before being handed off to the sections they support. On Order Missions Not only do we perform daily missions, we also perform missions tasked by the battalion. These tasks normally involve using the lift capacity of the HEMTTs in conjunction with procuring large amounts of items. For example, several times the S4 has needed HEMTTs to move air conditioner units to improve quality of life in the billets. Other times, we have hauled large refrigerators or freezers. While we usually receive a 24-hour notice, there are times we receive no notice, and it helps to have a system that keeps our manpower flexible enough to respond immediately. Another on-order mission has been to transport connexes from Baghdad International Airport back to the battalion. While the battalion could rely on external units to bring the connexes to us, our ability to transport connexes on our lowboys and a 24-hour-or-less notice allows the battalion to get the connexes quicker. Furthermore, our forward support battalion used our lowboys to move its connexes. This not only helped them, but also helped our battalion by providing our maintenance teams with class IX held in those connexes. Also, by facilitating a positive relationship, the forward support battalion gave us extra class III packaged products that were in short supply. In short, remaining flexible has allowed the support platoon to assist the battalion in several ways, often with little notice, to improve not only the security of the battalion, but the quality of life. Throughout the rest of our deployment, we know we can expect more on-order missions consisting of various tasks. Operational Support It is important to note that in addition to the support we provide the battalion to Continued on Page 21 12 — November-December 2003 “One of our main tasks is the transport of detainees. This happens once or twice a week, depending on the number of detainees held at the battalion detention center. When there are enough detainees to move, our platoon transports them to Baghdad International Airport for further detention and questioning. “

Support Platoon in Baghdad from Page 12 November-December 2003 — 21 Other examples:

• Seize key terrain — repeats Field Manual (FM) 3-0.

• Masking criteria — should be included in unit SOP.

• Evacuation criteria for damaged vehicles — should be SOP.

• Casualty evacuation procedures — should be SOP. Where We Want to Be: VII Corps Field Order 18 Doctrine already provides potential solutions to simplify the OPORD. Every commander and staff officer should read and take to heart Appendix H to FM 101-5.3 This appendix clearly demonstrates that, contrary to popular belief, current doctrine encourages short, simple orders. Appendix H contains Field Order 18 — the OPORD for the VII Corps exploitation from the Remagen bridgehead in World War II. Remember that OPORD NAVAJO, a brigade order, was 22 pages without annexes. Contrast it with Field Order 18 — a corps order for a complex operation, consisting entirely of a five-page base order, a sketch, a seven-page intelligence annex, a fire support annex, and an overlay. FM 101-5 makes several important points about Field Order 18:

• Although brief and simple, it is complete and doctrinally correct.

• VII Corps produced the order under time pressure and in a combat environment.

• Oral orders, an overlay, experience, and good SOPs made the order effective.

• Subordinate commanders clearly understood the concept and executed effectively.4 As the introduction to Appendix H illustrates, a well-trained unit with a strong SOP can succeed in executing a complex operation based on a very simple order.5 Commanders and staff must be prepared to plan as VII Corps did in 1945 — in the field, in contact, and under time constraints. The most effective way to ensure success under these conditions is to produce orders that are as clear and concise as possible. By turning to the solutions already present in our doctrine — matrix orders, overlay orders, rehearsals, SOPs, and short written orders such as Field Order 18 — today’s heavy brigades and task forces can ensure that they will fight and win on future battlefields. Notes 1U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), Washington, D.C., 14 June 2001, p. 11-8. 2FM 3-90, Tactics, GPO, Washington, D.C., 4 July 2001, p. 4-12. 3FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, GPO, Washington, D.C., 31 May 1997, Appendix H. 4Ibid. 5Ibid. CPT Brian Hayes is commander, B Battery, 1st Battalion, 246th Field Artillery, Chatham, VA. He received a B.A. from Princeton University. His military education includes Airborne School, Armor Officer Basic Course, and Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course. He has served in various command and staff positions, to include battalion fire support officer, 1st Battalion, 116th Infantry, Roanoke, VA; XO, A Company, 2d Battalion, 70th Armor, Fort Riley, KS; assistant S3, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (2-34 AR), Fort Riley; liaison officer, 2-34 AR, Fort Riley; and tank platoon leader, A Company, 2-34 AR, Fort Riley.