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ARMOR · November-December 1991

The Case for Light Cavalry I Ut

Major Robert J. Wottlin
pp. 30–32Features1991

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We deployed an airborne corps without a corps-size covering force.... Alight cavalry regiment

COUM do for the airborne corps what an armored cavalry regiment does for a heavy corps.

Do the Persian Gulf War’s successes reaffirm the practice of employing main body forces without cavalry outfits or with ill-organized cavalry organizations? Satellites, aircraft, and special operations units provided vital battlefield information, but these high-tech systems are best for long-range planning. In the fog of battle, scouts in contact provide the most timely intelligence to the ground commander. We continue to rely less and less on cavalry outfits to conduct reconnaissance and security missions. When the enemy situation is unknown, it is not sound to allow main body forces to fight the covering force battle. A cavalry unit fighting the covering force battle provides early warning, reaction time, maneuver space, and information about the enemy. We deployed an airborne corps without a corps-size covering force (until the 3d ACR arrived), and divisions with ill-organized divisional cavalry squadrons. Future table of 01 ganization for the divisional cavalry squadron will correct the divisional problem. The corps-size pblems still exist. Alight cavalry regiment (La) could do for the airborne corps what an armored cavalry regiment (Am) does for a heavy corps. Light Cavalry Regiment A LCR using firepower, mobility, and combined arms can conduct reconnaissance, security, and economy-of-force missions as part of alight corps’ offensive and defensive operations. A cavalry regiment conducting a reconnaissance mission provides the corps commander the ability to see 30 kilometers forward of his forces. As a security force, the mobility and combined arms organization allows a cavalry outfit the ability to change quickly from defense to offense by disengaging, moving rapidly over long distances, and counterattacking to destroy or delay enemy forces. The combined arms squadrons and troops of the LCR would permit detaching them to provide reconnais-The Light Cavalry Regiment F rdr[ Fig. 1 30 ARMOR -

The regimental light cavalry squadron has the same organization as the heavy cavalry squadron, except the howitzer battery has towed 105-mm cannons. The Light Cavalry Squadron Fig. 2 Sance and security for division and brigade operations. Alight cavalry squadron or troop could deploy with a division or brigade-sue element or with battalions operating separately. Also, the LCR could provide a self-contained force for an economy-of-force operation in the main battle area (MBA).

Light Organization The LCR organization uses the same table of organization as the ACR. The major difference between the LCR and the ACR organization is the combat vehicles and weapon systems. The light cavalry, equipped with high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), motorcycles, armored gun systems (AGS), and towed artillery could enhance the light fighter's combat power. This self-contained unit would have three light cavalry squadrons, a combat aviation squadron, and a support squadron (Figure 1). The regimental light cavalry squadron has the same organization as The Light Cavalry Troop Fig. 3 the heavy cavalry squadron, except the howitzer battery has towed 105- mm cannons (Figure 2). The tank company, of course, has an AGS, but with the same organization. The light cavalry troop's scout platoons have motorcycles and HMMWVs, and tank platoons have the AGS (Figures 3 & 4). Force Protection The survivability of the LCR is not equal to that of the ACR, but proper use of terrain, movement techniques, and dispersion would enhance it. Firepower and mobility are its important strengths. Cavalry commanders can mass their fires and forces on critical points to attack enemy weaknesses, gain time, and exploit successes. The air cavalry squadron (equipped with AH-58Ds or RAH-66s) adds three-dimensional mobility and aerial firepower to complement ground forces. The combination of TOW missile-equipped HMMWVs and high velocity 105-mm armored gun systems (AGS) provides the light fighter increased protection against enemy armored forces in mid-to high-intensity conflicts. The rapid mobility and smaller vehicle size permit the LCR to operate in low- to mid-intensity conflicts as well. The scout platoon includes enough personnel for dismounting and for manning vehicles during dismounted operations. Mortars and howitzer batteries organic to the light regiment provide essential indirect fires. The LCR would clearly increase the light fighter's reconnaissance and security capabilities in most conflicts. Armored Gun System An armored gun system is the key to make this light force work. All other weapon systems are available. A stm- 31 ARMOR -

Light Cavalry Platoons Scout Platoon Armored Gun System Platoon c I tegically deployable, lightweight tank killer with a rapid firing cycle (quicker than the TOW missile) would give the LCR the ability to fight the covering force battle. The Sheridan’s marginal performance in

CAUSE, and now DESERT STORM, proved its inability to fight on today’s battlefield. We need anew, easily deployed armored tank killer for light forces. We know that future constrained budgets do not allow for anew acquisition program, but we must replace the Sheridan. Industry has made significant investments in prototypes that we cannot afford to let slip away. If everyone understands that the AGS is not a replacement for the main battle tank, then we might get the funding. Conclusion pursue a strategically deployable AGS for our contingency forces. We cannot afford to continue deploying light forces without vital cavalry forces and with an obsolete tank killer. BG L. D. Holder, former 2d ACR commander, commented: “One of the points drawn from the war Persian Gulf) is the Army needs its cavalry regiments. It used all three to good effect. In contingency operations, the requirements for reconnaissance, security, and economy of force - the very things cavalry units are made for - arise immediately after the initial task of securing a base.” The Army needs to give its light corps a regimental cavalry outfit like it does for the heavy corps. If force reductions in Europe reduce the need for a second ACR there, then the Army might convert the other into alight fighter structure. Also, we must 32

ARMOR-!

Major Robert J. Wottlin graduated from the University of Houston in 1979. He holds a bachelor‘s degree in history and a Master’sin public administration. He sewed with the 2d ACR as platoon leader, XO, and troop commander. A graduate of AOBC, AOAC, CAS3, CGSC, and Ranger and Airborne Courses, he is currently an inspector general on the USAREUR staff. wember-December 799 7

End of indexed article

Citation

Captain Harry Schute, Jr.. “The Case for Light Cavalry Major Robert J. Wottlin The Armored Forces Monument Can’t Get There From Here: Moving the Heavy Force.” ARMOR, November-December 1991, pp. 30-32.

Major Robert J. Wottlin. “The Case for Light Cavalry I Ut.” ARMOR, November-December 1991, pp. 30-32.

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