Building on Force XXI Task Force and Brigade Recon Troop Scout Platoons

With the collapse of the wall dividing East and West Germany on 8-9 November 1989, the Cold War, as we new it, came to an end. The end of the Cold War, along with the Army’s technological revolution, justified the Army’s reduction in size in the 1990s. Technology also allowed us to do more with less, and forced us to rewrite the doctrine and standard operating procedures we use to implement these new tools of the battlefield. The recent development and fielding of the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT) and the development of the first Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), with its Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron, has caused us once again to review how our reconnaissance assets are configured and employed on today’s battlefields. Fielding equipment like the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), the brigade reconnaissance troop forward, and JSTARS, the commander now has eyes that see the enemy much deeper in the reconnaissance battlespace. With Strikers and Colts forward as part of the brigade reconnaissance troop, as well as air support, the commander can now effectively shape the battlefield and degrade the enemy with indirect artillery and MLRS fires prior to any direct fire contact. The RSTA Squadron appears to be designed to meet this forward battlefield shaping mission as well, although there seems to be a question of air assets being part of this organization.

It appears the organizations like the BRT, IBCT, and RSTA Squadron are based on the technology and capabilities of equipment not yet fielded or developed. Equipment like the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV), Mobile Gun System (MGS), Command Vehicle (CV), and Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3) will overcome some tremendous shortfalls in reconnaissance today.

An example of one such shortfall is adequate optics for the HMMWV scouts. Because HMMWV scouts have such poor optics, they have to close with the enemy to the point that their survivability is regularly compromised in order to provide accurate reporting and the ability to paint a clear picture for the commander. With the fielding of the LRAS3, this problem will be tremendously reduced and visual standoff will be greatly increased. But this technological change will not be fielded for some time.

The question now is, how do we provide the commander with the intelligence he requires and sustain survivability for our BRT and task force scouts with the equipment that is currently available?

This article contains proposals and techniques on training, configuring, and equipping today’s scouts to remain effective until we develop and field the equipment and units of tomorrow. It is vital that we take the time to accurately test and develop future equipment and units to ensure they meet the needs of tomorrow’s battlefields. It is just as vital that we attempt to correct shortfalls faced by today’s scouts.

Manning

Modern manuals and standard operating procedures are not written for the current six-HMMWV scout platoon configuration. FM 17-98, Scout Platoon Manual dated April 1999 refers only to the ten-HMMWV scout platoons or the six-CFV scout platoons. FM 17-98 states that these platoons can sustain only three OPs for long durations (over 12 hours). Once in the Force XXI, six-HMMWV platoon configuration, manpower will only allow two long duration OPs. The three-man crews of the HMMWV have always had a difficult time conducting OP/LP operations, let alone security patrols as well. HMMWV scout crews are also incapable of dismounting a pair of scouts forward of their vehicle to clear danger areas and intervisibility lines, and still leave enough personnel on the HMMWV to maneuver or conduct actions on contact. Scouts constantly die in training because they do not dismount and clear forward of their vehicle. This problem will be resolved with the fielding of the new RV which will have a six-man crew, four of them being dismounts.

A solution for this problem until the RV is fielded could be to place a fourth scout on each HMMWV. This additional scout can act as a loader/assistant gunner while mounted and support patrols and OP/LP operations while dismounted. This will also allow two scouts to dismount, clearing forward of the HMMWV while the driver and gunner remain on the vehicle to cover the dismounts and maneuver the HMMWV forward.

The brigade reconnaissance troop scout platoons should continue to serve on HMMWVs until the new RV is fielded. The BRT scout platoons should have eight HMMWVs, not six. Eight HMMWVs with four-man crews will create a 32-soldier platoon, four soldiers less than the future six-vehicle RV platoon. The current 18-man, six-HMMWV platoon is simply not capable of accomplishing all the tasks required to ensure mission success. The BRT TOC should be a C2 LAV until the new Command Vehicle is fielded. This vehicle will support the communications needed and allow room for battle tracking.

The battalion task force scout platoons must be prepared to move ahead of the brigade reconnaissance troop at any time, and be the reconnaissance asset furthest forward on the battlefield. The BRT will not always be able to be forward of the task force scouts because there will be times that the brigade commander will use the BRT in another capacity, such as flank guard missions. Task force scouts must increase their optics capability, survivability, and capacity for extended operations in the reconnaissance battlespace. The following suggested modification to the battalion task force scout platoon addresses these problems, as well as others. The following is the proposed organization.

