Tank Company Security Operations

by Major Patrick A. Stalllngs Introduction Stationary tank units are vulnerable to infantry using infiltration tactics, particularly in close terrain. Infantry units are well-armed with very effective antiarmor weapons, and can cause great damage if allowed to get close to the tanks. The tank company must be able to detect and destroy infantry attacks in order to conserve combat power.

The current tank company organization hcks the equipment and personnel for handling an infiltrating dismounted threat. Equipment needs include sensor systems, thermal night vision devices, and other security-re-Iated equipment. Personnel shomges rue best addressed by ensuring that task organization provides the tank company adequate dismounted security forces to conduct patrols and establish observation posts. Additionally, current company defensive doctrine does not give enough detail and guidance on security operations in the battle position or the assembly area Doctrine needs to include more definitive direction to the company commander on how to organize and implement his security operations.

Personal experience at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Polk, and Fort Hood has demonstrated the effectiveness of well-trained, dismounted soldiers armed with modem antitank weapons against armor in static positions. A dismounted night, attack by infiltrating infantry can be devastating to an armor company's defense, resulting in unacceptably high losses. Historical experience and an analysis of current light infantry antiarmor doctrine demonstrate that the potential for such a threat is not just a mining phenomenon. Historically, infantry has often attacked armor with hand-held weapons alone. With appropriate equipment and doctrine, these attacks have been very successful. Currently, some Third World nations with technological and numerical deficiencies in weapons systems compensate by using masses of people armed with inexpensive weapons to provide combat power.' Even in more developed countries, such as the United States, China, and North Korea, doctrine prescribes infiltration tactics by infantry units to attack and disrupt defending mor units. We can expect armed forces at all levels of the operational continuum to conduct infiltration attacks.

Historical Perspective My first moment of action was when I was marker tank in the Tobruk breakout and a very brave German jumped on my back flaps armed with a Molotov cocktail and a crowbar... I must admit that ever since then I've suffered a certain amount of 'infantry terror.'

Brigadier Richard Simpkin survived his encounter with an infantry antiarmor attack with the help of an alert wingman. There are numerous examples of other armored troopers who did not. Some of these examples are valuable lessons in the value of denying infantry the ability to find, close with, and attack mor.

The first infantry attacks against tanks occurred shortly after tanks were introduced onto the battlefield in WWI. Recovering from the initial shock of being attacked by armor, infantry soldiers improvised ways to attack tanks, including closing with the tanks and using phosphorus grenades, bundles of fragmentation grenades, and shots through the vision slits to stop the tank or kill the crew? Due to the slow speed and thin armor of those early tanks, these tactics were fairly successful.

In the spring of 1917, the Germans introduced the "K" bullet, a solid core round capable of penetrating mor, providing the infantry with their first organic antiarmor capability. In the Spanish Civil War 20 years later, the technologically backward separatists in northern Spain used sacks of explosives with time fuses against armor in close terrain. These first satchel charges required the attacker to close with the tank, start the fuse, and throw the charge on the tank. This highly dangerous maneuver was often fatal to both participants, but demonstrated again the vulnerability of armor to a determined though lightl y-equipped enemy: World War I1 inspired the creation of numerous infantry weapons specifically designed to destroy tanks. The German blitzkrieg and the apparent invincibility of the tank lent special urgency to developing away for light forces to conduct antiarmor operations. The combatants introduced three key antiarmor weapons during this period.

In the late 1930s. the British fielded the first hollow-charge antitank weapon. a rifle grenade for the Lee Enfield rifle. This weapon, a forerunner of the modem HEAT round, was based on the shaped charge still used in many antiarmor systems today? Later, the Germans developed the Panzerfaust, a small hand-held recoilless launcher for a hollow-charge projectile. Within 50 yards, it was very effective against tanks. The Panzerfaust was also the first antiarmor system designed to be thrown away once it was fmd.6 About the same time the Germans were fielding the Panzerfaust, the Americans created their own hand-held, recoilless antitank weapon, the bazooka. AIso firing a shapedcharge warhead, it was, for most of World War 11, very effective against German mor. A heavier version of the bazooka was developed too late for use in World War 11, but saw widespread use in the Korean War?

The main similarity between these hand-held antitank weapons was the short range required for maximum effectiveness. The requirement to get close to the target tank produced remarkably similar tactics among infantry forces in World War 11. A German example of these tactics is described by Guy Sajer in his book The Forgotten Soldier.

Sajer was in the Gross Deutschland Division on the Russian Front in 1943. His antitank training prescribed digging in and allowing tanks to overrun his position, and included instructions on how to operate the Panzerfaust, and how to mount a moving tank to attach a magnetic mine between the turret and hull. A soldier was trained to wait until a tank was five to ten meters from his fighting position before leaping out and running to the tank’s side or rear to engage! These dangerous tactics were used across the Russian Front to great effect?

Another World War II example of men attacking tanks occurred during the 1st British Airborne Division’s fight to retain the bridges at Amhem. The First Division’s bnve and lightly equipped soldiers found themselves facing 56-ton Tiger tanks. Using hand-held antiarmor weapons, antitank guns no larger than 75mm. and improvised antiarmor weapons, the airborne soldiers attacked and destroyed 60 tanks in the close confines of the city.” They accomplished this by using stealth and cover to engage the tanks from the top, rear, and sides. A common thread in World War I1 is the tactic of closing with tanks to take advantage of blind spots and maximize the effects of light weapons, and the use of stealth and surprise to engage tanks from the flanks and rear.‘’ The tanker’s reaction to the dismounted antiarmor threat was to look for infantry protection against infantry and antiarmor systems. One solution used by American commanders in Normandy was to have a rifle squad accompany their platoons of tanks. These infantry squads moved forward of the tanks and suppressed the crews of enemy antitank guns. This allowed tanks to maneuver through obstacles and close terrain to engage the enemy with the tank’s superior firepower.’* This combined arms approach to armor security was a tried and true tactic in World War 11.

