Forward Command: The Wehrmacht’s Approach To Command and Control In World War II

“The command and control system which supports AirLand Battle doctrine must facilitate freedom to operate, delegation of authority, and leadership from any critical point on the battlefield. Plans are the initial basis for action, but commanders must expect considerable variation from plans in the course of combat.”‘ France, 13 May 1940. The situation was desperate! The machine gun f i i from the French positions on the west side of the Meuse River had stopped the German assault cold. Four times the men of the 2d Battalion, 7th Rifle Regiment, 7th Panzer Division, had tried to cross to the west bank of the Meuse River... four times they had failed. Most of the officers were dead or wounded. One company had managed to get across, but now it was stranded on the far bank and was taking heavy casualties. No one was willing to try again to cross under such withering French fire. Demoralized and stunned, the battalion hugged the cover of the east bank and waited. A fast moving German staff car skidded into a position on the east bank, almost jolting its occupants out into a ditch. General Erwin Rommel, the division commander, climbed down a ravine, and asked the nearest soldier for the location of the battalion command post. Within minutes, Rom-me1 took command of the 2d Battalion, 7th Rifle Regiment of the 7th Panzer Division. The fate of the entire division’s attack depended on a rapid crossing of the Meuse. Using the battalion’s wireless equipment, Rommel organized direct fire support from several Panzer 111s and IVs and a troop of artillery that he had been racing after him to this decisive point in the division’s attack. Under Rommel’s direction the tanks began to plaster the French pillboxes with accurate direct fire. Organizing the battalion’s assault teams, Rommel personally lead the 2d Battalion in a coordinated assault to cross the Meuse River. Soon, the enemy machine guns had been silenced by the tanks, and the assault infantry had forced the river in rubber rafts. Combat engineers soon began to construct a pontoon bridge. The next day, his 7th F’anzer Division was racing to the west, prying open the Allied defense of France that would end with France’s surrender and the evacuation of the British Army at Dunkirk? Rommel exercised an approach to command that was an impomnt combat multiplier for the German Army. This approach, called “forward command,” was the standard tactical command and control style in the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht believed that the “forward command” approach was an essential element to achieve tactical victory in mobile warfare. Forward command called for senior commanders to issue orders based upon personal observation and to assume command of a subordinate unit orders-intensive, centralized approach to command and control. The dochine during a critical mint in the fightinp. nf “ h l i t 7 0 ” rlPmnnrlPrl niiirk think- --4-----o- - -... - _.._._.. -...-... The senior commander issued his orders based on direct observation and would actually assume command of a -- ----I--- ------.--- =----. _.._..-_ ing leaders and decisive command. Forward command relied heavily on trained, thinking, independent leaders 2 0 W O u 9 I,., lower formation or unit if necessary. Rather than stifling initiative, this system aided agility, initiative, and synchronization in the Wehrmacht. The purpose of this discussion is to describe the forward command approach employed by the Wehrmacht and highlight the importance of the forward command concept to German tactical success. The Germans did not believe in an 26 ARMOR - and unflinching trust in subordinate officers to carry out the mission within the intent of the senior commander. This understanding permeated the Wehrmacht’s approach to War. “The tempo of blitzkrieg calls for speedy and precise command, and its dynamic nature calls for anticipation. To achieve these, the operational and higher level commanders have to be forward, not only to see for themselves what is really happening, but to get the feel of the battle. All one can add is that this command technique was not a gimmick of Rommel’s. but was laid down in Guderian’straining manuals for the Panzertruppen. As Manteuffel put it, ‘I always located where I could see and hear what was going on in front; that is near the enemy and around t3 myself- namely at the focal point’.’ The Wehrmacht expected its tactical commanders, division level and below, to lead up front, sense the situation, and take decisive action without waiting for permission or further instructions. The most junior leaders were expected to take decisive action, even if that action meant changing the original plan, as long as the decision was guided by the commander’s intent. Commanders at every echelon expected their superiors to take personal command of their units in critical situations. In this fashion, the German commanders were able routinely to act faster than their opponents. Initiative The essential core of the forward command approach was the subordinate commander’s dedication to the senior commander’s intent, combined with independent action. The senior commander issued his orders. These were completely binding on his subordinate leaders. Subordinate leaders could change the plan, act independently, and make their own decisions, if those decisions achieved the object of the commander’s intent. Inactivity was considered criminal. Leaders were expected to think and make decisions. All decisions, however, were expected to conform to the basic goal of the commander. “...the basic principal of the German com-ARMOR - November-December 7997 27 mand system in World War II was to always try to make the decision on the lowest possible level of command so that it could be made as quickly as possible.”4 To the Wehrmacht, the commander’s intent was not a reiteration of the scheme of maneuver. A scheme of maneuver was considered only one way, usually the initial concept on how to accomplish the mission. Initial concepts were usually based on the terrain and whatever information on the enemy that was forthcoming. As m m information on the enemy was acquired, the subordinate was expected to act accordingly and secure the objective by the best possible means. The subordinate leader was guided by an intent that explained the mission’s object (desired end result), its importance (what will occur if the end result is not achieved), and the reasons (the desired end result will create the following situation). The understanding of this definition of initiative was vital to German tactical success. It provided the flexibility necessary to outthink and act faster than the enemy. Furthermore, every commander was required to understand the intent of the commander two echelons above his level of command. This became essential in making independent decisions in the heat of battle, when senior commanders either could not be reached or not be reached in time. By clearly understanding the intent of the commanders two echelons above, a subordinate leader could use the senior commander’s intent to guide his actions. Guided with this intent, he could make a more correct decision. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, considered by many historians to be the most gifted German commander of the Second World War, described how this process was able to work in his book Lost Victories: “The granting of such independence to subordinate commanders does, of course, presuppose that all members of the military hierarchy are imbued with certain tactical or operational axioms. Only the school of the German General Staff can, I suppose, be said to have produced such a consistency of out-Allied propaganda often portrayed the Germans as unthinking automatons. A serious battle analysis, however, reveals that the soldiers of the Wehrmacht showed unbelievable initiative and excellent tactical leadership. Junior leaders were willing to take risks when risks were necessary. They consistently outthought their adversaries. More important, the overall German approach to command and control supported and nurtured these attitudes. History proves that the thinking, independent minded tactical leaders of the Wehrmacht consistently outfought their opponents. That the Wehrmacht fought almost everywhere outnumbered, often in hopeless situations, and never disintegrated is a strong argument for the prowess of their tactical abilities. The forward command approach to command and control was a major m n for that success. Again, Von Manstein relates: “It had always been the particular forte of German leadership to grant wide scope to the self-dependence of subordinate commanders - to allot them tasks which leave the method of execution to the discretion of the individual. From time immemorial - certainly since the elder Moltke’s day - this principle has distinguished Germany’s military leadership from that of other armies. The latter, far from giving the same latitude to subordinate commanders on the tactical plane, have always tended to prescribe, by means of long and detailed directives, the way orders should actually be carried out or to make tactical action conform to a specific pattern. On the German side this system was considered a bad one. It would, admittedly, appear to reduce the risk of failure in the case of a mediocre commander. Yet it only too easily leads to the executant’shaving to act against the exigencies of the local sit-look.9-5 uation. Worst of all, in its preoccupation with security, it waives the opportunity that may occur through the independent action of a subordinate commander in boldly exploiting some favorable situation at a decisive moment.” 6 Synchronization Wehrmacht senior commanders were trained to issue orders that synchronized the combat power of their units by effectively planning two echelons down, and thinking two echelons up. Senior commanders planned two echelons down, issuing mission-type orders that specified what was to be done, rather than how to accomplish the mission. A division issued tasks to each of its battalions. The commander usually did this personally, issuing an oral order overl&king the battlefield. Each regiment would receive instructions for each of its battalions based on the division plan. The regiments would then synchronize the elements of combat power as directed by the division plan. In this manner, a high degree of unity of effort was achieved. Junior leaders were expected to take decisive action, guided by the corn mander ’ sin tent. The synthesis of these techniques led to a powerfully focused combat force, directed by a fast-reacting chain of command that sought out enemy mistakes and took immediate and decisive advantage of them. “Divisional operations were conducted from the forward position on the battlefield. The division Commander had his place with the group which was to make the main effort (schwerpunkr). He visited the regiments several times a day. The divisional headquarters was somewhat farther back and did not change its location duing opem-ti on^."