Cavalry Mortars

Training and Tactics by Captain Willlam W. Prior The mortar section of the cavalry troop is probably the least used asset in the unit. Although most cavalry leaders appreciate their troop mortars, few train to use them to their full potential. The result is poor planning for mortar support of cavalry missions and neglect of the mortar section in This article seeks to provide cavalry leaders with some tips on M i n g , procedures, and organization to help them better use their organic mortar sections. The focus is not on the gunnery skills or ARTEP missions of the mortar section itself, but on its training and organization within the frarne-work of the cavalry troop. The cavalry scout’s weapon of choice is indirect fire. The devastating effects of accurate indirect fires and the ability of the scout to deliver them without revealing his position are ideal for reconnaissance and security operations. Recent combat experience in the Gulf War proved again the effectiveness of artillery directed by scouts. But the Gulf War may have also conveyed some false impressions. The relative abundance and superiority of friendly artillery is something we cannot count on in future conflicts. Timely and accurate artillery fire can multiply the effects of the cavalry troop’s direct fires many times and spell the difference between success and defeat on the battlefield. But, the focus of artillery planning and employment is usually on massed fires at deep targets and integntion of sup cavalry operations. porting fms with direct fires in main battle area engagements. This process leaves little mom for the scout and his enemy combat reconnaissance patrol in the counter-recon battle, or the lead scouts in a movement to contact who have outrun their supporting artillery. This fire support void is filled by the mortars of the cavalry troop. The mortars can deliver a variety of munitions for a variety of missions. The mortarmen can give the air and ground scout HE for suppression, smoke for screening or marking, and illumination for observation or orientation quickly and accurately. These fires are exactly what the scout in contact needs at his disposal. The mortar section, as an organic part of the troop, constantly moves with the unit. While the M106A2 mortar canier is no faster than the M1W self-propelled artillery piece, and certainly no match for the M1 or M3 in terms of speed, the mortar’s sole mission is to support the cavalry troop. The mortars have no logistical tail or reinfoxring mission that may cause them to fall behind out of supporting range during fluid cavalry operations as is often the case with sup porting artillery. General Heinz Guderian, the mastermind of German armored tactics during World War II, believed “that tanks would never be able to produce their full effect until the other weapons on whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to their standard of speed and of cross-counby performance.”’ With regard to modem armored cavalry’s missions and capabilities, today’s artillery simply does not meet that standard. The point is that the mortars can stay with their troop and will be there to fire when the troop needs them most. Having said all of this, I wish to point out that there is not, and cannot be, competition between mortars and artillery. Neither weapon is “better” than the other, they are simply different systems with different strengths and weaknesses. Mortars and artillery complement each other well and both have an important role in the cavalry battle. To this point, this article contains nothing that is not h d y widely accepted or written in cavalry manuals. But the importance of planning for and using the mortar section emphasized above is all too often lost in our training and tactical operations. The suggestions that follow can help cavalry leaders realize the potential of their organic mortar sections. Live fire training between mortars and the scouts they support is absolutely essential. Yet, mortar live fire is usually adjusted by FISTS from sup porting artillery units. This may not detract much from the mortar section’s training, but the scouts and the troop suffer as a whole. Classes and call-for-fire trainers will never substitute for the experience the scout gains adjusting live rounds in an impact area. When the scout and the mortar section sergeant talk on the 12 radio and put mortar steel on target in training, they will be much more likely and able to do so in combat. Live fire training in adjusting indirect fire is nearly as important to scouts as is live direct fire training with their Bradleys. Yet, adjusting indirect is often viewed by cavalry leaders as good training “when we have the time.” Make the time! The scout on the ground or in the air will rely on mortar fire in combat. Make him train to use it in peace. The mortar section of the cavalry troop should emphasize the hipshoot in its live fire training more than any other mission. This is not due to a lack of proficiency on the part of the crews but to the relative frequency that mortars will be called upon to hipshoot in support of their troops. In typical cavalry missions, such as a movement to contact or a moving flank screen, the troop is moving almost constantly. To keep within range, the mortars must move with it. Hence, the mortar section will be moving a great percentage of the time when it is called upon to fire. Peacetime safety requirements make the hipshoot an unpleasant live fire training mission because the section must take several minutes of “admin time” to lay deliberately before it can actually fire a round. But cavalry leaders should realize that, if this is the way we will fight, then this is the way we must train. The mortar section sergeant should be allowed to command and control the m o m section independently in training operations. Some cavalry troops have the FIST control the movement of their mortar sections as FM 17-97, The Armored Cavalry Troop, suggests. Some may even link the movement of the section to that of the FISTV. But the FIST is not the best means of controlling the mortar section for two mons. First, the FIST should position himself where he can best provide and control troop fire support and, in some situations, use his laser. This usually translates to a place where he can see and influence the direct firefight. This is most certainly not the ideal place for the mortar section. Mortars should be behind the forward scouts in a position masked from enemy direct fm and able to provide fifes ranging two to three kilometers to the scouts’ front. Therefore, the mortars cannot and should not always move with the

FIST.