In the Korean War, during the linkup between UN. Forces driving north from Pusan and east from Inchon, Task Force Lynch, an American infantry unit driving toward Osan, encountered an armored North Korean unit attempting to block its advance. Task Force Lynch attacked with infantry and destroyed two T-34s with recoilless rifle and 3.5-inch bazooka fire. As the day ended, when more enemy armor was observed, the infantry conducted a night attack and destroyed at least four tanks with bazooka fire. The attack continued the next morning, when three more T-34s were destroyed with bazookas.” The Chinese and North Koreans also used infantry forces to attack tanks. They mounted an attack on Task Force Crombez as it attempted to relieve the 23rd Regimental Combat Team in Chipyong-ni. Their technique was to approach the mor column in close terrain and use satchel charges, bazookas, and bangalore torpedoes to destroy or disable tanks. During the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, faced with the necessity of attacking armored forces with lightly armed infantry, infiltrated as close as possible to firebases and defensive positions and then massed antitank and rocket-propelled grenade fires on armored targets.14 Often, the Vietnamese were able to locate American positions by the noise of maintenance operation.'^ The noise of maintenance and sustainment activities in armored units still make avoiding detection a problem. The American reaction was geared toward eliminating the advantage that close terrain gave the infiltrating enemy. Treeclearing equipment, de-foliants, and burn-offs created fm zones that made infiltration more difficult. Armor and infantry provided mutual support within fmbases; no tanker liked being stuck outside the perimeter without some security against infiItrators.’6 Early in its history, the Israeli Army was an infantry-based force with virtually no armor or heavy weapons. During the Israeli War for Independence, the army compensated for this disadvantage by using infiltration techniques in limited visibility to close with the enemy. The infantry would then destroy any defending mor with antiarmor weapon.'^ These antiarmor weapons were a m u of weapons stolen from the British, bought from foreign sources, and taken from captured enemy stocks.’* Our recent experience in Panama was a positive example of how to avoid tank losses from infantry attacks. Initially, tanks were tasked to reinforce the infantry. During this period, tanks were often used in engagements with Panamanian forces at ranges under five hundred meters. After along period of urban and jungle fighting, the tanks were used to patrol as a “show of force” operation.”

The close relationship between infantry and mor helped protect the armor throughout the operation. One illustrative observation of the mor commanders on the scene was that, “dismounted security is extremely important.” We relearned that 360-degree dismounted security is necessary for armored units in close terrain?’ Historically, many infantry forces have tried to take advantage of limited visibility, stealth, and surprise to close with armor and maximize the effect of light antitank weapons. Typically, armor has reacted by using dismounted security and by avoiding close temin as much as possible. Brigadier Simpkin put it best when he said combatants will, “...concentrate all available effort, whatever its nature, in time and space against the opposing element which is critical at that point in time and space.”’’ We have seen the truth of this in the past when mor was the critical element. Current and Future Antiamor Equipment and Tactics Regional threats will require the Army to be ready to deploy world-wideF2 Regardless of where the Army goes, it must be prepared to face infantry attacks against armor units. A representative sample of weapons currently available for antiarmor operations is described in Figure 1. All of the weapons systems in Figure 1 are available to alight force for killing tanks. They are light enough and have enough range and lethality to make alight infantry soldier a tank-killing system. Properly employed against the flanks, rear, and underbelly of a tank, all can destroy or disable.

An observation from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) indicates that “seventy-five percent of units that maintain security, win. Ninety-three percent of those that don’t, loe.[sic] The advantages in intelligence and disruption of the defensive scheme that accrue to units that successfully penetrate security measures are very important in setting the conditions for a successful attack. Given this observation, the role of dismounted infantry in denying security to defending forces becomes very significant.

According to these observations, dismounted infantry should use “stealth, darkness, and restrictive terrain ” to in-fdtnte enemy lines, recon obstacle locations and enemy positions, and conduct supporting attacks.” These infiltration tactics are meant to bypass and Light Antiarmor Weapons MINES:

ModellName BE!?

Weight Effect Carry M15 Mine Pressure 30 Ibs Breaks track M19 Mine Pressure 28 Ibs Breaks track M21 Mine Tilt Rod 18 Ibs Kills or Pressure Breaks track M24 Mine Swi tcMCmd 24 Ibs Kills INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS:

Model/Name Type of Round Penetration M203 Grenade Launcher High Explosive 50-mm armor DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS:

Carry ModellName Type of Round Weight Penetration Range AT-4 Shaped Charge-HEAT 15 Ibs 350-mm armor 300 M M72A4 LAW

Shaped Charge-HEAT 7 Ibs 350-mm armor 220 M RPG-7V

Shaped Charge-HEAT 22 Ibs 330-mm armor 500 M RPG-22

Shaped Charge-HEAT 11 Ibs 390-mm armor 250 M Panzerfaust 3 Shaped Charge-HEAT 26 Ibs 700-mm armor 500 M HEAT (High Explosive Antitank) Figure 1 eliminate the defending armored force’s security system.