^ The Germans believed that the basis for command was formed by the mission and the situation. The mission consisted of what objective was to be achieved. The order to accomplish the mission must be simple, 28 ARMOR - clear and definite. The order establishes the guidelines necessary to accomplish the mission. It establishes what units are to do: not how they are to do it. The method of execution is deliberately not included. Subordinate commanders are trusted to come up with the “how.” Mission oriented discipline is demanded. This approach substituted control for guidance and trust. If the subordinates’ abilities did not meet the challenge of the situation, or if the situation required a more experienced head, the senior commander was expected to take command of the subordinate unit and take decisive action. The understanding between commander and subordinate was that the senior commander’s intervention was his natural prerogative. By taking command of a subordinate unit, the senior commander could use his authority and experience as a direct combat multiplier. This concept of trust became a central principle in the Wehrmacht. “The combat value of every unit depends on the quality of its oficers. An average trained unit, which has its weak points, can still give a good performance if it has a good commander. In the same manner, a well-trained and experienced unit may fail under a mediocre commander. The value of good leadership is proved by the confidence of the troops in their leaders. the improvement of their fighting qualities, and finally by success in combat.... The confidence which the troops have in their commander will give them the assurance that his orders are correct, even if the reason behind them is not fully known.”8 Concluslon The need to understand the concept of forward command is as important today as it was to the Wehrmacht’s command style in World War 11. The architects of the Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine recognized this and made the understanding of the commander’s intent a central theme of AirLand Battle doctrine. The commander “cannot depend on constant direction, but must fight independently, even when he cannot communicate outside his own zone or sector. He must know the intention of the commander two levels above him, understand the concept of operation of his immediate commander, and know the responsibilities of the units on hisflanks and in support of his operations.” Tactical success in the early years of the war, however, was not enough to gain overall victory for Germany in WWII. Forward command could not overcome the overwhelming numerical superiority that opposed Germany. Fighting a war on many fronts against the entire world was too much, even for the well trained and superbly led Wehrmacht. Key leader casualties could not be replaced fast enough. As the war dragged on, the quality of the leadership and the quality of the soldiers was reduced to the point that tactical flexibility was greatly reduced. The German reach simply outdistanced their grasp. The perfection of the technique, however, is worthy of study. In an era in which the United States Army will have to do more with less, the technique of forward command will become a necessary element of victory. FM 100-5 (p. 23) states; “The fundamental prerequisite for unity of effort within Army organizations is an effective system of command which relies upon effective leadership to provide purpose, direction, and motivation; emphasizes well understood common doctrine, tactics, and techniques, as well as sound unit standing operating procedures and takes gective measures to limit the effects of friction. Leaders set the example, communicate their intent clearly, build teamwork, promote sound values, accept responsibility, delegate authority, anticipate developments, take decisive action, and accept risks.” For the Wehrmacht, these goals were met by the philosophy of forward command. 9 ARMOR - Notes ‘Department of the Amy, Field M a w 1 (FM) 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D. C.: May 1986). p. 21. (Hereafter referred to as FM 100- On page 22. the manual states that “if an unanticipated situation arises, canmitted rnaneu-ver unit commanders should understand the purpose of the operation well enough to act decisively, confident that they are doing what their superior commander would order done were he present. *Field Marshal Erwin R-el, The Rommcl Papers. ed. by Sir B. H. Liddell Halt. trans. by Paul Findlay. (New Yo&: H a m & Brace and Company, 1953). paraphrased from pp. 8-1 1. 3LTC Mountcastle, “Command and Control of Armor Units in Combat.” Military Rm’ew, November 1985. p. 29. 4Generalmajor A. D. F. W. von Mellenthin. conference notes from Armored Warfare in World War 11. (Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Columbus Laboratories. May 10. 1979). p. 11. ’Field Marshal En& von Manstein, Lost Victories, edited and translated by Anthony G. Powell. (Novato. Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982. Original in 1955). p. 383. 5). 61bid., p. 383. ’Mellenthin, p. 26. *GeneralfeIdmamchd Albert Kesselring, Manual for Command and Combat Employment of Smaller Units (Based on German Erperience in World War 11). (originally ppared by the Chief Historian. Headquarters Eumpean Command United States Army, on 17 July 1952), p. 12. 9FM 100-5. p. 22. Major John F. Anta1 is the brigade operations trainer (obsetver/controller) for the Brigade Training Team (Broncos) at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. He is an Armor officer and has commanded two tank companies and sewed as a tank battalion operations officer in both the 2d Infantry Division (Korea) and the 1st Cavalry Division (Fort Hood, Texas). He is a 1977 graduate of the United States Military Academy, a graduate of the Airborne Ranger, and courses, and a 1990 graduate of the Command and General Staff College. 29