Second, the FIST may be unable to control the section via FM radio. The FIST must monitor troop command, squadron fire support and the supporting artillery digital radio nets simultaneously, and continually plan and control the fire support battle. If forced to control the movement and placement of the mortar section on a separate radio net, he can quickly become overwhelmed in battle and may neglect the mortars, usually when they are needed most. Thus, positioning on the battlefield and competing responsibilities severely limit the ability of the FIST to control the mortar section in tactical operations. The best answer to the command and control question is to have the mortar section sergeant lead the section as a separate unit within the troop (as FM 17-97 also suggests). If the section sergeant has a secure radio to monitor the troop command net, he can independently maneuver his section to best support the troop. He probably knows best the capabilities of his weapons and his soldiers and can select the best firing positions on the ground. He can monitor the battle and anticipate and react to the needs of the scouts while freeing the FIST to concentrate on the fm support battle as a whole. The key is the training of that mortar section sergeant to act independently within the framework of the troop commander’s intent. This is not to say that the mortar section and the FIST do not have a unique relationship within the troop. The troop mortars are a key part of the troop’s fire support, as mentioned earlier. The troop FIST must incorporate the mortars into the fire plan and ensure they are used effectively in battle. How the FIST and the troop leadership ensure effective use of the mortars is the next topic of discussion. The key to effective and timely use of the mortar section lies in the configuration of the fire request radio channels and in who makes the decision to employ mortars on a specific target. FM 17-97 outlines the mortar fire request channel as seen in Figure

1. This system can be improved in two ways. First, the scout platoon leader should make a preliminary “thunder down” 1

3. FIST monitors spot report and receives permission from tray commander to support wi!h indirect fires. 4.

FIST

sends message ’Thunder Down’ on troop fire

1. Scwe send spot report to support net. Scouts and mor-platoon leader (Platoon Net). tars monitor. 2 Platoon leader forwards 5.Sawtscall!hemortarcion spot report to CP (Troop Corn wmp fire support net to r e mand Net). quest indirect fires. Fig. 1. Mortar Fire Support Channel (from FM 17-97)

November-December 1993 13

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1. scouts r e d spot report to platoon leader (platoon net) and platoon lmder deddes ‘Thunder DowW mortar rnis- s h . 2 Ratoon leader fwwards spot report fo the CP (p mmmand net). s . ~ c s l l l h e ~ (mortar internal net) b request indirect fires while platoon leader is on troop annmand net.

4. FIST and mortar section sergeant monim spot report on troop mmmand net. Fig. 2. Proposed Mortar Fire Request Channel decision, if appmPriate, and have his OP talk directly to the mortar section. The scout platoon leader knows the criteria for artillery employment, the urgency of the request and has a rough idea of the availability of artillery. While he is sending the spot report to the troop TOC, the OP and mortar section can prepare to fire the mission. Meanwhile, the FIST can monitor the report on the troop net and either alert the platoon leader that he is firing artillery, if appropriate and available, or approve the use of the mortars by default. If artillery is to be fd, the scout platoon leader and mortar section sergeant will hear it on the troop command net and check fm the mortar mission. If mortars are to be fired, valuable time will be saved The scout in contact knows the value of his mortars. Don’t let him forget it in training. and the mission may be fired as soon as the FIST or commander approves. Second, the troop fm support net becomes a mortar internal. net that scouts drop to for mortar support. As alluded to earlier, the mortar section sergeant needs a secure radio to monitor the troop net and operate his section independently. He needs another “internal” net to control his element and receive calls for fm from the scouts. The section sergeant will monitor the “lightning up, thunder down” decision on the troop command net and, thus, need not talk directly to the FIST on a troop fm sup _ _ port net (they can talk on troop command if absolutely necessary). This permits the FIST to monitor one less radio net while still controlling the fire support assets available to the troop. Additionally, the scouts can go directly to the mortar internal net to call for fire in an emergency. Figure 2 shows this revised mortar fire request channel. Again, the key to this process is the training of the mom section sergeant. He mu& always know where he can and cannot fm, understand the commander’s intent for the use of indirect fires and keep track of his ammunition status if this method is to work. The organic mortar section is the cavalry leader’s most responsive and dedicated means of fire support. Through betta training and OPtional procedures, we can make the mortars a more lethal and useful tool in the cavalry battle. Emphasizing live fire training with the scouts and the hipshoot mission, allowing the section sergeant to command and control the section on his own, and streamlining the mortar fm request channel in the troop will improve our mortar support and the troop as a whole. The scout in contact knows the value of his mortars. Don’t let him forget it in training. Author’s Note: I am deeply indebted to LTC Douglas A. Macgregor, Commander, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry for historical references and suggestions on format and content. I also am indebted to CPT David Smith, FSO of 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry for his tactical and technical expertise and suggestions on content. Captain William W. Prior graduated from West Point in 1987 and also attended AOBC that year. In 1988, he was an honor graduate of the Infantry Mortar Platoon Operations Course at Ft. Benning. He sewed with L Troop, 3/2

ACR

as a tank platoon leader, scout platoon leader, and for two years as the XO of K Troop, where he was responsible for a 4.2-in. mortar section. He deployed to the Gutf as XO of K Troop during Operation DESERT STORM. After attending AOAC, he was assigned to 1-4 Cavalry at Ft. Riley and sewed for a year as the squadron S1. He presently commands A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry. 14