One recommended infantry attack technique is to force the mor out of position and into the killing zone of supporting antiarmor systems, The targeted vehicle must choose between flank and rn shots from attacking infantry or direct engagement with supporting armored systems.

The observations further recommend electronic warfare support to jam fire control nets and protect the light force from indirect fires?’ Additionally, indirect fire support, particularly smoke and illumination, is important for creating successful conditions for the infiltrators.

Many nations and forces adhere to the light infantry doctrine. The Antiannor Handbook for the 82d Airborne Division describes tat-tics, techniques, and procedures for operations against armored forces. The handbook was developed because of the need for airborne forces to deal with armored adversariesF6 The basic tenet of the 82d Airborne’s approach is to use stealth and periods of limited visibility to close with defending tanks. The infantry maneuvers to gain the advantages of flank and rear sh0ts.2 Their stated intent is to minimize casualties while maximizing weapons effects?* Using these tactics, the airborne infantryman can attack important rear m sites, ambush supporting units, and attack to disrupt the defensive ystem.2 The United States Marines also tec-ognize the need to train infantry units to fight an armored threat?’ The Marine Infantry Officer’s Basic Course teaches its officers to draw tanks into ambush, use smoke and suppressive fires to force the mor to button up, disable them by flank and rem shots, and destroy them using satchel charges, Molotov cocktails, thermite grenades, and antitank weapons. 31 An article in the Marine Corps Gazette describes infiltration as the offensive form of maneuver for light infantry. According to this article, one of the objectives is to create a breakthrough by disrupting or destroying key defensive positions. The author also points out that current technology allows relatively small bands of infantrymen to call in highly accurate and lethal indirect fire on identified enemy locations?2 Other Marine articles recommend training techniques for preparing infantry to attack tanks in close combat. Familiarization with tank vision restrictions, the noise of tank gunnery and operation, and an appreciation of how to use restrictive terrain to close with tanks are listed as training techniques.33 All of these techniques prepare Marine infantrymen to take on armored forces and win.

Other nations have developed organizations and tactics geared toward defeating armored forces. Chinese principles of combat include secrecy, infiltration, and night operations to maximize the effectiveness of their largely infantry force.% Soviet platoon leaders and company commanders personally take their units through rigorous training on tank vulnerabilities, emphasizing how to take advantage of such weak spots?s One regional threat particularly well suited to infiltration tactics is the North Korean People's Army (NkPA). Specific organizations and tactical doctrine have been developed by the NkPA to support dismounted assaults on South Korean and American defenses.36 Aside from their combat infantry line units, the NkPA has over 100,OOO unconventional warfare and special commando troops whose primary mission is to create breakthroughs of defensive lines?7 These infiltrating forces have major objectives of securing the approach routes, raiding and fixing enemy strongholds, securing and controlling key temin, and other disruptive missions?* They will use stealth and limited visibility to penetrate defenses and close with defending forces.

NkPA combat infantry units have five basic forms of maneuver: penetration, Pocho (an infiltration maneuver by small units through gaps in the enemy lines), Cheon Ib (another form of infiltration maneuver), envelopment, and bypass. Infiltration, deception and surprise are integral parts of each tehnique? Additionally, the night attack is a preferred method of conducting offensive operations, while one of the types of nighttime formations is the dispersed formation. This formation is used to allow infantry units to find gaps in enemy defenses and close with enemy positions:' All of the forces discussed are highly formidable, with tactics well suited to disrupting and defeating armored defensive positions. In general, their infantry will use stealth, cover, concealment, and limited visibility to close with tanks and engage them from the flanks and rear. American mor units must be prepared to deal with this threat.

Future Equipment and Tactics In the future, armies will continue to develop lighter, cheaper, recoilless, smokeless antitank weapons to exploit tank weak spots:' Therefore, the next generation of antitank weapons is likely to attack the top of armored vehicle or at least have improved ability to penetrate reactive or composite armor. Although effective ranges may increase, weapon weight will be kept low enough to allow a dismounted soldier to carry it. Additionally, laser technology currently allows small groups or teams of light infantry to locate armor defenses and designate individual tanks for indirect fire targeting. This, in turn, allows these infiltrating teams to strike repeatedly without being detected unless active detection measures are taken. As laser technology becomes more widespread, this technique will be adopted by many forces in order to maximize lethality while minimizing cost.

The basic tactic of using stealth, limited visibility, and close terrain to facilitate infiltration will remain the same. Although technological reaction and counter-reaction may protect against many weapons, doctrine and organization must adequately protect against the threat of infiltration attack. The key, now and in the future, is to deny the enemy access to your defensive positions.

Tank Company Security Capabllitles Does the tank company have the capability to secure itself against the threat?

The organic assets the tank company commander has available to conduct security operations are prescribed in the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). By task organizing, the battalion commander can provide the company commander with more personnel and equipment to secure his unit. The need for task organization is determined for each mission by considering the situation in terms of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time (METT-T). Since task organized assets can be as different as each battalion commander's assessment of MEIT-T, I will only discuss personnel and equipment organic to the tank company.

