The MAP, NISI and M C - A Company Commander’s Perspective

The soldiers of A Company, 3-8 Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division are testing the Army’s newest main battle tank - the MlA2. They received 18 production MlA2s on 31 March 1993 and began New Equipment Training (NET) in early April. A Fort Knox team taught crew, organizational maintenance, and direct support maintenance over a 30-day period. In July 1993, A Company deployed to the National Training Center to participate in rotation 93-10 following an extensive gunnery and maneuver training period. The company was organized as a tank heavy team 4 A 1st Cavalry Division M1A2 moves out at the NTC during test rotation. with two M1 A2 platoons and one Bradley platoon (the platoon leader manned an IVIS-equipped Bradley). This was the first NTC rotation involving an M1A2 companyheam. The TF commander, S3, TOC, and flank unit company commanders were also equipped with IVIS, enabling transmission and reception of digital information from the tank to the task force level. The Battle The mission was the one we liked best - attack! The TF mission was to attack to penetrate an enemy obstacle belt in the vicinity of Crash Hill and to destroy an MRC in the vicinity of Objective KELLY along Alligator Ridge. My company, Company A, 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, was to secure the TF right flank, conduct a hasty breach, and penetrate rapidly to destroy the enemy. Things looked tough from the start. At 0330 on 24 July 1993, the TF scouts encountered a persistent chemical agent strike in the vicinity of the TF direction of attack (DOA). There was a lot of confusion on the TF command net about the precise location and composition of the chemical strike. At 0500, as we were set in Attack Position MUSTANG North of Debnam Pass, I received an lVlS spot report from the TF on my Commander’s Integrated Display (CID) advising me exactly where the persistent chemical agent was located - a safe distance from our planned DOA. As a result, we avoided the contamination and having to fight in a degraded mode. As the front right company in the TF box, we began our move to the LD at 0530. We crossed the LD at 0600 and immediately began receiving indirect fire. We lost one vehicle to the enemy artillery. This, combined with the heavy dust created by the TF movement, caused confusion and significant obscuration. Yet we were able to maintain the company formation and continue to move at 15-20 kph because of the positional navigation systems (POSNAV) on the MlA2. We continued to move along DOA Mercury using lVlS waypoints toward OBJ KELLY. At PL OAK, my right flank platoon began to take ineffective direct fire from North wall. We executed a contact drill and continued to move. The 2nd platoon leader immediately sent an lVlS contact report with enemy location, DTG, and number of dismounts. On my CID I could see where my platoon leaders and I were located in relation to the enemy and knew we could continue along the DOA, out of direct fire range. Using my platoon leader’s contact report, I formulated a situation report for the TF commander and a call for fire requesting immedi- ate suppression. We continued our mission unscathed. At 0715, my lead platoon encountered an enemy minefield overwatched by a CSOP and dismounted ATGMs in the vicinity of PL MAPLE. I received a digital contact report from A31, the 3rd platoon leader, with the location of the minefield, enabling me to see exactly where it was in relation to me and my platoon leaders. I maneuvered 3rd platoon and my mech platoon to support by fire positions, and directed 2nd platoon to conduct a hasty breach. Using their Commander's Independent Thermal viewer, A31 acquired the CSOP, a T72, on the far side of the obstacle and destroyed it. They also used the far-target designate capability to call for fire against the ATGMs while the gunner continued to scan and attack enemy targets. The company XO quickly moved through the breach site, sending an lVlS report identifying the entrance and exit points of the breach. This was sent digitally to the TF to vector followa units through the breach. By 0730, A Company was clear of the minefield and moving along DOA Mercury toward OBJ KELLY. Our CSR was eight tanks and three Bradleys. We'd only lost two tanks and one Bradley since we crossed the LD. By 0740, the TF was through the breach and moving toward OBJ KELLY with its combat power largely intact. The tough fight was yet to come. Almost immediately, we began taking losses from a reinforced MRC on Objective KELLY. After a hard fight, my lead and mech platoons were lost to the dug-in MRC. My XO and I became casualties shortly thereafter. My 2nd platoon continued to attack, with the mech team, C/1-9 CAV, as their right flank platoon. The 2nd platoon sergeant attacked the remaining enemy using the ClTV in the Hunter-Killer mode to rapidly locate and destroy the tanks and BMPs. They continued to move along the DOA with TM C using POSNAV and digital waypoints to maintain stand-off distance, to skirt enemy engagement areas, and to navigate to the flanks of the enemy positions. They continued to send digital contact and spot reports to the company and TF showing the disposition of the enemy. This allowed the battalion commander to reposition his remaining forces to complete the destruction of the enemy on OBJ KELLY. We pressed the attack and fiied the enemy reserve while TF 1-9, our sister task force, maneuvered over Alligator Ridge to destroy them. 2nd platoon consolidated and reorganized at the conclusion of the battle, and, using IVIS, was able to report accurate ammo, fuel, and personnel status to the company and TF in minutes. Perspectlves From my perspective, after using the M1A2 at the National Training Center, I