Urban Combat in World War II

Urban Combat in World War II How Doctrine Changed as the War Progressed

But it came to pass on the seventh day that they rose early, about the dawning of the day, and marched around the city seven times in the same manner. On that day only they marched around the city seven times. And the seventh time it happened, when the priests blew the trumpets, that Joshua said to the people: ‘Shout, for the Lord has given you the city!’... And it happened when the people heard the sound of the trumpet, and the people shouted with a great shout, that the wall fell down flat. Then the people went up into the city, every man straight before him, and they took the city.1 Unfortunately, urban warfare has become much more complex than in the days of Joshua. In World War II, the U.S. Army would take an immature urban warfare doctrine in its infancy, test it, develop it, and change it, based on the new tactical realities, much as it had to do with the rest of its doctrine. World War II presented the U.S. Army with many challenges it had not previously faced on such a grand scale. It would have been difficult to predict the precise set of tactics and combinations of weapons that would be needed to be successful in combat in both major cities and small villages. So, the Army set forth a basic doctrine on how to apply combat power, but left the executors of these fights to develop the specific details. In most cases, the Army got it basically right, but in some cases failed to appreciate the possibilities inherent in their new weapons and doctrine, from the use of air power in support of attacking forces to the use of tanks and tank destroyers. One of the great lessons the Army would have to learn would be to adopt a more integrated approach to fighting. “Rather than relying on either the infantry, tanks, artillery, or air power alone to get the job done, the American Army discovered it could only win battles by using all available manpower and mate- 8 ARMOR — November-December 1999 rial resources in coordinated, combined arms operations.”2 Overall, though, the U.S. Army entered World War II with a solid basic doctrine that it adapted in the crucible of war. This adaptation can be seen best in the Army’s changing techniques and tactics in many areas, but in the area of urban combat, the Army was forced — because of tactical realities — to modify not only its tactics, but also its basic assumption that the urban fight was an infantry fight with only limited support from the other arms. Prior to looking at specific examples of operations in Aachen and Brest, an examination of the Army’s urban warfare doctrine, as well as its pre-war training, is necessary to appreciate the Army’s starting point. A quick look at the capstone manual for all U.S. Army doctrine, the 1941 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations, reveals that the Army had not completely developed a doctrine for urban conflict: the 300-page manual has only two pages directly covering urban combat, in Section IV, “Combat in Towns.”3 FM 100-5, however, did offer a good description of some of the characteristics of urban fighting. The manual stated that fighting in towns offered concealment for troops and weapons, as well as protection from the effects of fire and protection from mechanized attack. Towns were described as being naturally strong defensive areas, but that they are also a “conspicuous topographical feature,” the details of which can be readily discerned. The manual also pointed out that fighting in towns would be characterized by close combat and not sweeping maneuver. Additionally, difficulties in command and control would make the nature of the fight decentralized, with the outcome resting largely on the “initiative and aggressive leadership of subordinate commanders.”4 Next, the manual described the basic method for attacking a town: The town was to be isolated from its surrounding terrain and neighboring defenses. Like other attacks, the attack on the town should seek a flank or the rear of the main defenses. If the town had been turned into a heavily fortified position, then the attack should be made “strongly supported by artillery, combat aviation, and other supporting weapons.”5 Once these fires are lifted, the attack should proceed by bounds through the town to the far side where the unit was to prepare a defense against counterattack. FM 100-5 accurately predicted that troops would need detailed intelligence of an urban area. It recommended the use of reconnaissance, to include aerial photos. Actual operations would bear this out, confirming that extremely detailed reconnaissance gained through patrolling and the commanders’ personal observations was vital to the success of attacks. Operations failed to appreciate the critical role tanks and tank destroyers would play, and advised against their use in cities: “Mechanized troops are of little value in combat within a defended town. Their use for such combat will probably result in excessive casualties, both in personnel and vehicles.”6 Experience would prove otherwise. An emphasis on urban combat for armored forces was absent in the Tennessee, Louisiana, and Carolina maneuvers in 1941. While fighting generally resulted in capturing towns, units didn’t practice fighting within them.7 As FM 100-5 succinctly put it in its description of the offensive operations of armored divisions, “Defended towns and cities are avoided.”8 Unfortunately, the Germans weren’t going to allow us to conveniently bypass their villages and cities. In fact, the German Army’s doctrine on urban warfare was much more developed, particularly in developing defenses.9 Their doctrine called for a series of well prepared, mutually supporting positions that could be used to blunt enemy attacks. Once the main attack was contained, the Germans would use their reserves to counterattack. The Germans pre-stocked water, food, ammunition, and medical supplies forward, because during actual operations movement would be difficult. They also understood that the main line of resistance should not be established on the edge of a town because an attacker can bring all his weapons to bear on the structures on the edge of a town. Instead, they defended within the town in an irregular pattern to make it difficult for an attacker to distinguish the main defense. Additionally, the Germans would integrate large stone and concrete buildings into their defenses as these buildings made natural strongholds. Heavy machine guns in dug-in positions at the corner of blocks would dominate the streets and open areas, from parks to cemeteries. Obstacles and barriers would keep out mechanized vehicles. The sewers and subways became routes for resupply, relief operations, and infiltration. Even on the defense, the Germans would seek to maintain the initiative by using their reserves to counterattack the flanks and rear of the enemy. Although that was German doctrine, the reality for the Germans would be decidedly different as well. They lacked enough reserves to maintain a counterattacking force.10 In addition, U.S. soldiers would use their machine guns to cover the open streets so that the Germans found it practically impossible to maneuver across streets to reposition forces. Buildings that U.S. artillery had reduced to rubble further limited the movement of any potential German counterattack force. Based on these realities, the urban fight in Germany ended up as a “close quarters slugging match.”11 This is the type of fight where accurately applied firepower generally wins. Later in the war, other manuals also elaborated on the urban fight, particularly FM 31-50, Attack on a Fortified Position and Combat in Towns and FM 17-36, Employment of Tanks with Infantry; however, both manuals weren’t published until early 1944, too late for the fighting in Italy.12 Meanwhile, military journals like Fort Benning’s Infantry Journal and Fort Knox’s Armored Cavalry Journal were filling the void by publishing articles on urban fighting. The fighting in Italian cities might well have prompted the expeditious updating of doctrine and training. Infantry Journal described the fight in Cassino as “a testing ground on which the lessons are learned; lessons in tactics, lessons in the uses and application of weapons.”13 In addition, lessons being learned here were sent back to the United States for inclusion in the training program of the divisions yet to be deployed.14 In October 1942, additional training was specifically ordered to prepare for combat in cities. The additional training took the form of a “combat in cities exercise” in which small units attacked through mock villages, clearing houses of hostile forces that were simulated by “pulley-controlled dummies” designed to pop up unexpectedly.15 It wasn’t much, but it was a start, and coupled with the recent publication of FM 31-50, the Army was headed in the right direction. FM 31-50 covered both combat in towns and combat against fortified positions like the Siegfried Line. Although both problems were included in the same manual, they were considered separately. Much detail was provided about the effects of aircraft in close air support. Also stressed was the penetration capability of various guns against concrete fortifications and bunkers. Yet, when one moves to the chapter on combat in towns, such

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