Personnel Figure 2 lists the personnel available to the tank company commander. These personnel are organized as three line platoons of four tanks each, and a headquarters platoon with one armored personnel carrier, two lfi-ton trucks (I-IMMWV), one five-ton truck, and two tanks. Each line platoon is authorized one officer, one platoon sergeant, and fourteen soldiers, while the headquarters platoon has the remaining two officers, the Personnel Inventory For Tank Company Captain............. 1 Lieutenants........... 4 First Sergeant......... 1 Supply Personnel........ 2 NBC Personnel......... 1 Platoon Sergeants....... 4 Tank Commanders....... 6 Tankcrewmembers..... 43 -................ 6P3 Figure 2 fmt sergeant, and eleven soldiers. With this number of personnel, the company has no more than a complete crew for each vehicle. By comparison, the mechanized infantry company has 54 dismounted personnel not committed to crewing vehicles.& A partial list of authorized tank company equipment is at Figure 3. The list is limited to equipment with direct applicability to security operations.

Tank Company Defensive Security Doctrine Company defensive tasks are outlined in mission mining plans (MTP), field manuals 0, and unit standard operating procedures (SOP). Within the defensive regimen, many tasks are either directly related to providing security for the force or direct assets away from that requirement. A short summary of defensive tasks is included below.

A simple list of tank company tasks for the establishment of the defense is contained in the company-level and platoon-level MTP:. Occupy per platoon MTP. Establish unit security. Emplace observation posts (OPs). Patrol areas that cannot be ob-. Emplace Platoon Early Warning. Position weapons systems and es-and air guards served System (PEWS) tablish fields of fire 16 camouflage positions. All infantry fighting positions and OPs with overhead cover in two hours. Conduct rehmals. Improve defense. Recon and establish alternate and. Emplace minefields and obstacles. Stockpile and protect ammunition and supplies4 The establishment of unit security is intended to protect the rest of the company during prepantion of the defense. Many of these security tasks require more effort and assets than others.

Combat forces and observation posts (OPs) are established to provide early warning and gain time for the defenders in case of attack. The emphce-ment of OPs is critical to securing the defense against a11 manner of threats. Standards for the establishment of OPS are:. Platoon leader or phtoon sergeant site the OP. Must have good observation and provide early warning. Select multiple positions if needed to cover platoon’s sector supplementary psitions. Have good cover and concealment, with overlapping fields of view when possible. Covered and concealed mutes back to the position. Have individual weapons, rifles, telephone, MOPP suits/mask, binoculars, night vision goggles or sights, map/compass, load bearing equipment W E ). At least two soldiers per OP 47 OPs may conduct air guard duties, but typically this duty is picked up by a vehicle with some defensive counter-air capability. In a tank company, this requires an individual to scan air avenues of approach from the tank commander’s position of a tank. Patrols of dead space in sector must be conducted at random, but with well coordinated and planned routes. Patrols are best employed during the day, while other passive measures are more effective at night, Patrols must have communication, rifles or submachine guns, and appropriate supervision by trained noncommissioned officers.

Emplacement of the Platoon Early Warning System (PEWS) requires two Tank Company Equipment Equipment -Auth Remarks MlAl Tank................... 14 M113A2 Armored Personnel Carrier...... 1 M8A1 Chemical Alarms............. 4 Binoculars................... 16 Commo wire rolls,.5 km each......... 16 Camouflage screen systems......... 51 Remote control landmine system........ 2 40-mm grenade launcher............ 2 Cat S O MG, heavy fixed turret type...... 14 Ring mount, Cat.50 MG............. 1 Ground mount, tripod, Cal.50 MG....... 1 Night Vision Goggles, ANPVS 78...... 36 9-mm Pistols.................. 58 Radio Sets, vehicle mounted......... 17 M16A2 Rifles................... 4 Phone Sets, TA-1 8 TA-312.......... 12 M-4 Carbine, 5.56-mm............. 28 Cal.50 MG, heavy barrel, flexible........ 2 Figure 3 4 per platoon, 2 in HQs Headquarters platoon 1 per platoon 1 pertank 8,000-meter capacity Mounted on M16A2 rifles 1 pertank Mounted on truck 8 M113 Truck mount Carried in M113A2 2 per tank Personal weapon Personal weapon 3 per platoon 2 per tank45 soldiers and three to five minutes per sensor for installation. With five sensors per system, total installation time is approximately thirty minutes. Monitoring the system can be done by OPs, but recovery is best accomplished by the same team that emplaced the sensors!’

Obstacles are emplaced under the supervision of a platoon sergeant. Crews must emplace obstacles within six hours. Security must be provided initially for the obstacle teams, and then for the obstacles once established. That security can be dismounted or mounted, depending on the situation!’

Conducting the Company Defense From the incredibly busy activity of establishing the defense, the company must shift into maintaining and conducting the defense against all attackers. Although the list of tasks is smaller, the commitment of assets is still intense. Tasks associated with this phase are:. Continue to improve the defense Conduct counterrecon. Prepare for tactical operations. Defend against dismounted attack. Defend against mounted attack” Even after the defense is established, the company continues to improve its positions, camouflaging vehicles and equipment, clearing fields of fire, burying wire, improving firing positions, digging communication trenches between positions, and other improvements the leadership deems necessary?’