believe it provides several significant advances in lethality and command and control over the M 1 A1. Lethality First, the CllV gave all my tank commanders the advantage of the Hunter-Killer capability. We were able to acquire targets more quickly because both the gunner and the TC could search separate sectors. We destroyed more targets in a shorter time period than we could have with MlAls because TC to gunner hand-off times were almost instantaneous, thanks to the "target designate" function on the Commander's Control Handle Assembly (the old "TC ovemde"). My gunners could also track moving targets more effectively because the Gunner's Primary Sight head mirror assembly is stablized on both the vertical and horizontal axes so the gunner doesn't have to dump lead while tracking targets. This feature came in real handy tracking targets at long range, and it worked well during both live fire and force-on-force MILES engage me nts. Finally, the MlA2's lethality is increased by the ease with which leaders can call accurate indirect 36 fires. My platoon leaders continuously used Far-Target Designate to send an accurate 8digit grid for indirect fire targets. Far-Target Designate works by lasing to targets and receiving a digital enemy icon on the CID (even out past 7000m). It worked very well in live fire when we could lase. During force-on-force, we used the CITV’s choke sight or manually input an estimated range on the CID and still sent our calls for fire through IVIS. Calls for fire were sent digitally to the TF lVlS base station that passed them by hand to the FSO for input into TACFIRE. Currently no direct lVlS link has been established between the lVlS and TACFIRE systems. Command and Control Command and control and situational awareness are significantly improved with the M1A2 and Bradley-IVIS vehicles. The MlA2’s POSNAV system allowed our platoons, COTTM, and Task Force to maintain movement under a variety of visibility conditions because all the IVlS-equipped vehicles on a given radio net could see the other vehicle positions on their tactical screens. My TCs could keep their heads in the battle even while buttoned up because the drivers had waypoints to assist their navigation to objectives or key positions, and the TCs didn’t have to direct their every move. The TCs could also see the battlefield clearly through the 360-degree vision blocks on the Improved Commander’s Weapons Station. They could even use binoculars through the vision blocks. The Intervehicular Information System (IVIS) really played a key role in improving our situational awareness on the battlefield. The TF TOC (with the lVlS base station) sent us operational, obstacle, and enemy overlays, along with the TF fire support plan. I modified the overlays as needed and quickly sent the graphics to all the platoon leaders, which increased my own planning time. The TOC also sent digital updates to the overlay, such as exact locations of enemy minefields and contaminated areas. As missions changed, the TF commander would also send us digital graphic FRAGOs, and I’d send them to the platoons. Everyone knew where we were, and where we needed to go. When we were in a fight, we could tell exactly where we were in relation to the graphic control measures, each other, and templated and actual enemy positions. When it came time to mass fires on the enemy, whether it was in the offense or in the defense, we could do it easily, thanks to lVlS and POSNAV.. As the fight developed, my TCs and platoon leaders helped me paint a picture of the battlefield for the TF commander by sending digital contact and spot reports through IVIS. During live fire, every time a TC lased on a target he’d get an exact 8- digit grid on his screen with an enemy icon. With four keystrokes, he could send a contact report to his platoon leader, who could quickly send it to me. I consolidated these reports and sent them up to the task force so my boss could see exactly what we were facing and confirm templated positions. (This system worked less well in force-on-force because we lacked an effective eye-safe laser filter.) The M l N s stayed in the battle thanks to the redundancy of key components and the short time it took to diagnose a fault. The built-in test (BIT) worked great. If a tank went down, the TC quickly knew which component had gone bad. The mechanics could move up with the right part, do a quick check with the Fault Isolation Test (also right in the tank), and replace the bad component with a good one. (The cumbersome M1A1 STE will be a thing of the past.) Also, the bad parts came back to the supply system quickly because the Direct Support Mechanics could figure out more quickly which cards to replace in the failed component thanks to the M1A2 DSESTS. In all, the M1A2 worked very well for us at the NTC. It was reliable, easily maintainable, and lethal. There are still some things I’d fix - we need to be able to link up more quickly and more reliably (occasionally, vehicles lose their digital link during start-up or shut down procedures); POSNAV could stand a direct Global Position System Interface (GPSs were used to update the POSNAV system to maintain accuracy); graphic symbols need to be made smaller to reduce screen clutter; friendly icons need a position indicator arrow to show vehicle orientation or direction - but I’m impressed with what I see right now. Captain Wade L. McVey was commissioned in Armor from California State University Sacremento (ROTC) in 1986 and is a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, Armor Officer Advanced Course, and Airborne School. He served as an MlAl tank platoon leader and XO in 3d Battalion, 77th Armor Regiment, Mannhiem, Germany. He is currently commander, A Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Ft. Hood, Texas.