Enemy aircraft and air inserted dismounts are two of the greatest threats to reconnaissance assets forward on the battlefield. To counter the air threat, the gunners (noted with asterisks on the table), and their vehicle commanders, are to be trained as two-man MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems) teams, and have Stinger missiles in their load plan. Scouts must only engage enemy air in the reconnaissance battlespace in self-defense, otherwise they may compromise the reconnaissance mission.

A medic and mechanic need to be permanently attached to the platoon, cross-trained in mounted and dismounted operations and the platoon’s standard operating procedures. This cross-training is critical to the survivability of these assets working this far forward. Both the medic and the mechanic will be part of the platoon sergeant’s CFV, which has the room for them and their equipment. The medic must be prepared to stabilize casualties for extended periods of time until exfiltration or medical evacuation. The mechanic must have the ability to adapt and overcome difficulties. His approach should be geared toward quick fixes to sustain operations until time permits proper corrective repairs.

Tactical Employment The debate over the best scout vehicle is never-ending. Even today, as word gets out about the development of the new RV, critics line up to chide the future vehicles. But until these new vehicles are fielded, each type of vehicle we currently have has something to offer and should be integrated according to its capabilities to maximize mission success.

The deeper into enemy territory that scouts go, the lighter and quieter they must be. Scouts moving deep into the battlespace should be inserted by air or HMMWV to maximize stealth. The closer you get to the main body in the brigade combat team, the greater the need to have reconnaissance assets with survivability and lethality. With the downsizing of the Force XXI task force and brigade combat teams, the task force and brigade commanders cannot risk the loss of their fighting assets in the reconnaissance fight. In offensive operations, enemy reconnaissance must be defeated in the reconnaissance battlespace prior to committing the first task force. Enemy eyes on the brigade or task force main body have proved devastating on numerous occasions throughout history, and aggressive counterreconnaissance is a must. The forward task force company conducting counterreconnaissance should have a platoon designated to clear possible enemy OPs. Bradleys or tanks will fix and destroy enemy that the scouts have either lost contact with or cannot engage with indirect fire. Counterreconnaissance armor or air can also work with scouts in hunter/killer

Vehicle #1 M3 CFV

Vehicle #4 M3 CFV

SGT (Gunner) SPC (Driver) PFC (Loader) PFC (Scout) SFC (PSG)

SPC (Gunner)* SPC (Driver) PFC (Loader/Mechanic) PFC (Medic) ALPHA Section Vehicle #2 M1026 HMMWV

BRAVO Section Vehicle #5 M1026 HMMWV

CHARLIE Section Vehicle #7 M3 CFV

DELTA Section Vehicle #9 M3 CFV

SSG (Sec Sergeant) SGT (Gunner)* SPC (Driver) PFC (Scout) SSG (Sec Sergeant) SGT (Gunner)* SPC (Driver) PFC (Scout) SSG (Sec Sergeant) SPC (Gunner)* PFC (Driver) PFC (Loader) PFC (Scout) SSG (Sec Sergeant) SPC (Gunner)* PFC (Driver) PFC (Loader) PFC (Scout) Vehicle #3 M1025 HMMWV

Vehicle #6 M1025 HMMWV

Vehicle #8 M1025 HMMWV

Vehicle #0 M1025 HMMWV

SGT (Sqd Leader) SPC (Gunner) PFC (Driver) SGT (Sqd Leader) SPC (Gunner) PFC (Driver) SGT (Sqd Leader) SPC (Gunner) PFC (Driver) SGT (Sqd Leader) SPC (Gunner) PFC (Driver) teams. M3 CFVs in the task force scout platoons, working in depth, overwatching the light scout vehicles moving into sector, can also support in this role. The CFV has the optics and weapons range to provide this support in depth so as not to compromise stealth for the reconnaissance assets forward. These scout CFVs, forward with the scouts, will provide immediate support for the light scouts in a surprise meeting engagement, in turn increasing their survivability. Direct and indirect fires coordinated by the CFVs will also increase the likelihood of the scouts in contact successfully breaking contact and continuing with their mission. With HMMWVs, CFVs, and LAVs forward on the battlefield, the enemy will not be sure what size or type of element they are facing. This confusion may cause the enemy to commit early, allowing greater warning and reaction time for friendly commanders. The CFVs can support infiltration in echelon by providing overwatch for the initial teams moving into sector. The first echelons in sector then provide cover for the rest moving into sector from their set positions. This creates an umbrella of security and overwatch for the follow-on teams moving into sector, as well as attached assets such as NBC and smoke vehicles. The CFVs can also escort these assets moving into sector or act as gun support for medevac assets going forward.