Preparation for tactical operations requires that many actions be sustained for the duration of the defense. The first priority is securing the position by maintaining OPs, patrols, air guards, and PEWS. Equipment and weapons’ maintenance is also absolutely essential. Resupply operations, particularly food, fuel, and ammunition, must also be conducted daily. Training and rehemls continue, and asleep plan is executed to maintain continuous operations?2 The standuds for a successful defense against dismounted attack prohibit losing more than one vehicle per platoon?3 The subtasks of this requirement recognize the importance of detection and warning to defeating the dismounted threat. Even with successful detection and reaction, the standards allow the platoon leader to withdraw if necessary to conserve the combat strength of his platoon. Defense against amounted attack requires the concentration of company fifepower against the enemy. Key players in accomplishing this are the OPs established earlier. OPs provide early warning, calls for indirect fires, and assistance in identifying the location of the enemy attack.% Before any attack, countemconnaissance is conducted to force the withdrawal or destruction of enemy reconnaissance units. The entire company is involved in making the counterreconnaissance fight a success, as depicted in Figures 4 and 5.5’ Figure 4 illustrates a security plan for fairly clear terrain, where mounted OPs are able to establish fields of surveillance that can truly interlock and reach out along distance. The commander is expected to “spread his platoons and vehicles as far apart;Is nec-essay without losing the ability to concentrate firepower against the enemy.”56 Given that a platoon’s defensive sector is typically from 400 to 800 meters wide, the layout depicted would have to be used in very open terrain in order to deny dismounted routes into sector. In fact, the platoon in mounted OP positions would be covering the company’s frontage of 1,OOO to 1,600 meters. This dispersion leaves mom for infantry infiltration routes if enough cover or concealment is available.

Figure 5 also envisages fairly open terrain for employment of the defense. This is a more realistic approach to securing a position, with a mix of mounted and dismounted security that, if properly employed and maintained, should be able to detect and react to both mounted and dismounted attack In close terrain, the number of dismounted OPs would have to be increased.

In addition to the defensive tasks discussed earlier, other tasks, requirements, and duties will naturally pull at the company’s already limited assets. Sickness, injury, special duties (details, etc.), and maintenance-related jobs will also require the commitment of company personnel.

Assembly Area Operations Another type of operation requiring security operations against a dismounted attack is occupation of an as-Double-Layer Technique

1. Each platoon puts vehicle OP forward.

2. Platoons keep all weapon sights on -crews rotate //-----em sentries.

FIgure 4 -Night Sunfelllance Plan (Part II) sembly m. Assembly areas resemble defensive positions, but are more temporary and typically oriented 360-degrees for security purposes. In assembly mas, many of the m e tasks are required as in the defense. Security operations during the occupation of an assembly area m geared toward avoiding detection, since defensive arrangements are usually hasty. This includes an increase in dismounted patrols to cover dead space and heightened alert status for vehicle crews?’

Personnel 8t Equipment Issues Within the framework of assembly m a and defensive tasks is the need to maintain security. FM 71-1, The TanWMechanized Infantry Company Team, describes security measures as those actions taken to “protect the team from being found or attacked by surprise.”58 Figure 6 is a matrix from the manual listing some active and passive security measures. As described earlier, O h rn very important for the company’s defensive security. To minimize effect on the total force and heighten the teamwork of the OP team, two members of the same tank crew are used as OPs. If required, the remaining two crew members can move their tank. The problem is they can only fire in slow, de-Passive and Active Security Measures Passive Active *Disperse vehicles and platoons. *Use camouflage, concealment, *Impose radio-listening silence. *Turn engines off and keep them cold. *Reduce noise. *Position GSR posts. *Do not move around in positions. *Use no lights. *Keep antennas tied down. *Use hide or defilade positions. *Do not position in likely artillery target areas. *Establish OPs. *Perform mounted and dismounted *Emplace platoon ea@ warning devices. *Deploy M8 chemical alarm nets. and cover. patrols.

Figure 6 graded mode. If each platoon is forced by terrain to establish an OP. the company commander’s immediately available firepower is cut by one-fourth.

Since two of the 16 personnel assigned to a tank platoon are the platoon leader and platoon sergeant, there me actually 14 men at best to maintain I two-man OP on a 24- hour basis. If teams are rotated to maintain effectiveness, the platoon leader will cycle through his entire platoon in short order. At the same time, the platoon must have someone on air guard and monitoring the radios. Further, dismounted patrols will require at least three soldiers under a noncom- -/’ / Figure 5 -Night Surveillance Pian (Part 1) Systems Ovrlrp Technique

1. Platoon 100% alert -other platoons rest.

2. Platoon conducts local security with only NVGs.

3. Dismounted patrol links the two platoons and uses NVGs.

4. GSR reinforces the forward screen (if available).

5. Company HQ and trains conduct local security and radio watch.

6. Company commander locates with company HQ. missioned officer’s control (typically a tank crew) to periodically check their sector.

All of the tasks listed above, dong with maintenance jobs, sustainment requirements, and sleep planning add to the platoon leader’s personnel load. He must accept considerable risk in some areas to accomplish all of these important tasks.

As casualties, illness, or accidents occur, the platoon leader’s ability to conduct security operations is further degraded. There is no redundancy in the organic tank platoon or company organization that compensates for personnel shortages.

One obvious equipment shortfall is the lack of PEWS. Despite the recognition in doctrine that this sensor system is needed at the platoon level to effectively implement security opentions. the PEWS is absent from the tank company’s authorized equipment. This is particularly serious since the system would help compensate for personnel shortages in the organimtion by covering dead space that might require an OP.

The heaviest weapon available to the dismounted platoon member is the 5.56-mm carbine. OPs need a more effective weapon to engage and suppress infiltrating infantry. The tank company has 7.62-mm machine guns mounted at the loader’s position on each of its tanks. These could be used i a by the OPs if a ground-mount was provided?’ An observation from Operation JUST CAUSE was that a ground mount system of some sort was needed for the coaxial machine gun on the Sheridans. One crewman went so far as to actually use asbestos mittens to hold and fire the dismounted coaxial machine gun to suppress attacking infantry!’ Another equipment problem is the shortage of binoculars. There are just enough for a set on each of the tanks and two sets with the commander and executive officer respectively. When a set of binoculars goes forward with the OP, one of the tanks does without. This reduces one tank commander’s ability to observe his sector during daylight hours. The lack of a man-portable radio is also a problem. Doctrine recommends the use of patrols to cover dead space, but the TOE does not provide the tank company any communication for those patrols to report contacts. The additional radios would also provide aback-up for wire communications to OPs.

OPs are expected to establish their positions as standard fighting positions with at least 18 inches of overhead cover. There are no provisions in the TOE or on the M1 tank load plan for materials to accomplish this requirement, with the exception of a shovel, axe, and pick. I found that airfield paneling provided an excellent overhead base. With the addition of sandbags to the load plan, the unit would have adequate resources to protect their OPs in any terrain. One advantage for the company is its tank Thermal Imaging Systems (TIS). These ballistic sights allow night and day target acquisition and engagement capability for the main gun and coaxial machine gun. Thermal sights allow identification of vehicles at 2,000 meted1 and detection of dismounted personnel at 4,000 meters, regardless of light conditions.6* There are some limitations to the thermal system. Thermal sights im powered by the tank’s batteries, and cannot be dismounted from the vehicle. The power drain from running the sights requires the periodic recharging of the batteries by running the tank’s engine. Aside from the intermittent noise of running engines, the sights themselves emit aloud clicking noise easily discernible up to 100 meters from the k1nk.6 These unavoidable noise producers we a real handicap to noise reduction as a passive security measure. Also, thermal sight capabilities are degraded by rain, snow, dust, infrared smoke, and heavy foliage.64 Unfortunately, these conditions occur with great regularity in many pas of the world. Additionally, since the TIS is aline-of-sight system, terrain masking also blocks thermal sight detection.

Future tank designs ive going to worsen some of these problems by reducing the number of available personnel. The tanks of the future will, most likely, have reduced crew size due to adoption of an automatic loader.6’ These two- or three-man crews will still have to handle the tasks listed above. The current tank company can bxely accomplish these tasks as organized. The reduction in personnel will force some sort of augmentation by personnel and equipment to successfully secure the future tank company.

Compahson of Capabirity to Threat The tank company commander must not only m y his forces to detect infiltration attacks, but must also be arrayed to defend against what is probably his primary threat, the mounted attack. The difficulty in resolving this dilemma is the most serious consequence of gaps between capability and doctrine.

In open terrain, the tank company commander’s night vision sights and weaponry allow him the flexibility to set up effective mounted OPs which can be supplemented by minimal dismounted OPs to compensate for dead space. This is the ideal situation that doctrinal security operations are best suited to address. Unfortunately, flat, clear terrain is not prevalent in many parts of the world where tanks might be expected to fight.

Close tenain, such as heavily forested areas or hilly, rugged ground is not as simply defended. Mounted OPs in close termin are themselves vulnerable to infiltration attack due to their noise and physical signature. Many of the advantages of mounted sights and weaponry will be negated by intervening terrain and vegetation. All that an attacking infantry unit requires is one unwatched lane to successfully overcome a defender’s counterrecon effort.

Heavy use of dismounted OPs to compensate for limited fields of observation will quickly degrade the company’s ability to fight its tanks. OP equipment is inadequate; moonless or cloudy nights limit the capability of the authorized passive night vision goggles significantly. Tank company OPs do not have sufficient weaponry to defeat or suppress attacking infantry units.

Clearly, these deficiencies indicate the TOE does not provide adequate personnel for executing security operations as required by current doctrine. On paper, there are enough soldiers in the company to handle security requirements. However, due to lack of depth in the organization, any circumstances that detract from the number of available soldiers will impact directly on the company’s capability to sustain defensive operations. Equipment shortages and inadequacies are also debilitating. The lack of ground movement sensors like the PEWS handicaps the company’s detection effort. Infiltrating forces will take advantage of dense foliage areas and dead space to move into sector. Easily emplaced and recovered sensors would allow the company to cover infiltration avenues of approach while minimizing OP requirements. Unfortunately, even the PEWS has only a thirty percent chance of detecting a crawling A Sensor system with better detection capability is needed to cover densely vegetated avenues of approach. The passive night goggles currently authorized rue easily degraded by lack of natunl illumination or washout from artificial illumination. Since infantry units are going to attack on clouded, moonless nights or use indirect fire illumination to blind passive night surveillance systems, passive goggles have some definite disadvantages. Additionally, doctrine fails to adequately address the threat. The company commander is instructed to cover enemy avenues of approach into his position, but dia-g m sand emphasis all imply that security is only used forward of the defensive position. Lack of all-around security is dangerous, considering infantry's doctrine of infiltrating to attack the flank and rear of tank positions.

Doctrinal manuals discuss the process of bringing enemy mounted units under fire, but do little to instruct the company commander on what process he should follow to defend against attacking infiltrators. Company counter-reconnaissance and security doctrine does not provide the commander with an adequate mework for planning and preparing.