CFVs organic to the task force scout platoons will support convoy and route security operations. They also support stability and support operations, in or out of MOUT environments. The task force scout CFVs can also be pushed forward, in an emergency, to support the brigade reconnaissance troop. When conducting offensive operation planning, always plan operations to continue beyond the objective. The reconnaissance mission always takes follow-on missions into consideration and constantly leapfrogs reconnaissance assets forward of the task force early enough to provide the critical information needed to generate reconnaissance pull on the battlefield. Because commanders want their reconnaissance assets in sector as soon as possible, task force scouts are either conducting resupply operations or are already moving into sector for the next mission during defensive operations. Because of this, the counterreconnaissance and screen line operations are best left to other units in the task force, such as the mechanized infantry. Once task force scouts get established in sector to support the next offensive operation, they will provide advance warning to the task force of approaching enemy and conduct battle handoff to the counterreconnaissance force if the enemy’s destruction was not possible with indirect fires.

The brigade reconnaissance troop can further destroy enemy reconnaissance with indirect fires from their Strikers/ Colts if they are also forward. Task force scouts can conduct continuous operations forward for extended periods of time if they don’t have to conduct screen line operations in the defense. This gives them the time needed to prepare for the next extended operation.

Conducting risk management and evaluating safety also includes the threat the enemy presents. Everyone, at all levels, must evaluate how to reduce this threat. Select routes that are outside enemy weapons range once proposed enemy positions are templated. Using Terrabase on the possible enemy positions will also allow you to see what the positions can and cannot see, and this will also help in route selection. Once the initial echelons are in sector, the CFVs in the follow-on echelons move in and clear these potential threat areas. The CFVs have a greater likelihood of survivability and defeating the enemy threat in a meeting engagement. The communication scheme is also vital. One technique is for the task force scout platoon to have the S2 monitor the scout platoon net, allowing the scouts to be on the platoon net and the task force command net. Also preset is the indirect net, A&Land O&I, which act as the scout backup or alternate net, especially when the task force is in direct contact. It is also wise to preset the nets of the companies in the lead of the task force to provide real-time information directly to the elements getting ready to be in contact. During the reconnaissance fight, the intelligence is pushed up on platoon internal net by S2 eavesdropping as the reports come over the net. This provides real-time information. If S2 is having trouble monitoring the reports, they communicate to the scouts on task force command. This prevents the higher headquarters from tying up the platoon net.

Scouts will regularly paint the picture for the command and commander on the command net. Net discipline is very important to this technique. Once the task force is in contact, the command net becomes overwhelmed so most intelligence continues to be pushed up on the platoon internal net. Two scout vehicles will monitor platoon internal and task force O&I. These teams will ensure all reports are being received by S2 when the command net is tied up. Communication must be a constant consideration in the planning phase of an operation. If terrain is going to limit transmissions, mutual communication support must be planned. Transmission limitations can be determined by a reconnaissance of the area of operation, and if this is not possible, by a map reconnaissance.

To sustain operations for more than 12 hours, section integrity must be maintained. A scout platoon of six HMMWVs maintaining section integrity has the capability to observe only one, maybe two NAIs. If two NAIs are tasked for an operation greater than 12 hours, the scout platoon will not be able to provide redundancy or depth on the tasked NAIs, and they are really in trouble if a scout team is compromised. For this reason, it is critical that a scout platoon be at least eight vehicles and that at least half these vehicles be four-man crews to facilitate dismounted operations. With the addition of four CFVs to the task force scout platoons, more NAIs will be covered in depth and the CFVs will provide the redundancy needed to ensure success with their optics and weapons range capability. Using Recon Pull in the Attack Scout offensive planning should be done in multiple phases. One of the phases is supporting the task force once they have executed operations and are in contact. This is done by pulling the task force through each security belt of the enemy, by having eyes deep initially covering these belts, and by continuously bounding scout teams forward, in depth, even after task force contact is made. The scout plan should also include a fire support plan, not only for the reconnaissance fight, but