Concluslon and Recommendations Tank companies have a miuginal a-pability to secure themselves against infilmtion and attack by dismounted infantry. Important gaps in equipment authorizations and doctrinal expectations exist. Additionally, lack of depth in personnel strength assures that casualties and injuries will degrade that capability from marginal to inadequate. This problem is not insurmountable, if some changes in TO&E and doctrine are implemented. First, the tank company commander needs a more complete doctrinal answer to the question of how to secure his force f h man infiltration attack. One recommendation is that doctrine on company security operations adopt technique for planning and conducting this critical element of the defense. The commander must decide which dismounted avenues of approach to monitor, as well as the technique he is going to use to conduct the monitoring. The monitoring effort must be as far from his main positions as his assets will allow, and oriented in all directions. The key is to achieve "first-detection advantage" by detecting the attacking infantry prior to their discovering the main defensive positions:' He must m y his detection effort in at least hvo belts to initially detect and then finally determine the direction and intent of the enemy attack. The commander can achieve this by mixing sensors, mounted and dismounted OPs, and roving patrols in a coordinated and rehearsed security plan in depth.

Lastly, he must have a plan to destroy the infiltrators. His OPs must have both direct and indirect fire engagement criteria for attacking small forces, while a reaction force is ready in the main defense to move out, intercept, and destroy larger attacks. Regadless of improvements in doctrine, the company needs more personnel to defend and secure itself. While adding personnel, such as an infantry platoon or extra tankers, on a permanent basis might appear to be an easy answer, manning constraints will probably not allow this. The next best answer is to ensure that each tank company has an infantry platoon attached for security operations. In 1986, a study at Fort Hood, Texas, examined the effect of mating combined infantry and armor units at the battalion level. There was little appreciable difference between the com-a DECIDE - DETECT - DESTROY bined m s battalions with permanently assigned tank and infantry teams and a normal task organized unit with habitual task organization relationships!'

The key change is that the decision to task organize is no longer situationally dependent. The decision to not task organize now creates a significant risk.

Some equipment should be added to the company organization. One exmple is the PEWS. It is needed in the current organization as an interim fix to the lack of sensors. In the long run, the company needs a more advanced sensor system that can reliably detect a wider m g e of threats, such as crawling men, and can relay that data over a greater distance than PEWS. Hand-held thermal viewers, such as the ANPAS-7, m also needed by company security forces. These devices can detect infantry out to 400 meters, as well as identify vehicles at approximately 1,OOO meters. Infantry companies rue currently authorized six of these devices for their security ef-f0rt.6 Tank companies have the same security requirements, but no hand-held thermals are authorized. As noted earlier, the tank company also needs portable radios, ground mounts for the loader's machine guns, and additional binoculars to more effectively protect itself from infiltrators. Endnotes 'Chris Bellamy. The Future cfhnd Wadare, SL Martin's Pmr. Inc., New York, 1987, p. 159. 'Bn'grdier R. E. Simpkin, 'Men Againat Tanks" in The Mechanized Battlcfeld, A Tactical Aimlysis, ed. LTC J. A. English, MAJ J. Addicott. and MAJ P. J. Kramers, Pegamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishen, Washington. 1985. p. 139.

'John

Weeks, Men Agaimt Tanks, MasonlCharter Publishers, IN., New Yorlc.

1975. p. 26.

41bid.. p. 31. 'lbid.. pp. 3940.

Tbid.. pp. 68-69. 'lbid., p. 100. *Guy Sajer, The Forgotten Soldkr, Sphere 'Weeks. p. 185.

Books Ltd.. London, 1977, p. 206. "Ministry of Infamation. By Air to Battle -rhe Oficiol Account of the British First and Sixth Airborne Divisions, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1945. p. 134. "J. O. Rodriguez. "David and Goliath - Can Airborne Infantry Defend Against Armor in Central Europe." MMAS Thesis, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1986, pp. "Captain Richard S. Faulkner, "Lecvning the Hard Way," ARMOR. VoL 99, July-August 1990, p. 25.

I3Jim Mesko. Armor in Korea. SquadrwJSig-nal Publications, Inc.. Camllton. Texas. 1984. 14Jamer R. Arnold. Illurrmred History of the Vietnam War, Armor, Bantam Books, Inc, New Yo&, 1987. pp. 60-61. "bid.. pp. 69-71.

I6lbid.

"Karl Farris. "Growh and Change in the Israeli Defense Foras Through Six Wan." Thesis. U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa, 1987. p. 22.

"David

Eshel. Chariots of the Deseort, Brassey's Defence Publishen. London, 1989. 19Captain Kevin J. Hammond and Captain Frank Sherman, "Sheridans in Panama," 22-24.

p. 21. pp. 1-10.

ARMOR. Vol. 99, MatCh-April 1990. pp. 8-13. 201bid.. p. 14.

"Brigadier Richard E. Sirnpkin, Antifank, Brassey's Publishen Limited. Oxford, 1982. pp. 2tWhite House. National Security Strategy of the United Srcrres. Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C.. 1991. p. 30. =Center for Army Lessons Learned. "Year of Training Compendium. Volume 1: Heavy Foms," Combined Arms Training Activity. Fort Leavenworth. Kan.. 1988. p. 6. 228-229. %]bid.. p. 10.

2Slbid. m82d Airborne Division, Antiarmor Handbook, Fort Bragg. N. C.. Headquarten. 82d Airborne Division, 1984. t71bid.. pp. 22-12 through 22-13.?bid.. p. 22-9.

ZPlbid.. p. 22-1 1.

9ergeant J O

R. urphy. 'Antiarmor Training. " Marim Corps Gazette 74. October 3'Captain Timothy J. Jackson. "Light Infantry Techniques," Marine Corps Gazette 74. June 32William S. Lid. "Light Infantry Tactics." Marine Corps Gazette 74. June 1990, p. 46. 33Captain David W. Szelowski, "Training Grunts to Tackle Tanks," Marine Corps Gazette

74. October 1990, p. 49.

1990. p. 46.

1990, pp. 54-55.

"Bellamy. p. 162.

"Robert Kuth, "Soviet Airborne Antiarmor Tactics in the Defense," U. S. Army Russian Institute. Garmisch, Germany. 1981. p. 15. %. S. Army Combined Arms Combat Devel-oanents hctivitv. FC 100-2-99. North Korean People's Army Opemtions, Headqumn. US. Army Combined Arms Center. Fort havenworth. Kan.. 1987. p. 3-4. "Ibid.. p. 3-5.

"Ibid., p. 4-8.?bid..

p. 4-2. *Olbid.. p. 4-20.

4'Weeks. p. 186. '2Randall Steeb. Keith Bmdley. Dan Norton. John Bondanella, Richard Salter. and Temll Covington, An Exploration of Integratd Ground Weapons Concepts for ArmorlAnti-armor Missions, RAND, Santa Monica. Cali., 1991.p.24. %.s.

A Y. abl le of Organization and Equipment. W17377L000, Tank Company, Tank Battalion," Printout received from Fom Devel-went Office. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.. 31 October 1991. p. 6-7. @U. S. Amiy Tactical Canmanden Development Course. Battle Book, US. BrigadelBattal-ion Task Force. U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth. Kan., 1991, pp. M-1 - M-5.

U. S. Army. "TOE U17377LDOO." p. 8-9. 45 %. S.

Army. ARTEP 71-1-MTP. Mission Tmining Plan for the Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company and Company Team. HQ. Department of the Army. Washington, D. C., 1988. 47U. S. Army. ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Mu-sion Training Plan for the Tank Platoon, HQ. Department of the Army, Washington. D. C., 48P. Antson, A. Burkard. 1. Jacobs, D. McLaughlin. K. McPhenon. and B. Rapapt. Tacricnl Sensors for Dispersed Tactical Nuclear Force Units. Phase 11. Defense Nuclear A ency. McLean, Va.. 1984, pp. 108-109. f9U. S. Army. ARTEP 71-1-MTP. p. 5-142. 5oU. S. Army. ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. pp. 5-pp. 101-103.

1988. pp. 119-120.

10, 5-99. Also U. S. Army, ARTEP 71-1-MTP.

p. 5-103.

99. Also U. S. Army, ARTEP 71-1-MTP, pp. 5-102 - 5-103.

U. S. Army. ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. p. 5-10.

"U. S. Army, ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. p. 5-52 531bid., p. 5-99. %. S.

Army. FM 71-1. TankandMechanizd Iqantry CompnylTeam. Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C., 1988, pp. 4-9 - 4-1 1. See ala0 FM 71-123. Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heovy Forces: Armored Brigade, BattaliodTask Force, and CompanylTeam, Final Draft. Unedited. U. S. Army "U. S. Army, ARTEP 71-1-MTP. p. 5-103. %FM 71-1. p. 4-9.

"ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. pp. 5-31 - 5-32. %. S. Army. FM 7l-1. p. 4-10. sllis idea first surfaced in a convenation I had with Captain Curt Hoover. Maneuver Division, Center for Army Lessons Lecvned. Armor School. Fort KIIOX. Ky.. 1991, p. 4-179. 60Hamrnond. p. 15. <.

ARMOR - 6'US. Army Taaid Commander's Dcwlop ment Coune. Battle Bmk, US. BrigadkIBattal-ion Task Force. p. 1-7.

"Howard Tate, engineer for Geaed Dynamics Tank Division, telephonic interview by.u-thor, Leavenworth. Kan.. 18 November 1991. 63cnonal experience with finding tank assembly area at Fort Hood, Texas. taught me that the distinctive clicking of thermal sightn was a tme indicator of the Ml's presence. %DC.

Bank Book, p. 1-8. aR. Steeb. et al, Integrated Ground Weapons @P. Antsen. e( 4 TNP security study. p.

671bid.. p. 66. aU. S.

Army Training and Doctrine Command. Indepen&nr Evaluorion Report fa the Combined Arms Maneuver Battalion, US. Army TRADOC, Fort havenworth, b., 1988, p. 1.

Concepts, pp. v-vi.

120.

TCDC, Bttle Bmk, p. 1-7. 69 Major Patrick A. Stallings graduated in 1980 with a BA from McNeese State University in Lake Charles, La. After AOB, he served as a tank platoon leader, S1, and tank company executive officer in 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry at Fort Hood, Texas. He attended AOAC in 1985 after being a senior class advisor to an AOB class.

After reassignment to Fort Polk, Major Stallings sewed as the S4, company commander and S3 in 3d Battalion, 77th Armor, participating in NTC rotations while the S4 and S3. He was assigned to PERSCOM as the Joint Speciatty Officer manager from 1988 to 1989, followed by a year as the Future Readiness Officer for Armor Branch. He attended CGSC and SAMs, and is currently assigned as the deputy G3, Plans, 1st Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany.